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
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN FIVE DEVELOPING NATIONS



American Institute for Research

CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

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
THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN FIVE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Edited by John P. Lovell

Contributors:

John P. Lovell, Donald N. Levine,
P. J. Vatikiotis, Richard Sisson,
and Fred R. von der Mehden

March 1970



American Institute for Social Research
CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

Completed and Published by the American Institute for Social Research, New York, N.Y.

Prepared by the Center for Research in Social Systems, New York, N.Y.

This report is a preliminary report and is subject to change and is not for distribution outside the Center.

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ABSTRACT

This report consists of five case studies of the political role of the military: Ethiopia, Jordan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Burma. It includes an introductory essay by the editor suggesting conceptualization of a research format—that an explanation of the political role of the military depends upon (1) the political resources of the military, (2) the political perspectives of the military, and (3) patterns of demands and supports within the civilian sector.

Each study presents the history of the armed forces, their organization, training, patterns of social recruitment, and values. The political history of each country emphasizes causes of political stability or instability such as sociopolitical divisions or presence of a potential external threat. The politicization of the military resulting from these internal and political factors has led to incidents of military involvement in politics, including coups d'état in all the countries, and to military governments in three of them; these incidents, and the military governments, are described in detail.

Research and writing completed in autumn 1966.

FOREWORD

This study was conducted under a program designed to encourage university interest in basic research in social science fields related to the responsibilities of the U.S. Army. The program is conducted under contract by The American University's Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS)*; CRESS in turn has entered into subcontracts supporting basic research in a number of major universities having a marked interest in one or more of these research fields.

The research program was formulated by CRESS in terms of broad subject areas within which research would be supported, with the scholars themselves selecting specific topics and research design, utilizing information in the public domain normally available to academic and private individuals. Under the terms of the subcontract the authors are free to publish independently the results of such research.

The report which follows is a series of five case studies concerning the role of indigenous military establishments in developing areas. It was produced under a program designed to increase university research interest in fields related to the U.S. Army mission and to support basic research in those fields.

This report results from a subcontract between CRESS and Indiana University. The principal investigator for the research was John P. Lovell.

Research was begun in the winter of 1963-64 and was completed in the autumn of 1966. The central focus of each of the case studies is on the period from the end of the Second World War to the 1960's, although in one case (Jordan) the author thought it desirable to include extensive discussion of selected aspects of prewar history as well. In preparing their studies, the authors have relied exclusively upon unclassified sources of information.

The chapter, "Politics and the Military in Ethiopia," was prepared by Professor Donald N. Levine of the University of Chicago. The inadequacy of source materials presents formidable problems in the analysis of the position of the military establishment in contemporary Ethiopia. Professor Levine, a qualified scholar and the author of Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopia (University of Chicago Press, 1965), has acquired field research and teaching experience at the University College in Addis Ababa. Equipped with this background, his chapter contributes to an understanding of the role of the military in Ethiopia; it delineates the current resources and disposition of the military, relates its continuity with the Abyssinian past, and discusses the value orientations of civilian groups toward the armed forces.

The chapter on Jordan, "Politics and the Military in Jordan," by P. J. Vatikiotis reflects the author's long years of study and observation and long concern with the role of the military, particularly in the Middle East. Professor of Politics (Near and Middle East) in the School of Oriental and African Studies of the University of London, Professor Vatikiotis traces the development of the Jordanian Army from its early origins to the present and presents an analysis of the interplay of forces which have affected the Jordanian scene.

* On November 1, 1969, CRESS affiliated with the American Institutes for Research.

Richard Sisson's chapter, "Politics and the Military in Pakistan," is the work of a scholar from the University of California at Los Angeles. It is a clearly written and concise history of events of military intervention. He concludes that the army became overtly involved in Pakistani political affairs not from greed for power but because the officers concerned thought it was the only way to stave off disaster. Professor Thomas Perry Thornton of George Washington University acted as a consultant critic in the review of this chapter.

Professor John Lovell of Indiana University has been principal investigator for the research and editor of the report. He contributes his own chapter, "Politics and the Military in South Korea," to the series of case studies. Mr. Gregory Henderson of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research brought his valuable Korean experience to a commentary which was used by Professor Lovell to modify and refine the final draft of his analysis.

Professor Fred R. von der Mehden, an Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science at Rice University, Houston, Texas, is an "old hand" at Burma studies. His chapter, "Politics and the Military in Burma," shows the changing role of the military against a background of Burmese political life. Faced with a formidable problem of scarce resources, Professor von der Mehden calls upon his own close knowledge of the area and people to bring forth a reasoned history of the Burmese military, its ethnic composition (where data permits), its ideology, and the place which it sees for itself in the future of Burma.

The present volume was initiated in the hope of combining the depth of detail of case studies with the comparability and patterning of theoretical analyses. Reflecting scholarship and such theory as now does exist, the studies are systematic, as comparable as paucity of data will permit, and suggest ways in which further research can be presented for cross-country or cross-regional analysis.

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CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY

John P. Lovell
Indiana University

STUDY OF THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS

That indigenous military establishments have enormous political importance in most of the nations of the world which we have come to call "developing" is obvious even to the most casual observer of the contemporary world scene. Furthermore, only one oblivious of centuries of world history would regard major participation by military leaders or elites in politics as curious or novel. However, it is fair to say that the systematic study of the role of the military in politics in developing nations is novel, most of the significant literature of the social sciences on the subject having been written within the past two decades.

The lack of analytical attention to the role of the military in developing nations until recently is attributable in part, of course, to the relative youth (in terms of years of independent existence as nation-states) of most of the nations which fall into the "developing" category. However, one must also attribute the belated recognition by social scientists of the military as a proper and important object of their concern to various persistent biases, among which have been a tendency to equate military organizations with militarism (that is, with the glorification of violence and war for their own sake), and a tendency to view extensive participation by the military in the political process (e.g., as rulers) as necessarily perverse. Those who have shared such biases have tended to regard military involvement in politics as a legitimate subject only for the expression of alarm, or for denunciation, but not for serious analytical inquiry.

In recent years an increasing number of social scientists have rejected such biases, acknowledging that the role of the military in politics, like social conflict, is a normal rather than an abnormal feature of contemporary life, which is not eliminated or "corrected" by being denounced or ignored. Moreover, many now realize that the effects of military involvement (again, like social conflict) sometimes are beneficial to the fulfillment of certain social values in developing nations, just as sometimes they are detrimental. In any event, the appropriate function of social scientists, many today would say (and this is the view of the authors of the present volume), is not to pass a priori judgment on military involvement in politics in developing nations, but rather to seek to increase our understanding of the military as a social and political institution as well as of the conditions under which various types of political involvement by the military occur.

The present volume of five case studies may be described as contributing to the initiation of a third phase in the post-World War II development of studies of the role of the military in developing nations. The first phase consisted of individual case studies of particular military establishments or of particular political systems, with an incidental focus upon the role of the military therein. A second phase was begun when various scholars (e.g., Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Lucian Pye, Edwin Lieuwen, John J. Johnson, Edward Shils, Manfred Halpern,

Dankwart Rustow, John Campbell, William Gutteridge, Samuel Finer, Morris Janowitz) gathered together data from individual case studies or drew upon their own independent observations of a number of political systems to formulate general propositions or middle-range theories about the role of the military in developing nations.¹ The contribution of such macroanalyses, as the present writer has pointed out elsewhere, has been "to synthesize disparate findings, to identify patterns of characteristic military behavior, to offer propositions about the military in politics generally, which ideally can be supported by data from a broad range of cases."² However, a limitation of extant macroanalyses, as noted in the essay just cited, has been "that generalizations made in many instances have outdistanced available empirical support." Thus, the case studies of the present volume were initiated with the hope that by combining the depth of empirical detail of the case study with the concern for theory and comparability of the macroanalysis, some of the deficiencies of each of the earlier phases of investigation might be overcome.

The purpose of the remainder of this essay is to describe the theoretical framework within which the studies included in this volume were designed and to highlight some of the major findings of the various investigations.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Who Are the Military?

The student of the role of the military finds himself lured into navigational difficulties by a Lorelei on each bank of the river. On the one hand, he is tempted to veer in the direction of ambiguity in defining his subject—"the military." On the other hand, there is the danger that the student of "the military" will become mesmerized with this descriptive category to the point that an attempt is made to explain all behavior of persons embraced by the category (however rigorously defined) with reference to the fact that the persons are "military," rather than in terms of other distinguishing features which may have equal or greater explanatory relevance.

To elaborate on the first problem: what, after all, is the composition of the group relevant to investigation by someone interested in "the military"? Does the group include all uniformed personnel on active duty in the armed services? Active duty and retired personnel? Personnel in the armed services, reserves, and national guard? All persons having formal responsibilities for the management of violence on behalf of the society (armed services and police)? Are paramilitary and guerrilla bands included in the definition? Was Castro a "military" man, for purposes of the definition, at the time of the overthrow of Batista? Is Castro now a "military" man? Is Nasser now a "military" man? Were Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Park Chung Hee of South Korea "military" men subsequent to proclaiming that military rule had given way to constitutional rule in their respective regimes?

Of course there is no simple answer to these questions that will provide a satisfactory guide for all investigations. The general strategy of the authors of the present volume has been pragmatic and flexible, guided by the comparative analytical purposes of the studies. Our foremost concern has been with members of the regular armed forces. The army has received more attention than other branches of service because, in every case reported here, they are the largest branch, and the one most relevant (to date) politically. More data have been gathered on officers than on enlisted personnel, for the obvious reason that, occupying positions of greater authority, officers have greater political resources at their disposal; furthermore, in the countless cases of political activism by military men in various parts of the world in the post-World War II period, with rare exceptions the political activists (e.g., the planners and leaders of military coups) have been officers rather than enlisted men or noncommissioned officers.

In instances (Burma, Pakistan, Korea) where the military have become the ruling group in the society, even if military men then formally "retire" from military service (e.g., Park Chung Hee in 1963), our interest in them not only continues but is augmented to the extent that one of the key areas for further research is that of the behavior pattern of military men as rulers. Do military men, once in power, characteristically attempt to legitimize and continue their rule (for example, by running for elective office as "civilians"), or do they seek to disengage themselves from politics at the earliest opportunity? Do military men possess a distinctive cognitive and value orientation that makes them less effective, generally, than civilian politicians as rulers (a hypothesis which many students of the military in developing nations have advanced, and an allegation which Neustadt makes about the Eisenhower presidency in the United States)?³ The present volume presents no definitive answers to these questions; but recognition of the importance of the questions in part defines the focus of the studies.

The authors of the present volume (although some of us more than others) have also had some concern in our studies with groups such as the police, palace guard, or national guard who, like the regular armed forces, are concerned with the management of violence in the society. Among the prime political resources of these groups are their control of means of coercion (weapons) and their capacity for rapid action over relatively long distances (through modern means of transportation, communications, and intelligence resources). Such resources take on particular relevance when compared to those commanded by other groups within a society. Furthermore, the structural differentiation which exists within a society in the performance of a given function is of interest to the social scientist (e.g., the extent to which functions performed by police and regular armed forces are differentiated). Moreover, the division of labor which exists within the armed forces themselves (e.g., between the various branches of service), and the patterns of authority, communication, and power which result are often of political relevance, and therefore of interest to us as students of politics.

As a final observation, it is probably axiomatic that it is never all of a military establishment who are active in important political events, such as a coup d'état, but rather a relatively small group or faction within the military. Such a distinction was found in every case, with the qualification that, although leadership in planning the military coup of 1958 in Pakistan was limited, virtually no opposition to the coup emerged within the military, and orders for deployment of troops to execute the coup were communicated through the normal military chain of command. The reader will find that in some of the studies the particular composition of the faction or factions which are particularly active or relevant politically are identified, and an effort is made to explain why these groups, rather than others, became activists.

The Significance of Military Experience

Assuming that the student of the role of the military in politics can describe with some clarity what his subject (the military) is, the danger remains that he may oversimplify the task of explanation through a myopic approach to his subject. The problem may be illustrated with a series of questions, with the qualification that whereas the questions are posed in dichotomous terms for purposes of highlighting the problem, answers to the questions may lie somewhere along a continuum between alternatives, or even outside of alternatives provided.

Is the relevant fact about the men who executed a coup d'état in Nigeria in July 1966, the fact that they were military men, or the fact that they were of the Hausa tribes of the northern region, whereas power previously had been largely in the hands of the Ibos of the eastern region? Is the puritanical ethos promulgated by those who came to power in Egypt in 1952 attributable to "Spartan" training and indoctrination peculiar to military institutions or is it

attributable to the personalities of persons who see themselves as revolutionaries? Were the acts of nationalization of various economic enterprises by the Ne Win government in Burma reflective of a military concern for centralized control and efficiency, or did they reflect Burmese nationalism directed against ownership that had been largely in the hands of Chinese entrepreneurs? Was the hostility of leaders of the revolution of May 1961 in South Korea toward civilian politicians a case of military-civil antagonism, or a case of class conflict between persons from relatively humble social origins (the military leaders) and those from more well-to-do backgrounds (the politicians)?

The point to be made by posing the above elusive questions is that one focusing upon "the military" as the subject of investigation may be tempted to explain actions and attitudes of persons included in his investigation solely as a function of their participation in "the military" (that is, as a function of socialization into and identification with the military role); whereas, in fact, other independent or intervening variables (e.g., regional identification, socioeconomic class, age, or education) may have equal or greater explanatory relevance. Thus, the East Bank versus West Bank rivalry in Jordan, tribal loyalties in Ethiopia, frictions between East and West Pakistanis, conflict between Burman and non-Burman ethnic groups, and the relative youth of Korean military leaders in contrast to the ages of established politicians, are among the variables which authors of studies reported in the present volume find important, variables relevant independent of military experience.

However, military experience also is of considerable explanatory significance in the studies with which we are concerned. One thinks, for example, of the importance of the British colonial experience in molding the attitudes of contemporary officers of the Jordan and Pakistan armies; the impact upon the thinking of current military leadership in Burma of their membership in wartime nationalist military groups; the significance of participation in the Korean conflict or in the U.N. Congo force for various segments of the Ethiopian military; the relevance of Military Academy (KMA) ties among Korean officers.

The task, then, is one of sorting out and weighing military and nonmilitary sources of influence upon behavior and attitudes, carefully studying recruitment patterns into the military as well as socialization experiences which military training and operations provide. Essential is a perspective which encompasses the political system in its entirety, rather than a focus upon military institutions alone, in order that hasty and spurious inferences about the significance of military experience may be avoided. The success of the authors of the present volume in maintaining such a perspective, of course, will be for the reader to judge for himself.

Political Roles of the Military

In each of the five case studies included in the present volume, "the political role of the military" is treated as a dependent variable. That is, in contrast to some studies of the military in developing nations, the focus of the present studies goes beyond the most dramatic form of involvement of the military in politics, the military revolution or coup d'état, and includes all discernible variations in the role which military men and institutions play in a political system in developing nations. Taking a sizable time period for analysis (the core of each study focusing upon virtually the entire post-World War II period) allows us to observe variations in each case, and to describe and analyze the dynamics of the transition from one type of political role to another, suggesting the preconditions or precipitants of performance by the military of each of various roles. An attempt to synthesize observations from the five cases and to offer generalizations about the three independent or intervening variables most significant to an explanation of variations in the political role of the military will be offered

later in the present essay. First, however, some comment is needed on the problem of making useful operational distinctions between various types of political roles which the military perform in developing nations.

The question of how many types of political role one can usefully distinguish, and the question of what types of distinction are most meaningful, are questions of judgment about which there is likely to be disagreement among social scientists. Two works that probably were more influential than any others in providing authors of the present volume with a starting point for their own analyses of political roles of the military are Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations, and Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback.

Both Janowitz and Finer seek to generalize about the military on the basis of data from large numbers of political systems. Both construct typologies of the role of the military in politics, in each case ranging from minimal influence to dominant influence in a political system. Janowitz has only three categories into which the military of a given political system might be assigned: "mark of sovereignty," a situation in which the military wield minimal political influence; "political bloc," in which they are influential but not the ruling group; and "political ruling group." Finer speaks of four "levels of intervention" by the military in politics. The first and lowest level is that of "influence," by which Finer means "the effort to convince the civil authorities by appealing to their reason or their emotions." At the second level, which Finer terms "blackmail," the military invoke some sanction as a means of exerting pressure upon the civil authorities. At a third level, "displacement," the military actually employ violence or the threat of violence in order to replace the existing civilian ruling group by another group more compliant with military wishes. Finally, at the most complete level of intervention, "supplantment," the military themselves oust the civilian regime and assume power directly.

Clearly, both the Janowitz and the Finer typologies are adequate only for making the grossest kinds of distinctions between various political roles. Even at the gross level, one wonders how often two or more social scientists would agree that a particular act of the military was "influence" rather than "blackmail" or the other way around. Problems of consensus aside, what would one social scientist do about classification, using Finer's guidelines, in a situation where a particular military group used their "influence" in pursuit of policy objectives A, B, and C, but used "blackmail" to achieve policy objective D? However, details of the typologies need not trouble us long, because Finer and Janowitz have been less concerned with providing rigorous operational criteria for the classification of various military establishments or groups than with setting forth a broad theoretical framework within which an array of otherwise disparate data about the military becomes meaningful. Thus, the contribution of each of the two authors lies primarily in generating concepts and hypotheses built upon a discussion of a wide range of cases about how, why, and under what conditions the military intervene in politics; the two authors do not carry us far in consideration of the variations which occur in the kinds of roles which the military play in politics.

If variations in the political role of the military are to be adequately described and assessed, the scope of the political influence of the military needs to be included, in addition to degree of influence. One might modify the Janowitz typology by introducing this added dimension, as illustrated in the table on page 6. As in Janowitz's own formulation, a distinction is made between three levels of intensity of influence. But at each level, a further distinction is made in terms of scope between influence that is relatively extensive and influence that is more limited.

Table 1. A Paradigm of Political Roles of the Military

Degree of influence	Scope of influence	
	Relatively extensive	Relatively limited
High	Ruling elite	Ruling coalition
Medium	Predominant political bloc	Competitive political bloc
Low	Praetorian army	Palace guard

Thus a distinction is made, for example, between the role which the Ethiopian army performed in the decade or so prior to the Italian invasion of the mid-30's, and the role which they performed after regaining independence in 1941. Although in both cases the army was relatively small and served as the symbol of the authority of the emperor, in the former period the army was much more a personal royal force, competing to some extent with the forces of traditional warlords in the provinces; in the latter period, the personal, symbolic function was assigned to the Imperial Bodyguard, with a standing army of infantry, artillery, armor, engineer, and signal forces established, supplemented by a territorial army in the provinces. Although the army remained under the emperor's tight control during this period, the scope of its limited influence had expanded, so that we might refer to the role of the Ethiopian military in the 1920's and early 1930's as a "palace guard" role, and that of the early 1940's as that of a "praetorian army."

At a somewhat higher level of influence, it would seem desirable to make a distinction between the role which the military played in Burma in the decade before the first military coup (1958)—when the military had a generally apolitical orientation, yet were somewhat influential because of the importance of military activity relative to the general instability during the period—and the period between military coups (1960-62), when, although the military had relinquished their ruling authority, clearly they stood in the wings as the key political group in the system. In the former instance, the political influence was largely limited to matters of defense or internal order; the role of the military, therefore, might be termed that of a "competitive political bloc," since the military was but one of several important groups in the political system. During the period between military coups, however, the influence of the military and the threat of their possible seizure of power again were widely felt throughout the political system; thus the military at that time might be termed a "predominant political bloc," since the political importance of the military exceeded that of any other single group.

At the highest level of influence, it seems desirable to make a distinction between a situation in which the military rule by themselves, exerting their control directly over all parts of the political system, as in South Korea in the period May 1961-December 1963 and in Burma after the 1962 coup; and a situation in which civil elites are brought into the power structure through creation of a mass-based political party and the conduct of elections, as in Korea since 1963, or through tolerance by the military of a relatively autonomous area of civil authority, such as the civil service, as in Burma and Pakistan after the military coups of 1958. In the situation where some meaningful participation is provided for civilian elites, the role of the military might be termed that of a "ruling coalition." Even if the military are a dominant party in the coalition, the situation is distinguishable from one in which the military directly control, by themselves, all parts of the political system as the "ruling elite."

Emphasis on the scope as well as the degree of political influence of the military ought to make one more sensitive to roles of the military in relationship to political inputs (processes including, according to Gabriel Almond's formulation, recruitment, socialization, articulation and aggregation of interests, and communication), whereas when one considers only degree of influence, normally one thinks in terms of the amount of control or influence which the military wield over political outputs (governmental policies and actions). Such increased sensitivity to political inputs is needed, for it may be here rather than in relationship to political outputs that the military of non-Western nations will make their greatest impact. Problems of measuring such impact are of course enormous. The data provided on roles of the military in relationship to political inputs in the present volume are unfortunately limited. One can only hope that the present volume will serve at least to alert future researchers to the continuing need to fill in the tremendous gaps in our knowledge about this aspect of the role of the military in politics.

One should note that the two dimensions of influence (scope and intensity) give an incomplete picture of the role of the military in politics without an indication of the nature of the system to which the political role of the military is related. Thus, if one is interested in classifying the military of all the nation-states of the world, then, as both Janowitz and Finer imply, a typology of political systems is needed as an extension of a typology of the role of the military in politics. The relevance of the political system to the military role might be illustrated as follows. If the military were to seize control of the formal institutions of government in some of the newly independent states of Africa where authority remains highly decentralized and fluid, we might term the military a "ruling elite." However, only by reference to the nature of the political system in which the seizure of power occurred would we adequately account for the consequences of control of the formal institutions of government, which would be less than in a system where formal institutions are somewhat more developed and authority is more highly centralized, as in South Korea. A seizure of power in Korea, in turn, has consequences which differ from those which might be anticipated from a military coup in, say, the United States or Great Britain. To cite another example, although the military are generally subordinate to the civilian sector both in the United States and in the Soviet Union, the form which the relationship of the military to the political system takes is somewhat different in the two cases, because the political systems differ. In the case studies reported in the present volume, each of the political systems has its own peculiarities—peculiarities important enough to warrant rather extended discussion in each study, although not too great, we think, to preclude meaningful comparisons of one system to another. It should be noted also that each of the systems studied was undergoing a profound transition during the time period included in the analysis only as this transition is recognized do the dynamics of the role of the military within the system become meaningful.

FINDINGS

A general theme emerges from the five case studies included in the present volume, which is consistent with the findings of other studies which have preceded the present analyses. It is that the role which the military will play in a particular political system at a given point in time is largely determined by three factors: first, the pattern of demands and support imposed by the political structure within which the military operate; second, the political resources of the military; and third, the political perspectives of the military. In the terms used above, the political role of the military is the dependent variable, and the three factors are independent or intervening variables. Each of these factors requires further explanation.

Structural Demands and Support

The military may be described as a subsystem of a social system, interacting with it through a pattern of reciprocal demands and supportive actions. That is, the military makes demands upon the government and the society, for recruitment, allocations, etc., and is thus dependent upon their support. In turn, the society makes demands on the military, and receives its support. Three variable aspects of the pattern of demands and support which the political system imposes are particularly relevant for consideration: (a) the degree of stability and legitimacy of governmental institutions; (b) the level of internal or external threat to the political order; and (c) the nature of social norms defining legitimate modes of transferring authority within the political system.

Stability and Legitimacy of Government

The first of these is the degree of stability and legitimacy of existing governmental institutions. Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia and King Hussein in Jordan each has managed to survive threatened or attempted coups d'état in large part because of the aura of legitimacy which attaches to his person, an aura which makes even those not entirely satisfied with conditions or policies under a monarch reluctant to become a party to a plot to overthrow the regime. Loyal military forces who suppressed the attempted coup by members of the Ethiopian Imperial Bodyguard in 1960 were able to employ the theme of sanctity of the imperial offices, as supported by the archbishop of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, on behalf of popular resistance to the rebel cause. The close identification of U Nu of Burma with Buddhism generally enhanced his stature in a similar way and lent a measure of order to a situation in the post-independence period that otherwise was characterized by chaos and instability. In 1958 a threat of civil war coupled with the chronic inefficiency of civil government seem to have been the key factors which prompted the military to take over from U Nu. His prestige was such, however, that in 1960 the military gave him another chance at civilian rule (following his victory at elections which the military supervised), only to seize power again in 1962.

Of course, if authority is highly personalized in one man, or in a small number of key leaders, it follows also that the death or departure of the central figure or figures increases the susceptibility of the system to forcible overthrow. Thus the death of the revered Mohammed Ali Jinnah in Pakistan in 1948, followed by the death of his protégé, Liaqat Ali Khan, in 1951, contributed to a period of great instability and growing disenchantment with the central government, leading in 1958 to the takeover of government by the military. In South Korea, although the regime of Syngman Rhee was highly unstable and susceptible to a coup d'état for the first several years of his reign, in time, an aura of authority attached to his person which, coupled with his considerable political skill, kept an otherwise politically threatening military at bay. Even in the series of incidents which led the aged Rhee to step down from office in 1960, popular criticism tended to be directed against his underlings, rather than against Rhee. His departure from office, however, left a vacuum. The new regime of Chang Myön, for all its good intentions, had neither the strength of Rhee's personal charisma nor a basis of legitimacy as leaders of a popular revolution, since the overthrow of Rhee had been largely the doing of students, and politicians of the Chang regime differed little ideologically from those associated with Rhee. Thus, after less than a year in office, Chang Myön and his government were overthrown by a military coup d'état.

Perception of Threat

Undue preoccupation with Western belief in the virtues of civil control of the military and, conversely, belief in the evils of military rule might lead one to the erroneous conclusion that military intervention in politics is universally resisted and condemned by civilians. The fact is that civilians, individually or collectively, consciously or inadvertently, have served in a number of instances to stimulate or invite the military to intervene in politics. A notable example occurred in Pakistan in 1954 when the governor-general, beset by regional frictions and unrest, dismissed the Constituent Assembly and asked Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan, commander-in-chief of the army, to head a new government, a request which General Ayub refused.

It would seem to be the case that demand within the civil sector of society for the participation of the military in politics is related to perception by the former of internal or external threat to existing order. The rationale for increased participation by the military is based on the fact that military organizations, by virtue of their discipline, training, organization, and arms, coupled with a loyalty to the nation that transcends parochial loyalties, are peculiarly equipped to take charge in times of crisis and danger. For example, in Burma during the first decade after independence (1948-58), although the military adhered closely to civil control at the national level, on the local level, in some areas where raids and insurgencies kept the villager in a constant state of apprehension, the military performed all governmental functions, a degree of participation in political affairs which most villagers welcomed. In South Korea, the strict martial law imposed by the military when they seized power in 1961 brought an order which to many civilians came as a relief, after experiencing (especially in Seoul) a year of almost continuous demonstrations and turbulence since the fall from power of Syngman Rhee.

At the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Jordan Legion consisted of only 6,000 men, lacked an organized reserve, and had virtually no trained technicians and supply forces. Within five years, the Legion tripled its strength, greatly expanded its educational and training facilities to provide technical education, and built up a national guard force to a strength of some 10,000. The latter development is a particularly interesting by-product of the response to the Israeli threat, because the development of the National Guard meant that the Legion impact now reached village level extensively (especially along the Israeli border), with regular Legion noncommissioned officers providing training for the Guardsmen.

Modes of Transferring Authority

A third aspect of the social system relevant to present discussion is the nature of existing social norms defining legitimate modes of transferring authority within the political system. In none of the political systems included for analysis in the present volume is there a highly developed institutionalized procedure for peaceful periodic transference of governmental authority. Lacking a well-developed procedure of this sort (and the procedure need not take the form of popular elections necessarily, as the orderly change of government in the Soviet Union with the ouster of Khrushchev demonstrated), one less restraint is imposed on those who might be disposed to seize the reins of government by force. Conversely, where orderly procedures exist for the periodic transference of authority, conspirators against the government must include in their calculations the probable popular opprobrium which a coup d'état would incur, however unpopular the incumbent regime might be, because forcible seizure of power represents a violation of widely accepted "rules of the game."

In Burma, Pakistan, and Korea, military coups d'état have established precedents which others may be tempted to follow, as the Park Chung Hee regime has learned on at least three occasions (where attempted coups by factions within the military itself have been suppressed). Nevertheless, relatively peaceful elections in Korea in 1953 and in Pakistan in 1965 suggest that efforts are being made to cultivate popular belief in the efficacy of orderly means of transferring authority. In Jordan and in Ethiopia, as previously noted, rule of the monarch is accorded a legitimacy and even sanctity which has served to inhibit popular support for movements to overthrow the rulers. However, with the passing of each monarch from the scene will come a period of adjustment—perhaps a tumultuous period, with a high probability of substantial military intervention in politics—until a means of transferring authority to replace hereditary succession gains widespread support among politically articulate members of the population (the assumption being that hereditary succession will be abandoned, with the possible exception of retention of a monarch limited to ceremonial powers, as the practice has been abandoned in most other parts of the world).

Political Resources of the Military

It is almost tautological to observe that the political role or roles which the military play in a given society hinge largely upon the capabilities of the military to attain various goals in the political system, that is, upon their political resources. The term "political resources" is used here in the same sense that Robert Dahl uses the term, and is equivalent to the term "base values" as used by Harold Lasswell.⁴ Political resources refer to tangible or intangible resources which constitute the base of political influence for an individual or group, and may include a wide diversity of assets ranging from personal charisma to physical strength. In the case of military organizations, the quantity and quality of the following resources frequently determine the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the military in the political realm and the nature of the political roles which they perform: the size of the military, skills which they possess, weapons and armaments at their disposal, their organizational cohesion and discipline, their prestige, the communications facilities which they control and operate, their transportation equipment and mobility. Obviously, the nature and quantity of resources which are likely to enhance significantly the political capabilities of a given individual or group vary somewhat from one political system to another, and in any case must be calculated relative to the distribution of political resources within the system as a whole.

One of the contributions which the authors of the present volume hope to make is to provide data in some depth on the political resources of the various military establishments which are analyzed. Thus, the reader will find here empirical descriptions of military numerical strength, organization, education, equipment, and other resources as detailed as that available in any other source. The relevance of such descriptive data on political resources to analysis of the roles which the military play and of the extent to which the military have been effective within the political system may be suggested by a few illustrations.

In Jordan, in the attempted coup led by Abdullah al-Tel in 1949, and in Ethiopia, in the abortive coup by members of the Imperial Bodyguard in 1960, failure may be attributed in large part to the fact that in each case the political resources commanded by those within the military who remained loyal exceeded that of leaders of the coup. Indeed, the successful suppression of the coup in Ethiopia enhanced the political resources of loyalist members of the army and air force (especially their stature with the public at large and with the Emperor), and they utilized these resources to demand and obtain increases in pay.

Discipline and a relatively efficient organization were among the resources of the military in Pakistan which were prerequisites to being called upon to perform a variety of political activities outside of the defense sphere even prior to 1958 (the year of the military coup). Among the activities performed by the military were food distribution in East Bengal in 1956, which political pressure brought to an end after only one month, and anti-smuggling activity along the Indo-Pakistan border in East Bengal in 1957, which again stimulated political pressures sufficient to bring about an abrupt termination of the operation.

In Burma, the military acquired resources in the economic sphere as early as 1950 through the Defence Services Institute, which served as combination military "PX" and public department store, and which eventually expanded into a number of other enterprises, including fishing, banking, bus transportation, the hotel industry, electronics, coal supply, and foreign trade, and other enterprises too numerous to list here. With the second military takeover in 1962, vast sectors of the Burmese economy were nationalized, giving military men control of important sectors of public policy not only through top government positions but through administrative positions throughout the economy.

The Korean case illustrates vividly the political significance of the accumulation of political resources over time by the military. In the period from the founding of the Republic of Korea (1948) to the outbreak of the Korean War (June 1950), when the political system was susceptible to forcible intervention, the ROK military establishment lacked the capability for organized political action; it was relatively small in numbers, poorly equipped, its officers for the most part were not well trained, and the organization was plagued with factional divisions and strife. From the end of the Korean War, however, the ROK army emerged as the fourth largest in the world, in the next few years, with American aid, the ROK military acquired increasingly modern skills, equipment, weapons, and a sense of organizational pride. The impact of this increasingly potent force upon the Korean political system must be viewed not only in terms of the seizure of government by the military in 1961, a phenomenon which should evoke no surprise, given the political resources at the command of the military by that time, but also in terms of the changes wrought in Korean society through direct or indirect exposure to military training and activities. To cite but one example, most Korean men now between the ages of 20 and 40 have experienced military service, and reflect this experience in new skills, changed attitudes, and changed desires.

Political Perspectives of the Military

"Political perspectives" refer to cognitions as well as to affective judgments about the political system. These perspectives are relevant because they define the disposition of the military to assume various political roles. They include political goals which they value, perceptions which they hold of civilian political elites, images which they have of the appropriate role of the military within the political system, and their enthusiasm or reluctance to engage in political activity.

Perhaps more striking than any other single observation to be made on the findings of the present studies is the extent to which the military of all five of the nation-states analyzed share certain common political perspectives, a homogeneity in outlook which has increased as professionalization of the military has increased in the various systems.

One notes, first of all, that although provincial, regional, or ethnic ties remain important as divisive factors within each of the military establishments studied, professional training of

the military in every case has inculcated a sense of dedication to the nation's advancement and welfare that sets the military apart from most other groups within the society. Second, although traditional cultural values remain strong enough in each case to provide a clear distinction between the outlook, say, of the Ethiopian military man and that of the Burmese military man, the commitment of the military to modernization of their societies, to technological progress and efficient organization of the economy is common to all five cases. The evidence here suggests that military establishments have become vast educational institutions in developing nations, exposing thousands to new skills, modern equipment, improved managerial techniques, and effecting a transformation of attitudes that reaches the draftee and the village reservist, but is found most profoundly among the regular officer elite, who are becoming increasingly conscious of the instrumental potential which they possess in relationship to their nation's development.

The values of the military must be analyzed in relation to their perceptions of other elites. The greater the contrast between the image which the military man has of himself and his image of civilian political leadership, the greater the incentive of the military man to substitute his own leadership in the political realm for that of civilians. In Pakistan and Burma, the early years after independence saw the fruits of British professional training in terms of the conscientious adherence by military leaders of the two states to nonintervention in political matters. Yet in 1958 the military seized power in both states. What change of attitudes had occurred? Increasingly, military leaders in Pakistan and in Burma saw a sharp contrast between their own ideals, commitment to the national welfare, and perceived capabilities, on the one hand, and the incompetence, selfishness, and corruption which they perceived in civilian leadership, on the other hand. The self-image of the military man, revealed in each of the five case studies, is that of a man of honor, willingly enduring hardship and sacrifice on behalf of the greater good of the nation which he serves. The contrasting image of the civilian politician articulated especially by leaders of military coups, not only in Pakistan and Burma but also in Korea and in Ethiopia, is that of a parasite, who takes from the public coffers but performs no useful service in return, whose capacity for leadership is hampered by narrow traditional and parochial perspectives, and whose word cannot be trusted.

A final observation of some interest about political perspectives of the military is that there is evidence that political activism among the military in a given state may have a contagious effect upon military establishments elsewhere, especially if political problems elsewhere are similar to those which trigger the initial political activism. One notes that in 1965-66, five military coups took place in Africa within six months of one another. In Latin America, where the sharp decline in military dictatorships during the late 1950's seemed to herald the end of the caudillo era, seven military coups were executed within a two-year period that began with the military deposition of the Frondizi government in Argentina early in 1962.⁵ Student demonstrations in Turkey in April 1960 drew inspiration from the student protests that brought about the resignation of Syngman Rhee in Korea the same month, an event widely publicized in Turkey.⁶ In turn, the seizure of government by the Turkish military in May, on the heels of the student demonstrations, provided an example which the Korean military would emulate a year later. Park Chung Hee, leader of the military regime that seized power in South Korea in 1961, has said that he and others who planned that coup were also influenced by the example of Nasser in Egypt, as well as by earlier historical examples, such as the Young Turk movement of Mustafa Kemal.

Like the problem of assessing the importance of the American Revolution as a stimulus to revolutionary activity in France in the late eighteenth century, the problem of defining the connection between any two (or more) instances of military intervention in politics must

remain an elusive one. The major factors which determine the role which the military play in politics in a given political system at a particular point in time are, as argued above, (1) the pattern of demands and supports imposed by the social structure within which the military operate; (2) the political resources at the disposal of the military; and (3) the political perspectives of the military. However, given a combination of these factors which defines the preconditions for political intervention, political action by a military establishment elsewhere can serve as "an idea whose time has come" to precipitate the military to intervene in the political system. Conceivably, acts of political "disengagement," that is, the withdrawal by a given military elite from politics back to the barracks, also could serve as a model which military establishments of other nation-states would seek to emulate. In the one dramatic instance of political disengagement reported in the present volume, however (the return of Burma to civil rule in 1960), after a short period the military changed their minds and took control of the government again. Thus, to date, political engagement rather than disengagement remains the example that is notably contagious.⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹See, especially, Stanislaw Andrzejewski, Military Organization and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954); Lucian Pye, Armies in the Process of Political Modernization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, Center for International Studies, 1959); essays by Lucian Pye, Edwin Lieuwen, John J. Johnson, Edward Shils, and Manfred Halpern in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962); Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1960), and Generals vs. Presidents (New York: Praeger, 1964); John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964); essays by Dankwart Rustow and John Campbell in Sydney N. Fisher (ed.), The Military in the Middle East (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963); William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), and Military Institutions and Power in the New States (New York: Praeger, 1962); Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). Peter B. Riddleberger has gathered together an interesting inventory of hypotheses from these and other studies, with many of the references annotated, in Military Roles in Developing Countries: An Inventory of Past Research and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: The American University, Special Operations Research Office, 1965). See also Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962).

²John P. Lovell, The Study of the Military in Developing Nations: Devising Meaningful and Manageable Research Strategies (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University, 1966), 13-page monograph publication of the Carnegie Seminar on Political and Administrative Development.

³Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: Wiley, 1960).

⁴Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 15. Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridian, 1958), postscript; and "The Study of Political Elites," in Harold Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965).

⁵See Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, for details about the coups in Latin America in the early 1960's.

⁶Walter F. Weiher, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 17, and footnote 25.

⁷Some of the terms used in this essay are sociological conceptions. "Middle-range" (p. 2) is a term used by Robert K. Merton in Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957). The term is distinguished from "narrow-range" and "broad-range" theories, respectively. As used in the present context, "middle-range" theories refer to interconnected propositions about various facets of the political behavior of military elites.

On p. 4 it is said that the five case studies treat the "political role of the military" as a "dependent variable." On the same page and on p. 7 it is stated that three factors are

"independent or intervening variables," the three factors being political resources of the military, political perspectives of the military, and the dynamics of the political system. Independent variables are those which are observed, and changes in them are said to explain or predict something about the dependent variable. Intervening variables are those which intervene causally between the independent or dependent variable, and may be observable or may be hypothetical. Source: Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1964).

David Easton, in his three volumes on political theory, uses the terms "demands" and "support" used on p. 7 and p. 8 of this essay. In general, demands upon a political institution (such as the military establishment) are actions by others in the society that explicitly or implicitly seek to influence or change the policies or behavior of the institution. Supports are actions that serve to reinforce the policies or behavior of an institution or to protect it from attack or criticism.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN ETHIOPIA*

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INTRODUCTION

Stirred by the examples of Colonel Nasser and General Abboud in the north and embarrassed by the comparatively high standard of living in African countries to west and south, a small band of officers sought in the closing hours of 1960 to add Ethiopia to the growing list of developing nations in which military leaders have intervened to play a decisive role in national politics. The full details of their action remain cloaked in mystery; the full consequences of the event cannot yet be measured. But one thing is certain: a view from the outside, which mechanically equates that intervention with parallel phenomena in other countries, cannot begin to comprehend the meaning of that historic episode.

The present study attempts to set that episode and its aftermath in a broader historical and institutional context, although in a brief and schematic fashion. It locates the novel position of the military in contemporary Ethiopia on a plane of continuity with the Abyssinian past, and in a field of opposing and concurring forces in the present. In doing so, the present study may serve not only as an effort to throw some light upon Ethiopian realities but also as a contribution to the comparative effort to understand the dynamics of military involvement in politics.

THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The Traditional Army

Warfare has been one of the most prominent activities in the Ethiopian kingdom since its founding. The ancient kingdom of Aksum sent out a number of military expeditions in many directions—against African tribes to the north, west, and south, and twice across the Red Sea to conquer portions of Arabia. With the dissolution of the Aksumite polity around 800-1000 A.D., Ethiopian forces pushed south to invade territories of the Agau and related peoples. For two and a half centuries after the ascendance of the Amhara dynasty in 1270, they carried on a long and largely successful series of campaigns against the petty Muslim states to the east. In 1527, however, Ahmad Grafi in a jihad (holy war) conquered Abyssinia. Grafi's forces were defeated and driven out after 1541 by the Ethiopians with the aid of the Portuguese. Two decades later the Ethiopians pushed back an invasion of Ottoman Turks in the north. During the three centuries which followed that victory Ethiopian armies were preoccupied chiefly with battles against the Galla, a large tribe of pastoralists who penetrated the country from the south after Grafi's invasion.

* The views expressed are exclusively those of the author; they do not represent the view of CRESS or the U.S. Government.

The nineteenth century also saw a half-hearted attempt to oppose the British expedition under Napier (1868); two victorious campaigns against invading Egyptian forces in the north and a series of battles with Sudanese dervishes led by Emperor Yohannes (1872-89); the conquest of a number of tribes in the eastern, southern, and western regions of present-day Ethiopia under Menelik (ruler of Shoa, 1865-89; emperor of Ethiopia, 1889-1913); and a brief period of warfare against the Italians culminating in the Ethiopian victory at Adowa (1896).

In addition to this record of military campaigns against invaders and subject peoples, Ethiopian history is marked by chronic internecine warfare. While this was most conspicuous during the century before the coronation of Theodore II (1855), in which the absence of strong central authority promoted a condition of extreme instability, the competition and rebellion of feudal lords and the chronic antagonism between peasants and regular soldiers made civil war among groups of Amhara and Tigré themselves a regular feature of Abyssinian history.¹ The most cursory reading of Ethiopian history supports the generalization made by Ludolphus, who wrote three centuries ago: "The [Abyssinians] are a Warlike People and continually exercis'd in War. . . neither is there any respite but what is caus'd by the Winter, at what time by reason of the Inundations of the Rivers, they are forc'd to be quiet."²

The prominence of warfare in Ethiopian history has been matched by the conspicuous place which military culture occupies in the overall pattern of Amhara-Tigré culture. Military virtues have ranked among the highest in the Abyssinian value system; military titles have been among the most prestigious in their social hierarchy; military symbolism has provided a medium for important national traditions and a focus for national sentiment; military statuses and procedures have influenced patterns of social organization in many ways. Indeed, in the traditional Ethiopian system, the political involvement of the military is not a problematic phenomenon which needs to be explained; on the contrary, any distinction between the two realms is difficult to make.

Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this permeation of Ethiopian culture by military themes is that during most of the last millennium, the political capital of Ethiopia frequently took the form of an army camp. It consisted of a vast array of tents, arranged as it were in combat-ready formation with the emperor's tents in the center, flanked and guarded at the front and rear by officers and their entourages. The court would rest in one spot for a certain time—until political or military considerations dictated a move or until the local supply of firewood was exhausted—then strike off for a new location where, on a sizable plain, a central (and often elevated) position would be staked off for the imperial tents, and the rest of the population would quickly establish themselves in their accustomed positions relative to that of the emperor. The camp was so large, yet laid out so regularly that, despite its periodic movement from region to region, perceptible differences of dialect and vocabulary developed in different quarters of the mobile capital. In such a setting policies were forged, decrees promulgated, political intrigues hatched, and judicial verdicts pronounced. Even during those times when Ethiopian emperors chose to reside for longer periods in more stable quarters, a military flavor was imparted to the capital by the frequent military expeditions originating there and by the fact that high civil dignitaries bore such titles as General of the Right Flank, Commander of a Fort, and General of the Vanguard.

The armies which formed the matrix for this efflorescence of military culture in Ethiopia were not, as in Sparta, the product of careful organization and systematic development, but tended rather to be highly labile affairs. They came quickly into being, performed erratically, and dissolved in a moment. Their potency was due, not to the perfection of a specialized institution devoted to the art of warfare, but rather to the extent to which Ethiopian society

as a whole was pervaded by military skills, virtues, and ambitions. For while the Ethiopian army was neither trained nor disciplined, it could count on a number of cultural factors to produce an effective soldiery.

1. Observers of many centuries have commented on the extraordinary physical capacities of the Abyssinian people. As a rule thin, light, almost frail in appearance, the Abyssinian soldier is nevertheless noted for great endurance—he can climb mountains with ease, march rapidly for long distances under heavy pack with light rations, and can sleep on a rock.

2. Knowledge of the use of whatever weapons were available in a given century and region was widely diffused throughout the male population. Arms were seen and practiced from infancy. Possession of arms of some sort—formerly a spear, but during the last century more frequently a rifle—has been considered a normal mark of manhood.

3. A cult of masculinity was highly developed in Abyssinia and conceived specifically in terms of military prowess.³ To be a man was to be a killer, tireless on the warpath, and fearless in battle. The prospect of acquiring prestige through trophies collected from murdered enemies was a powerful incentive to which most Abyssinian males were sensitive.

4. The prospect of acquiring booty was another powerful incentive. The norms of combat in Abyssinia included wanton expropriation of the property of conquered peoples: cattle, grain, arms, and sometimes slaves were among the items to be gained.

5. Success in military activity was the key route to social mobility. Outstanding achievement at arms brought a man honors, favors, and political appointments. Men with any ambition at all—and most had dreams of rising high at some time in this society which provided much opportunity for upward mobility—were thus motivated to seek opportunities for combat.

6. Personal loyalties, finally, played an important part in many cases—not the horizontal loyalty to comrades, which has been stressed in sociological studies of modern armies, but vertical loyalties to one's chief or patron.⁴ Although service under a master was voluntary and was frequently discontinued when the leader's fortunes waned, so long as the leader was successful and reasonably effective in rewarding and supplying his followers—and in some cases even when not—a sense of being "his man" and wanting to be brave for him was another factor motivating Abyssinians to do well in battle.

As this last consideration suggests, traditional Abyssinian armies consisted of a number of individual leaders—the emperor and the governors of provinces—and the fluctuating numbers of troops under their personal command. These troops were of three kinds. First, each "big man" had a standing corps of soldiers, armed retainers who lived near his quarters. Such men served their master for the security and comfort that came from living near a seat of power and at his expense. Second, there were men whose rights to the use of certain land entailed the obligation to serve some designated ruler for two or three months during the year—a kind of *corvée* labor in the form of military service. Third, there was the mass levy in time of emergency. Such troops were recruited by sending out a proclamation, and bringing to bear various formal and informal sanctions against those qualified males who failed to turn out. Delinquents in Menelik's day were punished by confiscation of goods, whipping, and imprisonment, and one of his proclamations states that "if an eligible man remains at home, let him be called by the name of woman, and let his wife take possession of all his wealth and become head of the household."⁵

It was thus assumed in Abyssinia that every able-bodied adult male who did not belong to the clergy was willing and able to be an effective soldier. This assumption produced bewilderment and dismay when acted on in warfare against the Italians in 1935-36, but it was sound enough for Abyssinian purposes prior to that time. The existence of a ready supply of capable soldiers enabled the traditional military system to function on a highly individualistic basis. Each soldier was responsible for procuring weapons, either from his own resources or through arrangements with his leader. He was expected to acquire the skills needed to use them on his own; there was no provision for collective training procedures of any sort. He was likewise expected to arrange his own logistics: he either walked to battle or else brought his own mule, arranged for his own sleeping quarters, brought his own food supply and supplemented it by preying on local peasants as he went, and brought along his wife or maidservant to prepare his food. Finally, each soldier was his own master in battle. The Abyssinian fighting unit was not the squad or platoon, but the individual combatant, who sized up the situation as he went along, chose his own time and place to close with the enemy, and chose the objects for his personal attack.⁶

Viewed as a collectivity, however, the traditional Abyssinian army appears to have been an unstable and inefficient organization. Troops moved into battle in a disorderly manner. They were not accustomed to persevering in battle; at the first sign of defeat, mass retreat was not unusual. When their leaders faltered, or failed to provide for them properly, or appeared to be heading for failure, Abyssinian soldiers often deserted en masse and went over to the other side. They were as quick to abandon the military role as they were quick to assume it; barely had the noise of battle ceased when they set about exercising their favorite pursuits of civil litigation, political intrigue, and caring for their home estates.

Even when fighting at their best, moreover, the Abyssinian soldiery did not form an efficient military force. Their standard tactics were to engage in massive frontal attacks in an effort to envelop and confound the enemy; the alternatives were victory or retreat. The more subtle maneuvers of guerrilla warfare and the taking of cover were tactics that conflicted with their ethic of impetuous fearless aggression. Because of this "unreasoning offensive spirit," as an Italian officer wrote in 1937, Ethiopian troops were easy to defeat by a disciplined modern army. It was clear to Haile Selassie from the beginning of his reign that modern forms of organization as well as military technology were indispensable if Ethiopia was to remain a proud power as she had been in the past.

Modernization of the Armed Forces

The modernization of Ethiopian military forces was prefigured by the Portuguese mission of the sixteenth century, which brought the first supply of firearms into the country and taught Abyssinian soldiers how to use the new weapons. While additional supplies of modern weapons filtered into the country during succeeding centuries, substantial modernization of Ethiopian military technology did not occur until the late nineteenth century. The turning point was perhaps the defeat of the Egyptian forces by Yohannes. 20,000 Remington rifles were taken after the Battle of Curae (1876) alone. Subsequently, Menelik imported large quantities of rifles and ammunition and some artillery from France and Italy, an effort aided by the competition between these two powers to win his friendship. With the opening up of trade routes via Harar (previously controlled by the Egyptians) after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and the establishment of Italian and French ports on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Menelik's needs for weaponry were filled by a lively arms trade. By the time of the battle of Adowa in 1896 the armies of Menelik and his generals possessed an estimated 100,000 rifles and 40 cannons. Menelik also employed French officers to train some of his

personal troops. A more serious attempt to impart modern military training to Ethiopian soldiers was carried out during the regency and reign of Haile Selassie, who sent a number of Ethiopian officers to the St. Cyr military academy in France in the 1920's. He also brought to Ethiopia in 1929 a military mission from Belgium which trained his Imperial Bodyguard for half a dozen years, Swiss and Belgian officers to train the troops in his province of Hararge, and established in 1934 a military academy at Holeta, 30 miles from Addis Ababa, initially under Swedish management.

Haile Selassie's program of military modernization was barely launched before the Ethiopian army was put to a shattering test. When the war with Italy broke out, no more than 25,000 men could be said to have been modern soldiers commanded by trained officers. The vast majority of the troops were traditional soldiery, armed with spears or old-fashioned rifles, and led by men who held their positions as old nobles or provincial governors rather than as professional officers. The modern ideas of strategy adopted by the emperor at the instigation of European military advisers only confused and undermined the confidence of the old-time commanders and their armies.

By the time Ethiopian troops were fully defeated by the Italians in 1937, however, important lessons had been painfully learned. Ethiopian soldiers adapted themselves to become guerrilla fighters and, through constant harassment of Italian troops in well-chosen times and places, so undermined Italian morale that reconquest of the country was relatively speedy in 1941.⁹ The need for modern training as well as weapons had been seen clearly by many men other than the small circle of European-oriented leaders at the top. After the liberation, the government moved posthaste to replace the traditional system with a standing modern army. The emperor concentrated the responsibility for military activity in a national Ministry of War (later termed Ministry of Defense). The strength of the traditional war lords in the provinces had been greatly depleted by the losses of the war, and the emperor effectively eliminated their potential for a comeback by depriving them of the right to appropriate local revenues, the foundation of their capacity to acquire soldiers in the past.

The postwar development of the Ethiopian military forces may be traced in three stages, paralleling the three phases of political involvement by the military, to be discussed below.

Phase I. 1942-50. The years following the liberation were marked by rapid development of modern troops, trained primarily under British auspices. Under a convention signed in 1942 the British agreed to provide at their own cost a mission "for the purpose of raising, organizing, and training the Ethiopian Army." They had begun such training in Khartoum in 1940, and proceeded to equip and instruct ten infantry battalions, a regiment of pack artillery, an armored-car regiment, and engineer and signal services. The battalions thus readied were stationed at key points around the country and played an important role in maintaining internal security during the decade of instability which followed liberation. In addition, the emperor revived and trained his Imperial Bodyguard under the command of Ethiopian officers who had attended the Holeta Academy before the war and were ripened during the campaign of liberation. The seriousness with which the government took this military build-up is indicated by the fact that, in addition to the resources contributed by the British, Ethiopian expenditures for the Ministry of War and Imperial Bodyguard alone—i.e., excluding expenditures for police and other security services—amounted to 38 percent of the total national budget in 1943-44. The following year it dropped to about 25 percent (although the absolute figures remained about the same) and remained approximately at that level for the remainder of the decade—in each year constituting the largest single item of the national budget.¹⁰

In addition to the forces trained by the British mission and those of the Emperor's Body-guard, another army was set up in Ethiopia during this period. In order to absorb and "defuse" the relatively large numbers of armed patriot bands which were roaming the country as outlaws after the liberation, a loose territorial army was organized. In contrast to the new standing national forces described above, men entering this army were not given rifles upon entering but rather were enlisted only if they already possessed rifles. This territorial army thus served the function of checking unemployment and brigandage in the postwar period. By the close of this period, most of them had been absorbed into the regular army or else into the newly formed national police.

Phase II. 1951-60. This period was marked by the replacement of British influence by a number of other foreign military missions, the expansion and diversification of the military forces, the introduction of substantial American aid, and the first participation of Ethiopian forces in an international military campaign.

The British mission was phased out during the late 1940's and left Ethiopia altogether in 1951. In an effort to reduce British influence in this area, the Ethiopian Government had brought in Swedish military advisors and instructors as early as 1946. In 1953 a U.S. military assistance group arrived in Ethiopia to help train and equip various branches of the security forces. Swedish officers were brought in to train the new air force, and Norwegians to train the fledgling navy. Three cadet groups were taken successively through three-year training programs, in which Swedish officers also played a part. In 1958, a military mission from India arrived to set up and manage the new military academy at Harar. Israeli officers have also served as instructors in various sectors of the military establishment, and Japanese instructors were imported to train security personnel. Ethiopian security personnel were also sent abroad for training in various countries, including the United States, England, and Yugoslavia.

In 1951 the Kagnew Battalion, formed of crack troops selected from the Imperial Body-guard, was sent to Korea to fight with the United Nations forces as part of the U.S. Seventh Division. Altogether, three battalions were sent prior to the cease-fire, a total of about 5,000 men; and additional battalions had the experience of being stationed there following the truce. In appreciation of Ethiopia's contribution to the Korean campaign and in exchange for rights to set up a U.S. army base at Asmara, Ethiopia became the recipient of a substantial amount of U.S. military assistance. The amount given to Ethiopia from 1950 to 1965 exceeds \$55 million, more than half of the amount of military aid given to all of Africa during this period.

Phase III. 1960-65. The last half-dozen years have seen no notable changes in the patterns of modernization just described, but they have provided Ethiopian troops with three important occasions for active duty and thereby have increased the general prominence of the professional army in Ethiopian life. Ethiopia was among the first countries to send forces to the Congo; over 3,000 Ethiopian troops and half an air squadron participated in the United Nations military action there. Closer to home, skirmishes in the vicinity of the Somali border have occasioned a number of military reprisals and attacks, and the stationing of larger numbers of troops on the alert in the Ogaden. The Somali danger also occasioned Ethiopia's first defense pact, with Kenya, in December 1963. Internally, the rebellion of the Imperial Bodyguard in December 1960 led to an engagement in which the regular army and the air force quashed the rebels after a day of heavy fighting. In the wake of this revolt, the officer corps of the bodyguard was completely dismantled, and a new Imperial Bodyguard was reconstituted with fresh troops and officers from the army and a new period of training under Indian officers.

The Military Today

The emperor remains the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ethiopia and intervenes authoritatively in all important decisions. Theoretically he is advised by a National Defense Council, about which little is known. Reporting directly to him are the Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard; the Minister of Interior, under whom are the Chief of Police and the Chief of Security; his own private intelligence networks; and the Minister of Defense. The latter commands the Chief of Staff, under whom are the commanders of the army, navy, and air force; though in practice all of these officers also report directly to the emperor.

The Imperial Bodyguard today consists of about 6,000 men, organized into 9 infantry battalions. The regular army, including the Imperial Bodyguard, consists of about 38,000 organized into 4 divisions, an artillery battalion, an armored battalion, and an airborne rifle battalion. The air force numbers some 2,000 men. It includes a squadron with DC-3's and C-47's and a squadron of F-86's and F-5's plus T-33 and T-28 training craft (all U.S.-made), as well as 18 piston-engined Swedish Saab-91 training craft and 2 squadrons of Saab-17 light bombers. The navy has around 3,000 men, and includes five 95-foot U.S. coastal patrol boats, 2 Yugoslav motor torpedo boats, and an 18-year-old reconverted seaplane tender outfitted as a patrol-boat tender, training vessel, and imperial flagship. There are approximately 20,000 men in the national police force distributed throughout the country.¹¹ Since 1960 the territorial army has been reorganized. Little is known about it, though it appears to be concentrated in Shoa Province at locations not too far from Addis Ababa.

Noncommissioned personnel have been recruited into the Ethiopian security forces on a purely voluntary basis. N.C.O.'s come primarily from three sources: patriots who fought in the underground during the occupation; rural youths who are dissatisfied with their lot and interested in the opportunities, adventure, and "manly" life-style of the soldier; and the unemployed of the cities, including numerous school dropouts.

The older generation of army officers also enlisted voluntarily, as have most if not all of the air force cadets. The older officers include a small group who received some modern training before the Italian war; a group of officers of field-grade level who served with the patriot forces and are relatively untrained; and a group who were in exile with the emperor during the occupation and received some training by the French or British during the war years. By contrast with these groups, the postwar cadres of officers in the Imperial Bodyguard, navy, and (since 1957) army have been hand-picked from the cream of secondary school seniors and first-year college students. Length of service is based primarily on military willingness to grant a release upon individual application after an initial period of service.

In terms of ethnic composition, the enlisted men consist primarily of Galla, with some admixture of Tigré. At the commissioned level, the proportion of Tigré is higher and that of Galla lower. A survey of the cadets in the Harar military academy in 1959-60 revealed the following ethnic distribution: Amhara, 53 percent; Tigré, 25 percent; Aderi (native of Harar) and Galla, 8 percent; no reply, 13 percent. With respect to the socioeconomic class of their families, the same cadets responded as follows: upper class, 11 percent; middle class, 53 percent; "poor" or lower class, 21 percent; peasant class, 3 percent; no reply, 13 percent.

Five schools are now devoted to the training of military personnel: the infantry school at Holeta, the air force school at Debra Zeit, the naval cadets' school at Massawa, the Abba Dina Police College in Addis Ababa, and the Haile Selassie I Military Academy at Harar. All but the first of these are geared primarily to the training of commissioned officers and accept only well-qualified secondary-school graduates into their programs. They are educational institutions in a broad sense, including in their curricula a variety of academic and practical subjects in addition to the strictly military and technical ones. The Abba Dina Police College, for example, which is in the process of expanding from a two-year to a three-year program, provides courses in law for its students, while cadets at the Harar Academy take courses in English literature and other purely academic subjects. In addition to their substantive content, these training programs may be said to have three general educational objectives: the development of a loyalty to the nation that transcends loyalty to particular ethnic groups; the substitution of an ethic of professional competence for the old-fashioned military ethic of naive martial enthusiasm and wanton bravery; and the substitution of an ethic of professional duty for the old-fashioned ethic of political ambition through military service.

THE ETHIOPIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Contemporary Political Structure

The salient features of Ethiopia's political structure are generally well known and need only to be briefly reviewed here. Ethiopia is governed by a monarch whose theoretically absolute powers are legitimated both by ancient traditions and by a written constitution (1955), which asserts that "By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His power is indisputable." The present incumbent has worked steadfastly to consolidate and assert the full imperial power ever since his emergence on the national scene as regent following a coup d'état in 1916. In the prewar years, he attained this goal by building up his military strength to the point where he was stronger than any of the semiautonomous feudal lords who might choose to oppose him. The power of the latter was decisively undercut in 1942 with the elimination of their rights to collect revenues through the establishment of a national Ministry of Finance and the subordination of all provincial governmental functions under centralized Ministries of Interior and Justice. At the same time he constructed an elaborate edifice of national administration, including sixteen ministries: a number of independent agencies performing various developmental functions, like the Imperial Highway Authority and the Imperial Board of Telecommunications; and a number of coordinating bodies under the Council of Ministers such as the National Coffee Board and the Economic and Technical Assistance Board.

Over all these administrative organs the emperor's authority has remained supreme. While the burgeoning of this new governmental apparatus created new sources of power and hence potential opposition, the present emperor has managed to secure the minimal loyalty of most members of the administration through a subtly graded system of economic and social rewards, and to forestall threatening coalescences of interest through a multiplex surveillance network and a skillfully applied policy of divide et impera.

Haile Selassie has also established a Parliament in Ethiopia. The first Parliament, set up in 1931, consisted of a Senate whose members were appointed from the nobility by the emperor, and a Chamber of Deputies who were chosen by the nobility and local chiefs. Following the new constitution of 1955, members of the Chamber of Deputies have been elected by universal suffrage; such elections were held in 1957, 1961, and 1965. The Parliament exists primarily

as a deliberative body, since legislative power remains essentially in the hands of the emperor. The Ethiopian Parliament convenes annually, but since political parties are not allowed and the proceedings of Parliament are not regularly covered by the press or published in any form, it is difficult to determine exactly what transpires in its deliberations.

The fourteen provincial governments are headed either by personal representatives of the emperor or else by governor-generals holding regular appointments through the Ministry of Interior. Under them are numerous district governors and subdistrict governors. All these officials hold appointments through and receive salary from the national Ministry of Interior, although in outlying districts the authority of Addis Ababa has not penetrated very deeply, and these men are often members of local families long important in the area. This system of provincial administration is paralleled by a complex judicial system, which included nine appellate levels culminating (until recently at least) in the emperor's private court. In addition, each provincial and subprovincial center includes a contingent from the national police force.

Stability of the Present Regime

Although the present regime has attained a degree of autocratic control previously unknown in Ethiopian history, and although natural processes of social change at work in the country have introduced many new sources of tension, it has been characterized by a basic continuity and stability remarkable for a part of the world where convulsive change of government has been frequent in recent decades. The magnitude of the present emperor's political achievement is highlighted by the fact that his predecessor, Lijj Iyasu, had far better genealogical claims to the throne but was overturned after only three years in the imperial office, whereas Haile Selassie has played the dominant role in shaping the fate of Ethiopia for virtually half a century now. In addition to his unusual political talents, the durability of his regime may be accounted for by at least six salient sociological factors.

1. Sanctity of the imperial office is an ancient theme in Abyssinian tradition. So long as the emperor remains true to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church—it was his alleged conversion to Islam that hastened the downfall of Lijj Iyasu—he is endowed with a sacred aura that rests on three considerations: his membership in a royal line hallowed by alleged descent from King Solomon; his anointment at the hands of the archbishop of the church; and his status as protector and defender of the church.

2. The centralization of military power in Addis Ababa before and after the Italian occupation gave Haile Selassie the force with which to back up his claims to legitimate authority. The two dozen years of systematic acquisition and purchase of arms by Menelik after 1878 decisively shifted the balance of military power in the empire to the central province of Shoa. The modernization of Haile Selassie's troops in the 1920's and early 1930's increased the extent of Shoa's superiority, and the establishment of the British-trained regular army following liberation, together with the reconstituted Imperial Bodyguard and national police system, definitively raised the might of Addis Ababa far above that which any potential provincial opponent could muster.

3. The authoritarian ethos characteristic of Abyssinian culture has favored a state of mind which cheerfully relegates the responsibility for decisions concerning the public realm to the highest authorities and which discourages the open expression of criticism of such authorities. This ethos is informed both by the religious notion that it is immoral to disobey one's superior and the secular argument that human affairs are headed for trouble in the

absence of strong authoritarian leadership.¹² Thus it is that numerous Ethiopians who have had strong personal grievances against the emperor or serious disagreements with some of his policies have refrained from attacking him publicly in any way and have consistently shown him the greatest deference.

4. The pursuit of interest on an individualistic basis is another feature of Abyssinian culture which has worked to support the present regime and which Haile Selassie has encouraged. The traditional social system of Abyssinia encourages the pursuit of individual, not collective, ambition.¹³ It is lacking in mechanisms by which individuals can associate in the pursuit of collective interests. There are no fixed corporate structures either in the kinship system or on a territorial or civic basis which might canalize the pursuit of common interests. There are no traditional patterns for cooperation beyond the reciprocal arrangements for attaining such restricted goals as the construction of a roof or the repair of a church. The Abyssinians are sociologically unequipped for banding together to confront some authority with common demands. Their system promotes, rather, the pursuit of individual advantage by means of winning the favor of some authority. Ethiopians today have therefore been almost—but not quite—as little disposed to insist on forming associations for the articulation and aggregation of interests as the emperor has been disposed to permit the formation of such associations. Labor unions were not allowed in Ethiopia until 1963, professional associations have been discouraged, and political parties are still not permitted. The combination of government policies and the individualistic character of the populace has resulted in the absence of organized groups which could in any way threaten the regime.

5. The arrangement of marriages in order to promote political harmony has been a stabilizing technique used with great effectiveness throughout the present regime, beginning with Haile Selassie's own marriage before coming to power to the daughter of an important Galla chieftain. Haile Selassie has brought nearly all of the great, politically problematic families in the country into his fold by marrying one of their members to one of his children or other relatives.

6. The symbolic adequacy and instrumental effectiveness of Haile Selassie's regime must also be credited for contributing significantly to its durability. While all segments of the population know areas of frustration for which they hold him responsible, all of them are able to identify with him in some respect or other and to remember some of his policies from which they have benefited. While he has undermined the power of the old nobility, he has gratified them by retaining much of the old court symbolism and has rewarded many of them with appointments to the Senate and the provincial administration. While he has undermined the power of the clergy to some extent and has been a primary agent of secularization in the country, he remains steadfast in his adherence to the basic traditions of the Orthodox Church, has won its independence from the patriarchate at Alexandria, and has handsomely rewarded the highest dignitaries of the church. While he has antagonized the Abyssinian peasantry in various ways—by building up Addis Ababa at the expense of the provinces, by showing favoritism, by maintaining what some feel to be a repressive political system, by introducing alien ways—nevertheless, he has won their everlasting gratitude by symbolizing the independence of Ethiopia from European rule, by freeing them from the traditional necessity of paying indefinite amounts of tribute and corvée labor to exploitative local lords, and by bringing such benefits as roads and medical centers into some outlying regions. While he has kept the highest government officials in a state of uncertainty and dependence through the use of his authority, he has given them much of whatever prestige and income they possess and has increased the national prestige of Ethiopia so that they are benefited in many ways. While his behavior toward the modern-educated has often offended their dignity and his policies have been

privately criticized by them as insufficiently progressive, he has also been identified as responsible for introducing modern education into Ethiopia and for giving them what facilities and perquisites they now possess. While to the numerous ethnic and regional groups throughout the country he symbolizes the continuance of Shoa dominance under which many chafe, he also gratifies them by virtue of the majesty of being an emperor, and by such improvements as increased security in the provinces and rudimentary signs of better living standards. To all parts of the population, finally, his diplomatic success in capturing an important place in the leadership of the pan-African movement during the past decade has been a conspicuous source of support for the regime.

THE POLITICAL CAPABILITY OF THE MILITARY

Acutely aware of the age-old connection between military activity and political ambition in Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie has taken pains to instill in his professional military forces the idea that they are to be guided solely by an ethic of duty and to refrain from getting involved in the political realm. The heading of every issue of the official Imperial Bodyguard newspaper has carried the injunction: "The soldier's work is to follow orders, not to engage in politics."

Significant as the question of the degree of interest in a political role may be, it does not afford so revealing a category for dealing with the political involvement of the military as does the category of political capability. For, although interest may be high, the capability may be so low as to preclude the possibility of involvement; conversely, even though interest may be low, a military organization with a high degree of political capability may be pressured by societal strains and the flow of events into playing an important political role. In analyzing the elements of such capability, four variables would seem to be of obvious significance: the economic and cultural resources of the military; their politically relevant value orientations; their position in the social structure; and their internal organization.

Economic and Cultural Resources

As indicated above, military expenditures have constituted the largest single item in the national budget ever since the liberation. During the past decade expenses for the armed forces have averaged a little under 20 percent of the budget. In 1968 this amounted to approximately \$US37 million for the armed forces, and \$1.9 million for the police and security departments.¹⁴ While not large in absolute terms, it represents the largest defense outlay of any country in sub-Saharan Africa except South Africa and, in the past few years, Ghana and Nigeria. It amounted, in 1959, to 2.2 percent of the gross national product; in 1963, to 1.3 percent;¹⁵ and in 1968 to 2 percent.¹⁶

The income of the higher-ranking officers has been impressive by Ethiopian standards. They have received substantial salaries, free housing, free cars, and servants and retainers drawn from the ranks. In many cases their income is supplemented by rents from land holdings in the provinces and urban real estate, and at times by personal gifts presented directly by the emperor. Many officers in the air force in particular have been recipients of royal gifts in the form of land, and other privileges. However, lower-ranking officers have complained of income insufficient to meet their minimal needs, and the low income of enlisted men has been a source of acute dissatisfaction for many years.

Collectively, the military possess a modest proportion of the country's modern facilities. They have their own engineers and roadbuilders, if not of the best quality; and they have their own hospital and doctors, if not the most effective. They operate at least three newspapers for distribution within the military, and the Imperial Bodyguard operated a radio station in the 1950's until it was closed down because of political pressures.

The postwar generation of officers represents a significant proportion—probably no fewer than 10-12 percent—of all Ethiopians who have received modern education beyond the secondary school level. Many of them pursue higher education on their own, those in Addis Ababa frequenting extension courses at the university.

The military have been the primary agency for the development of a secular national culture in postwar Ethiopia. Their soccer teams have helped to focus attention on national sports; their Olympic champion Lt. Abebe Bikila, two-time marathon winner, has been a major national hero and the focus of much national pride—the only Ethiopian other than the emperor to be greeted by cheering crowds at the airport. More recently Sgt. Memmo Wolde, 1968 Olympic marathon gold medalist, and silver medalist in the 10,000 meter race (finishing behind Temu of Kenya), seems to be becoming almost as popular as Abebe. In the musical field, the military services have not only been the principal source of performing musicians in the modernizing sector—army, Imperial Bodyguard, and police have each maintained popular dance bands, and the police have pioneered with a symphony orchestra—but have created distinctive Ethiopian pop tunes which have won the hearts of their countrymen. These and similar innovations have been fostered by their self-confident realization that in Ethiopia the military is the only institution that is simultaneously traditional, modern, and national; that they have a natural mission, as it were, to create the new national culture of modern Ethiopia.

Value Orientations

Although not much reliable information is available on the subject, it may be suggested with some confidence that, after liberation, technical modernization and social welfare are the primary values toward which most Ethiopian military officers are oriented. No longer are Ethiopian soldiers oriented in terms of defending the church: religious issues have receded and a good many military officers have become agnostics, especially those trained under the Indian military mission. Nor are they likely to pursue partisan ethnic causes; a real and vital sense of common nationality is perhaps stronger among the military than any other group in the country. They favor technical modernization because their experience with modern technology has convinced them that it can be useful for the nation, and those who have been abroad for training or active duty are particularly anxious to have their country "catch up" to what they have seen elsewhere. While they do not reject the authoritarian ethos of Abyssinia, they do feel a patriotic inclination to see the lot of their countrymen improved, and favor social welfare, rejecting the traditional pattern in which a privileged few live at the expense of a relatively impoverished many. Many of them have objected to what they considered the corruption of the present regime and its "parasites," and to the extent to which the emperor was using his authority arbitrarily and unproductively. While most of them probably felt loyal to Haile Selassie in the years just after liberation, throughout the 1950's increasing numbers of officers were becoming alienated from his regime. To some extent this reflected grievances over salary on the part of lower-ranking officers and enlisted men; to some extent it meant a growing political consciousness. As one former officer of the Imperial Bodyguard has recollected:

Around the time of the Korean War a number of us officers in the Imperial Bodyguard began to talk about things that were bothering us. We observed the many oppressions in our country. We understood that it was not right for Ethiopians to live in subjugation under

the power of one man. We saw that justice was destroyed and that everything was done by lies. Inspired by the spirit of nationalism, we therefore began to express opposition in conversations among ourselves.

Finally, most of them have not the slightest interest in an aggressive, expansionist nationalism—although some of the older officers have long been advocates of a "preventive war" against Somalia. In recent years they have developed a keen interest in African politics and a sympathetic orientation toward the pan-African movement.

Position in Society

In the past the status of the military in Abyssinian society was marked by three characteristics: lack of isolation of the military from civilian society; public appreciation of the values embodied by the military; public dislike of the predatory aspects of military behavior. In modified form, these characteristics are still in evidence today.

Although because of their special training centers and chains of command the military are today far more separated from the rest of society than before the war, they appear to remain in more intimate contact with civilian society than is true, say, of the American military. Most members of the forces stationed in Addis Ababa live not in barracks but in private quarters among the civilian population. Military officers interact a good deal with civilians of high status at parties, dances, weddings, and funerals. Army officers are often related to civilian officials by blood or marriage. They mingle with civilian students at extension courses of the university. The postwar trained officers typically retain contacts with their former fellow students from secondary-school days.

With respect to their attitude toward the military, the civilian part of the population is ambivalent. The negative side of their attitude does not rest, as in some democratic societies, on an ideological distrust of the military because of their association with militarism and antidemocratic tendencies. On the contrary, at the ideological level Ethiopian society is, if anything, promilitary. Rather, dislike of the military has to do with a sense of their being burden on the country. Traditionally, this negative attitude arose as a reaction against pillage and the quartering of troops during war. Haile Selassie sought to overcome that opprobrium in the Italian campaign by insisting that civilians be reimbursed for anything the soldiers needed to take from them. It has a contemporary counterpart, however, in the idea that the military today are doing nothing to develop the country, but are expensive for the country to maintain. The arrogant behavior of many veterans of the Korean campaign in the bars and cafés of Addis Ababa in the mid-fifties also exacerbated civilian feelings.

In two important respects, on the other hand, the military are objects of the highest admiration and appreciation. They are appreciated for defending the country's territorial integrity and political independence, matters about which Abyssinians feel very strongly. They represent, moreover, the style of life and virtues connected with masculinity, a value which remains of some importance in Ethiopian culture. The generally high esteem which the military enjoys because of these reasons, the appreciation of their contribution to the secular national culture, and the tradition of military involvement in politics suggests that the assumption of major political responsibility by the military would not be regarded by the public as an unpleasant prospect.

With respect to the specific relations between the military and other elites in Ethiopian society, the following may be said. The regular clergy continue to have the same supportive attitude they have always had toward Ethiopian military endeavors. The two establishments are acknowledged partners in maintaining civil order. When the army and air force were putting down the rebellion in 1960, one of their early actions was to drop leaflets containing a statement by the archbishop that those who aided the rebels would be excommunicated. So long as there is broad agreement between the military and ecclesiastical leaders with respect to policies pursued, the support of the latter could probably be assumed. While most members of the church hierarchy oppose many aspects of modernization, they have probably been more sympathetic to such modernization as has taken place under military auspices. Insofar as the territorial army is a force to reckon with, it can be considered much more closely tied to the traditional church.

The civilian government officials probably give more than a passing thought to the prospect of being displaced by the military. One of the ministers most sensitive to this possibility, the late Makonnen Habtewold, was instrumental in having the emperor make certain high-level changes in military personnel because their political ambition was reaching a dangerous point. Because of their fear of displacement, civilian bureaucrats might be inclined to join with the church in the event of a church-army showdown.

Students and young intellectuals combine appreciation of the military's potential for modernizing the country with fear of the illiberal tendencies that might be associated with military rule. In 1968 students carried on a demonstration in Addis Ababa protesting police brutality in the suppression of an earlier student demonstration. The Bodyguard was called in to replace or to supplement the Police and quickly restored order without excessive injuries to the populace. But for the most part, students and other youth appear sympathetic to the idea of universal military service, an idea currently promoted by the military as a means of increasing civilian-military harmony.

Inner Solidarity

Within the army, the main axes of cleavage among the officers have been those dividing the postwar cadres from the older groups. The tensions have been partly those of a generational nature, partly reflections of ideological differences between the more progressive-minded of both groups, and the conservatives among the older group. Differences in outlook stemming from the variety of national traditions—French, British, and American—which have influenced their training have furthered the cleavages to some extent. Finally, the alleged permeation of the military ranks with government informers, especially in recent years, has worked to sow widespread suspicion among the officers and to inhibit communication to a considerable extent.

Unlike the army, the differences among officers in the Imperial Bodyguard were not so pronounced. The bulk of bodyguard officers stemmed from the postwar period, and they developed an esprit, stimulated partly by their privileged training, their uniforms and other perquisites, including an officers' club which was a center for numerous cultural as well as social and athletic activities, that led them to take a more sanguine view of the overall solidarity of the military than ever really existed. In 1960, before the coup, a number of Imperial Bodyguard officers said in private conversation: "If and when the time for action comes, all of the armed forces will rise as one man."

The somewhat privileged status and perquisites of the Imperial Bodyguard had the additional effect, however, of arousing a good deal of envy among army officers. Their envy was aroused particularly by the fact that the officers and troops who went to Korea were drawn almost exclusively from the bodyguard. Despite occasional friendships among individual officers from both forces, the relationship between the army and bodyguard as a whole was colored by a significant amount of antagonism.

This author does not have sufficient information to comment with assurance upon the internal solidarity of the air force, navy, and police, or of their relationships with the other armed forces. It is likely that morale is relatively high among the air force officers, since all of them represent the postwar generation and they derive satisfactions and prestige from their familiarity with aeronautic technology. But in all the services is a fear of informants and a mutual suspicion which decisively inhibit the development of the kind of solidarity that marked the Imperial Bodyguard in the 1950's.

PATTERNS AND SOURCES OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

Ethiopian military personnel have become directly involved in the input and output functions of government in four distinct ways in the postwar years: military activity has been a means of competing for power; military personnel have been assigned to government positions; one group among the military forces seized control of the government in a short-lived coup d'état; and one group of the military created a precedent for public political expression in an unusual instance of institutional interest articulation. Broadly speaking, these types of involvement can be related to patterns of societal development and tension in the periods following liberation described above in relation to modernization of the military.

Traditional Patterns Of Political Involvement: 1942-50

The fusion of military and political roles was manifest in two ways in Abyssinian society. First, military activity was the key route to political power, both for the ambitious commoner or young man who sought to be rewarded by his lord with a political appointment of some sort and for the ambitious lord whose fortunes vis-à-vis other lords depended to a large extent on the size and effectiveness of the army he could muster. Second, administrative, fiscal, and judicial functions were normally performed by men who were also military leaders and bore military titles.

With the reforms of 1942, Haile Selassie differentiated between the two realms once and for all. Provincial lords were deprived of their private armies; the civilian functions of government were bestowed upon specifically designated civilian officials; and the military functions devolved upon professional soldiers. But the transition was not completed overnight, and it is not difficult to discern in the new era what might be called modes of political involvement of the military that are cognate with the older patterns.

In 1943 a rebellion broke out in Tigré Province. The rebels blockaded the northern main road and stormed the provincial capital, Makale. Battalions of the territorial army were sent to no avail, and then two battalions of the British-trained regular army were dispatched and the rebels were defeated after heavy fighting and bombing of the Makale market by British planes. Earlier in the year, two army battalions had been sent to contain hostilities in Hararge Province instigated by a group of Somali. From the viewpoint of a modernized polity, these two incidents would be counted simply as instances of the normal military function of

maintaining domestic security. It had not been more than a dozen or so years earlier that the imperial forces were competing on a somewhat more equal basis with rebellious forces in the west and north. The scion of the old Tigre dynasty was associated, if only circumstantially, with the 1943 rebellion, and thus the military action against the Tigre rebels bears a sociological family resemblance to the old power struggles between an emperor and a dissident feudal lord.

A more benign pattern of military involvement was that of appointing military personnel to governmental posts. Many of the posts of bureaucratic officials held old military titles like Dejazmatch (Commander of the Gate) and Balambaras (Commander of a Fort) but by 1942, these titles had become purely honorific, and European terms were used for higher military ranks. In addition to this traditionalistic usage, however, the emperor appointed a number of men who were professional soldiers in the new army to administrative posts in the government. This practice was continued through the 1950's. Among the most important appointments of this sort may be cited a Minister of Interior; the (late) minister of National Community Development, who had formerly been Commander of the Imperial Bodyguard and Minister of Defense; and the governors of four of the largest and wealthiest provinces: Eritrea, Hararge, Kaffa, and Sidamo. Even though appointed to civilian posts, such men retained their professional military titles.

Modernizing Tensions and Political Involvement: 1951-60

The decade of the 1950's was marked by relative calm with respect to the provinces. Although tensions in Eritrea (which was federated with Ethiopia in 1952), the Somali area, and elsewhere existed below the surface, no attempt was made to gain power through provincial insurrection.

A new source of tension, however, appeared as a result of the continuing education of groups of Ethiopian civilians and soldiers alike. They felt increasingly that Ethiopia's modernization was proceeding too slowly under the existing regime, that high government officials were using their offices for personal aggrandizement, and that the emperor bore primary responsibility for these and other ills of the country. From about 1955 on, the idea of overthrowing his regime attracted a number of these modernizing Ethiopians, some of whom formed small conspiratorial groups in which military and civilian circles were linked. By the end of the decade, a fairly large circle representing a number of the most able and progressive military and civilian leaders had agreed that forcible overthrow of Haile Selassie would be too disruptive, but that they would wait until he passed from the scene naturally to remove the objectionable hangers-on of his regime and take the reins of government into their own hands. A small segment of this circle, notably the then commander of the Imperial Bodyguard and his civilian brother, became too impatient to follow that policy and decided to carry out a coup d'état while the emperor was out of the country on a state visit to Brazil. They were joined by the Chief of Security, who had formerly been an officer of the Imperial Bodyguard. Their strategy was developed by a group of about a dozen Imperial Bodyguard officers.

Power was seized in the early hours of December 14, 1960, when high government officials were lured to the palace, on the pretext that the empress was seriously ill, and then incarcerated. Bodyguard soldiers seized control of communications and transportation lines and established themselves at key points around Addis Ababa. The Chief of Police was quickly brought into the command circle, and the police maintained order in the streets--altogether there were no scenes of civil discord. At noon the titular head of the new government, the crown prince, read a message which proclaimed the end of three thousand years of

oppression, ignorance, and poverty, and announced a policy of rapid modernization and political liberalization.

The Imperial Bodyguard leaders had instigated the coup on the blithe assumption that once the word was spoken, all patriotic forces would join hands to build the new society. They had underestimated the extent to which army-bodyguard tensions had been built up, the persisting adherence of the public to the old regime, and the degree to which army commanders were disposed not to cooperate with the Imperial Bodyguard commander. Two key army generals had escaped during the round-up of major political figures and set up their own loyalist headquarters with the First Army. On the afternoon of December 15 hostilities broke out between the Imperial Bodyguard rebels and the army loyalists; the latter, aided by the air force, crushed the rebel forces after twenty-four hours of fighting.

Army Prominence and Political Involvement: 1960-65

The political position of the army was greatly enhanced by their suppression of the Imperial Bodyguard revolt. Although the loyalist army leaders became the objects of virulent attacks in leaflets which were circulated by underground sympathizers with the coup, the dissidents were not able to sustain the momentum of the rebellion and the army emerged as the political force in the nation. Together with the air force they had eliminated their rival, the bodyguard; they had won the emperor's gratitude by saving his throne; and they had had a chance to experience their own importance by taking that bold public action.

Stimulated by this new prominence and sense of importance, the armed forces began to air grievances of their own which had long been suppressed. In the spring of 1961, in what was an unprecedented action, a large contingent of army officers and men marched to the palace and demanded a raise in pay. The emperor had little choice but to acquiesce, and he granted them what amounted to a budget increase of about Eth\$2 million. Around the same time, the air force went on strike for more pay. The emperor tried to maintain control by assigning them to manual labor, but one group reportedly dug ditches at the Dire Dawa airport that hindered traffic, and he was obliged to give them the salary increases after all.

The prominence of the army has been strengthened by two other developments since 1960. Their participation in the United Nations military mission to the Congo, which involved a number of army as well as bodyguard men and officers, has brought them a good deal of prestige at home. Similarly, public appreciation of the military role has been enhanced by the security threat posed by Somali attacks and reprisals in the Ogaden.* As a result, while military leaders may still be reluctant to seize control of the government while the emperor remains alive, their political capability has been greatly increased.

CONCLUSION

In the two decades following Ethiopia's liberation during which the military forces of the nation were systematically and continuously being built up, only one segment of those forces—the Imperial Bodyguard—acquired sufficient facilities, solidarity, and modernizing momentum to attempt a bid for total power. Had they succeeded, the face of Ethiopia today doubtless would be different. That they did not is due primarily to two factors: the strength of the forces upholding the regime of Haile Selassie and the extent of the disunity within the military services.

* Since this report was written a third development, provision by Ethiopia of military training for a number of sub-Sahara African nations, has further enhanced their prominence. (Ed.)

Their very failure, however, has altered the situation in which any future development will take place. The suppression of the revolt by the army has given its leaders an increased sense of power and responsibility for the continuity of Ethiopian politics and has impressed upon the public the fact that they are the political factor to reckon with in the future. The stability of Haile Selassie's regime has been based on the authority of a single man. When he goes, a condition of instability will inevitably follow. Into that vacuum, ready or not, the military will be drawn, even though the civilian format of the government is likely to be retained. With respect to the resources at their command, their value orientations, and the support of the public, the military are in a position to make a creditable contribution; but the disunity which continues to afflict them may limit the extent of their effectiveness for some time to come.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The Amhara and the Tigré are the two ethnic and linguistic groups whose joint culture is that traditionally referred to as Abyssinian.

² Job Ludolphus, A New History of Ethiopia, trans. J. P. Gent (2nd ed.; London, 1684), p. 217.

³ Cf. Donald Levine, "The Concept of Masculinity in Ethiopian Culture," International Journal of Social Psychiatry, XII (Winter 1966).

⁴ Such horizontal loyalties have, however, been of importance in the military organization of the Galla, whose traditional social organization is based on a system of age-graded classes.

⁵ L. Sambon, L'esercito Abissino (Rome, 1896), p. 9.

⁶ Cf. Donald Levine, Wax and Gold: Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 262-63, 272-73.

⁷ Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 167.

⁸ Richard Pankhurst, "Fire-arms in Ethiopian History," Ethiopia Observer, VI, No. 2 (1962).

⁹ Harold Marcus, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Ethiopia, 1936-1941" (unpublished manuscript, Department of History, Howard University).

¹⁰ Perham, op. cit., pp. 200-206.

¹¹ Helen Kitchen (ed.), A Handbook of African Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 197-98.

¹² Cf. Donald Levine, "Ethiopia: Identity, Authority, and Realism," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).

¹³ There may be certain regional exceptions to this generalization—the Tigré in the region of Wajirat are said to have a much more cooperative and communitary orientation, for example—and it certainly does not apply to many of the ethnic groups outside the sphere of Amhara-Tigré culture.

¹⁴ Imperial Ethiopian Government Budget for the Fiscal Year 1968, pp. 116-118.

¹⁵ H. R. Coward, Military Technology in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, Center for International Studies, 1964), p. 260.

¹⁶ Based on preliminary GNP estimate in A.I.D. Economic Data Book: Far East, Revision 218 (Washington, D.C., A.I.D., April 1969).

CHAPTER 3

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN JORDAN*

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BACKGROUND: DATA ON THE POPULATION¹

The area covered by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was approximately 37,000 square miles (approximately, because of undemarcated desert areas in the east). The West Bank, or that portion of Palestine incorporated into Jordan in 1948, occupies 2,165 square miles of this area. The remaining 34,000-35,000 square miles include the wide desert and highlands east of the river Jordan, i.e., what used to be Transjordan—now referred to as the East Bank, or East Jordan. As rainfall and cultivation are concentrated in the northwest corner of the country, seven-eighths of the population (estimated in 1965 as 1,976,000) live in less than one-eighth of the land area. This population complex extends from Amman, northeastwards to the Balqa and Ajlun districts, and includes the West Bank to the west of these. Thus, whereas the country's area is largely desert and the overall population density about 20 to the square mile, density in the northwestern population center of 5,000 to 6,000 square miles is about 800 to the square mile. Of the remainder of the population, four-fifths live in sparsely settled town regions; one-fifth live in the desert. Among the latter, pure nomads are now few; the vast majority are seminomads who leave their cultivated land only for the winter, returning in the spring for the harvest. Of these there are probably no more than 50,000-70,000 today.

Villagers number roughly 500,000 living in about 1,200 villages and hamlets, 800 of which are in the West Bank. These people cultivate the lands immediately surrounding their villages and are economically almost completely dependent upon agriculture. Another 350,000 Jordanians constitute the so-called urban population in both Banks of the country; the most fully urban districts are Amman and Jerusalem. The remainder live in town centers in the twilight zone between urban and rural life. Some 700,000 Jordanians, or over one-third of the population, live in towns and cities of over 5,000 inhabitants. This results in about 45 percent of Jordan's population being urban; about 50 percent rural; and roughly 5 percent tent-living nomadic and seminomadic. Farmers (i.e., all categories engaged in agriculture), craftsmen, and unskilled labor constitute together about 65 percent of the economically active population. Professional and technically skilled people are a mere 16,000-17,000 (about 2 percent). Workers in transport and commercial-trade activities are slightly over this, about 21,000 (about 2 percent).

It is socially and economically significant that the state more than trebled its population in 1948 with the annexation of Arab Palestine. From an original population of approximately 400,000, clearly divided between nomads and seminomads of the desert on the one hand and primarily settled rural (hardly any urban) inhabitants on the other, Jordan in October 1948 acquired an additional 1.1 million people. Of these, 500,000 were refugees; about 450,000 were actual residents of the West Bank; and some 100,000 were exiles from other parts of Palestine who had somehow managed to move into the West Bank area, but not as refugees.

*The views expressed are exclusively those of the author; they do not represent the views of CRESS or the U. S. Government.

About 500,000 of the population are still refugees, a third of whom continue to receive UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) relief. Ten percent of the country's schools are refugee schools, maintained by UNRWA. Apart from the difficult problem of the refugees, there were problems arising from the infusion into the commercial, professional, and political stream of society of skilled and educated Palestinians. (These Palestinians had been exposed—and accustomed—to a relatively higher standard of primary and secondary education under the mandate than had Transjordan.)

THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

To trace briefly the evolution of the political system, three distinct phases can be observed: (a) the mandate period (1921-46); (b) the independent kingdom, phase I (1946-48); (c) the independent kingdom, phase II (1948-56). Only the last period should interest us in detail, for two important reasons. First, in this period the problems of the integration of Palestine into Transjordan emerge clearly and manifest themselves in the troublesome political life of the country. Second, in this period occurred the greatest and most rapid expansion of the Arab Legion. Moreover, the latter played perhaps the key role in maintaining the integrity and stability of the monarchy and its regime while the integration of the East and West Banks of the country was taking place.

The Mandate Period (1921-46)

The first seven years of this period were taken up by the consolidation of the amirate founded by Abdullah between 1921 and 1923, whose autonomy had been recognized by the Anglo-Transjordanian Agreement of 1923. In addition to the opposition Abdullah faced from the Istiqlalists (Independence Party) in 1921-24 and townsmen, he had to contend with serious tribal opposition to his rule. Tribal resistance to his integrating authority was expressed in a series of rebellions, such as the ones at Kura (1921), Kerak, Tafileh, and Ajlun (1921), and the Adwān uprising in Balqa in 1923. With the help of the new Arab Legion under F. G. Peake, Abdullah succeeded in suppressing all of these. The opposition from townsmen rallied mainly round the Istiqlalists. By defeating them Abdullah placated the local chiefs, especially the tribesmen. A series of frontier demarcation agreements in the east and southeast, protected successfully by the Legion with British air support, further strengthened his position.

A second agreement with Britain in 1928 led to the creation of an identifiable, though incipient, political system with limited constitutional characteristics. A rudimentary unicameral legislature was set up by the promulgation of an Organic Law in April 1928. According to the Electoral Law of August 1928, this body was elected for three years to serve as a Legislative Council. Legislative power was vested in the council and the amir. Significantly indicative of the level of political consciousness in the amirate was the very low percentage of polling in the first elections held: only 3 percent of the electorate voted.

There were serious limitations on the powers of the new Legislative Council, e.g., no law passed by the council could be implemented without the amir's approval. The latter, in turn, had to get the concurrence of the British Resident in Amman under the mandate status. In these circumstances, the council was no more than a debating society. Moreover, disagreement between the amir and the council did not imply political deadlock. There was no need for such disagreement to be resolved, since the amir could resort to rule by decree.

A series of five national congresses (1928-33) were held by opposition leaders to demand the limitation of the amir's power as a necessary step towards a truly constitutional system. So long, however, as the amir was supported by the British—a major source of his legitimacy and authority—and so long as he controlled the Legion, these opposition efforts bore little fruit.

Abdullah permitted the organization of political parties in this period. They were agreed upon the separate statehood of Transjordan; moreover, they were composed mainly of notables—tribal and other leaders—and reflected the interests of propertied groups. Their leaders and members were no longer interested in Pan-Arab schemes, or in the overthrow of Abdullah. What they sought was a measure of greater power vis-à-vis the amir, and a further measure of independence by negotiations between the amir and the British mandate authorities. Nonetheless, in a limited way, these early parties and their activities mark the beginning of a semiorganized public opinion in the country, and the evolution of a separate Transjordan nation-state identity, especially when the latter was, under Abdullah's rule, developing separately from the wider Arab political sphere and particularly separately from Palestine.^{1b}

With the assistance of Britain and the determined use of his Legion force, Abdullah achieved his goal of founding a state for himself. This he did unashamedly at the expense of the wider Arab cause of the First World War and in the teeth of his Pan-Arab opponents. He had won the first round.

In December 1941, an agreement was concluded between Britain and Transjordan to amend certain clauses of the 1928 Agreement. Because of the war, Britain agreed to remove the restraints placed by the 1928 Agreement upon Abdullah concerning the raising of an armed force, i.e., the expansion of the Legion. The 1941 amended agreement permitted the amir to do that without prior—or any—approval from Britain. This was a significant step toward the further strengthening of Abdullah's position in Transjordan which later stood him in good stead in the Palestine War.

The Independent Kingdom, Phase I (1946-48)

Partly in recognition of Abdullah's active, though minor, contribution to the war effort—particularly the supply of garrison units to guard military installations in the Middle East theater—the British agreed to renewed talks for the formal ending of the mandate and the negotiation of a treaty with an independent state of Transjordan. In response to a Transjordanian memorandum in June 1945, requesting such talks, the British Government invited Abdullah to London. His visit took place in February 1946, and in March negotiations had been completed for the termination of the mandate and the signature of a new treaty. The latter was ratified in June. It recognized the independence of Transjordan.

In 1947 the Transjordanians proclaimed their independent state as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan; however, the British retained the protection of their vital strategic military interests. The proclamation changed much of the legal terminology of the state's formal institutions but not the nature of its rule. Thus the amirate became the kingdom; in place of the Organic Law there was now a constitution. The Legislative Assembly became a National Assembly consisting of two houses: a lower house (the Chamber of Deputies) comprising twenty members elected by an electorate of 150,000, or one-fourth of the total population, and an upper house (Senate), comprising ten members appointed by the king for an eight-year term.

The 1946 Treaty was superseded in 1948 with a new one which eliminated the more stringent British riders regarding defense arrangements. The earlier provision permitting Britain

to post armed forces throughout the kingdom was replaced by a new arrangement limiting British military facilities to two airstrips, one in Amman and the other at Mafraq, together with a small garrison in Aqaba. Jordan, on the other hand, was to receive further military aid under the amended provisions of the treaty.

Many Jordanians have expressed the view that under the direction of Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Resident in Amman, 1939-46, and ambassador thereafter until 1951, the mandate relationship with Britain was at its happiest. They have argued that Sir Alec worked assiduously for the gradual relaxation of the more stringent mandate controls over the country, established an intimate working relationship with Abdullah, and thus helped Jordan develop its own experienced civilian administration and institutions.

To some extent the ability of Abdullah to revise the 1946 treaty within less than two years of its initial negotiation was because of the revived political opposition in the country. New parties sought actively to further sever the country's relationship with Britain. And as the Arab question in Palestine was gaining momentum and coming to the forefront of Arab politics, the pressure upon the monarch mounted. On the domestic level, the opposition sought a more liberal constitution than the one promulgated in 1947. The elections of that year indicated that power continued to be concentrated in the hands of the new king, assisted by his executive.

Partly in response to these domestic pressures and partly motivated by his own ambition, Abdullah became very active in the field of Arab nationalist politics throughout this first phase of independence. He worked on two fronts. Having secured and strengthened his position in an independent kingdom across the river Jordan, he took a renewed and intensified interest in the Palestine question, supporting such moderate groups in Palestine as the Nashashibis and the Tuqans in order to strengthen their hand against his major adversaries there, the Husseinis (after Husseini, Istiqlal leader). On the wider Arab front, especially since the formation of the Arab League in Cairo, in 1945, with Egypt looming large in the struggle for its leadership, Abdullah revived his Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent schemes. The latter were especially timely, since in 1945-46 Syria and Lebanon had just been removed from direct French rule.

Political opposition groups and parties in Transjordan during this phase were still seeking to curtail the power of the new monarch with a more liberal constitution which guaranteed a genuine separation of powers. The Jordan Arab Party founded in 1946 stands out in this connection. Its membership then is meaningful for the political developments in the country ten years later. Thus Suleiman Nabulsi, Shafiq Rusheydat, Abdel Halim Nimr, Abd al-Qadir Tel, and others were, if not members, at least identified with this group. Not only did they demand a liberalization of the political system, but, significantly, opposed the new 1946 treaty and its amended form in 1948; and were in favor of following the Arab League Covenant.²

The Independent Kingdom, Phase II (1948-56)

Political developments in this period were dominated by two epochal events: the Arab-Israeli War in Palestine, and the annexation of Central Arab Palestine by Jordan. Only the political consequences of the latter event concern us here.

Without discussing in any detail the annexation of the territory controlled by the Legion in Palestine in October-December 1948,³ suffice it to say that a temporary arrangement to administer the area was quickly improvised, using Palestinian personnel. Mandate laws and

ordinances remained in force. The most important step in terms of political development was the reshaping of the Jordanian cabinet in May 1949, a year after the outbreak of the Palestine War, to include three Palestinians.⁴ This was a most important change pending a more permanent constitutional-legal arrangement, since the newly annexed territory comprised about 750,000 people, or over twice the population of the original kingdom east of the Jordan.

The Electoral Law was amended in order to double the number of seats in the assembly from 20 to 40, 20 for each Bank. The number of senators was increased to twenty, of whom the king appointed seven Palestinians. The cabinet was expanded further to about a dozen ministers, and included five Palestinians. The first elections in the enlarged kingdom took place on April 11, 1950. The newly elected chamber formalized the annexation of Palestine and legalized the integration of the two Banks. During the next year and a half a series of cabinet shuffles were accompanied by the emergence of a National Front opposition party. The important thing, however, was that 750,000 Palestinians had acquired Jordanian citizenship and those of voting age, the franchise.

Despite this advance in political development, including the legalization of an opposition party, King Abdullah and his government came under heavy criticism from various quarters, especially over budgetary matters relating to the Legion. This was not surprising, since over 80 percent of the budget in 1950-51 was allotted to security (both army and police). The opposition was clamoring for the control of the purse strings by the chamber—a constitutional principle not operable in Jordan at the time.

Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951, and for a while it looked as if political development would be arrested. The assassin and those who conspired in the murder of the monarch were predominantly ex-Palestinian. Nevertheless, new elections were held on August 29, 1951, without serious incidents. In the brief reign of Talal (until September 1952) a new constitution was promulgated in January 1952 which, with several amendments (major ones in 1954), is still the fundamental law of Jordan. It liberalized the political system insofar as it made the cabinet more responsible to the chamber, especially in matters of the budget, votes of confidence, and dissolution. The cabinet was required to resign within one week of the dissolution of the Assembly and make way for a caretaker government. The term of the House of Notables (or Senate) was halved from eight to four years. A General Accounting Office was established for the audit of public expenditures. As for the new departures in party activity, these are discussed briefly in relation to political-social groups and the Legion, below.

Having acquired 2,165 square miles of territory in 1948-49, comprising a new population of three-fourths of a million, over half of whom were destitute refugees, the system managed to make the transition without serious trouble. The extension of the franchise went hand in hand with an amended legislative-judicial structure. The nature of the executive, however, remained unaffected in terms of its extensive power until 1952. The first limitations upon it were placed by the new constitution of 1952 and its amended articles in 1954.

Administrative integration of the two Banks has been assiduous. The country was re-organized into eight administrative provinces, headed by governors appointed by the Ministry of Interior. All local administrative officers in the West Bank are now predominantly ex-Palestinians. The provinces are subdivided into districts administered by district officers, and the districts into village local authorities. New civil service regulations make all Jordanians eligible for government employment. There has been surprisingly little, if any, regional or other group discrimination in appointments and transfers. Rather, the civil service has so far worked well on an interregional basis. Notably, an increasing number of

ex-Palestinians staff such departments as Tourism, Development, Social Welfare, and Education. Recently, the Foreign Office is acquiring a preponderance of them.

In a matter of a few years the integration of the two Banks proceeded fairly smoothly to produce an ever-expanding political community of new Jordanians. The ex-Palestinians came to have a stake in the transformed parliament in which, in less than a decade, a greater measure of parliamentary control over the executive was achieved by the new provisions of a vote of confidence and the power to impeach ministers. The latter became collectively and individually accountable to the chamber for their policies. Some control over fiscal policies of the government was also introduced. But it must be noted that the monarch in Jordan is not a figurehead. His powers of summoning, proroguing, and dissolving parliament, and hence, his ability to rule by decree, even if only temporarily, afford him extensive governing powers.

Despite shortcomings one cannot but view the measures taken by the authorities since the merger of the two Banks in 1948-49 as a bold and deliberate policy of integrating an economically less advanced (though politically perhaps more experienced) Transjordanian population with an economically and socially more advanced, though politically shattered, one. The step moreover was taken when 50 percent of the Palestinian population were destitute refugees, and the other 50 percent defeated nationalists. When, in 1948-49, West Bankers could have easily rejected the suggestion that Jordan was their country, it is almost certain that their vast majority today considers it as such. Moreover, a new generation has grown up since then as native-born citizens of the kingdom.

BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION OF THE LEGION: 1921-48

Before Amir Abdullah arrived in Transjordan in 1920 or in Amman in March 1921, there were two security forces in the area organized by the British authorities. One was the Darak, or gendarmerie, led by local Arab officers, remnants of the security forces of the short-lived Arab Syrian government of Faisal in Damascus. The commanding officer of this force was Lt. Col. Arif Bey al-Hasan from Salt. This force was separate from the Shurta, or police units responsible for internal order in the towns. The other was the so-called Mobile Force, formed by Captain Brandon in Amman, and consisting of 100 men. Seventy-five of these were cavalry and 25 of them manned two Maxim machine guns. This force was financed by the British. It was taken over in 1921 by Capt. F. G. Peake of the Egypt Camel Corps.

When Abdullah came from the Hejaz to Ma'an in southern Transjordan he brought with him a "battalion"—though probably a force consisting of no more than 200 men—of troops. This he placed for training under Capt. Abdel Qadir al-Jundi while still in Ma'an. When he traveled north to Amman at the end of February 1921, the force accompanied Abdullah there.

As Abdullah set about to establish a central administration in Amman the security forces which could be used by him for this purpose appeared as four separate units (not counting Captain Brandon's Mobile Force):

(1) A localized, or stationed, Darak, referred to above, with an authorized strength of 550 men, but of a lesser actual strength. This was distributed between three provinces as three units commanded by Arab captains: (a) Ajlun, (b) Kerak, (c) Halqa. In addition to these commanders there were from fifteen to twenty other Arab officers in the force.

(2) A battalion of reserve gendarmes, commanded by Lt. Col. Fuad Bey Salim, with an authorized strength of 400, but an actual strength that did not exceed 150. This was also officered by old officers of the Arab Syrian Army, many of whom had served in the Ottoman armies.

(3) A regular army battalion of some 200 infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Istambuli from Beirut. This was probably the old troop that had accompanied Abdullah to Amman.

(4) A cavalry troop of 100 men commanded by the Nejdī Ibn Ramih, which came to form the amir's private guard in the early days.

Abdullah made himself commander in chief of all these forces, while he entrusted direct responsibility for their overall administration and supervision to his Minister⁵ of Public Order and Security, Col. Ale al-Khalqi.

This arrangement did not, however, last very long, in fact, barely more than two months. In May 1921, a serious incident of tribal rebellion in Kura, near Irbid,⁶ indicated clearly how weak the Darak forces were and how inadequate this initial makeshift arrangement was. The incident reflected the unwillingness of tribal factions to be integrated into wider districts as a preliminary step to the imposition of authority by the incipient central government of Abdullah in Amman. The security forces had failed in their punitive measures against the rebels. They lacked equipment and funds, as well as adequate training. While Abdullah eventually resolved this and subsequent incidents of rebellion elsewhere in the territory in part by the politics of conciliation and amnesty for tribal leaders, he felt unsure of his authority without access to an effectively organized force.

The Kura incident foreshadowed the crucial role of the Legion in the consolidation of the Transjordan territory and the establishment of the amirate under Amir Abdullah. In Transjordan the tribal society had received a minimum of influence and control from Ottoman and other administrations. Raiding between tribes, and raiding of settled cultivators in villages and towns by the tribes, as well as attacks upon government garrisons were common occurrences. Political control over tribal society was achieved by both force and conciliation. The latter took the form of financial concessions, often outright bribes, by the government, special privileges with regard to land and administration, and the bestowal of honorific titles as well as of actual positions in any incipient central government. Gradually the tribes were pacified and settled into a more sedentary community as part of a larger state. These developments took place primarily through the efforts of the Arab Legion.

The British mandate authorities in Jerusalem, as well as their agents in Transjordan, were now convinced of the inadequacy of security forces commanded by Arab officers. They were now interested in increasing their control over such security forces under a reorganized establishment. Abdullah was now ready to seek increased financial assistance from Britain to strengthen his position in a hopelessly fragmented territory and so impose his authority over both tribal groups and townsmen. The British acceded to his request for further financial assistance on two conditions: (1) that Peake be placed in charge of all finances for the security force instead of Abdullah's minister,⁷ and (2) that a reorganized Mobile Force with an authorized strength of 750 officers and men be raised and commanded by Peake.

These conditions produced a split between Abdullah and his then Prime Minister Rashid Bey al-Talī who was identified with the so-called Arab Independence group of Syrian émigrés (they were averse to expanded British control) and who insisted upon an authorized strength of 1,500 for the new force. Abdullah let him resign and carried on with the agreement.

Peake could not at first easily find recruits from Transjordan for the Mobile Force, so he resorted to ex-Ottoman Arab soldiers and Palestinians. By autumn 1921, he could field the following:

- 3 cavalry companies commanded by Arab captains
- 2 infantry companies also commanded by Arab captains
- 1 battery of mountain artillery commanded by an Iraqi officer
- 1 machine gun company
- 1 signal squadron

In addition to these unit commanders, Peake got together ten other Arab officers, mainly lieutenants, and set up base camp near the Amman railway station. Later in the spring of 1922 he imported three Egyptian line officers to take charge of troop training and engaged a British officer to look after administration. He also founded a school for training gendarme and police, whose administration remained separate from that of the Mobile Force, however.

By December 1921, the major function of the Mobile Force became clear: to put down tribal uprisings and other incidents that disturbed the peace and challenged the authority of Amman, i. e., of the amir. Just as important was its further function of collecting taxes for the amirate's treasury. In general, the Mobile Force was entrusted with the task of establishing order, peace, and security throughout the territory. While it may be argued that many states in the Fertile Crescent were artificial creations of the European powers who came to control the area at the end of World War I, Transjordan was perhaps the most artificial. While Jordan has been an independent state only since 1946, its army dates back in one form or another to 1920-21. The army, that is, preceded the emergence of a sovereign state in Jordan. In fact, the army created the state. The maintenance of the state of Jordan and the securing of the West Bank from Palestine in 1948 are accomplishments of the Legion.

Meantime, beginning in May 1921, the British had erected the beginnings of two air stations, one in Merka and the other in Amman. A small detachment of British troops had also been posted at Azraq. The air stations came to play a decisive role in the skirmishes between the security forces of Transjordan and raiding tribes that crossed the border from Arabia.

The new Mobile Force under Peake found early occasions to test its strength, training, and discipline against dissident groups throughout Transjordan. In December 1921-February 1922 it was engaged in putting down tribal uprisings in Kerak and Tafilah against the Amman-appointed governor. The rebel leaders were arrested, and the force spent some months restoring order in the area and collecting taxes. By the summer of 1922, the Mobile Force under Peake was fully engaged in repulsing Wahhabi raids from Arabia. Similar Wahhabi raids occurred again in the summer of 1923 and 1924. All had been successfully repulsed by the new Mobile Force with the aid of British planes.

During this time, the force also had to cope with the resolution of serious internal political conflict in the important Salt area of the Balqa province. It involved not merely a struggle for power between leaders of a tribe but also a direct challenge to the authority of the amir, Abdullah. The Adwān rebellion in the summer of 1923 acquired a political dimension directly affecting the amir's relationship to Britain. It involved disaffected politicians of the Arab Independence group (Istiqlaliyyah). It was not clear at the time whether the Adwān were seeking to extract further privileges from Amman, secure certain rights, or to overthrow the government. At the time it was believed that British agents had fomented the rebellion on

instructions from the High Commissioner in Jerusalem. The Independence group in the Amman government feared that the movement was aimed directly against them. It appears, on the other hand, that the Adwān resented the fact that the administration of Transjordan under Abdullah was largely in the hands of outsiders (i.e., Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, and Palestinians). They demanded posts in the administration for the natives and coined the slogan "Transjordan for the Transjordanians."

The initial force sent out by Amman to quell the Adwān uprising was not able to cope at first, and Peake was away on leave at the time. Abdullah shrewdly resorted to tribal conciliation, while at the same time he arrested many of the Adwān leaders as a show of force.⁸ Nonetheless, the incident brought to the surface the latent conflict between the Independents and Abdullah who wished to establish firmly his authority with British aid. It also foreshadowed a further role for the Mobile Force in resolving this conflict on a future occasion.

It should be noted that for the first two years of this early phase the Mobile Force commanded by Peake remained separate from the administration of public security and order in the three districts of Transjordan. The latter remained under the jurisdiction of the gendarmes (Darak) and police (Shurta) officered entirely by Arabs. Soon after Abdullah had secured an agreement with Britain recognizing the autonomy of his amirate in April 1923 further changes in the administration of the security forces were introduced. In September 1923, the previous arrangement for the security forces was abolished. Instead, all forces in Transjordan now were put under the command of Peake, and were given the new name, the Arab Army, which came to be popularly referred to as the Arab Legion. In November, Abdullah appointed Peake to the rank of major general. He was now commander of the Arab Army, serving as an employee of the Transjordan amirate government.

These arrangements confirmed not only the understanding between Abdullah and the British, which matured in a series of agreements since March 1921 and culminated in the treaty of April 1923, but also indicated the defeat of the anti-British Independence elements in Abdullah's first governments. They also reflected the change in Abdullah's plans and policies. From his earlier avowed aim to retrieve Syria from the French on behalf of his brother Faisal, declared with such bravado when he came from the Hejaz to Ma'an in 1920, Abdullah had returned from London in early spring of 1923 to declare to his Transjordanians that he intended to set up a state in Transjordan. His initial success by the end of 1923 was very much due to the patient and determined use of the new security force. His political opponents collapsed and his ascendancy was now secured in what one of his private secretaries (by 1924 a political exile) subsequently described as the "Abdullah state."⁹

Having settled the Adwān incident to his advantage, Abdullah coupled a conciliatory policy of placating local notables and tribal leaders with a positive government program of consolidating his power. By autumn 1923, he was assured of further British aid. He was therefore determined to maintain good relations with Britain. But the British financial grant would remain inadequate without more revenue from taxation. Tax reform and strengthening of public order became immediate aims of the amir. One serious obstacle now remained in the way of implementing this program. It plagued Abdullah for another year: the Istiqlalists.

Even in this early phase, political agitation among some of the Arab officers of the new force was inevitable, particularly when Abdullah's schemes were not to everyone's liking. Some of the Arab officers in the security forces, as stated earlier, belonged to or sympathized with the extremist Istiqlalists (Independence Party). First, they resented Abdullah's retreat from his initial purpose in coming to Transjordan, namely, to "liberate" Syria from

the French and restore it to the Arab kingdom of his brother Faisal. Second, they opposed and disapproved of Abdullah's increasing dependence upon Britain, which in due course had the effect of subordinating them to his authority. Since July 1921, there had been occasional raids by Arabs against French border outposts in Syria with the knowledge, if not collusion, of these officers. The French, on their part, lodged repeated protests with the Jerusalem authorities to order their wards in Transjordan to stop the incursions. In the spring of 1923, unpaid and therefore disaffected members of the gendarmarie feared that the British would hand over Arab nationalists to the French authorities in Syria, so they agitated for a mutiny. This feeling further exacerbated the relations between Abdullah and the Istiqlalists in his government. A fresh series of attacks by marauders on the Transjordan-Syrian border in August-September 1924 brought a British ultimatum to the amir ordering him to bring the situation under control. Abdullah acted swiftly by exiling many of the Independence Party leaders. Meantime, Peake purged his Mobile Force of suspected and known Independence Party officers by cashiering them. About eight to ten of these left for the Hejaz and other parts.

Sweeping administrative reforms—sweeping, that is, for the Transjordan of those days—were being introduced in early 1925, as the reorganized security forces under Peake continued to deal with tribal unrest, tax collection, and generally the task of establishing law and order in a vast but sparsely populated country. While playing the important role of peacemaker, the Legion was also gradually weaning the tribes and the provincial population from the belief that the government was weak and that by stirring up trouble they could extract money and other concessions from it as they had done under the Turks in the past. Rather the Legion showed by the spring of 1926 that the government could and would levy and collect taxes, that it could and would build roads and enforce municipal ordinances. Thus the reforms that set up the administrative cadre of the new amirate coincided with the role of the Legion in the first registration of the population, and the introduction under British supervision of financial accounting and control. The Legion, in short, had in this phase of its development (1923-26) introduced by its disciplined use of force the tribesmen—the restless atomistic Bedouin, and the ambivalent townsmen to the notion of restraint and to the acceptance of an order imposed by a central administrative authority.

In this phase the recruits for the Legion were mainly, if not exclusively, villagers, peasants, and some townsmen. Bedouins stayed away. Until they accepted recruitment and began to enlist in the Legion in large numbers in the 1930's, Bedouins constituted—with their constant raiding—a major irritant to the state. Even so, by 1926, Peake had raised a force of over 1,500 officers and men in the Legion. This force proved the most important instrument in the consolidation of the amirate amidst political conditions characterized by a population that had known little loyalty to any settled government before that time. This, together with the eventual demarcation and successful guarding of the country's boundaries—also mostly the work of the Legion—strengthened the position of the amir and his administration in Amman.

It appears that the Legion suffered a serious setback in its early development in the next ten years (1926-36). This constitutes the next phase in its evolution. It is, moreover, a politically controversial period. In March 1926, the British High Commissioner in Palestine decreed the creation of a new armed force to be called the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF). The ostensible role of this force was to defend the frontiers of Transjordan, especially those with Syria and Saudi Arabia. Although it is reasonable to assume that a strong force to protect the eastern frontiers was justified at that time, there is disagreement among British officials who were involved regarding the motivations of Lord Plumer in creating this force.¹⁹ The Saudis, to be sure, had just conquered the Hejaz and expelled King Hussein, father of Abdullah, from his throne. They could conceivably have had further territorial ambitions. Yet, the actual effect of this policy was an immediate reduction of the Legion's

strength from 1,600 to under 900 men. Its artillery, signals, and machine gun units were abolished. Some of its officers and men were transferred to the new TJFF. The official explanation for the Legion's reduction in force was that of economy. Paradoxically, though, the Transjordan government was required to carry one-sixth of the budget of the new TJFF.

Significantly, the TJFF was to be under the direct control of the High Commissioner in Jerusalem. All its officers (except for medical officers) were to be British. The bulk of its recruits came from the disbanded Palestine gendarmerie and volunteers from surrounding areas. The TJFF set up headquarters in Zerqa, with base camps in Ma'an to the south, and Samakh in northern Palestine close to the Syrian border. It is alleged by those who were opposed to the formation of the TJFF that the quality of its officers was unimpressive and that its recruits were not very loyal. Moreover, they have argued, the TJFF was nowhere near as successful in defending Transjordan's frontiers, or in maintaining order, as the Arab Legion had been up to that time, or subsequently, after the formation of the Desert Mobile Force under the command of Glubb in the 1930's.

The real blow to the Legion, however, was its reduction to an internal security force, largely confined in its role to police duties, shorn of any military functions. In 1927-28, the commander of the Arab Legion was redesignated "Assistant Commanding Officer, Army, for Public Security."

When the period 1928-33 turned out to be a turbulent one for the country—intensified tribal raids, political agitation in the towns against the 1928 treaty with Britain—it became clear that the reduced Legion, confined in its functions as it was, could not cope effectively with the internal situation. In November 1930, Capt. John Glubb, a sapper, arrived from Iraq, where he had been engaged for some years in the pacification of tribes, to serve as second in command to Peake. To meet the constant pressure from the tribes and the apparent inability of either a reduced Legion or the TJFF to counter it, the government set out to raise a Desert Mobile Force.

The new force was to be purely Bedouin in composition, recruited from the nomadic and seminomadic tribes. It was to have both striking capacity over long desert distances, as well as recourse to strategic regrouping, resupply, and communications by a series of forts to be built throughout the desert, and was to be equipped with wireless sets.

This development ushered in a new phase in the evolution of the Legion, marked by (a) the direct recruitment of Bedouins into the force; (b) the acquisition of extensive ground operational experience at least in desert warfare; (c) extensive practice in operations which involved the coordination of ground forces activity with supporting air strikes by wireless communication; and (d) the acquisition of intensive, though limited, expertise in the use of transport. In short, an elite force within the Legion was to acquire intensive military training.

Glubb's success in recruiting Bedouins and pacifying them over the next five to ten years was the result of a combination of expert diplomacy and efficient military action. To this extent Glubb was instrumental in raising and training what soon came to constitute the striking force of the Jordan Arab Army.

Further strengthening and militarization of the Legion occurred as a result of the Arab rebellion in Palestine in 1936-39. The Palestine authorities soon came to depend partly upon Legion patrols on the border for the pursuit and apprehension of rebel infiltrators and rebel escapees.

Whereas in 1936-36, the Legion, police and gendarmierie numbered no more than 1,200 officers and men, the Palestine troubles led to the authorization by Britain of an additional reserve combat force in the Legion of two cavalry companies, and one battalion of mounted (cars) Bedouins, the so-called "Bedouin Mechanized Force," with a strength of 350. Yet, at the outbreak of the Second World War, when Glubb had succeeded Peake as Commander of the Legion, its actual combat strength was barely over 800 men. Between 1926 and 1940 the Legion was no more than an internal security force; the few new officers admitted received hardly any military training: the emphasis was on police duties. In 1940, with the exception of Gen. John Glubb and Brig. Norman Lash, a large proportion of the other 35 to 40 officers were Arabs who had served under the Turks before 1918.

This situation however, did not obtain for very long. The exigencies of war enabled the Legion to recruit young officers for actual military training, and to expand its strength of enlisted ranks. Thus, in 1941 there was a total force of 1,300 (if urban and rural police were included, a total of over 1,500—but this figure excludes the separate TJFF of about 700). At the request of the General Officer Commanding, Middle East, the 1941 strength was expanded to seven armed and well-trained permanent battalions of about 350 men in each. In 1945 the total force was 8,000.

This force was used widely throughout the Middle East theater for guard duties over installations, oil pipelines, communication centers, ports and air fields, trains, and other land transport convoys. The brief participation of Legion units as scouts in the swift campaign in Iraq in May 1941 under Habforce, to quash the Rashid Ali al-Geylani pro-Axis regime; and in Syria and Lebanon in June 1941 to oust the Vichy forces, not only gave the Legion added operational experience, but also helped its further expansion and retraining as a military force.

This expansion was achieved by British financing and equipment. Towards the end of the war the Desert Mobile Force was enlarged from one regiment (one battalion, really) to three, organized in a brigade headquarters. It acquired a base training camp at Azraq, bought more transport, and generally experienced its most sustained training period.

However, with the exception of the Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon campaigns, the Legion's ground force remained basically a collection of garrison infantry units. When the mandate status of Transjordan was abolished in March 1946, and an independent kingdom proclaimed, the Legion entered an entirely new phase: the transition from a security force with limited military operational functions to a national army. The first stage in this transition period was marked by a continued conception of the Legion as an elite force. The Palestine War brought about its expansion into a more national military institution. The rest of our discussion will concern these two stages. Most of the illustrative data are drawn from the period of greatest expansion, 1948-56.

EXPANSION OF THE LEGION: 1948-56

The outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War in May 1948 found the Legion with an overall strength of 8,000, of whom only 4,500 were available for combat, with an officer strength of about 300. Their operational organization consisted of four mechanized (i.e., lorried) regiments (really battalions in strength). These were quickly reorganized in two brigade groups, with brigade headquarters, each comprising two regiments. In addition, there were two artillery batteries of four 25-lb. guns each, and seven garrison units trained primarily as guard stationary units without any tactical operational capabilities. They were mainly rifle companies, their heaviest weapon (they had no mortars) being a Bren gun per platoon. A division headquarters was

superimposed over this for purely administrative—without real operational—function. There were unfortunately very few officers with staff training to man it.

Moreover, the formal organization of the Legion did not until then provide a proper reserve force, despite a law passed in 1947 for the formation of such a force. Rather the Legion was a long-term enlisted regular military force. But there were no extensively organized or substantial supporting services such as engineers, supply and transport, workshops, medical corps (except for unit M.O.'s) or other technical services. Recruitment of British officers on a large scale had not begun in earnest until early 1948. It was accelerated between 1948 and 1953. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the Desert Mobile Force had expanded from one to three regiments. Despite these difficulties, the total strength of the Legion was raised by 1949-50 from 6,000 to 12,000. Over £ 6,000,000 were spent on the Legion even though the British subsidy authorized an expenditure of only £ 2,500,000. Britain, it seems, paid the balance.

The British forces had evacuated Palestine in May-August 1948, and even though their continued presence in the Suez Canal area meant that the Legion could still depend on them for help, distance and political considerations made it imperative for the Legion to create its own independent technical and other services. So at this juncture expansion of the Legion did not mean simply officer recruitment and training, but more significantly, technical training in new branches. The period 1948-56 was crucial in this respect.

A National Guard was trained and expanded in the 1950's. The latter reached a total strength of 30,000, recruited mainly from villagers, especially those living in villages on the Israeli border. The guardsmen were trained by regular Legion NCO's who were attached to village units. Usually a legionnaire wireless operator was also attached to National Guard units to maintain communications with regular Legion units and GHQ. Generally the National Guard was modelled after the British Territorial Army.

By 1953, the Legion comprised 17,000-20,000 officers and men, including base units. Meantime, its educational and training facilities had expanded greatly to deal with its needs, and its technical and supporting services had been founded. Artillery, engineers, and armor grew from regiment to arm, branch, or corps status. Over 1,000 new officers had to be trained to command a total Legion force of some 25,000 by 1956, 60,000 today.

The ratio of officers to the total strength of the Legion in 1956 (1,500:25,000) remained relatively low for an Arab army; 2,000-3,000:25,000 would have been a more common, although an inflated, officer ratio. But trained Arab soldiers were a limited source, one of the political bones of contention, as we shall see later, between Glubb and the king. After 1956, emphasis on staff and technical training increased, and this was politically significant both for the Legion and the country.

In the period 1950-57, the largest item in Jordan's budget was that of the military. The Legion spent more than all the regular ministries combined, the figure rising from £ 4,898,000 in 1951 (total budget expenditure for that year was £ 9,763,000) to £ 12,272,000 in 1957 (total budget expenditure for that year was £ 23,181,000).¹¹ A British annual subsidy and loans covered practically the total figure. This also had political implications to be discussed below. This was supplemented by other foreign aid from the United States and the United Nations, the latter especially for refugees. Such foreign subventions have accounted for 60-65 percent of the country's total revenue since then.

Training

Although regiments carried on much of their training within the unit, a Training Center to coordinate and develop all training for the Legion was established in 1950. In 1951, a formally organized Cadet School to train subalterns was opened.

The Training Center was organized basically into: (1) A School for Boys. Recruitment for this school was from Bedouin and other tribal groups. Boys came in as young as ten years, and normally spent seven years in the school before they were formally inducted into the Legion. The school was referred to as the "Education Wing" of the Training Center. (2) A "Training Wing" comprising "schools" or "sections" for tactics, small weapons, heavy weapons, provost marshal, administration and military justice, basic training (boot camp of sixteen weeks' duration), and a Police Training College.¹² All these courses were of under 3 months' duration (about 10 weeks), and enrolled an average of 24 men in each at any one time, except for boot camp which took in lots of 50 recruits at a time.

The Center was commanded and administered by a British officer (a colonel) with an Arab officer as second in command, an Arab adjutant, and an Arab quartermaster. Cadre officers on the staff of the Center were all hadari, i. e., townsmen, including all instructors. There were a few British warrant officers instructing drill and physical training. The Education Wing (Boys' School) was staffed largely by ex-Palestinians, mainly from Jerusalem, Nablus, and Tul Karem.

At GHQ, the Education Branch for the Legion, which supervised and controlled both the Amman Training Center and education officers and NCO's in all Legion units, was headed by an ex-TJFF lieutenant-colonel, a Christian from Madaba in Transjordan.

All officers until 1956 came from two categories: School boys from the Training Center would enter Cadet School, and NCO's would be sent to Cadet School. After Cadet School they would serve as subalterns with units. The difficulty with NCO's (this difficulty did not arise with cadets selected from the Boys' School) selected for officer training was their lack of adequate formal education. This, in turn, rendered them unsuitable for higher officer grades. They usually never rose beyond the grade of first lieutenant, and occasionally that of captain commanding an operational infantry or armored car company. Higher officer grades after 1953 implied a level of staff training which, in turn, required relatively higher educational qualifications and, in the case of the Legion, knowledge of English. By 1951-53, for instance, at least two Arab officers were dispatched each year to Sandhurst and/or Camberley for further training. As artillery, engineers, and armor grew, more Arab officers were sent to England for appropriate training in these branches.

While the bulk of recruits for Legion units continued to come from the Amman Training Center, further training was carried on within the units and arms of the service themselves. Specialized training was provided locally by the Training Wing of the Center, and advanced training was by exceptionally tight selection by General Glubb himself—for courses in the United Kingdom. Promotion whether to NCO ranks or officer grades remained a traditional Legion procedure, characterized by a series of examinations, performance ratings by unit commanders, and conduct criteria.

Engineers

The origins of the engineers is interesting because it called for ingenious improvisation. The First Field Engineer Unit was hastily formed in May 1948 as Legion units were crossing

the Jordan into Palestine. A sapper major seconded from the British Army borrowed a subaltern from the departing British forces in Palestine and gathered 30-40 men from various Legion units. None of these had engineer training, and many of them apparently were undesirable personnel, "throwouts" from their units. A hadari Arab officer, well-educated, but without engineer training, also joined. Thus the First Field Engineer Unit began with two British sapper officers, and, it seems, an Irish sapper NCO who had deserted from the Palestine British forces.

Equipment consisted mainly of picks, shovels, and some transport. There was no regular pattern of recruitment or training at this early stage, and not enough equipment to give adequate engineer support to an operational brigade group already engaged in combat in Palestine. Nevertheless, the unit built some roads, laid wire defensive perimeters, and carried out demolitions.

During the first truce in the Arab-Israeli War in June 1948, the unit descended upon Beit Nabala, near Ramallah (Jerusalem sector) to forage in engineer stores left behind by the British Army. There they acquired barbed wire and sand bags in sufficient quantities. The truce moreover gave the unit the chance to weed out the misfits and to organize their technical responsibilities for newly acquired communications, such as the remnants of the Palestine railway in the areas the Jordan Army controlled. Two more British officers, a major and a subaltern, were engaged on contract to strengthen their sapper force. At this stage, the unit was largely occupied with setting up defense works, building roads, laying wire, anti-tank obstacles, and mine fields. A forward base was formed south of Ramallah, and a rear base at Zerqa on the Transjordan side of the river. The latter eventually became the Engineer Base Camp of the Jordan Arab Army. By the end of 1948, this First Field Engineer Unit was ready to begin systematic training and operations.

Eight Legion NCO's, selected for their excellent infantry training record, were recruited to engineers. An Arab officer without engineer training was brought in for his excellent record in regimental administrative duties. A British contract officer came in to supervise general engineer training for both officers and men. Arab cadets were also posted to the unit as subalterns. All of these were East Bankers. The Irish "deserter" NCO was replaced by a British Sergeant Major of the Royal Engineers who was put in charge of sapper training. Significantly, the unit recruited craftsmen and tradesmen from among the Palestine refugees (about 40 craftsmen) rather successfully. Most of these had been civilians with the British Army in Palestine, or with the mandate government public services. After infantry boot camp, most of them became senior NCO's in engineers. In fact the railway, which until 1950-51 was the responsibility of engineers, was run with the aid of the ex-Palestine Railways employees. Meantime the British Army in the Canal area donated, sold, and lent tools and some heavy engineer equipment and stores to the unit. From the remnants of the Palestine Mandate Survey the unit recruited enough men to raise a survey section to handle cartography and minefield plotting. This section soon came to be commanded by an ex-Palestinian, who was commissioned a lieutenant.

At the beginning of 1949, the engineers could boast a strength of 300. The trained sapper soldiers in it were mainly Transjordanians; the tradesmen and technicians ex-Palestinians, and the officers British and Arab. Significantly though, this new technical service was almost 100 percent hadari, i.e., townsmen, in its composition. It included one Bedouin: a driver.

The prestige of the unit at that time was not too high, even though by the end of 1948 Arab second lieutenants who had been sent to Chatham, Kent for Young Officer (Y.O.) and School of Military Engineers (S.M.E.) training were beginning to join the engineers. Bedouin and other

tribesmen were not attracted by engineers partly because this involved manual work and partly because of their traditional outlook upon the Legion as a fighting force.

Successor British Commanding Officers of the engineers until 1956 have stated that the engineer branch continued to be mainly townsman in composition, with some peasants. But it included hardly any Bedouins. Tradesmen strength gradually became mixed Palestinian-Transjordanian. Officer and NCO training in Y.O. and S.M.E. courses in England increased. They also felt that much of the ethos of the engineer branch personnel was not military, but rather craftsman-bureaucratic. The tradesmen especially viewed their service in the Legion in lieu of secure civilian employment.

In July 1951, the field unit became known as the independent field squadron with a brigade major, and seven Arab officers, three of whom had been to Sandhurst and S.M.E. A major obstacle to further expansion was the unavailability of suitable Arab officers. There was until this time no school or training unit in which new officers and men could be given extensive, or adequate, engineer training. What they did, instead, was to take cadets and send them to the Y.O. and S.M.E. courses in England. But under this scheme no more than two cadets could be sent each year, or at any one time, and these had to know English. The latter requirement automatically reduced the number of qualified candidates. When, however, more field units were improvised and extensive field exercises held, a training wing was set up, which later became the engineer training squadron. As more senior Arab officers were sent to Chatham for field engineering training, it became possible to train NCO's and men within the units themselves.

The Legion, however, was expanding rapidly since 1951 into more brigade groups. It became difficult to create, equip, and train independent field squadrons to support these groups. So, in 1952, engineers were allowed to reorganize as a regiment. A base camp with training grounds, workshops, magazines, and stores was developed. But this, in turn, posed serious problems with regard to equipment and personnel shortages, as well as with regard to administration. By spring 1953, a complete division field engineer regiment (including signals) was created. Its most critical shortage was trained officers. This was, perforce of circumstances, met by the use of subalterns with only a few years officer experience. Systematic training on a crash basis was however, put under way in both the units and the base camp. As new squadrons were formed and trained they were attached to the various brigade groups for engineer support service.

Artillery

The formal organization of artillery did not begin seriously until 1951. At that time it comprised one regiment of field artillery (two batteries of four 25-pound guns each and an anti-tank battery). The personnel were predominantly Bedouin. The officers, however, were all hadari. In 1951, it expanded to three regiments of three, instead of two batteries each—an organizational pattern similar to the British. A new antitank and light antiaircraft regiment was formed. All new recruits came from the Amman Training Center; officers from the Cadet School. In the light antiaircraft regiment all personnel were townsmen, many of them West Bankers, and a few Circassians.

Artillery training was conducted within the army's units. Gunnery instructors were all British. Officers among the latter were seconded from the British Army to serve as instructor gunners. By 1953 there were about fifteen of these, including the brigade major. In addition to these, there were a number of British warrant officers also serving as instructors.

in 1952, however, an Artillery School within the arm was founded. There was apparently no set level of formal education required for admission into the school, so long as trainees were literate and had some knowledge of the most elementary mathematics.

Infantry (Including Armored Car Regiments)

In a country like Jordan, infantry (which has been mobile or mechanized) is the core element in the army, crucial to the security and stability of the regime. Until 1956, there were nine infantry regiments and two armored car regiments. Seven of the former were 90 percent Bedouin in composition. Both armored car regiments were almost wholly Bedouin. The strength of an infantry regiment varied between 350 and 500 officers and men, whereas an armored car regiment was always over-strength and in excess of infantry regiments, often mustering 700-800 officers and men. Officer strength in an infantry regiment varied from 30 to 35 all grades, including subalterns (cadets, really); whereas in an armored car regiment this strength often exceeded 40-45 officers.

In a typical infantry regiment there were at any one time nineteen subalterns, eight second lieutenants, four first lieutenants, and two captains (all Arabs) in addition to a British CO, usually a lieutenant-colonel. All officers were promoted from the ranks by a series of examinations, except for the cadets who came from Cadet School. Captains in 1956 had been born between 1915 and 1920; first lieutenants in the early 1920's; second lieutenants in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Most enlistments in the ranks (with the exception of long-term service NCO's) had begun in the late 1930's and throughout the 1940's. (It should be noted, however, that dates of birth of officers and other ranks were not always accurate, especially among the tribal personnel.)

Thus the average age of cadet-subalterns was 23-24 years. The average formal education level was about fifth elementary, or seventh elementary in army school. The very few non-Bedouin officers became signal officers, since many of them spoke some English.¹³ Tribal distribution in infantry units varied widely in regard to major tribes, groups, and sub-groups, with a prevalence of Nejdīs from Arabia and Shammar from the north and northeast. Nevertheless, major tribal groups from within Jordan, especially the south, were adequately represented. The vast majority of the personnel were married, and some had more than one wife.¹⁴ All officers had passed various training and specialized courses such as administration, drill, signals, antitank, weapons, and map reading.

Among the warrant officers and top NCO's (top sergeants and sergeants) the age distribution was higher than that among cadets and lieutenants. This was roughly about 30 years, with 10-15 years' Legion service. The clerical-administrative NCO's were almost exclusively hadari, often or frequently from the West Bank. Many of them had some secondary education and knew both Arabic and English. All NCO's and men could, however, carry on with further education within the Legion to attain equivalent levels of civilian schooling.

Transfers from some infantry regiments at one time to the police or gendarmerie force, and to training duty with the National Guard were used by CO's to get rid of undesirable personnel. Two-thirds of the Bedouins who left a regiment after a five-year enlistment usually returned to their tribe. Those who could re-enlist did so, for inability to re-enlist was considered by them to be a calamity.

In the armored car regiments, recruits came mainly from the Amman Training Center. Tribal groups and subgroup distribution could vary as widely as from 60 to 70 such groups in

a regiment. The second-in-command was always an Arab. Procedures and patterns of officer promotion were similar to those in infantry regiments. The educational level of personnel amounted to the equivalent of four to five years of school. One of the two car regiments had only one townsman, a Sandhurst-trained officer, with troop command. Its signals officer was also a townsman; and so were the administrative NCO's. By 1956, however, infantry—but particularly armored car regiments—already showed a higher proportion of West Bankers in their composition. These began to come in especially as mechanics and maintenance personnel.

While the operational organization of armored car regiments in their early days consisted roughly of four car squadrons, plus a headquarters squadron, later on the number of regiments was increased and these were all reorganized into an armored brigade headquarters.

Technical Services

One of the most impressive developments in the rapid expansion of the Legion in 1948-56 was the setting up from scratch of elaborate technical support services for the army.

In 1946-48, the Legion consisted of three motorized regiments, plus two static garrison groups. Between them they had 400 miscellaneous vehicles, largely obtained from the British Army, about nine or ten 3.7 howitzers, plus the usual small arms, i.e., rifles, light machine-guns, and revolvers.

The Legion operated a small base workshop in Amman and another smaller field workshop near the Palestine border, involving about 350 men. A British officer directed the Amman base workshop; two other British officers served with the field workshop. These were assisted by about seven British NCO's.

But these workshops were capable of only very light repairs for vehicles. Heavier repairs were normally done by British army workshops in Palestine, which also provided the Legion with all spare parts for vehicles. Civilian contractors in both Transjordan and Palestine were engaged for certain major technical repairs, such as engine overhauls. Only with the end of the British mandate in Palestine did the Legion face the task of providing complete technical services for its units. On the other hand, the rapid expansion of the Legion engendered the need of technical maintenance for bigger, more varied, and complex weapons and transport vehicles. The formation of such new arms as armor, artillery, and engineers with weapons and technical equipment (such as signals) more sophisticated than anything the Legion had handled until that time further emphasized this need.

By 1953, there were over 4,000 vehicles in the Legion from motor cars, trucks, and armored cars to tanks, heavy weapons, and other complex equipment.¹⁵ The Base Technical Organization (BTO) of the Legion was by then capable of servicing this equipment, together with that of three field artillery regiments and the light antiaircraft regiment. The BTO came to comprise 2,300 officers and men, including workshops, stores, vehicle depots, Mechanics Training School (MTS), Driving School (DS) and ancillary services. The 2,300 figure included students in both of these schools.

The establishment comprised 35-40 officers commanded by a British colonel, 4-5 other British officers, and 16-20 British enlisted men. The MTS and DS establishment had a 25 percent NCO complement. Moreover, the overall composition of the BTO was 90 percent hadari (townsman) and 10 percent Bedouin. Of the former, 20 percent were West Bankers,

i.e., ex-Palestinians. This percentage must be higher today. In the Divisional Technical Organization (DTO, i.e., technical service groups attached to various units, e.g., infantry brigades, artillery, armor, engineers, etc.) 80 percent of the personnel were townsmen, and 20 percent Bedouin. Again, of the former, 20 percent came from the West Bank.

Recruitment in 1946-48 was by a process of selection by examination and interview. Two qualified students each year would be selected to attend a three-year automotive engineering course in the United Kingdom. In some years as many as six such candidates were selected. The CO of the BTO set the examination papers in mathematics, very elementary physics and mechanics at approximately university matriculation level. He also marked the papers, which were all in English. This naturally limited the number of potential candidates to those who knew English. The Chief of Staff, namely, General Glubb, made the final selection, though not strictly on the basis of examination results. While studying in the United Kingdom these personnel carried the rank of cadet. At the successful completion of the course, they were commissioned lieutenants in the Legion to serve with the BTO. Thus, the system primarily aimed at the training of a cadre of officers for the technical services. Yet, apart from these technically trained cadres, all other officers in the BTO were recruited and promoted according to the prevailing pattern in the Legion, i.e., largely from the ranks and from the Cadet School.

In 1948-49, a more rapid expansion of the BTO set in, with the enlistment of West Bankers who were tradesmen, clerk-storemen of varying skills, and some ex-TJFF personnel who had just been released from that disbanded force. Yet until 1956, recruitment of such tradesmen and other personnel with technical skills was limited by the requirement of basic military training for all enlistees. The practice of direct commissions, even on temporary contract terms, for graduate mechanical and other engineers or university and high school graduates was never considered by the Legion. In fact, General Glubb was vehemently opposed to such procedure.

Enlisted men reflected the usual educational level prevalent in other branches and units of the Legion, i.e., from semiliteracy to fourth elementary. The educational level of senior NCO's, however, ranged from fourth elementary to first secondary. The vast majority of officers did not have any higher formal educational qualifications.

With the phenomenal growth of Amman and other towns in 1949-56, the best tradesmen tended, by that time, to leave the Legion for more remunerative civilian employment. Yet, in the absence of complex industries--in fact, so long as the army remains the largest single industry in the country--the attraction and retention of technically skilled personnel will not be critically difficult.

The preceding illustrations of the organization and structure of certain units suggest that, until 1956 at least, the Legion was still trying to retain its original character of a highly trained, mobile corps d'élite.

POLITICAL-SOCIAL GROUPS AND THE LEGION

Until the incorporation of Central Palestine into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, political party activity in the country was limited in aims and scope. In the 1920's and 1930's, parties were permitted by Abdullah to organize and operate under license, e.g., the Istiqlalists (Independence Party) and the Jordan Arab Party. Leaders of parties usually represented sectional interests of tribal chiefs, notables, and the very small propertied upper class. Most of

them aimed at extracting a greater share of power by demanding the curtailment of the monarch's prerogatives. These parties were agreed, however, on the existence of the emirate, and were not in any way seeking the overthrow of the ruling house. Even if some among them harbored such aspirations, the mandate relationship with Britain until 1946 would have rendered their fulfillment a near impossibility. Until his assassination, King Abdullah managed to curtail, and frequently suppress, ideological groups of both ends of the political spectrum. Only in the traditional Transjordanian groups described did he see a useful adjunct to his essentially tribal-autocratic rule.

The accession to the throne of his young grandson in April 1953 unavoidably heralded the risky inauguration of a new era. King Hussein embarked upon a deliberate policy of political liberalization. In May 1953, the new Prime Minister, Fawzi Pasha al-Mulqi, a king's man, to parallel fundamental reforms in government and its institutions, extended the freedom of political association. The political parties that emerged reflected the changes that had occurred, especially as a result of the Palestinian situation. The parties which were organized between 1952 and 1956 reflected three political trends in the country. First, the traditional Transjordanian groupings, old-type tribal chiefs, notables, and landlords, generally loyal to the monarchy and anxious to retain their political ascendancy and privileged status in an expanded realm that now included a more advanced, but alienated and embittered, population, continued to exist and function. Second, groups and parties with conservative ideological coloration, particularly a militant Islamic one, became active.

The Ex-Palestinians

Third, a number of groups and parties reflecting ideological tendencies against the status quo, which ranged from the mild socialist and the Pan-Arab nationalist to the Communist appeared on the scene, heavily populated by ex-Palestinians. It became apparent by 1956 that the Baath and the National Socialists had a relatively large following: townsmen and villagers, petty bourgeoisie, and intelligentsia, especially in the West Bank. The Arab Baath party in 1952 (renamed in 1954 the Arab Baath Socialist party) was a Jordanian branch of a wider organization cutting across Arab state boundaries. Along with leftist elements and a few Communists it organized a National Front. Many of its leaders and members were ex-Palestinians, especially from the Ramallah-Jerusalem and Nablus areas.

The ex-Palestinians considered their incorporation into the Kingdom of Jordan the unilateral act of an ambitious Arab ruler, and against their wishes. They did not consider their continued existence in an Arab enclave of Palestine the consequence of a saving action by an Arab army—the Legion. Rather they viewed the latter as the willing instrument of this ambitious ruler in acquiring territory. They now constituted over 65 percent of the total population of the Kingdom. In contrast to the Transjordanians they considered themselves economically, socially, and politically more sophisticated. Moreover, they tended to be attracted to Pan-Arab and Arab nationalist views of groups and parties active elsewhere in the Arab world. This was particularly the trend after they had lost what they considered to be Arab territory—their country. The Baath and the National Socialists had a small following among officers, particularly those in the administrative and technical branches of the Legion. More dangerous was that the Baathists, for instance, and in 1936 the Arab Nationalists, were concerned with the fundamental question of whether Jordan should exist as a nation-state at all, or whether it should be part of a larger Arab sovereign entity. To this extent these new parties reflected not only the alienation and frustration of ex-Palestinians who until that time saw no reason why they should be loyal to a monarchy which many of them considered traitorous to the so-called Arab cause, but also the effects of the gusty winds of a new Arabism preached from Cairo and

Damascus. To this extent also, these were not Jordanian parties in the sense of national groups. There was no fundamental agreement between them and among their members that the Jordanian state was viable, or even desirable.

After union, and particularly soon after the assassination of King Abdullah in July 1951, the country entered upon a most precarious political transition. King Talal's accession to the throne and his quick abdication (deposition on medical grounds of acute schizophrenia), gave an opening to anti-Hashemite political elements whose major support and inspiration came from the West Bank.

The Integration Policy

Most commentators on Jordan have repeatedly referred to the courage displayed by its young monarch in times of crisis, and to his luck. Unfortunately they have not underlined his political sagacity in attracting a composite political elite to his service. Whereas his grandfather was a ruler of great, though controversial, vision in the context of the wider arena of politics among Arab states, King Hussein has limited any such visions he may have had, and instead has identified exactly the forces within his state to which he must respond.

When Arab Palestine was annexed in 1948, there were twice as many Palestinians as there were Transjordanians (roughly 750,000:350,000), and over half of the newcomers were destitute refugees. The foremost concern of the refugees—and soon the settled population in Central Palestine—at that time was for security. This need was mitigated, if not fully met, by King Abdullah's act of merging the two Banks. At the beginning representation remained unequal: a Transjordanian minority remained politically privileged and in effective control of government. Yet, the gradual but wholehearted integration of an ever-increasing number of West Bankers into the echelons of government—the Cabinet, the legislature, the courts, the bureaucracy—successfully eroded any elitist intransigence on the part of Transjordanians. The king even risked as early as 1954 entrusting the portfolio of defense to an ex-Palestinian. The position of Chief of General Staff, however, continues to be a prerogative of Transjordanians. But even that may go to an ex-Palestinian in the future, as surely as the premiership of the country may go that way soon.

Because King Hussein—and here perhaps is where his political shrewdness was manifested at its best—avoided identification with the exclusive, intransigent, pro-monarchical, conservative old Transjordanians, and responded to new forces, despite a period of civil disturbances, real violence was successfully avoided.

The king sensed that the opposition which appeared since the union of the two Banks differed in nature from the opposition that arose from time to time under his grandfather's rule. The only practical riposte to an ambitious, leftist, supra-Jordanian Arab nationalism (mainly from the West Bank) appeared to him to be the political integration of its leadership into the elite of the state institutions. In retrospect, this seems to be the explanation of Hussein's so-called "rolling with the nationalist punch" in 1956-57.

Simultaneously, he consciously, gradually integrated the new elements into the Legion in order to transform it into a national army. In doing this, the monarch has managed to continue to identify himself with the traditional forces in the Legion while at the same time he has captured the leadership of a viable integrative process so essential to the political stability of his country. The most interesting and encouraging aspect of this transformation of the Legion into a national army since the 1951-56 period has been the understanding of the monarch

that the success of this delicate operation depended in great measure upon the smooth and adroit political and administrative integration of the two communities in Jordan.

It is not unfair, on the basis of the evidence that was available to the present author, to state that until 1956 General Glubb believed that he could maintain the Legion as a corps d'élite and, whether consciously or unconsciously, resisted the inevitable influx into the technical branches of skilled ex-Palestinians. In his tight control of recruitment policy, promotions to the lowest enlisted ranks, and the final choice of candidates for further training after examination results, Glubb was trying to maintain a politically safe cohesion within the Legion. The unprecedented expansion of the Legion, however, in the years 1951-56, and the need for greater self-sufficiency in services that could not possibly be manned by the normal traditional recruit for the Legion began to unavoidably erode his old conception of the Legion.

A part of the king's integration policy was the merging of the Legion with the National Guard in 1956. Until then the National Guard was a separate organization, though trained and controlled by Legion GHQ. The merging of these two institutions into a total force of about 55,000 officers and men meant bringing into closer proximity Legion officers with National Guardsmen who were largely Palestinian border villagers. The integration of these two forces was a deliberate act of the government to associate the West Bankers with the Legion, in order to make defense, especially against Israel, a commonly and more widely shared national responsibility. It was an attempt to merge an essentially elite force of tribesmen and Bedouins who came from Transjordan and neighboring countries to the east and northeast, with a territorial frontier force consisting of settled agricultural peasants, villagers and townsmen. Another step taken by the king was the separation of the police and gendarmerie from the Legion in July 1956.

The monarch in Jordan has minimized the antiregime political activity of Palestinians and thus their inclination to infiltrate the officer corps by expanding the ruling elite and responding gradually but positively to some of their nationalist demands since 1954. He has, in effect, related them meaningfully and effectively to an evolving social and political order. By gradually changing the system that prevailed under his grandfather, King Hussein has in great measure minimized the sources of disturbance. In this way, opposition to the monarchy and to King Hussein himself has been successfully eliminated, but opposition to the very notion of a Jordanian state has not been eliminated, even though the assimilation described above of a number of leaders of this opposition may have lessened its future chances.

Sociopolitical Divisions in the Legion

One of the most significant aspects of the patterns of training and recruitment remained that of the overwhelming Bedouin-tribal composition of infantry and armor units on the one hand, and the predomination of hadari (townsmen) personnel in the technical branches on the other. The only hadari officers and NCO's in infantry and armor until 1956 were very few administrative, interpreting, clerical, and educational sections of the headquarters establishment in a regiment or a brigade. Technical maintenance squadrons attached to units were also hadari. But these were in a minority, and normally had no troop or line command in the units.

Regimental and other commanders did observe a certain antipathy between Bedouin-tribal and hadari elements in units. The Bedouin was, if not inimical, at least scornfully indifferent to the hadari officer or NCO. Occasionally a hadari officer or NCO had to be transferred out of a unit because of this feeling which frequently engendered a tense atmosphere.

Moreover, given the wide and varied tribal distribution of Bedouin personnel, intertribal friction within regiments constituted another dimension of the unit disciplinary problem for the commanding officers.

The sense of collective responsibility and security (the "sacred collectivity") so central to a Bedouin or tribal society carried over to the Legion. Though generally disciplined and loyal—especially to their CO, to the Pasha (General Glubb) and to the monarch—the Bedouins tended to stick together against all outsiders. Even though with the passage of time the Bedouin officer and NCO after long military service identified somewhat less with their tribes, whenever their interests, careers, or security were threatened they invariably resorted to the assistance offered by the sacred tribal collectivity.

For the period under discussion the attitude of officers and NCO's was of two kinds. On the one hand, the tribesman-Bedouin in the Legion (overwhelmingly in infantry and armor) understood loyalty in personal terms, not on any higher institutional level. He was loyal to the commanding officer of his regiment, the Pasha, "our father, Father of Faris", and "Our Master" the king. The latter personified the army, because the Bedouin, when inducted, took an oath to serve "king and country." As will be shown, in the political disturbances of the period October 1954-January 1956, the Bedouin's attitude clearly was one which assumed that only the hadari—the town slicker—officer could be involved in politics. To some extent this may have been a rationalization—or another way of expression—of the constant, underlying friction (a result of the antipathy referred to earlier) between Bedouin and hadari elements in the Legion.¹⁶

On the other hand, the attitude of hadari officers and NCO's is both more complex and more crucial to any political involvement of the military. First, one must bear in mind that before 1949-50 the townsman officers and NCO's in the Legion came mainly from the few, sparsely populated towns of Transjordan: Salt, Irbid, Amman, Kerak, Madaba. Very few of these had anything approximating higher education; a few of them had completed secondary school. In this sense, they did not represent a highly sophisticated group of urbanites. Moreover, they rarely received direct commissions, since this practice was unknown—and unacceptable—to the Legion. The long process of promotion and strict GHQ and British unit supervision imposed a discipline which even the more ambitious and devious among them would have found too difficult to circumvent. Meanwhile, staff experience until the early 1950's remained limited. Their training when in Cadet School, or within the unit, was more practical and applied than it was academic and theoretical (as part of the training in military academies and staff colleges can be).¹⁷ Only with rapid expansion of the Legion did systematic staff training of a greater number of Arab officers begin. During this period also the largest intake of townsmen—including those to be trained for commissions—especially from the West Bank (i.e., ex-Palestinians) occurred. These came mainly into the technical branches of the army: a potentially significant political group. Until the Palestine War, however, there was no overriding political consideration that would have influenced the political attitudes of hadari officers, or affected their loyalty to the monarchy.

Nevertheless the two instances of political involvement of officers in Jordan that I propose to discuss were led by East Bankers. These have been, so far, the only known overt attempts by army officers to challenge the monarch's authority and to overthrow his regime. The bulk of the conspirators, but not the two leaders, in both coup attempts, were officers in the administrative and technical branches of the Legion. British regimental commanders suspected as early as 1953 the informal existence of what they called an "administrative network" of politically oriented officers inimical to both the Chief of the General Staff and to the regime. General Glubb, however, tended to consider any political involvement of Legion

officers as strictly the result of external influence, in these instances, mainly Egyptian influence. While it is true there was Egyptian exploitation of the unstable political situation in Jordan in the 1950's, a categorical rejection of any other basis for the political involvement of Legion officers was clearly a misjudgment of the situation on the part of the Chief of the General Staff. To some extent it reflected his loss of touch with the overall new conditions in the Legion brought about by rapid expansion and change.¹⁸

There have been, of course, repeated occasions in which the resources of the military have been called upon by the monarch in order to cope with civil-political disturbances and to retain firm political control over the country. The two most critical such occasions were in the period October 1954-January 1956, and in April 1957. On both occasions the predominantly tribal-Bedouin ground operational units (i.e., mechanized infantry and armor) were clearly the upholders of the status quo, never hesitating to use force against civilian political groups.

Regarding the ability of the military in Jordan currently to act as an effective political force, one must say, on the basis of this study at least, that the Legion so far cannot do so. Tribal and familial primary loyalties, and the hadari-Bedouin dichotomy have yet to be superseded by any universal perspectives of a professional ethic, a sense of public responsibility, or a feeling of corporateness. Although the old nexus of army loyalty to the monarch-chief (which was colored by both religious and tribal premises of allegiance and legitimacy) may now be undergoing a transformation to a loyalty towards a nation-state entity, the 50 percent tribal element in the army makes a facile generalization hazardous.

The monarch has been careful to retain this traditional, conservative, Transjordanian tribal element as the predominant one in the operational ground force units, namely, infantry and armored car regiments, which thus constitute a corps d'élite. The army continues to be headed by a chief of general staff who is a member of the Majali tribe from Kerak and the ex-commander of the royal bodyguard. The deputy chief of general staff is the younger maternal uncle of the king, although very much a professional army officer. The director of public security is also an army officer and a member of one of the southern tribes. His deputy, however, is a townsman, an ex-artillery colonel. There is no evidence that tribal groups and the tribal ethos are being eroded as rapidly as in countries where the potential of economic development, including industrialization, is greater. Whatever is done in Jordan, its economic development potential will remain limited. Conditions which could transform the tribal sectors of Jordanian society thus are not massively present in the country. To this extent the tribesman can continue to identify himself with the military establishment and its function and to maintain his traditional role of warrior, because it is not being rapidly superseded by available alternatives for him in civilian life.

On the other hand, the technical branches, including the rapidly expanding royal air force, are creating a new group of better educated, more sophisticated townsman (West Bank) officers and NCO's. The technical expansion of the army may also offer the increased number of townsmen-tradesmen the best alternative of secure employment. One must assume that the further integration of West Bankers into the army, whether as recruits, NCO's, or officers will have political repercussions for the army in particular and the country in general. These repercussions may not be dangerous so long as operational ground forces and officers with troop command remain predominantly tribal-Bedouin and Transjordanian in composition. It is conceivable, though, that the more technical units will expand to the point of becoming a potent political force within the army's command structure.

To separate once more the National Guard, largely composed of ex-Palestinian villagers, from the army has also been recently considered. As mentioned earlier, these two

organizations were merged in 1956-57. The argument for separating them derives from the notion that fraternization between personnel of the two forces could produce politically unwelcome results. National Guard personnel, who are only part-time and not professional soldiers, are more receptive to antiregime political subversion.

Whether it is possible ever to transform the Legion into a truly national army is a difficult question to answer. I am inclined to the view that it is not. For this is closely linked to the question of whether the incorporated population of Central Palestine will ever feel totally Jordanian. The case of their present generation of political leaders indicates that this may be on the way. But can it be accomplished without a vaster national education system (a university was opened only three years ago) and national conscription? In the case of the first—education—Jordan lacks the qualified manpower for schools, colleges, and a university. It must import these from neighboring Arab countries. And imponderable dangers lurk in this eventuality. In the case of the second—a truly national army—the government might run the risk of tampering with the delicate balance which the tribal corps d'élite provides in the army at present.

Political-Social Divisions in Jordan Today

There still lingers in Jordan the division between one group, which has apparently become smaller and less significant since 1961, which doubts the rationality and usefulness of the state of Jordan, and another which considers the existence of Jordan as desirable. The army buttresses the latter group, because of the tribal corps d'élite within the army and also because of the close relationship of this elite to the monarch. The sociological division between tribes and settled communities, and the political division between East and West Banks will, it seems, continue to exist for some time to come, because it is unlikely that there will be a detribalization of the desert, for the reasons mentioned above. And these desert tribes will continue to form the sources of recruitment for the corps d'élite of ground forces in the army which supports the existence of Jordan. But, short of a total success of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to be described below, an open split between the two Banks is unlikely.

Integration is perhaps the young king's greatest achievement so far. When at one time nationalism in Jordan united behind the throne only the old, conservative Transjordanians, while it divided the alienated Palestinians from them, today the latter's nationalism does not appear as vehemently committed against the status quo. Rather the ex-Palestinians are interested in becoming the major, if not sole, recruiting ground from which the elite, with whose aid the monarch shall rule, will come. It is not fair to argue that such a trend reflects no more than the temporary, or passing, failure of Arabism—as preached by Cairo and Damascus—to realize its aims. That this failure has a sobering and felicitous effect upon ex-Palestinian Jordanians, there is no doubt. But there is a more positive and independent reason for the change in the attitude of ex-Palestinians towards both the king and what they now consider their country of Jordan. The nature and context of Palestinian Arab politics have changed since 1949. The Arab loss of Palestine unavoidably discredited the anti-Hashemite leaders of Arab political organization there, namely, the Husseinis. These are no more. The present generation of leaders that has emerged—men in their thirties, forties, and some even in their fifties—is a new one in the sense that it is well-educated and professionally trained; the intellectuals in its ranks have barely a connection with the religious traditionalism or conservatism of the earlier generation of leaders. Some of the new generation are already in the Legion officer corps.

Moreover, the earlier political alienation of the Palestinians never erupted into an armed resistance movement, but confined itself to assassination of Abdullah and flirtation with wider

external Arab political forces. The Palestinians cannot separate from Jordan, for they would not be able alone to withstand the Israeli threat. To receive outside assistance, they would have to overthrow the present Jordanian regime. But the latter possibility they cannot entertain because the army, as presently constituted, would not allow it. The only alternative left would be to infiltrate the army and wean its officer corps away from their commander in chief. As will be seen, in the instances of the Tel and Abu Nuwar incidents, this infiltration was limited. As more Palestinians participate in the allocation of the country's resources and the formation and implementation of its political programs, infiltration will, despite the recruitment changes occurring in the army, become still more difficult. Moreover, so long as the monarch continues to effectively lead the army, competitors for this role become still more limited in number. This is not to say that the problem of succession will not arise in all its complex and politically explosive possibilities in the future. But here, too, the composition and political loyalty of the army will be crucial.

Given the fact that an originally fractious society in Transjordan was brought under the control of a central government by the use of the Legion; and given the fact of the still lingering division between ex-Palestinians and Transjordanians—a muted split currently, but nevertheless one that is easily prone to fanning by outside influences—one cannot contemplate a political system in Jordan that is not based on a strong ruler (in this case a Hashemite monarch), supported by an army which includes a promonarchical corps d'élite within it. Despite its questionable popularity, the monarchy in Jordan is a working principle of authority and legitimacy. The challenges thrown against it since 1951, primarily by the West Bank community, have been met successfully in two ways: by the use of the Legion, and by a parallel, though cautious, legal-institutional integration policy on the political and economic levels of nation-state existence. Given the political splits and sociological divisions, it is uncertain, were the present regime to be overthrown, what formula of political authority the Jordanians (both East and West) could conceivably agree upon, let alone do so peacefully.

The Palestine Liberation Organization

There is one source of possible conflict and political upheaval that may involve the army. That is the Palestine Liberation Organization launched and organized under Arab League auspices in the spring of 1965 and largely with its financial support (mainly Egypt's) now operating from headquarters in Beirut.¹⁹ Its training of commando units, consisting of Palestinians, first to infiltrate and attack Israeli positions across Arab borders, and later to shoulder the major task of "liberating" Palestine by an armed attack, is based on the premise that only Palestinians themselves can successfully prepare and organize for the retrieval of Palestine. Such activity, however, can undermine the precarious truce currently prevailing between Israel and Jordan, and bring Israeli retaliation against the regular Jordan Army.

Border clashes, not merely Israeli attacks against Jordan and Jordanian villager infiltration across the lines, have been, and remain, a serious political problem in Jordan, and one that could perilously undermine the stability of the regime. It is for this reason that the government and the Legion are adamant in preventing such border infiltration by Arab villagers. In fact, there is legal provision for the prosecution of infiltrators. The overextended resources of the Legion across a 400-mile border do not present a comfortable military situation from the Jordanian point of view. Moreover, any inadequate countermeasure to Israeli retaliation by the Legion because of its limited resources inevitably brings political disturbances. Hence, Jordan officially and actively opposes the paramilitary activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In the absence of national conscription, the PLO may succeed in recruiting ex-Palestinian Jordanians into its guerrilla and other paramilitary units. The very fact that the Organization proposes to liberate Palestine implies the serious political argument that the present Jordanian control of Central Palestine does not represent Arab authority at all. To this extent, the Organization represents a political movement which, in order to realize its aims, must necessarily alienate those ex-Palestinians who are now subjects of the Jordanian Kingdom from their king. Moreover, the PLO constitutes a potential armed force under the direction of a conspiratorial political group.²⁰

There have been indications this year (1966) that King Hussein is considering the possibility of a military service law that would encompass all citizens, including ex-Palestinians. It could conceivably undermine the divisive effect and appeal of the PLO. It could also have the added effect of assisting the acceleration of the political integration of the two Banks. So far, however, there has been no conscription law in Jordan.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

In this section army involvement in politics will be illustrated by six accounts of events: (1) the Col. Abdullah al-Tel incident of 1949; (2) opposition to British command of the Legion; (3) the political turmoil around the Baghdad Pact; (4) the dismissal of General Glubb in 1956; (5) opposition to British subsidy of the Legion; and (6) the abortive coup allegedly led by Gen. Ali Abu Nuwar in April 1957. A theme seeming to tie together these events is the existence of antagonism between anti-British, anti-Western Arab nationalists, and the Baath, supported by Syria and Egypt, on the one side; and King Abdullah, and King Hussein, supported by Britain and the West, on the other side. After these six accounts, reasons for the failure of coups and the problem of professionalism in the military will be discussed.

The Col. Abdullah al-Tel Incident of 1949

Col. Abdullah al-Tel was born in 1918 in the town of Irbid in Transjordan. Before the rapid growth of Amman, Irbid was the most populous town in the country. After graduating from the local secondary school, he was employed briefly as a customs officer on the Palestine-Transjordan frontier. Early in the Second World War he enlisted in the Legion, and was assigned as orderly room clerk to a company. He then went through the usual Legion promotion channels and obtained a commission.

When the Arab-Israeli War broke out in May 1948, Tel had just been promoted from captain to major that March. He was commanding one of the garrison companies which came to man the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem. During these operations, three of the infantry garrison companies were improvised into a battalion (a Jordanian regiment, that is) and Tel was made commanding officer (CO) of the regiment, but still with the rank of major.

According to the account of General Glubb it seems that, while on one of his inspection tours of units, the late King Abdullah was impressed by Tel's briefing on operations while the unit was under mortar fire. In recognition of such courage, the king promoted Tel to the rank of lieutenant-colonel on the spot. Glubb makes no secret of his putting through the promotion papers only because of the royal command; nor of his having expressed his disapproval to the king on the grounds that Tel had no seniority in rank.²¹ In any event, Tel came to command the 6th Infantry Regiment in the Jerusalem sector.

At that time Jerusalem was the center of political agitation and opposition against King Abdullah of Jordan. The articulate members of the public in general and its leaders in particular were embittered by what in the summer of 1948 looked like a losing Arab cause in Palestine at large. By his own admission Tel contemplated a coup against the regime as early as December 1948.²² He further stated that he had broached the idea to a number of "sincere" or "loyal" officers, on the grounds that there was need for change in the country. He explained that he never approached any number of officers as a group but always individually, so that strict secrecy could be better observed. He referred to these officers as "Free (or Liberal) Officers."²³

Of the Arab armies that had entered Palestine to prevent the establishment of the state of Israel, all seemed by then well on the way to military defeat, except for the Legion, which had secured the Old City, as well as certain quarters outside the walls. The implication was that treacherous factors aided this advantageous situation of the Legion, including the latter's inability, or unwillingness, to go to the aid of the tottering Egyptian forces in the battle of the Negev. Clearly, Tel's first major weapon in hatching the conspiracy was the suggestion that (a) the Legion was not doing all it could in the war effort against the Israelis, (b) it was not doing all it could because it was commanded by Englishmen, and (c) the king was party to all this, and should be removed.

The last point was crucial in Tel's political campaign. Not only had Abdullah been identified in the minds of Palestinian Arabs for a generation as the trusted friend of the British, but also as the arch-enemy of their traditional political leaders, the Husseinis. Some among the latter had led the Palestinian Arab armed resistance against the Jews before the Arab armies entered the conflict. Tel had in his possession extensive blackmail material in the form of photostatic copies of the secret correspondence between Abdullah and the Israelis, who had been negotiating to reach some agreement—and peace—since 1947. Tel, moreover, had been present at some of the meetings between the Israeli delegates and the king at his winter palace in Shuna.

Thus, in addition to his convenient location in embattled and embittered Jerusalem as CO of the 6th Regiment, Tel had been singled out by royal favor as special courier and secret emissary of the king in his delicate negotiations with the Israelis. As commander of the 6th Regiment, deployed within the walls, Tel was in constant communication with an international brigade of journalists as well as Israeli military personnel from the other side. Journalists swarmed into the Holy City since its fate had attracted world concern. Tel spoke for the Legion within the walls. The other regiment fighting outside the walls did not attract as much attention. Moreover, it was commanded by a British officer.

When in February-April 1949 the Jordanians negotiated and signed an armistice agreement with the Israelis in Rhodes under UN auspices, Tel was appointed Governor of Jerusalem, relinquishing his regimental command. This removed him from GHQ control and placed him under civilian administrative authority. It was from this position that Tel began to explore his coup possibilities with two kinds of political allies. First, he approached civilian anti-Hashemite leaders in Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus, Tul Karem, and Hebron. In Ramallah especially, the Baath party (originally founded in Syria) had a large following. It was led by Abdullah al-Rimawi—at that time in the political wilderness. Through its press, a steady campaign against the regime was conducted with the active encouragement of the governor, Tel.

Central Palestine secured by the Legion was incorporated (annexed) to the kingdom by a resolution of the Jericho Congress in December 1948, and ratified by the Transjordanian Parliament the same month. The annexation of Arab Palestine by Abdullah was now a fact,

and a clear and challenging answer to the All-Arab Government of all Palestine was formed there.

It was public knowledge that the Egyptians were unhappy about Abdullah's annexation of Central Palestine; so were the Syrians. Second, therefore, Tel tried to form an alliance of the Palestinian malcontents with assistance from anti-Jordanian Arab states. Tel sought, in visits to Syria and Egypt in the spring and summer of 1949, the help of the new ruler of Syria, Col. Husni al-Zaim, and of the authorities in Egypt. In both instances, he claims, he was encouraged and promised material help. In the case of Syria, however, he states that the rapid succession of coups (Hinnawi, Shishakli) within a few months militated against his plans. Yet with such encouragement, Tel became more outspoken in his criticism of conditions and official Jordanian policy. These received extensive coverage in the Arab press.

Tel was attempting a political movement which would rely for its success upon outside assistance and an alliance with anti-Abdullah elements among the Palestine population. Here perhaps lay the seeds of Tel's failure. One seeks in vain for any evidence of extensive infiltration among the officer corps. It is quite likely that Ali Abu Nuwar (then a captain) and a tribesman officer from the south of Transjordan, Col. Muhammad al-Ma'ayita, were involved to the extent of tacit approval of Tel's moves. Both these officers had been military members of the delegation that went to Rhodes for the armistice talks in February 1949. But there is no evidence of any extensive conspiracy within the army. This would have been difficult for Tel to achieve, for until the end of September 1948 he was no more than a regimental commander, and the other regiment in the Jerusalem sector was commanded by a British officer. From October 1948 until June 1949 he had been governor of the city, and his contacts with army officers had become even more infrequent.

One must conclude that Tel gambled upon the incriminating evidence he possessed regarding the Abdullah-Israeli negotiations. To this extent his conspiracy did not aim at a purely military coup, but rather at a political uprising fomented by the evidence of treason on the part of the king. Tel did have incriminating evidence insofar as the Arab definition of treason in those days was concerned. But it did not occur to Tel that first, Abdullah made no real secret of his view that a negotiated peace with Israel was the best Jordan could bargain for under the circumstances prevailing after the armistice agreement; it was also the best the Arabs could hope for after the failure of their joint military campaign to destroy the incipient Israeli state. Nor did it occur to him that even if his plan had been successfully implemented his role as courier and emissary for Abdullah with the Jews both as CO of the 8th Regiment, and as governor of the city in 1948-49 could be used against him to discredit him politically.

One could argue that Tel might have contemplated separating Central Palestine from Jordan with outside Arab support. This was impossible at the time, however; for apart from his relative remoteness from military command, the Israelis would not have stood for it.

Why, in addition to the propitious political conditions of the Arab world, did Tel attempt such a coup movement, especially when he had slim hope of infiltrating the officer corps adequately to implement his plan? The reasons become clear if one reads carefully his own explanation of why he decided upon this course of action when he did.

My most cogent argument in convincing them (other officers) was the attitude of the Jordan army towards the Egyptian army in the battle of the Negev; the liaison between top authority in Amman with the Jews officially after the receipt of Sassoon's first letter

on 8/12/1949, (meaning 11/12/1948)...I began to prepare the people in Palestine to accept the idea of a coup, with the help of selected loyal young leaders from Jerusalem, Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron. We used the columns of the Baath newspaper (edited by Rimawi) for this purpose, and we were successful in apprising the people of the truth of the situation until they were willing to act against the government, the king, and the British. We succeeded in making the people lose all confidence in all three of them. Then came the coup of Husni al-Zaim in Syria on 30/3/1949, which moved us to think actively about implementing our scheme. We assessed the situation, including the alienation of Prince Talal from his father and political conditions at home, the position of the British in Jordan, the British subsidy to the Legion, and the enemy on the frontiers. After careful consideration of all eventualities we laid our plan.²⁴

Tel obviously disapproved of and opposed King Abdullah's policy of a negotiated peace with Israel. It is possible that he was motivated by genuine patriotic Arab sentiments. From the same quoted excerpt one also infers that he was encouraged by the Zaim coup in Syria, understanding from that that Arab army officers were now ready to overthrow older leaders who had not handled the Palestine situation properly. The urge to imitate Zaim was therefore strong. His political tactics for those days (1948-49) were also reasonable: the pursuit of alliances with opposition leaders within the country and Arab detractors of King Abdullah outside Jordan. But his ultimate failure shows that without a strong conspiratorial group within the officer corps, particularly among officers with troop command, a coup cannot be effectively carried out simply with the assistance of politicians.

Between May and September 1948, Tel commanded the 6th Battalion (Regiment) (not the seventh, as Abidi, Jordan, a Political Study 1948-1957, New York, 1965, states, p. 27n.). He was appointed Military Governor of Jerusalem on September 28, 1948, and Governor of the Old City on March 6, 1949. Upon his appointment as Military Governor, GHQ immediately issued an order to the 6th Regiment stating that the duties of Colonel Tel were limited to those of military governor and that he had no command over the regiment. The latter was turned over to Lt. Col. Muhammad al-Ma'ayita.²⁵

With this order, GHQ cleverly and properly severed any formal military relationship between Colonel Tel and his old regiment. But the order also had the effect of pushing Tel towards further political involvement with opposition leaders. In fact, after his appointment as Governor of the Old City under a civilian administration, Tel became totally involved in the preparation of a political movement against the monarchy. Interestingly enough the Baath leader Abdullah al-Rimawi, and other Palestinian opposition politicians (Anwar al-Khatib and others)²⁶ later served the regime as cabinet members. It is certain that at no time did any of these politicians have complete confidence in Tel's ability to deliver a sizable portion of the Legion in the case of a coup. It is also certain that in 1949, Tel himself sensed the growing ire of the king and that of Legion GHQ, especially General Glubb, over his political activities. Without extensive support from his fellow officers—particularly now that he was no longer on the active commissioned list of officers—he felt that time was running out on him.

Tel tried one other avenue for his activities, namely, a liaison with Crown Prince Talal. The latter had been popularly identified with the cause of Arab nationalism. As a matter of fact, Talal never got along with his father, King Abdullah, suffered from mental illness from a young age, and may have, therefore, viewed all opposition activity against his father as proper

and deserving. Tel claims in his memoirs that in April 1949 Talal had agreed to a coup which would depose and deport the king, and detain Glubb and all British officers of the Legion in Amman camp. Then he, Talal, would have taken over the kingdom in cooperation with loyal officers whose names would have been presented by Tel on the day of the coup.²⁷ According to Tel, everyone seemed to encourage him in his work, Talal, fellow officers, Syrian and Egyptian leaders. Yet it became clear by spring 1949 that the annexation of Palestine and the presence of Legion forces in firm military control precluded the success of any conspiracy short of the use of force, or direct outside interference.

If Glubb's story that Tel came to see him in the summer of 1949 and suggested that he would resign his civil governorship of Jerusalem and return to the Legion if he were given the rank of brigadier is true, certain inferences can be drawn.²⁸ Either Tel decided that only by return to active duty in the Legion could he hope to establish a wider, stronger network of conspiracy among the officer corps; or he had realized that his political future was uncertain under the circumstances. In any event, he resigned early in June 1949, retired to his home town Irbid and, according to him, continued to maintain his liaison with political allies both within and outside Jordan.

He left for Egypt in October 1949. His departure from Jordan to live in exile in Egypt is still a garbled story. Tel claims that he left the country on the advice of political allies at home and that of the Syrian and Egyptian governments. The idea was that he could best further the Arab cause from outside Jordan. So he slipped out quietly. In Egypt he apparently received a stipend from the Egyptian Government for some years, until his political usefulness was considered ended. Glubb, on the other hand, alleges that the Egyptians initially offered him a salary to go to Egypt. It is quite possible that Tel had decided that he would be able to organize a coup from that distance. As a matter of fact, he was sentenced to death in absentia for his alleged part in the conspiracy which led to the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951.

The case of Tel is interesting for many reasons. Tel was born in 1918; at 30 he was governor of a city whose fate in 1948-49 was of international concern. His native town, Irbid, as we saw in the earlier historical sections of this study, had been an initial opposition stronghold against Abdullah's struggling amirate. Within six years of enlistment (1942) he had risen to the rank of major, and a few months thereafter to the rank of colonel. Like Abu Nuwar later he was the recipient of special royal favor. Whereas Abu Nuwar had been involved in official representational capacities for the armistice agreement, Tel dealt with the most secret and delicate negotiations between an Arab king and the Israelis. The fact that he took copies of all the documents and correspondence relating to this matter with him indicates that he intended to use them for political blackmail. By his own admission, Tel used to brief opposition politicians of their contents even while the negotiations were in progress.

At 30, Tel was, as governor of Jerusalem, very much in the political limelight. He may have sincerely considered Abdullah's policy one of treason against the Arab cause. What is certain is that he used it to advance his own political ambition. He perhaps misjudged the determination of other Arab states, particularly Egypt, to effectively oppose Abdullah's annexation of Arab Palestine. Yet, inter-Arab politics at that time were easily misleading. A Jordanian accommodation with Israel never came to pass, partly as a result of Arab pressure, and partly as a result of Israeli intransigence over the conditions of a settlement. Moreover, what Tel perhaps did not realize was that Abdullah's negotiations with Israel were widely known—they were common Arab knowledge—only their exact nature and content were secret.

In the final analysis, Tel was unable to get very far because of (1) his inability to infiltrate the officer corps to any meaningful extent; (2) his identification with the town of Irbid

and lack of close relations with any great number of tribal officers; and (3) his relinquishing of troop command for the governorship. For all one knows the king's pushing him up so quickly and appointing him to the civilian governorship of the Old City may have been cleverly deliberate. As it turned out, he gave Tel enough rope until the only way he could escape the noose was to leave the country. It is also possible that the way in which he went about his political activities so soon after his brief army career did not endear him to either the officers or men of the Legion.

Opposition to British Command of the Legion

The anachronistic view of the Legion manifested by General Glubb in the last two or three years of his command is reflected even more clearly in the perhaps most difficult political period of the 1950's, namely, 1954-56. The rapid expansion of the Legion which, as I showed, unavoidably brought in new elements in its ranks, especially in the technical branches, coincided partly with the acceleration of political activity in the country. Much of this activity was oppositional to the regime and to the status quo. It was inevitable that opposition political views should infiltrate among the ranks of officers, particularly those in engineers, signals, artillery, and the administrative cadre.²⁹ General Glubb himself reports knowing of certain officers with political views and connections detrimental to the Legion's welfare and the country's security.

The political alienation of the public from the Legion increased in the years 1953-54. It was caused partly by the spate of unusually ferocious border clashes with Israel in the period October 1953-March 1954. Among the latter, the Israeli army's attack on the border village of Qibya on the night of October 14-15, 1953, and on Nahalin on the night of March 28-29, 1954, were especially disturbing. Regarding the Qibya incident, the charge was made by the opposition leaders that the signal sent for reinforcements to brigade headquarters by the NCO on duty in the village National Guard post went unheeded. One has no way of determining if the charge was justified or not. In any event, a ministerial court of inquiry at the time found it necessary -- or expedient -- to dismiss Brigadier Ashton from the Legion.³⁰

Taking advantage of the constitutional reforms affecting the liberalization of political life in Jordan instituted by King Hussein through his new Prime Minister Fawzi Pasha al-Mulqi (April 1953 - May 1954), opposition leaders, especially from the West Bank, organized demonstrations in major towns and cities. These aimed their attack and invective primarily against the British command of the Legion, but also against the Western powers generally. Palestinians at least could still resuscitate the traumatic and emotional issue of the loss of Lydd and Ramle during the Palestine War operations in 1948-49. They still adhered to their contention that General Glubb was mainly responsible for an unnecessary withdrawal of the Legion from that area of operations, thus permitting further loss of Arab land to the Israelis. The demonstrations, moreover, were not solely organized by radical, Arab nationalist, and leftist elements and groups; extreme rightist, religious fanatic groups like the Muslim Brethren and the Freedom Party of Shaykh Taqi al-din al-Nabhani were equally active against the government. For the Legion these political disturbances were ominous, for not only did they assign guilt and responsibility to its Chief of General Staff Glubb, but indirectly indicated that the army was a monarch's praetorian force.

Fortunately for the monarchy the Constitution of 1952 still afforded the king extensive powers in conjunction with the Cabinet. The deteriorating political situation in the country in 1954 could have been met only by the dismissal of the liberalizing prime minister and the dissolution of Parliament. New defense regulations granting the executive enormous powers

over political parties and the press were promulgated in an effort to restore order prior to elections for a new chamber.

The new government of Tawfiq Abu'l-Huda wanted to ensure the election of progovernment, or at least safe, candidates. According to General Glubb, Abu'l-Huda made no secret of his willingness to "rig" part of the elections, particularly in Amman. He even suggested that the same should be done among the voters in the Legion. Glubb, who apparently refused such a suggestion outright, compromised by presenting the soldier electors with a ballot that had government candidates clearly marked. Despite his assertion that "very few soldiers were interested in politics" (the Bedouin perhaps were not), General Glubb goes on to report that "as was to be expected, such units as workshops voted for rather left-wing candidates, not Tawfiq Pasha's nominees. A few soldiers voted Communist."³¹

The elections of October 16, 1954, were significant for civil-military relations in Jordan on two counts. First, the fact that a number of military personnel—and one suspects that voting for nongovernment candidates among engineer and artillery officers was heavier than General Glubb reports—voted for opposition candidates indicated the consequences of the influx of nontribal personnel and recruits into the Legion, especially in the more technical branches. Second, the use of the Legion to quell widespread demonstrations in the country on election day further alienated the army from the civilian population. As Glubb himself stated, it was the first time in its thirty-year history that the Legion had opened fire on a group of civilians.³² The suppression of opposition press media, and the return of loyalist members to the chamber rendered opposition possible only in the form of demonstrations and civil disturbances. Once more the opposition's attack was aimed at the British command of the Legion. When, earlier in the year, it was accused of being unable, or unwilling, or both, to cope with the external threat to the Arabs, namely, the border attacks by Israeli troops, now it was identified in the mind of the masses as first, the suppressor of civil liberties, and second—not unrelated to the first—an upholder of British influence in the country. The king was not at that moment an object of attack. In a way, he had covered his rear, for he had inaugurated his reign with a declared policy of political liberalization embodied in concrete legislation³³ and he had permitted party activity. It left the conservative Transjordanian political leaders who controlled the executive allied to the Legion as the obstructionists of the nationalist cause.

Opposition to the Baghdad Pact

The monarch then sped to secure his political flanks to keep pace with the rapid involvement of the Arab region in the cold war. Britain and the United States were involved in a diplomatic campaign to associate Middle Eastern states with their global cold war policy, including the negotiation of defense pacts. He therefore sought to start negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948.

In the furor over the Baghdad Pact in early 1955, pressure on Jordan was not exerted by the West alone, but also by the anti-Baghdad Pact (because anti-Iraqi) Arab states, namely, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The government and the king found themselves between the Scylla of great power solicitation, backed up by the offer of good military hardware and economic aid, and the Charybdis of Arab nationalist and unity agitation. Britain, for example, proposed early in 1955 an annual grant for the maintenance of the National Guard amounting to one million dollars. She also gave Vampire aircraft to the fledgling Jordanian Air Force. The Turks, moreover, fully associated with Western military alliances, were also offering token aid with military aircraft. A flurry of state visitors to Jordan in 1955—President Celal Bayar of Turkey, Gen. Abdel Hakem Amer of Egypt, and later Sir Gerald Templer, British Chief

Inspector, General Staff—clearly indicated the involvement of Jordan in the periphery if not the center of attempted alignments in the Middle East.

The position of Jordan vis-à-vis the Baghdad Pact, the relationship with Britain, and the more volatile question of Arab nationalism were delicately precarious throughout 1955. On the one hand, the West and its Middle Eastern ally Turkey were anxious to associate Jordan with the new Baghdad Pact. The Arab nationalists, led by Egypt, on the other, were anxious to exert pressure on Jordan not to do so. Political groups, especially the Baath, National Socialists, and leftist National Front groups were active throughout the year, vociferously demanding that Jordan take an Arab nationalist course. Agitation by Egypt further implied that this course should fall in line with her policy. Moreover, the Israeli Gaza raid in February in 1955, together with a proliferation of other border clashes, exacerbated the political situation further.

The late Maj. Salah Salim of Egypt visited Amman in March 1955, and Gen. Abd al-Hakim Amer in December. The latter is reported to have made the following entry in the Visitors' Book of the Army Officers Club at Zerqa:

My visit to the Club, which represents the youth of the Army, impressed upon me that I was in the company of young officers who wish to elevate the standards of the Army of the sister state, Jordan. My visit has strengthened my faith in the Arabs and Arabism.

Clearly, the inscription was meant to appeal to the more ambitious young officers who favored the immediate Arabization of the officer corps; to wean them from their British officered command; to galvanize any resistance among them against a renegotiated British connection; and finally to encourage their opposition to a Jordanian association with the Baghdad Pact. Both press and public appeared elated with the Egyptian visitors: their response was enthusiastic.

Four changes of government within the year, on the other hand, only reflected the chronic instability of the country, caused partly by these external influences, and partly by the refusal of West Bank politicians to either cooperate in the formation of a viable government, or clearly support any that excluded their numbers in it.

When Templer arrived on his mission in early December, the political atmosphere was tense. The offer he made to Jordan appealed to both the king and his cabinet. Its most attractive terms related to the strengthening of the army, payment of British subsidies, and, best of all, significant aid in the development of an operational air force. Where the offer presented serious and, as it turned out insurmountable, political difficulties was in its stipulation that Jordan join the Baghdad Pact and exchange the existing Anglo-Jordanian Treaty for a new special agreement between the two countries within the context of the Pact.

The Templer-Jordan discussions and the airing of the issues toppled Said al-Mufti's government, since the West Bank ministers would not cooperate with, let alone support, it.³⁴ The king found it difficult to get any leader who could form an acceptable government. Finally he called upon Hazza al-Majali (a member of the Majali tribe from Kerak) to form a government.

Hazza al-Majali was willing to stick his neck out publicly by declaring openly that his government meant to accede to the Baghdad Pact. The next day, however, riotous demonstrations broke out in Amman and other towns, making it plain to the government that Majali's

policy was unpopular and would be resisted by civil disturbances. Two days of rioting brought the Legion once again into action in support of a government that could not find enough public support to rule. On December 19, Majali's government fell, and Parliament was dissolved by the king. The crowds most probably felt, and perhaps were convinced, that their organized opposition had produced the crisis. The outgoing prime minister, on the other hand, was equally convinced that there was for the first time massive intervention by Arab state agents inimical to the regime. Glubb, for instance, has reported that both Saudi and Egyptian representatives financed some of the demonstrations.³⁵

At the same time, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia came forward with an offer of financial aid guaranteeing the equivalent of the British subsidy to the army, to permit Jordan to forgo both British aid and accession to the Baghdad Pact.

While wavering in its policy under such pressure from neighboring Arab states and the difficulties of civil disturbances at home, the caretaker government of Ibrahim al-Atasi stalled for time. It made credible noises on the Arab front, while it continued to consider the basic Templer proposals, at least in so far as these affected the strengthening of the army. It was, in retrospect, an amazingly brilliant multipronged policy on the part of the young king to follow such a circuitous and perilous course which eventually divided and disarmed the opposition. This, as we shall see, he was able to do in large measure because of his correct assessment of the political role of the Legion.

But early in January 1956 new demonstrations and riots of unprecedented ferocity broke out. The mobs burned public buildings, government offices, and private homes. Once again the Legion became directly involved in restoring order, particularly the Bedouin 2nd Regiment. In addition to the use of tear gas, the troops repeated the firing at the crowds which had occurred for the first time in October 1954. The alienation of the agitated public from the Legion was now complete. In the public's view, the king, assisted by the army, its British commanders, and the British Government, was bent upon suppressing their nationalist aspirations.

The king, on the other hand, was determined now that public order had been restored, to beat the nationalists at their own game. This he did by identifying the Legion as a national army by Glubb's dismissal in March 1956. By dismissing Glubb the king was able to accelerate a future understanding with Britain on terms far less obnoxious to extremist nationalist elements. His care in insisting that his dismissal of General Glubb had no bearing whatsoever upon the legal and political relations of Jordan with Britain was nothing short of ingenious. Not only did it not harm him at home, but it elicited the desired response in Britain.³⁶ With the leverage thus gained, he did not accede to the Baghdad Pact; nor did he accept the financial aid offer of the three Arab governments; instead, he embarked upon a policy of vague Arab cooperation to avoid committing himself to any binding agreements with the other Arab states.

The Dismissal of General Glubb in 1956

A very intelligent and knowledgeable senior British officer who had raised and trained his own regiment in both Jordan and the Federation of Southwest Arabia commented once: "...in Arab armies the officers are the only people who matter." Thinking back over his experiences with the Arab Legion from 1952 to 1955, he reported that he was convinced "that much of the discontent among Arab officers had stemmed from a feeling that they were not being given sufficient responsibility." Thus a source of political conflict within the Legion until 1956 was the control of the establishment by foreign senior officers. Resentment was not necessarily mixed with hatred, or even colored by political considerations at the outset. Yet such

resentment was easily exploited by both opposition political leaders and groups within Jordan since 1954, and by external elements. Among the latter, Cairo Radio was prominent. One suspects that much of this resentment at the outset was largely apolitical: it was still on the level of personal ambition on the part of Arab officers who aspired to—and anticipated—promotion to senior positions. From that level, it was not difficult, given the reception of internal and external political influences, to articulate the resentment in political terms. This, despite the fact that until 1956, the bulk of Legion officers distrusted politicians. When it came to promotions, security of position and related career matters, in terms of fairness and impartiality they probably trusted their British senior commanders more than they did one another. They felt, as Major General Lunt put it, that "...under Arab control promotion would depend more on favoritism, or tribal affinities than on military efficiency...."

General Glubb knew about this resentment of British officers, but never quite grasped its full significance. King Hussein, on the other hand, seems, in retrospect, to have understood it perfectly.

When General Sir Gerald Templer visited Jordan in December 1955, plans were drawn up for the further expansion of the Legion. The point at issue was not so much that the king wanted three new infantry divisions, as it was one of the nature of the plans drawn up by GHQ. General Glubb's account states that Britain (as per the Templer mission) was willing to raise the 1955 Legion subsidy of £10,000,000 to £16,500,000 for each subsequent year. This would have allowed the formation of a fourth infantry brigade, representing a 25 percent increase in strength. Two brigades would be available for operational deployment and two for training and reserve. A new tank regiment and one of medium artillery would have been organized, in addition to an increase in strength for support units (transport, workshops, signals, administration). General Glubb considered the king's demand for three infantry divisions and an armored division unrealistic, since he argued that the Legion could not provide adequately trained officers and NCO's that fast. He argued that the 1955 ratio of 1,500 officers to 23,000-25,000 men would, in order to satisfy the king's demand, have to increase by 3,000, to make up a 4,500 officers to 65,000-70,000 overall strength ratio. Since the output of the Cadet School at the time was 100 per year, it would require 30 years to produce the 3,000 additional officers needed. Assuming the output were doubled, it would still have taken until 1975. It should be noted, in this connection, that the possibility of opening a military academy or a staff college of limited scope was never entertained by General Glubb. These institutions might conceivably have improved the officer training situation. It is only fair, however, to emphasize the two most serious limitations upon expansion in those days, particularly concerning the question of officer strength. Finding suitable officers was a major problem. This, in turn, was closely linked with the level of literacy among personnel and the fact that until 1956 the rate of illiteracy among recruits was fairly high—about 50-75 percent. A more subtle and complex difficulty was the fact that the administration, operational, and other command functions were articulated and set on record in English. This problem was not peculiar to Jordan; other Arab armies faced it: a shift from the Turkish military terminological legacy to English and then to Arabic. Thus, whereas Arab officers, especially those with troop command on the company level and a few of them on the regimental level, proved their capacity in acquiring high level tactical ability, their record in administration was on the whole never too good. A major reason for this shortcoming was the question of educational level. Another significant reason was the widespread use of English, in the presence of a British Chief of General Staff (CGS) and senior commanders, for administration.

One can thus identify three general areas of conflict in the Legion. First, there was the conflict between political leaders on the one hand and General Headquarters (GHQ) on the other (i.e., General Glubb) over defense plans (see below) and officer promotions. Second,

there was the matter of aspiring junior officers who felt that the promotion pattern in the Legion was too rigid and slow. Third, there was the conflict between the king and General Glubb over all these matters and the question of Legion expansion already referred to which came to a head in March 1956 and resulted in the dismissal of Glubb.

Seconded British regimental commanders were regular professional officers, most of them with World War II command experience, whereas the average Arab politician's view of an army is more heroic-romantic than it is practical-scientific, more in terms of dash and numbers than in terms of efficient organization, training, and firepower. General Glubb, perhaps thinking in these terms, must have overlooked the shift that was occurring in the Jordanian view, namely, that the Legion had to be a "national army" and not merely a corps d'élite. From his writings, it is clear that General Glubb continued to consider the Bedouin and tribesman as the most felicitous recruiting ground for the Legion. He was perhaps quite correct in this. But he also seemed incapable of appreciating the fact that change in Jordan was favoring the townsman, especially with the massive infusion of ex-Palestinians into the body politic. So that while the monarch was anxious, for political reasons, to gradually integrate the two Banks of the country, Glubb appeared to insist upon retaining the Legion as an exclusively Trans-Jordanian and, more specifically, tribal elite force.

From Glubb's repeated remarks about Arabs with university degrees, one concludes that he was in principle opposed to university graduates being trained as officers. One tends to agree with his estimate of the average Arab graduate's conception of things military, particularly the aversion, for a very long time, of the middle class Arab to any activity that might involve direct physical danger, or one that might involve physical hardship. Yet, if the Legion were to expand and to transform itself into a modern military establishment, with the technical appurtenances of such an establishment, the recruitment and military training of such new elements for the officer corps could have been profitably risked. Despite whatever militarily cogent arguments Glubb's plans were predicated upon, they still smacked to the Arab of aiming at exclusiveness.

The military soundness of the politically controversial defense plan proposed by General Glubb in 1955 and rejected by both the cabinet and the king, I do not propose to discuss, for I am not qualified to do so. Suffice it to say that the plan was probably devised along the lines of strict British Staff College standards. The objection to it was primarily political. As it emphasized the ultimate defense of Jordan east of the river, it implied a withdrawal from Central Palestine—a measure totally unacceptable to any politician, let alone a monarch who had staked his political future partly upon the integration of the two Banks. The regimental British commanders I interviewed did not suggest that they were consulted in this matter; rather, it appears that the plan was the product of GHQ alone. In fact, one regimental commander indicated that at no time during his tour of duty (three years) with the Legion was he ever taken into the confidence of GHQ about any matter of general importance to the Legion. To this extent, one can detect a common enough human failing on the part of the CGS, namely, a loss of touch with change, which inevitably led to anachronistic policy decisions.³⁷

General Glubb was in large measure correct in wishing to retain the Legion as a mobile, long-enlistment volunteer regular force. Its mobility was crucial to a long and wide frontier. He was on the other hand taking a politically unjustified position when he also insisted that it remain inbred, that is, largely tribal and Bedouin, with no change in its recruitment patterns to allow for the population and socioeconomic changes occurring in the country since 1950. He was, moreover, taking a major political risk in insisting that it should remain under foreign officer command and supervision, even if, as he suggested, only until 1965. His conception of the Legion as a corps d'élite was perfectly comfortable for the days of the amirate when the

country consisted largely of desert, tribes, and very few sparsely populated towns. But an army consisting exclusively of martial elements was no longer adequate to meet the requirements of Jordan in 1955. The technological complexities of maintaining and operating a modern armed force were too pressing for that.

No one can deny the contention of General Glubb that the Legion was popular with the rural and tribal population. This was natural, for these were the elements largely constituting the Legion. He is also correct in reporting that the townsmen, especially in the West Bank, misunderstood, resented, and even disliked the Legion. Apart from the fact that they were suffering from the humiliation of the loss of Palestine (even though the Legion was the force which retained the West Bank for them), there were relatively few West Bankers in the Legion. One wonders if their attitude towards the Legion would have changed, once more of them had become part of it. It is difficult for a population to identify with, let alone appreciate, a force that is exclusive in its composition and, in some respects, alien. The Legion was not a "national army."

A similar resentment may have met General Glubb's program of indoctrination for the troops, especially during critical political conditions in the 1950's. His custom of addressing officers and NCO's of units about political problems was not extraordinary for a CGS. What must have appeared odd was for a British commander of an Arab army to address units of the Legion about the Templer mission, particularly at a time when the general political atmosphere in the Arab area over the Baghdad Pact was tense and unsettled. A senior British officer serving with the Legion at that time reported that upon departing on home leave to the United Kingdom, General Glubb had circulated a message to all Legion personnel in which, among other things, he stated that he would be returning to Jordan because that is where he wished to end his days. It seems some Arab officers were heard to remark something to the effect "like hell he will."

If this is an indication of a change in sentiment towards the CGS, one can make a case for the gradual alienation of certain Arab officers from the British command of the Legion. It also suggests that Glubb was determined to hang onto the command of the Legion and its continued supervision by British officers recruited on secondment or contract, while more and more Arab officers taking their cue from politicians in the country were determined that the Legion should become a strictly Arab army. The king, as it turned out, roiled with the Arab nationalist punch and possibly forestalled serious trouble in the army by dismissing General Glubb in March 1956.

The British ambassador to Jordan in 1951 had strongly urged Glubb to resign his position with the Legion and the Jordan government, as the ambassador himself did. King Abdullah had just been assassinated. With his death a era in Jordanian history and politics had come to an end. The future was uncertain. The ambassador felt that those few British officials who had worked in the country for some 20-30 years in close cooperation with the founder and ruler of the country should bow out gracefully. But Glubb felt he should stay on.

Glubb's suggestion that, in dismissing him, the king was under the influence of nationalist young Arab officers, particularly his aide-de-camp Ali Abu Nuwar and the latter's clique, and that the young king resented advice from an older man in command of his army may contain an element of truth and reflect accurately the feelings of a young monarch struggling to establish his political primacy over an unstable realm. What one feels, having read General Glubb's account, and particularly the account of his dismissal penned by the king, is that it hardly occurred to the general that the king could not afford him politically: that the establishment of his unquestioned authority over the Legion and the country, including those officers he may

have suspected harbored political ambitions contrary to his own interests, required the termination of Glubb's services. It would have been quite different were Glubb and other British officers to have remained as expert advisers in a Legion commanded by Arab officers. Technical and other military experts serve on contract, or otherwise, with many Arab armies. What Glubb did not seem to fathom politically was the fact that an Englishman—whether legally a servant of an Arab king, or not—was now not only unacceptable to Jordan, but also dangerous as a political liability to the monarchy itself. What he also failed completely to sense was that the young king wanted Glubb's role as "head soldier," "father of the Legion," or whatever one wants to call it, for himself as an additional guarantee of his survival and of the security and stability of his kingdom.

The preceding are observations which benefit from hindsight. It must be immediately conceded that the issues must have been clouded by the normal emotional involvement of a CGS who for fifteen years had commanded the Legion and supervised its expansion from a mere security force to an operational military force. Nonetheless, it is somewhat presumptuous of someone, who in the final analysis was an outsider, to insist that he and not the monarch and commander-in-chief should set army policy. Once his advice was rejected, the practical thing to do was to resign.

Opposition to British Subsidy of the Legion

After the dismissal of General Glubb, Jordan's external detractors, i.e., Egypt and Syria and Arabia, shifted their attack from the foreign command of the Legion to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, specifically the British subsidy. In March 1956 they invited Jordan to participate in talks leading to some agreement for the coordination of Arab policy, mutual defense pacts, and other relevant arrangements; and they renewed their standing offer of aid. Hussein, however, responded with his own proposals for widening the talks and wider Arab collective pacts. His policy was not simply one of safety in numbers, but contained the shrewd realization that the more Arab states he could involve in these deliberations the less the likelihood of their reaching agreement. The reason for his policy was that he wanted to keep the British subsidy of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

The Suez crisis of June-November 1956 seemed to divert attention from these matters. Jordan's security became the immediate problem. The threat from Israel was imminent; so was the potential threat from any Arab armies that might ostensibly come to Jordan's aid. The elections held on October 21, 1956, reflected primarily the issue of Jordan's position in the Arab world, and a corollary of this issue, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. The alternative to this treaty was to seek one with the Arab states, thus satisfying the nationalists. The king and his supporters clearly did not cherish such an arrangement that might be dominated by Egypt. To opt for an alliance with Iraq alone would smack too obviously of a Hashemite dynastic bloc. The démarche by the king for a wider Arab collective security pact was meant as no more than a smokescreen: he felt a new arrangement with Britain was the best course.

The election of a 40-member chamber returned a National Socialist party majority of eleven, two Baathis, three National Front (leftist, Communist), five Muslim conservatives, and eight Constitutional (pro-regime) deputies.³⁸ The National Socialists led by Suleiman al-Nabulsi officially adhered to the preservation of the regime and the continued existence of the state of Jordan. This was not the case with the Baath and National Front deputies. The king, with impeccable constitutional style, invited Nabulsi (who failed himself to win a seat in the election) to form a government, since his party had won a plurality of the seats. Ominously, the Baathis and the National Front supported the coalition government he formed. All three

parties were agreed on the issues of anticolonialism and nonalignment, further liberalization of political life, i.e., a curtailment of the monarch's prerogatives, and the displacement of traditional Transjordanian leadership. Still more ominous was the exclusion from the cabinet of the proregime Arab Constitutional party which had secured the second largest number of seats in the chamber.

The Nabulsi government is crucial to an understanding of civil-military relations in Jordan. During its tenure of office a split between the king and the cabinet over matters of national and international policy developed into open mutual defiance. It is unlikely that the monarchy would have survived this estrangement between king and an elected, popular, nationalist government without the decisive role of the Legion. It seems that the king at first went along with the new cabinet's reorientation of Jordanian foreign policy towards closer cooperation with Egyptian-Syrian-Arabian inspired Arab unity and against the British relationship. This government was, moreover, willing to sign the Arab Solidarity Agreement (it did so on January 19, 1957) by which Syria, Arabia and Egypt pledged to pay Jordan an annual subsidy of £12.5 million. This virtually, though not formally, terminated the effectiveness of the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. It accelerated negotiations with Britain for its formal termination which occurred on March 13, 1957. Six months later, British troops evacuated their bases in Mafraq and Aqaba.

The announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine of military aid against Communist aggression in the Middle East, on January 5, 1957, presented the king with the appropriate occasion to express disapproval of his government's foreign policy. The government and members of Parliament publicly declared their disapproval of such doctrines by pleading nonalignment and indicating a desire to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union (which had been pro-Arab in the Suez war). But the king was unequivocally firm in his commendation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, and rejected the Arab Solidarity Agreement which he must have mistrusted from the beginning. Nevertheless, the cabinet seemed to defy the monarch's wishes and not to heed his warnings, for it remained implacably opposed to Western overtures. The breach between cabinet and king was now open.

At this crucial point, the king embarked upon a diplomatic offensive, using his chief royal chamberlain, by floating the idea of a meeting of heads of Arab states to discuss not simply Western colonial aggression, but also Communist subversion, implying his approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine and thus openly defying and ignoring the cabinet. On its side, the cabinet embarked upon a diametrically opposed diplomatic offensive marked by a decision to accord formal recognition to the Soviet Union and Communist China. This, the cabinet argued, was in accordance with Soviet aid to the Arab cause over Suez and essential to its proclaimed positive neutrality. The king, however, interpreted these moves by the cabinet as calculated to undermine his position.

The Gen. Ali Abu Nuwar Incident of 1957

Upon the dismissal of Glubb, Col. Radi Ennab—by consensus of the British officers I interviewed, an ineffectual officer—was promoted to major general and temporarily appointed interim CGS. Soon thereafter, in April, the king caused the appointment of his young aide-de-camp Lt. Col. Ali Abu Nuwar to that post, promoting him to lieutenant general. Ali Abu Nuwar was a high school graduate from Salt, and had received training at both Sandhurst and Camberley. In his early thirties he was assigned to the post of military attaché in the Paris embassy, where he was serving in the summer of 1954. That summer, the king paid a visit to Paris during his holidays in Europe, and, it seems, took a liking to Ali who had accompanied

him on his various outings in the city. Soon after returning to Amman, the king had requested Glubb, through the prime minister, that Abu Nuwar be posted back to Amman as aide-de-camp to the king. Glubb objected at first, for he argued that the normal tour of military attachés was from two to three years and Ali had been at this post just under a year. Nevertheless, he acceded to the king's wishes which were communicated in the form of a veiled order. Along with Ali, other young officers in their early thirties were posted to the office of aide-de-camp to the king, among them Ali al-Hiyari.³⁹

As chief of the general staff, Abu Nuwar apparently effected transfers, promotions, and retirements among officer personnel. These to some extent paralleled the retirements effected by the Nabulsi cabinet in March-April 1957, especially in the public security forces, including the director, Commander Bahjat Tabbarah—an ex-lieutenant colonel.

Glubb alleged in his account of the April 1957 coup that Abu Nuwar had been a known Baathi; that he had influenced the king towards terminating the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty (my feeling is that the king decided on the latter course to disarm the nationalists); and that he poisoned the king's attitude towards Glubb (this one can believe with some reservations).

The significant factor is that Ali Abu Nuwar, Ali al-Hiyari, and officers with similar background and orientation were politically more involved than others. Given their proximity to the king and, therefore, the seat of authority and center of power, they must have felt they could advance their political position. Moreover, there were no British officers with command functions left in the Legion.

While the breach between cabinet and king was widened by the former's formal protest to the latter regarding his independent diplomatic endeavors, this small group of officers (perhaps no more than fifteen) contemplated their own defiance of the monarch. It seems that their first attempt was a complete fiasco. On April 8, a mysterious alert operation was conducted by the 1st Armored Car Regiment which ended in surrounding Amman completely. When questioned by the king, the Prime Minister, Nabulsi, proffered that the military operation was designed to extract his own resignation. The CGS Abu Nuwar dismissed it as an operation to spot-check vehicular traffic entering and leaving Amman. But when, on the next day the cabinet dismissed Tabbarah, the director of public security, and appointed General Muhammad al-Ma'ayita (a known Ali Abu Nuwar man) in his place;⁴⁰ when the Nablus chief of police, who was suspected of pro-Nabulsi party affiliations, was transferred to Amman, the king smelled a rat. He dismissed the government the next day.*

None of the "safe" politicians the king had invited to form a new government were able to do so. Meantime, the Abu Nuwar cabal slowly came into the open. It appeared in collusion with the nationalists who had submitted their minimum demands for any cooperation in the formation of a new government. Abu Nuwar on April 13, contacted Said Pasha al-Mufti who was trying to form a government. Along with Gen. Ali Hiyari (Deputy CGS) and Muhammad al-Ma'ayita (Director of Public Security designate), Abu Nuwar asked Mufti to inform the king that the situation in the army was most dangerous and could erupt unless he permitted the formation of a government headed by Abd al-Halim Nimr (Minister of Defense and Interior in the just dismissed government). This was no less than an open ultimatum and a clear threat to use the army against the king. Abu Nuwar's confrontation with Mufti coincided with the appearance of National Socialist party members at the palace to propose that a coalition

*Thus the Arab Solidarity Agreement and the decision to recognize the Soviet Union and Communist China were not implemented.

government under Nimr would be acceptable. The king agreed to this arrangement, however, as it would have included independents.

It is perhaps at this point that Abu Nuwar miscalculated. The government which he and his fellow officers wanted was about to be formed. A second mysterious operation took place. Abu Nuwar's cousin, Ma'an Abu Nuwar, CO of the Amira Aliya Brigade, ordered all its regiments—many of which were Bedouin in composition—to move 40 miles east of Zerqa for an all-night celebration. He also instructed that all weapons should be left behind. The brigade included all-Bedouin armored car and infantry regiments, as well as a regiment of artillery which was perhaps the center of the conspiracy. Ali had recently appointed his cousin to command this brigade as a calculated measure in the plot, for he could not have hoped otherwise to infiltrate the Bedouin company commanders.

The king was not unaware of the conspiracy afoot among artillery officers. After the incident of April 9, he made a point of having his own contacts with loyal Bedouin officers, who kept him abreast of events. One of these, Capt. Talab al-Fahad, a company commander in the 1st Regiment Armored Cars, allegedly through the intermediary of Deputy Akif al-Fayez, apprised the king on the 13th of the movements of the Aliya Brigade. Suspecting a trap, the regiments ordered east of Zerqa refused to obey Colonel Ma'an's order, mutinied, and clashed with the artillery regiment at Zerqa. Some casualties were reported. A few loyal troops, however, managed to move towards Amman to ensure the safety of the king.

The king took along the CGS Ali Abu Nuwar and went towards Zerqa to investigate the situation himself. Meeting troops coming towards Amman, the king was barely able to save his CGS from them, and sent him to Amman. It was obvious by then that the coup had aborted.

Neither the CGS and his group of conspirators nor the Nabulsi cabinet had been able to gain control over the Legion in terms of capturing to their side officers with troop command. While artillery, engineer, and other officers and personnel in the technical branches were sympathetic to the conspirators it is certain that (1) the core mobile ground forces were not simply tribal-Bedouin and therefore loyal to the king, but that, (2) as Transjordanian elements, they viewed with acute distrust political machinations largely led by West Bank politicians. It is also certain that (3) the Arabization of the Legion by an act of the king had lessened the potential of a conspiracy aimed against him by officers on the grounds of Arab nationalism. Here, the various diplomatic maneuvers he has assiduously conducted in the preceding two years also paid dividends. He made it appear, that is, that there was no alternative to him in the country.

The Failure of Coups

There are many reasons for the failure of coups, and the failure to attempt more coups, in Jordan:

1. The Legion did acquire territory in the Palestine War, even though one could argue that it was territory allocated to Arabs in the first place by the U.N. Partition Resolution. Its Palestinian and other detractors could not oppose effectively the regime the Legion supported.
2. Ex-Palestinian political leaders who, in 1948-49, may have been antiregime and alienated from the government, were, by 1957, more closely associated with the state Jordan, having positions in government, chamber, and cabinet. This was the result of the policy of integration.

3. The young king had gone a long way towards meeting ex-Palestinians' nationalist demands, as a result of his diplomatic activity regarding the Baghdad Pact, and the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty.

4. Abu Nuwar was in too much of a hurry, as his frantic transfers and retirements of military personnel indicate. He had barely enough time to foster a core of revolutionaries in the officer corps.

5. General Glubb, in his account, described Abu Nuwar as a Baathi. This may have been so, since Tel, in his account, intimates as much also. Yet the Baath in Jordan even under the best of political circumstances could muster only three members in Parliament. It is not clear that Abu Nuwar had established firm relations with civilian politicians in 1956-57, let alone that he had extracted any commitments from them.

6. Tel banked heavily upon promises of assistance and support of Egyptian and Syrian leaders.⁴ Abu Nuwar also may have been in contact with Egyptian and Syrian elements—the fact that he went to Syria after his mischief was found out indicates that this must have been the case. But this promised outside support apparently was not forthcoming.

7. Conspirators among civilian groups (Baathis, Communists, or other), short of successfully infiltrating the officer corps, cannot easily lead an effective insurrection. But there is no guarantee that officer-led coups or revolutions will succeed, so long as the composition of the army and the officer corps remains tribal-Bedouin in infantry and armor, and hadari (townsmen) in the technical, administrative, and support units. Abu Nuwar was absolutely unable to crack the tribal edifice of operational hard-core troops. If one had a way of identifying the background of each of the 30-40 odd alleged conspirators in the Abu Nuwar abortive coup, one would find that with few exceptions most of these officers were in the administrative, engineer, artillery, and technical maintenance branches of the Legion. Until 1957 all of these were still no more than support units to the operational ground forces. The latter were completely mobile, and officers with troop command in the operational ground forces were far removed from the conspiracy. The general assumption on the part of the tribesmen that political conspiracies are the exclusive malaise and prerogative of townsmen helps maintain the breach between them. The obvious association of West Bank opposition leaders with such conspiracies further alienates the tribal element in the Legion from them. King Hussein had managed to capture the role of father and chief of the army enjoyed previously by General Glubb and the late King Abdullah. To the tribal elements in the Legion he had by 1957 succeeded to his grandfather's position of military chief. As far as the tribesmen were concerned, he was not only commander-in-chief but also their chief shaykh, that is, their chief tribal ruler.

8. So long as the Legion in Jordan remains a privileged group in the economic sense, the possibility of coups is not eradicated, but lessened. The army in Jordan is a relatively privileged group. Its welfare services are extensive and, for the tribesmen, most meaningful. Education, housing, medical care, pay, and allowances that are not otherwise easily attainable in Jordan, all contribute to a feeling of security. King Hussein himself has consistently taken a direct interest in these matters affecting the army. Thus conspirators find it difficult to persuade officers to indulge in subversive activities.

9. Until 1957 the majority of officers in the Jordan Army were lieutenants and second lieutenants, so that at least 80 percent of the officer corps were between the ages of 23 and 30, and under the rank of captain. In 1957, General Glubb explained:

Thus the whole officer structure was extremely precarious. There were immense numbers of lieutenants and second lieutenants, some of them of excellent quality. But good captains were scarce. Battalion commanders could be found only with great difficulty, and senior staff officers did not exist, much less brigade or divisional commanders.⁵

After March 1956, the Arabization of the officer corps was accomplished by mass and rapid promotions. Yet the Jordan Army even then was not top-heavy in officer grade distribution in comparison with other Arab armies. Arab regimental commanders were too new in their posts in April 1957 to become wholly committed to political conspiracies. Thus, the relative thinness of top officer grades, and the earlier scarcity—but since 1957 novelty—may have been a blessing in disguise.

10. Massive purges of the officer corps, sweeping transfers, and retirements occurred in the period March 1956–April 1957. This is one of the most difficult questions to investigate adequately at the moment. While the practice has been used primarily to remove politically intransigent and undesirable personnel, one must note that it could have the effect of sparking off defensive coups by the personnel affected. On the other hand, the use of this method by those desiring to lead a coup is dangerous for it can backfire on them.

11. Until 1956, the Jordan Army was a long-service volunteer force: there were no conscripts in it. Regiments were about 700–900 strong. In some of the infantry and armored car regiments, over half of the men came from tribes outside Jordan, that is, from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. These recruits constituted an essentially mercenary group that would have been difficult to interest in political movements aimed against the regime short of wildly lucrative material promises. Length of service for these ranks was rarely under five years.

12. Top NCO's were perhaps the most committed ranks in the army with rarely less than ten years service behind them. Their involvement in conspiracies was unlikely partly because they had attained high NCO rank after long and exacting service. In many respects, these NCO's represented perhaps the most professional element in the Legion, at least in terms of expertise, discipline, and *esprit de corps*.

13. In the case of Jordan one can, lastly, argue that the lack of military *coups d'état* has been due to the absence of the most common accelerator of coups and violent revolts against the *status quo*: namely, defeat in a war.⁴

The Problem of Professionalism

The question of the army's political involvement remains unresolved in Jordan as in other new states. How to make the officer corps an absolutely professional body is a problem that plagues the Arab states, though perhaps Jordan does not face it in as great degree as some other of these states.

Rapid technological expansion in the Jordan Army, as in other armies, may provide one area of professionalism, namely, expertise. Greater expertise among the administrative managers and technically skilled officers in the Legion—now greater in number—may further speed up the development of a national consciousness in the Legion. It may produce the corporateness essential to professionalism; though in Jordan even a corporate ethos is problematic unless the tribal and other sources of divisiveness present in the army are completely overcome. But whether it can as well produce among officers a sense of social responsibility is difficult to say. It could foster allegiance to an alternative conception of the national interest other than the one represented and upheld currently by the present regime and its political order.

The expanded political establishment's gradual identification of its role in a more integrated nation-state entity increases its capacity to impose its civilian control upon the military. The closer identification of interests between a growing West Bank group of political leaders and the monarch, supported by older, more traditional Transjordanian groups, may

thus have the effect of further insulating the army from politics, and this in turn may facilitate the greater professionalization of the military. In consciously trying to retain the expanded and nationally more integrated military (i.e., the technical branches), which depends in the final analysis upon continued foreign aid, the king further encourages its development into a highly professionalized institution, insulated from civilian political influences.

But changing patterns of recruitment and training may have sociopolitical consequences. Technical services in the army may adopt a professional ethos, but if they develop a more bureaucratic attitude, political infiltration and political involvement become more likely. If there is a parallel technological advance and economic development in civilian society, these two technical groups may be aligned against the status quo: for to the natural social affinity between them will be added the link of economic interest.

Conclusion

Three to ten years after independence, the military in many new states have overthrown the first rulers who had come to power at the successful end of their anticolonial leadership. In Jordan, on the other hand, although the army in many ways founded the state,* it was radical Arab nationalist political leaders who sought to alter the status quo, not the army. Because Jordan's own resources appear insufficient to support the army, outside help—specifically Western aid—will remain a fundamental factor in the country's stability and integrity. The remark by Katharine Chorley in 1943 is still valid:

Insurrections cannot be permanently won against a professional army operating its technical resources at full strength. They can be won only when the introduction of some extraneous factor cripples the striking power of the professional fighting forces for one reason or another. The part to be played by the army is, therefore, decisive in any revolution, whether social or nationalist.*

Thus, the army will remain the final arbiter of political power in Jordan, to the extent that it will continue to support a monarch who, under present constitutional arrangements, has extensive powers of rule. Provided the army retains its corps d'élite of ground forces, the Legion will sustain the monarch in any serious struggle with political groups and leaders who wish to overthrow the regime.

FOOTNOTES

THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

¹Editor's comment: This analysis was written prior to the six-day war in the Middle East in June 1967. Many statistics and comments obviously need revision in the light of that conflict and subsequent consequences. Nonetheless, it is of interest to note the extent to which subsequent events have conformed to a pattern of trends accurately identified by the Vatiklitis analysis.

²On legislation generally for this period, see C. R. W. Seton (ed.), Legislation of Transjordan, 1918-1930 (London: Published for the Government of Transjordan by the Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1931). On the Organic Law of April 1928, see Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East (Durham: Duke University Press, 1947).

³Suleiman Nabulsi came originally from Nablus, Abdel Halim Nimr from Salt, Shafiq Rusheydat, and Abd al-Qadir Tel from Irbid. In fact, all of these, with the exception of Nabulsi, had been elected deputies in the first 1947 elections after Independence. Note below, in the discussion of the Military and Politics, that Nimr, from Salt, was the candidate for a national coalition government during the April 1957 crisis acceptable to Gen. Abu Nuwar, Chief of General Staff of the Legion, who also came from Salt.

On political parties in Jordan, see the detailed information in Aqil Hyder Hasan Abidi, Jordan, A Political Study 1948-1957 (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1955), pp. 191-212; see also Munib al-Madi and Suleyman Musa, Tarikh al-urduin Fi al-qarn al-iahrin (Amman, 1959), pp. 426-39, thereafter cited as Madi and Musa.

⁴I shall be dealing with this question in detail in my forthcoming book Modern Jordan, 1921-1965 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson).

⁵These were Ruhi Abdel Hadi, an old Abdullah sympathizer, for Foreign Affairs; Khulusi Khayri for Commerce and Agriculture; Musa Nasir for Communications. The latter was to my knowledge, in 1963, Headmaster of the Bir Zeit College near Jerusalem.

BEGINNINGS AND EVOLUTION OF THE LEGION: 1921-48

⁶The executive council, or government, which Abdullah formed in these early days was not quite a cabinet. So many Arabic terms have been used to refer to its members that I decided to use "minister" to designate them in this section.

⁷For details of the incident, see Madi and Musa, pp. 156-64; and Khayr al-Din al-Zarkali, Aman fi Aman (Cairo, 1925), pp. 117-30, hereafter cited as Zarkali.

⁸The Legion's financial independence from the cabinet continued throughout the period covered by this study. The British subsidy was paid directly into the Legion's account. This situation constituted one of the delicate political issues in the 1950's.

⁹Sir Alec Kirkbride, who was in Transjordan at the time, reported to me in a lengthy interview in October 1963 that the Adwain uprising was encouraged by the late H. St. John Philby, British agent in Amman at that time, without authority and against the wishes and policy of the

High Commissioner in Jerusalem. It was this rash private dabbling by Philby which led to his removal from Transjordan very soon thereafter. My father-in-law, who was one of Philby's junior staff just prior to that time, suggested unfelicitous attitudes on the part of Philby regarding policy, in a memorandum he left me before he died in 1960. The contents of the memorandum suggest that the role alleged by Sir Alec to have been played by Philby in this incident is most credible.

*See Zarkali, p. 203.

¹⁰Especially Sir Alec Kirkbride, and later Sir John Glubb.

EXPANSION OF THE LEGION: 1948-56

¹¹The current budget announced for the period April 7-December 31, 1966, estimates total expenditure approximately £51 million, almost equally divided between departmental and developmental expenditures. Of the former, roughly half is for defense and security. Incidentally, local resources are expected to cover less than half the expenditures. The balance will be made up from foreign economic aid (mainly U.S. and Arab League), foreign military aid (largely the U.S.), and development loans (mainly from the West, but increasingly from Kuwait).

¹²All British officers I have interviewed unhesitatingly reported that until 1956 the Jordanian police was under Legion control. King Hussein in his autobiography Uneasy Lies the Head (New York: Bernard Geis Associates, distributed by Random House, 1962), asserts that such control was a key consideration in his decision to terminate General Glubb's services in March 1956. The latter, in his two volumes dealing with the Legion, leaves this relationship between army and police unclear. See his The Story of the Arab Legion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) and A Soldier With the Arabs (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

¹³In the 1950's, townsman officers who ran signals and administration in practically all units of the Legion were viewed by the CO's as a significant network with mischievous political capabilities.

¹⁴Families of troops usually lived near a unit camp in nearby villages and towns.

¹⁵An embryonic air arm was begun in 1950-51. Its rapid growth, especially under King Hussein—an accomplished pilot himself—must have further aggravated the need for technical services of a new order and magnitude. I have left the new Royal Jordan Air Force out of the scope of my study, primarily because I have not been able to interview the British officers who had been responsible for the earliest training of this force.

POLITICAL-SOCIAL GROUPS AND THE LEGION

¹⁶On these disturbances see below. This formulation of Bedouin-hadari relations is not based on any rigorous survey of actual personnel on my part. This I did not undertake; and I doubt if it can be undertaken with any measure of success for some time yet. On the other hand, it is based on the measured opinion and qualified judgment of senior British officers who held key command positions in the Legion during this period.

¹⁷A military academy and staff college, each offering a two-year course, were opened in the last three years. One must wait and see what social and political impact these will have on the Jordanian officer corps in the future.

¹⁸I shall return to this point when dealing with the matter of the "Jordan Free Officers."

¹⁹On this, see P. J. Vatikiotis, "Nasser and the Arab World," New Society (London, December 23, 1965). See also Orient, No. 34 (1965), pp. 11-50; 181-96.

²⁰It is rumored that ex-Gen. Ali al-Hayari is currently working for the Organization in Cairo.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS

²¹See Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 255.

²²See Karithat Falastin, mudhakkirat Abdullah al-Tel, Vol. I (Cairo, 1st and 2d printings, 1959). (The Catastrophe of Palestine, Memoirs of Abdullah al-Tel), hereafter cited as Abdullah al-Tel. A second volume as promised by the author, never appeared. It seems that Tel is now back in Jordan.

²³No source on the Legion, or Jordan, is clear on the question of the "Free Officers." (One must bear in mind the popularity of such appellation for all and sundry conspirators among army officers in the Middle East.) Tel, in his memoirs, says nothing about them, pleading that to do so would jeopardize their safety in Jordan. He does, however, claim Ali Abu Nuwar and a Maj. Mahumud Musa as members. Glubb, on the other hand, refers to them only once, and then to describe the fraudulent character of their pamphlets:

In 1952, an Arab Legion officer in the Supply and Transport Corps (obviously a townsman) had been dismissed [from] the service for financial dishonesty. Intent on revenge, he went to Beirut, where he printed a number of pamphlets directed against myself and signed them "Free Officers." We obtained information of the activities of this ex-officer through the Lebanese police. He was warned and no further pamphlets appeared.

In 1955, pamphlets began once more to appear with the signature "Free Officers." A Soldier With the Arabs, p. 412. Glubb goes on to explain that the 1955 ones were drafted, printed, and posted from Egypt. The implication, however, is that there were such pamphlets as early as about 1952.

Brig. Peter Young in his book Bedouin Command With the Arab Legion, 1953-1956 (London: W. Kimber, 1956), implied that the Free Officers may have been a more ominous organization than Glubb thought. In relating the events of the civil disturbances of January 1956, Young makes various references to the Free Officers (also called The Liberal Officers' Rally) as well as to specific officers who, he believed, had been politically involved. His account centers upon the involvement of his own 9th Regiment in dealing with the disturbances in the area between Zerqa and Salt. He emphasizes the refugee problem and the West Bank political restlessness, but emphasizes the stabilizing role of the Bedouins in this situation. He reports conversations with Arab officers in which the strong view was expressed by the latter that Arabization of the officer corps was slow since Arab officers were quite able to command brigades by this time. He also reports their sympathy for and approval of demonstrations, especially among those officers who were townsmen (i.e., from Irbid and Salt). He also reproduces a translated text of one of the Free Officer pamphlets, and states that he had known of the movement's existence since the summer of 1954. His view is that its members came primarily from the intelligentsia, whom he identifies as primarily in the artillery and the engineers. He identifies such officers as Col. Sadiq Shara'a who became Chief of Staff after March 1956, when Ali Abu Nuwar had been appointed Chief of General Staff; Ali Kiyari, who for a while was General Officer Commanding 1st Division; and Muhammad Ma'ayita, who commanded artillery, as possible members of this movement. Moreover, he mentions extensive discharges and transfers from the Legion of as many as 1,000 Bedouin troops to the National Guard once Glubb had been dismissed. One gets the distinct impression from reading Brigadier Young's account that he was aware of some political movement within the Arab officer corps. Perhaps his long command in Jerusalem and close watch over affairs there gave him this vantage point. What is interesting is that he considered this movement far more ominous and credible than General Glubb did at any time. See Young, op. cit., pp. 137-89.

Young reports an interesting incident in Zerqa cantonment six days after the departure of Glubb from Jordan. At that time, Ali Hiyari was Chief of Staff, Gen. Radi Ennab had been made CGS, and Abu Nuwar Commanding Officer of the brigade posted on the West Bank. Along with other British officers, Young was getting ready to leave the country. Brigadier Mitford was still CO of the armored brigade. It seems that the 1st Armored Car Regiment and 2d Field Artillery Regiment had been ordered by Abu Nuwar to surround Zerqa cantonment. These orders from the CO Jerusalem Brigade were unknown to the CO Zerqa Brigade. Young explains this maneuver as an attempt by Abu Nuwar to intimidate recalcitrant fellow-Arab officers in the officer movement; and opines that the headquarters of the movement was in the West Bank headed by Abu Nuwar, with a branch in Zerqa. (See especially, pp. 180-83.) With the exception of Radi Ennab, all these officers Young mentions were then in their early thirties.

²⁴ Abdullah al-Tel, pp. 587-88. The reference to the Sassoon letter concerns the difficult and unsuccessful negotiations between Abdullah and the Israelis. (These are discussed by Tel on pp. 437-544.)

²⁵ Date of order, October 2, 1948. Note that Ma'ayita was a member of the Jordan armistice delegation to Rhodes, and a friend of Abu Nuwar. In the April 1957 attempted coup against the regime, Ma'ayita joined Abu Nuwar in the ultimatum to King Hussein to form a nationalist coalition government they approved of. It is possible that Ma'ayita's conspiratorial activities began in Jerusalem as a result of his close association with Tel.

²⁶ The Transjordanian Akif al-Fayiz is mentioned by Tel as one of those who sympathized with his political aims. Ironically, al-Fayiz in 1956-57 was the person who kept the palace informed about conspiracies within the officer corps, using his extensive contacts with tribal officers in the army. See Abdullah al-Tel, pp. 581-82, where Tel claims that in March 1949 he visited in Jordan such opposition leaders as Suleiman al-Nabulsi, Shafiq al-Rusheydat, and Akif al-Fayiz. The latter, incidentally, a deputy in the 1956-57 chamber (under the Nabulsi nationalist coalition government elections of October 21, 1956) representing Badu al-shamal ("Bedouins of the North") received in April 1957 communications from tribal officers in the Legion indicating the possible existence of a military conspiracy against the regime. These he immediately communicated to the king. Moreover, he had a Bedouin captain (Talal Fahad), a company CO in the 1st Regiment Armored Cars, report in person on developments in the army. See account in Madi and Musa, pp. 669-71. Incidentally, Rimawi, al-Khatib, and Rusheydat became members of the Nabulsi cabinet of October 29, 1956, as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Public Works, and Minister of Justice and Public Instruction, respectively.

²⁷ See Abdullah al-Tel, p. 592.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

²⁹ Several of the British officers I interviewed, who at that time commanded certain infantry regiments—a light antiaircraft regiment, and artillery units, reported knowledge of political talk among Arab officers. Some reported a general atmosphere of restlessness among these officers.

³⁰ See the account by General Glubb, *A Soldier With the Arabs*, pp. 312-16. See also Madi and Musa, pp. 586-88.

³¹ See Glubb, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-57.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 356-57.

³³ See, regarding this legislation, Abidi, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-18.

³⁴ See, on this general question, the discussion in *ibid.*, pp. 109-42.

³⁵ See Glubb, *op. cit.*, pp. 375-415.

³⁶ See *The Times* (London), March 8, 1956.

³⁷ It is strange in retrospect that Glubb never contemplated preparing an acceptable successor among the senior British officers, especially in 1953-54.

³⁸ Election results were as follows:

National Socialists	11
Constitutional Bloc	8
Independents	9
Baathis	2
National Front	3
Muslim Conservatives	5
Palestine Arab Bloc	<u>2</u>
	40

³⁹ It should be noted that, unlike Abu Nuwar, Tel had had no staff or advanced military training. On the other hand, Abu Nuwar was only slightly younger than Tel—i. e., of the same generation—a townsman from Salt, located close to Jerusalem. Ali al-Hiyari, cousin of Abu Nuwar, had almost identical military training as Abu Nuwar. Glubb, moreover, reports in *op. cit.*, pp. 293-94, that Abu Nuwar was reported attacking the monarchy and the British as early as the spring of 1952. "Never before had Arab Legion officers engaged in politics," stated Glubb. Yet Colonel Tel had, as early as 1948. There is, one notes, a pattern here in addition to the similarity of background between Tel and Abu Nuwar, insofar as Abu Nuwar also tried a liaison with Crown Prince Talal, especially during the latter's very brief reign in September 1951-August 1952. All radicals at that time seemed to look to Talal as a possible ally in their political designs. It is not unlikely that Abu Nuwar was shipped off to Paris as military attaché soon thereafter to keep him out of mischief.

⁴⁰ It will be recalled that Ma'ayita, although a tribesman from the south of Transjordan, had been a close associate and colleague of Abu Nuwar as far back as the armistice delegation in 1949-50. He had been, however, senior in rank to Abu Nuwar as a lieutenant colonel in 1949, and CO of the 6th Infantry Regiment in Jerusalem since October 1948 when he succeeded Tel to that command. In 1956, he came to command artillery.

⁴¹ Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations* (London: Macgibbon & Kee, 1962) devotes an appendix to his book (pp. 397-401) to debunking the prevalent theory of a coup led by Ali Abu Nuwar in April 1957. Largely depending on his interviews with President Nasser of Egypt and the exiled Abu Nuwar, Childers puts forward the theory that the coup was engineered by King Hussein and the Americans. It is well known that one of the trickiest and most misleading investigation methods is the interview. Childers, however, accepts the statements of his interviewees without question. That the king, early in January 1957, became estranged from his cabinet, led by Nabulsi, was obvious from the measures he took to oppose it. Rightly or wrongly, he must have felt that the government, not without the approval of the Chief of the General Staff, was planning to weaken his position. From that it must have been very easy to assume that they could very well oust him. But from this one need not infer that his Chief of Staff was anything but loyal to his monarch. This is naive, as well as politically ignorant. Briefly, this was a political fight for survival: the king outmaneuvered the forces which appeared to him inimical to himself and—not unlikely—desirous of his elimination from the throne. Who engineered the coup is in this sense immaterial. What is relevant is that it identified for Hussein those who could have conspired against him.

⁴² The optimistic way in which Tel reports the promises of Syrian and Egyptian assistance for his plans strikes one as eminently naive. See Abdullah al-Tel.

⁴³ Glubb, op. cit., p. 387. It should be noted that a cadet usually served in training with a unit, or regiment, as a platoon or section commander for at least three years before becoming a lieutenant.

⁴⁴ Immediately after the Palestine War ended there was a coup in Syria. The coup of 1952 in Egypt was partly justified by its leaders in terms of the Palestine War.

⁴⁵ The embryonic Ministry of Defence of what was to become the state of Israel issued in 1948, immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities between Israeli forces and the Arab armies in May of that year, a handbook on the armies of the Arab states. This apparently was meant to acquaint the Israeli soldier with the imminent enemy. In the section on Jordan the handbook states: "In Jordan there is an army which owns a state." See Agra (pseudonym), The Armies of the Arab States in the Context of Their Environment, (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1948.

⁴⁶ Armies and the Art of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1943), p. 23.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN PAKISTAN*

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INTRODUCTION

The conditions and attitudes which were conducive to the army's assumption of political power in Pakistan are of particular interest in the study of civil-military relations in new states. The Pakistan Army was a professional military force which, until the time of the 1958 coup, had studiously attempted to remain aloof from the arena of political conflict. With one minor exception, there had been no military designs on government and on two occasions, when the army was requested to assume the powers of government, it refused.

The first section of this paper is concerned with characteristics of the military establishment itself—its origins, organization, development, budget, pattern of training, and, to the extent which data permit, its patterns of social recruitment.

The bulk of our analysis, in sections II and III, will be devoted to the relationship of the military—primarily the army—to political institutions and political decision-making. It will be argued that the army became overtly involved in political affairs neither for the aggrandizement of power nor for the acquisition of values peculiar to the military establishment but because of the inability of political elites to maintain stable governments, to effectively set and pursue political goals, or to develop a sense of national identity and national symbols to replace the fragile ones developed during the nationalist movement. Since political instability was of central importance in prompting military takeover and in changing the military's conception of its ultimate role in the state, an attempt will be made to analyze those conditions which led to the collapse of democratic political institutions in the new state.

The fourth section describes the period—1958-62—which involved rule under martial law. Although the military engineered the coup, it never became widely involved in the administration of the state. After the first few weeks, all military troops and courts were withdrawn. The military stood watchdog over civic and administrative activity and demanded compliance because of what it could or might have done rather than because of what it actually did. During this period, however, the cabinet included four army generals, including President Ayub Khan, who ultimately made the big decisions. The civilian administrative authorities continued in the care of day-to-day administrative and political matters, and the many investigatory commissions which were established to study a variety of problems and to suggest reforms were selected almost exclusively from among civilians.

THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAKISTAN MILITARY

The defense services of Pakistan were created by a division of the British-Indian Armed Forces at the time of partition. Military service has been important in Indian history. The

*The views expressed are exclusively those of the author: they do not represent the views of CRESS or of the U. S. Government.

rise and fall of empires—Mogul, Hindu, and Sikh—were closely correlated with success in battle. Traditionally, political rule was associated with military prowess, and the military vocation was not only a potentially lucrative one but also carried a large measure of prestige. It also served as an avenue of social and political mobility in an otherwise highly immobile society.

The British-Indian Army had a tradition which reached back to the eighteenth century, and the early days of the East India Company. During the last century of the British raj (rule) it had been molded into an efficient professional military organization, reaching a peak of over 2 million troops during World War II. Recruitment was from all major communities of the subcontinent, and prior to the creation of the separate states of India and Pakistan, loyalties had been regimental rather than "national."

The Reconstitution of the British-Indian Armed Forces

The decision to partition the armed forces of British India was a natural corollary to the decision to partition the Indian subcontinent into two independent states, and was made shortly before the Mountbatten Award of June 3, 1947, when August 15 was set as the day of independence. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee (AFRC) was set up under the chairmanship of Sir Claude Auchinleck, the commander-in-chief of the Indian Army, to make proposals concerning the division of the armed forces, including installations and stores.¹ The ranking members of this committee were all British officers and included the commander-in-chief of the navy and air force as well as the chief of the general staff. Under the rubric of this general committee, separate subcommittees were set up to deal with particular problems of reconstitution and were responsible for drawing up recommendations which were then discussed with the British members of the AFRC. The final recommendations were referred to the Joint Defense Council, and if any differences existed and were not resolved there, the problem was sent to the Partition Council for a final decision.

The general rules governing the process of reconstitution laid down by Auchinleck established the stages of transfer and set the general frame of reference in which the AFRC and its subsidiary units were to operate. The first provision directed that "plans should be made forthwith for the immediate movement to the Pakistan area of all Muslim majority units that may be outside that area, and similarly for the movement to India of all exclusively non-Muslim or non-Muslim majority units at present in the Pakistan area." The next stage was to comb out these units themselves on the basis of voluntary transfers, thus giving all personnel in the armed forces the choice of electing which state they wished to serve. There was one major exception to this rule, namely, ". . . that a Muslim from Pakistan now serving in the Armed Forces will not have the option to join the Armed Forces of the Indian Union, and similarly a non-Muslim from the territory of India now serving in the Armed Forces will not have the option to join the Armed Forces of Pakistan. There will, however, be no objection to non-Muslim personnel from Pakistan and Muslim personnel from the rest of India electing to serve in the Armed Forces of the Indian Union and of Pakistan respectively."² With respect to the creation of the two new military establishments, personnel were to be divided on the same basis as the country itself; in the case of Pakistan, the military was to become almost entirely Muslim.

The major problem involved in reconstituting the armed forces was the division of the army, since it was by far the largest of the three services. Until the time of partition, the AFRC and subcommittees worked in an atmosphere of cooperation. The division of personnel and movable stores did not present any great difficulty and a unanimous agreement was reached

that the division should go to India and Pakistan respectively on a 64-36 percent basis.³ By the beginning of July, only a few weeks after the formation of the AFRC, the division of all major units of the army—armored corps, artillery, infantry, and engineers—had been made, and instructions directing the implementation of these decisions had been sent to all officers concerned.

The first question on which the army subcommittee could not come to full agreement concerned the division of ordnance stores and factories. This was of crucial importance to Pakistan, since the great bulk of stores and all ordnance factories were located in those areas which were to become part of the Indian Union. In the third week of August the subcommittee finally agreed to division of stores and factories on the same basis on which personnel and movable stores had been divided. But the Indian members of the Joint Defense Council did not concur with this arrangement and the question was referred to the Partition Council.⁴ A final decision was not made before partition, and after that it became increasingly difficult to arrive at agreement on outstanding questions concerning the division of the military. Before any final agreement could be made on the question of ordnance factories and stores, the supreme headquarters was closed down.

Table 1. Army Units Received by Pakistan and India
on a Rough-and-Ready Basis

Type of Unit	Pakistan	India
Armored corps regiments	6	14
Artillery regiments (all types)	8	40
Engineer corps	1*	2†
Infantry regiments	8	15‡
Pioneer companies	8	15
Army service corps:		
(a) Supply units	23	40
(b) Transport (MT)	24	53
(c) Transport (AT)	3	4
Ordnance field units	4	9
Ordnance static units	11	32
Workshop companies (EME)	13	20
Medical units:		
(a) Field	9	18
(b) Specialized	5	14
Remount and veterinary units	24	29

* Major portion.

† And a portion.

‡ Excluding 6 Gurkha regts.

The agreement arrived at by the Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee and approved by the two major political parties split many units in the British Armed Forces (see Table 1). The rough-and-ready basis of transfer was based on the majority community in each unit and many units transferred both in Pakistan and India included smaller units of the minority community. Most units from the battalion level up were split, while almost all companies, particularly in the fighting arms, were left largely intact. Although there was no institutional tradition of a Pakistan Army nor a permanent organizational structure until several years after independence, these basic units of the army were extremely cohesive and had their own

military traditions; this was largely responsible for the control which was exercisable in the army during the unsettled months following partition. In the phase of reorganization of the military, therefore, the problem was not a total reorganization and reassignment of personnel, but the organization of a series of relatively cohesive and self-contained units.⁵

A major concern of the Pakistan military during the period from 1947 to 1954 was the establishment of an organizational framework which would permit the absorption of the many units which came to it as a result of partition but which would also be flexible enough to permit rapid deployment. Until the end of 1948, however, the army was organized on a static basis, while various units were tentatively assigned to different command areas. By the end of 1948, however, these units had been organized into five infantry divisions and one armored brigade.

The units of most services, as noted above, had been split and, with the exception of the armored and artillery services, those units which were left intact were company units. The organization of the armored corps was perhaps the simplest, since the armored regiments which Pakistan received had Muslim personnel.⁶ Three of the six regiments were located in Pakistan territory, while the other three, located in India, were equipped with the materiel left by the three non-Muslim armored regiments which went to India. The artillery units which went to Pakistan, like the armored units, were constituted largely of Muslim personnel even at the higher levels of organization. Pakistan received three field regiments, a mountain regiment, an antitank regiment, a heavy antiaircraft regiment, a light antiaircraft regiment, a survey battery, and a portion of an air observation post squadron.⁷

The infantry regiments were especially difficult to reconstitute, since most of them had been communally mixed in the British-Indian Army and so were divided largely at the company level. Table 2 gives the "class" composition of the infantry regiments in the British-Indian Army just prior to partition; the infantry was by far the largest of the services in the army.

Within the regiments assigned to Pakistan under the initial rough-and-ready provision, there were 64 non-Muslim companies, which were transferred to India under the agreement of voluntary transfers, while 29 Muslim companies were transferred from India to Pakistan. This left a balance of 35 infantry companies which were to be established in Pakistan. This was done in several ways. First, a program was instituted for the reenlistment of personnel released from those services which were heavy with manpower. Second, since the infantry was almost entirely composed of personnel from West Pakistan, it was decided to raise an infantry regiment in East Pakistan not only to increase the size of the infantry but also to increase the sense of Bengali participation in the defense of their wing of the country. Decreasing the number of West Pakistani military in East Pakistan would further help reduce regional rivalry and tension.⁸ The first East Bengal battalion was raised on February 15, 1948, largely from the two Bengal Muslim Pioneer companies and from the Muslims of the Pithar Regiment who opted for Pakistan.⁹ The second battalion, raised largely by recruitment, was formed in December of the same year. The third effort to increase the size of the infantry was made by opening recruitment to the Pathan tribes on the northwestern frontier and a subsequent formation of a new Pathan Regiment. This regiment was initially formed in 1948 by converting the 14th Battalion of the Frontier Force Regiment and the 14th and 15th Battalions of the Frontier Force Rifles into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions of the Pathan Regiment.¹⁰

A problem which faced the Pakistan military during the first few years after independence was the acquisition of materiel. Agreements for the transference of stores from India to Pakistan never were fully implemented. Although the precise amount of stores and factories

transferred to Pakistan has never been made public. on December 31, 1947, Brig. E. C. O. Murphy, the Director of Ordnance Services of the Pakistan Army, gave a breakdown of items received as of that date¹¹ (Table 3). For various reasons the units which were hardest hit were those of the supporting services. The Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers received most of the stores and equipment due them, but in the Army Service Corps (transport), the Medical Corps, and especially the Ordnance Corps, there was an almost complete absence of the required materiel.

Table 2. Class Composition of British-Indian Infantry¹²

Unit Designation	Caste Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs	Others (including scheduled castes)
*1st Punjab Regiment	1/2	1/2	—	—
2nd Punjab Regiment	1/3	1/3	1/3	—
The Madras Regiment	1/2	1/4	—	1/4
The Indian Grenadiers	1/2	1/2	—	—
The Mahratta Light Infantry	1	—	—	—
The Rajputana Rifles	2/3	1/3	—	—
The Rajput Regiment	1/2	1/2	—	—
*8th Punjab Regiment	1/4	1/2	1/4	—
The Jat Regiment	1/2	1/2	—	—
*The Baluch Regiment	1/4	3/4	—	—
The Sikh Regiment	—	1/4	3/4	—
*Frontier Force Regiment	1/4	1/2	1/4	—
*14th Punjab Regiment	1/4	1/2	1/4	—
*15th Punjab Regiment	1/4	1/2	1/4	—
*16th Punjab Regiment	1/3	1/3	1/3	—
The Dogra Regiment	1	—	—	—
The Garhwal Rifles	1	—	—	—
The Kumaon Regiment	1	—	—	—
The Assam Regiment	—	—	—	1
The Sikh Light Infantry	—	—	1	—
The Mahar Regiment	—	—	—	1
The Bihar Regiment	—	—	—	1

*Indicates those regiments transferred to Pakistan in the first stage of reconstitution.

Table 3. Army Stores Received by Pakistan
as of December 31, 1947

Type	Amount Sanctioned	Amount Received
Ordnance stores	160,000 tons	23, 225 tons
Vehicles (soft)	1,461	74
Vehicles (armored— including 18 Sherman and 46 Stuart tanks)	249	none
Ammunition (all types, including explosives)	40-60,000	none
Engineering stores (including plant machinery)	172,667	1,125

The transfer of materiel from India to the Pakistan Navy and Air Force was not so difficult a matter. The air force received its quota of aircraft, consisting almost entirely of piston engine Tempest fighters of World War II vintage, from the British-Indian air force.¹³ The navy also received its quota of vessels from the Royal Indian navy, although naval stores and naval armaments could not be moved because of lack of shipping facilities and the numerous difficulties arising from partition.¹⁴ Furthermore, the Pakistan Navy was without good port facilities and did not have a dockyard which could undertake naval repairs and refitting, nor were there any stores depots. During the first years after independence the navy relied on outside sources for dock facilities and armaments and stores. Until the dockyards at Karachi and Chittagong were finished, the navy had to dock at the Royal Naval Dockyards in Malta, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.¹⁵

The remainder of the required materiel had to be acquired from abroad, necessitating the use of valuable foreign exchange. By 1951 the immediate pressure for these items had been met,¹⁶ and a decision was made to set up facilities in Pakistan for the production of a limited number of defense items. In 1951 the Wah ordnance factories started production; also in that year the Pakistan Armament and Aircraft Industries Ltd. was created to establish and manage aircraft, tank, and heavy gun factories. By 1954 the Wah complex was turning out all requirements for small arms and ammunition and by 1958 was producing a number of consumer items as well.

The major component in the procurement of military hardware came about as a result of the United States-Pakistan Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in May 1954. The discussions preceding the agreement and the agreement itself created major diplomatic problems in South Asia. The heated response to the treaty, particularly from India, probably limited the assistance which was eventually extended.¹⁷ In any event, there were competing views between Pakistani officials and U.S. military advisors and officials as to what an "adequate" Pakistan military establishment would be. Although none of the aid was supposedly channeled to those troops permanently stationed in Kashmir and East Bengal, those areas most sensitive in Indo-Pakistan relations,¹⁸ the military completed the program of equipping and modernizing those troops stationed in other areas.

The acquisition of military aid through the treaty enabled the military to fulfill their plans for their own development. At the crucial moment when the treaty was starting to be implemented, the military was given control of almost all aspects of military policy with the appointment of General Ayub as the Defense Minister.

Some idea of the importance of military matters relative to other policy objectives in Pakistan from the first days of independence, and continuing to the present, can be gained from an examination of budget allocations (see Table 4). The consistently heavy emphasis on military spending is attributable largely to the anxiety manifested by political leadership regarding the maintenance of the integrity of the state, a concern which has taken priority over other desirable, but somewhat less urgent, policy programs, such as long-range economic development.

Thus, the military has consistently received the major share of the revenue budget, that is, expenditures met from revenues raised from within the country. The highest proportions came during the first few years in which the military was getting on its feet, so to speak. The relatively high percentage in 1953-54 resulted from the martial law activities required of the army to quiet the religious turmoil which prevailed in West Pakistan during that time, while the high proportions in 1952-53, 1955-56, and 1956-57 resulted from extensive participation of the military in anti-smuggling operations. The average proportion of military expenditure

since the military takeover in 1958 has on the whole been less than during the previous period. Furthermore, the defense services undertook an exhaustive review of military expenditures in 1953 which resulted in considerable economies, largely because the initial reequipment program had neared completion by that time.¹³

Table 4. Proportion of Central Revenue Budget
Allocated for Defense Purposes (in crores*)¹⁴

Fiscal Year	Total (Rs.)	Military (Rs.)	Percentage
1947-48	23.60	15.38	65.2
1948-49	64.70	46.15	71.0
1949-50	85.00	62.54	73.1
1950-51	1,26.62	64.99	51.3
1951-52	1,44.23	77.91	54.0
1952-53	1,32.01	78.34	59.3
1953-54	1,10.87	65.31	58.8
1954-55	1,17.26	63.51	54.2
1955-56	1,43.34	91.77	64.0
1956-57	1,33.07	80.09	60.2
1957-58	1,52.18	85.42	56.1
1958-59	1,92.65	99.66	50.9
1959-60	1,73.33	95.99	55.4
1960-61	1,77.57	1,00.53	56.6
1961-62	1,88.59	1,01.01	53.8
1962-63	1,80.52	95.33	52.9
1963-64	2,46.59	1,22.88	49.8
1964-65	2,78.56	1,29.65	46.4

* A crore = 10 million rupees.

The proportion of the capital budget—i.e., disbursements met from sources other than revenue—which was allocated to the military was considerably lower. There are several qualifications to this observation, however. First, while the larger portion of the capital budget accrues from foreign aid, the amounts of military assistance are regarded as classified information and have not been made public. Although the precise figures on military aid are not known, some fairly reliable approximations are possible, based upon aggregate data published by the U.S. Government with respect to military assistance allotted to countries in the Near East and South Asia. According to one authority on military assistance to this area, approximately \$400 to \$450 million (between 1,90.40 and 2,14.20 lakhs†) have been extended to Pakistan during the period from 1956, when actual assistance commenced, to 1960.31 This involves an average annual outlay for this period of Rs. 47.60 to Rs. 56.05 lakhs.

Besides the acquisition of equipment and stores, another crucial problem in the early organization and development of the military was the creation of educational and training facilities for the development of adequate cadres to assume command, staff, and technical positions. At the time of partition, Pakistan inherited an officer corps inadequate both in training and experience for undertaking major command positions or assuming duties which required considerable technical expertise. It was largely because of this that Governor General Mohammed Ali Jinnah with the concurrence of top Pakistani officers requested British officers to stay on for periods ranging from one to three years in the army, and for longer periods in the case of the air force and navy, where officers with technical training were particularly

† A lakh equals Rs. 100,000.

required.²² Pakistani officers, however, participated in the screening and selection of British officers who had indicated that they would be willing to continue. The eventual exodus of the British officers strengthened the motivation of the Pakistani officers, since the possibilities for promotion within the services were greatly increased. At the time of independence there were 1600 British officers in those units permanently assigned to Pakistan.²³ Of them, 12 held the rank of major-general, 33 the rank of brigadier, and 35 the rank of colonel. All four area commanders were British, and of the 19 brigades, 16 were commanded by British. On the other hand, there were no Pakistani officers with the rank of major-general, only four with the rank of brigadier, and eight with the rank of colonel. Only three Pakistanis were in command of brigades.

The units which were hardest hit with respect to inadequate officer personnel were those of the technical services. While all units were deficient in officers, some services were overburdened with enlisted personnel and others had too few.²⁴

The navy and the air force were also faced with the major problem of attracting and developing an officer corps adequate in training and number to meet their command and technical requirements. On January 1, 1948, when the initial efforts were made at overall military planning, the navy had a contingent of 194 commissioned officers and 70 warrant officers as opposed to a requirement of 400 and 120, respectively.²⁵ This problem was complicated considerably for the air force by the lack of a reservoir of the technical talent required to pilot, navigate, and maintain aircraft. In 1948 the air force had 232 Pakistani officers, plus a contingent of 27 British officers who held most of the top command and staff positions.

The first major changes in rank and command positions came on January 1, 1948. Of 3,374 officers at that time, only 584 were British.²⁶ British officers still retained primary control in command positions of the fighting arms and were preponderant in the technical services. In the army there were six British and five Pakistani major-generals; 17 British and 15 Pakistani brigadiers; and 27 British and 14 Pakistani colonels. At that time, however, most top-ranking British officers were placed in command and staff positions in General Headquarters while Pakistani officers were given positions in field commands. Thus three of the four area commanders were Pakistani major-generals, and nine of the eleven brigades were commanded by Pakistani brigadiers. In the navy, 27 British officers were retained to assume top-ranking command and technical positions. Of the 16 officers on the naval staff at that time, however, 11 were Pakistani, with the top-ranking Pakistani officer being chief of the naval staff. Because of the grave lack of adequate personnel, British officers remained in the air force longer than in either the army or navy. In 1948, however, nine Pakistani officers were in command of units or stations and 46 held staff appointments.

To the fullest extent possible within all three services, British junior officers and non-commissioned officers were released immediately after independence. This decision was taken for two major reasons. First, it afforded maximum mobility at the lower levels of the command structure and lessened the chances of the development of a sense of unrest, competition, and rivalry among younger officers. Second, it provided for the practical military education of young officers through experience in command positions where the major questions of military organization and planning were not of central importance. From 1948 the number of British officers in the infantry, armored and army service corps was comparatively smaller than the number in the engineers, artillery, signal, and electrical and mechanical corps, in which British officers predominated numerically as well as proportionally, since most Pakistani officers had been schooled in the fighting arms.

The lack of highly trained and experienced personnel was complicated by an absence of adequate training institutions. At the time of partition, Pakistan had no military academies,

and inherited few training installations for officers or troops. Of the 46 major army training centers in undivided India, only seven were located in Pakistan territory.²⁷ Furthermore, attempts at maintaining some joint training facilities for the armies of both states collapsed for the same reasons which prompted the division of the area as a whole. The same problem of training affected the other two services.

Although a number of training institutions had been established in Pakistan by the end of 1948, during the first few years the Pakistan military had to rely on foreign institutions, primarily in Britain, for the training of its officer corps, as well as for training selected noncommissioned officers, particularly in the technical branches. Major efforts, however, were made to establish and upgrade national training institutions. The commitment of the Pakistan military to adequate education and training reflected their own preparation for and experience in a military vocation. At the time of partition and until the late 1950's, the ranking military officers, especially colonels and above, had been educated in British military schools and entered military service prior to independence. Since 1919 when, as a result of the Esher Committee report, it had been decided to reserve a limited number of posts for Indian officers in the British-Indian armed forces, these officers had been educated in British military academies. From 1922 to the early 1930's there had been ten positions reserved annually at Sandhurst for Indian cadets; and in 1922 the Prince of Wales Royal Military College had been established at Dehra Dun for the training of Indian officers for Viceroy's commissions.²⁸ This college was organized along the lines of Sandhurst, with instruction in military subjects given by British officers. At the time of independence, therefore, both Indian and Pakistani officers had been trained at one of these two military schools; even today, senior officers in the Pakistan military are characterized by this common educational background.

One of the first steps taken in each of the services following partition was the creation of military academies. In the case of the army, the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) was established in early 1948, modeled after the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.²⁹ Like Sandhurst, the curriculum includes courses in the humanities and general subjects, with half of the course work being in military science. At the outset, candidates from older age groups and with better educational backgrounds than the regular cadets were put through a seven-month course before being commissioned.³⁰ However, inadequate educational preparation among most members of the first classes of cadets in all service academies prompted the establishment of a precadet training school in Quetta on an interservice basis.³¹ There are several other schools which serve as preparatory schools for entry into the Pakistan Military Academy. These include the Punjab Cadet College and the King George Pakistan Military College at Jhelum, which until 1956 gave free education to the sons of enlisted men and junior commissioned officers. After 1956, however, recruitment policy was expanded to include the sons of civilians and commissioned officers in the defense services.³² All precadet training institutions are run and financed by provincial governments, although the ministry of defense, through the army education directorate in general headquarters supplies instructors and largely controls the structure and content of education.³³

One of the major changes in recruitment policy in the officer corps was the introduction of the "Y" cadet scheme. In order to get the best possible officer material, a new program was set up to encourage the entry into PMA of boys "from among the classes generally recruited in the Armed Forces. According to the scheme, sons, grandsons, and direct dependents of service personnel and ex-servicemen who are matriculates and between 17 to 20 years of age will be enlisted in the Army."³⁴ These recruits receive basic military training, instruction in the Army School of Education, and, upon passing the Pakistan Army Special Certificate of Education Examination, apply for admission to the Pakistan Military Academy and are usually successful.

A crucial problem was the arrangement of a program of advanced training for superior officer cadres. This has involved training both in Pakistan and abroad. The major institution for the education of senior military officers is the Command and Staff College at Quetta which was established in the early part of the twentieth century and which produced some of the finest officers of the British-Indian Army. This school has two major functions. First, it offers training, to officers with ten to twelve years' service, in staff duties and in the art of war with respect to higher levels of command. Second, "It is from amongst these staff trained officers that the bulk of the senior commanders and senior staff officers have been drawn in the past and will continue to be so in the future."³⁵ Courses here are ten and a half months in duration and include officers from all services and, since 1954, have included officers from other countries.³⁶

A number of high-level officers in all three services have been trained at the Imperial Defense College and at the Joint Services Staff College in Britain. Training, primarily in technical subjects for both officer and noncommissioned ranks, has been obtained in various military schools in the United States. The key officers in the military establishment at the time of the military coup in 1958 had all received training in at least one top-level foreign military institution.

A number of specialized training establishments were created in each of the three services during the few years following independence. By the end of 1948, schools had been established in all branches of the services for education and training in the technology and problems peculiar to each. Furthermore, each service established service-wide training facilities. In 1956 the army established a school of administration. Similar schools were established in the other two services as well.³⁷ The increasing complexity of a modern military force also prompted the creation of a series of schools for training personnel in the technical branches of each service. The air force established an apprentices school in 1951, which included facilities for training in signal and radar, and later established a jet overhaul workshop which performed training as well as maintenance and repair functions.³⁸ The navy during the first few years set up gunnery, electrical, signal, radar, communications, navigation, and antisubmarine warfare schools and later a mechanical training establishment which involved schooling for personnel in engineering and mechanical branches.³⁹

The need for experts in the maintenance and repair of new military equipment and hardware prompted the creation of the army school of apprentices in 1957, one year after the first military aid from the United States.⁴⁰ Recruits sent to this school are expected to rise to senior noncommissioned ranks in the engineering and signal corps. The program is designed to turn out 250 technical experts yearly after a four-year course. All education after the first year is in English.

The demands placed upon the Pakistan Army during the first few years after independence, although primarily of a military nature, did not permit the coherent development and organization of the military establishment. Until 1951 the organization of the army was limited to piecing together the various units inherited at partition into an organizational framework based upon the British model. After 1951 there was a marked change and an intensification of effort in the reorganization of the army, and an integrated program of military training was begun.⁴¹ There were several reasons for this. First, the army for the first time was relatively free from obligations either of a warlike or peace-keeping nature. Second, it had been accepted in political circles that there was a need for continued defense preparedness, thereby prompting the government to give economic priority to the support and improvement of the military establishment. Third, with the appointment of Mohammed Ayub Khan as the first Pakistani commander-in-chief in 1951, there was an increased momentum and effort toward the creation of a highly competent and professional military force.

The army during the early 1950's still reflected the hurried efforts to patch together the disparate units which fell to Pakistan with the division of the British-Indian Army. Several types of corrective measures were taken. At the end of 1953 an army planning board was established to make intensive studies of outstanding problems of reorganization and to make proposals to the commander-in-chief for their solution.⁴² Studies were made of all army units, including their history, traditions, military, and other experience, as well as a comparative study of the organization and authority structure of some of the world's major armies. These studies resulted in a series of papers and reports offering proposals for reorganization in the army. The general assumptions underlying the recommendations of the board do not appear to have been revolutionary. There was a general desire to abandon the British military model of World War II vintage upon which the Pakistan Army had been based. But the assumption underlying the reorganization of the major units was little different from the British since "it was thought that the logical sequel to the existing regimental system would be the grouping together of regiments with similar traditions and territorial affiliations."⁴³ In 1955 a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Habibullah Khan to undertake a study of the army planning board's recommendations for the reorganization of the infantry divisions.⁴⁴ On the basis of the recommendations of that committee, extensive field exercises were held, and after a review and analysis of the results, the divisions were reorganized.

One of the central concerns of Ayub after assuming the position of commander-in-chief in 1951 was to set up a coordinated program of military training. During the Kashmir war (1947-48) and the constant fear of military conflict, no attempts had been made to formulate an integrated program of training. There was, however, an intense and widespread concern in the top officer corps about the inadequate state of training. This concern was in large part the reason for the resentment on the part of the military at requests to engage in civilian tasks, since this hindered the development of a systematic training program. Prior to 1951 all training programs had been left to unit commanders and even within divisions there was no common or integrated program. Immediately after his appointment, General Ayub established a training advisory staff under a British major-general to study alternatives for the organization of training programs.⁴⁵ In mid-1952 divisional training teams were established in all divisions "whose main function was to unify the system, standard, and assessment of training in the division."⁴⁶ Also shortly after becoming commander-in-chief, Ayub instituted an annual planning and training exercise at general headquarters. These exercises were attended by all general officers, commanders of independent units and military institutions, and senior staff officers. These early planning efforts culminated in the 1954 "November Handicap" exercises which involved the employment of 50,000 troops—to that time, the largest military exercise held in Asia.

Social Recruitment in the Military

The pattern of social recruitment to the military in Pakistan after 1947 has not changed much from what it was under the British. Both the officer and enlisted cadres in all three services are recruited largely from West Pakistan; and from within this area, most come from the former provinces of Punjab and the North-West Frontier. At the time of independence the overwhelming majority of both officers and enlisted cadres came from these provinces; and in the fighting arms, which formed the bulk of the military, the representation from West Pakistan was 100 percent. Throughout the military, all officers with the rank of colonel and above were from these two provinces.⁴⁷

Although attempts have been made to expand opportunities for East Pakistanis to enter military service since independence (1947) and particularly since 1958, this is still an unsolved

problem. In the budget debates in the National Assembly in 1962 an argument was made by an East Pakistani member that representation in the defense services is still of crucial importance and concern:

... the question of Defence is as important and as burning a problem in East Pakistan as the question of economic disparity. It is an admitted fact that in the Defence Services we are hopelessly underrepresented. Apart from its other implications, it definitely baits the sentiments of every East Pakistani that he does not get a proper opportunity of defending his own motherland.⁴⁸

The precise policies which are followed in the defense services concerning recruitment to the military as well as the social basis of unit organization is regarded as classified information.⁴⁹ General statements concerning representation have been made by government officials, however, in response to questions posed in the National Assembly. In the case of the army there are defined limits laid down for recruitment from East and West Pakistan, although the proportions and limits with respect to the former provinces inside West Pakistan have not been made public (see Table 5).

Table 5. Representation in the Pakistan Army
by Province and Rank (in percentages)⁵⁰

Rank	Authorized Representation		Actual Representation	
	West Pakistan	East Pakistan	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Commissioned officers	(No fixed percentage)		95	5*
Junior commissioned officers	92.2	7.8†	92.6	7.4
Other ranks	92.2	7.8†	92.6	7.4

*This includes all branches of the army with the exception of the Medical Corps, in which officers from East Pakistan constitute 23 percent of the total.

†This includes manpower requirements for the 4th Battalion of the East Bengal Regiment which was being raised in 1963.

The participation of East Pakistanis in both the air force and navy is considerably higher than in the army (see Tables 6 and 7). There are several possible explanations for this. First, unlike the army, neither of these services has traditions of "class unit" recruitment (see page 99). Second, neither service has formal regional quotas set on recruitment. Third, in each service, all junior officers and others of lower rank have to pass promotion and trade tests. In the army all such examinations are in Urdu since it is the most widely understood language and is the medium of instruction and communication for army personnel from the rank of junior officer and below. (Urdu is spoken in West Pakistan, Bengali in East Pakistan.) In

the navy, however, there is a choice between Bengali and Urdu, and in the air force all such examinations are in English.⁵¹ It has been officially reported, nevertheless, that recruiting facilities in both the air force and navy have encountered considerable difficulty in attracting personnel from East Pakistan for both officer and enlisted ranks and that in order to fill manpower requirements they have had to resort to more intensive recruitment in the western wing.⁵²

Table 6. Representation in the Pakistan Air Force by Province and Rank (in percentages)⁵³

Rank	General Duty Pilots		Navigators		Technical	
	WP	EP	WP	EP	WP	EP
Commissioned officers	89	11	73	27	83	17
Warrant officers	--	--	--	--	82.8	13.2
Other ranks	--	--	--	--	72	28
	Administrative		Educational		Overall	
	WP	EP	WP	EP	EP	
Commissioned officers	69	31	87	13	16	
Warrant officers	55	45	88.6	11.3	17	
Other ranks	64	36	62.2	37.8	30	

Table 7. Representation in the Pakistan Navy by Province and Rank (in percentages)⁵⁴

Rank	Technical		Nontechnical		Overall
	WP	EP	WP	EP	EP
Commissioned officers	81.0	19.0	91.0	9.0	10.0
Branch officers	96.0	4.0	94.0	6.0	5.0
Chief petty officers	91.6	8.4	86.6	13.4	10.4
Petty officers	78.7	21.3	85.3	14.7	17.3
Leading seamen and below	71.6	28.4	71.5	28.5	28.8

The pattern of recruitment in preindependence India was predicated on the assumption that there were certain castes and social groups which constituted the "martial races" of India and which were especially suited by both ability and temperament for military pursuits. Although the validity of this conception has been frequently questioned, it was nonetheless important in that it did govern, to a large extent, the pattern of recruitment into the British-Indian armed forces from the nineteenth century. The organization of the British-Indian armed forces was determined by the social origins of recruits. In the combat branches, all companies were "class companies"—those in a particular company all being recruited from a single caste (jati) or social group and from a restricted geographical area. Each class unit had the tribes and clans which it could enlist determined by superior authority or by regimental rules.⁵⁵ This pattern of social organization in the military was established to minimize the potentiality of communal (ethnoreligious) tension and conflict; but it also was deemed to be conducive to the maintenance of morale and internal control over troop behavior. There was considerable use of traditional rules in maintaining a corporate spirit.

After the Mutiny of 1857, Indian personnel were taken from positions of command and in some units, such as artillery, were excluded from recruitment altogether.⁵⁶ This continued until 1919 when the decision was made to prepare a limited number of Indian nationals as officers with King's commissions in the army.⁵⁷ For the ten vacancies reserved annually for Indian cadets at Sandhurst, aspirants competed among themselves in a formal examination, final recommendations being made by the commander-in-chief of the army in India and the viceroy. Vacancies which were not filled in India were filled by the Secretary of State for India from among Indian boys educated in the United Kingdom. Passage to and from the United Kingdom was paid by the government, but the cost of education and maintenance had to be borne by the students themselves.⁵⁸ This system was thus biased toward the more well-to-do and Westernized elites. Muslim cadets tended to come from the landowning zamindari families who had long identified with the ruling power and who had taken to Western education, which was a prerequisite to participation in the affairs of the British raj.

A second source of King's commissions for Indian nationals was the Prince of Wales Royal Military College which was opened in 1922 at Dehra Dun.⁵⁹ This academy was first established as a preparatory school for those who desired to go to Sandhurst, and to offer adequate preparatory training which had been lacking in the first few groups of students to go from India. The cost of education, including tuition, living, and medical expenses, was Rs. 1,500 per year. The commander-in-chief of the Indian Army also had the right to nominate sons of holders of Viceroy's commissions for admittance fees lower than those noted above. The higher ranking Pakistani military officers were educated in these institutions and came primarily from landowning families in the Punjab and North-West Frontier Provinces.

Military Identification With the New State of Pakistan

The continuation of communal tension, which had come to be the dominant social and political conflict in undivided India, in the form of international hostility between Pakistan and India, tended to increase the effective identification of the Pakistan military with the new state.

Upon the return of military men after World War II, and with their participation in various types of partition activities, they started to become affected by communal (ethnoreligious) tensions. The creation of Pakistan and the conflicts arising from the division of the Indian Army had a significant impact on the attitude of the Pakistan military toward India, as well as upon the image which they held of their own role in Pakistan. By being involved to an extent in the decisions concerning the division of the army and other services, some

top officers—who were to become the first general officers in the new army—came face to face with the political questions involved in the division of the subcontinent and started to share with their political counterparts the attitude that India was committed to the disablement of the new state.

Prior to partition, the military high command had done everything in its power to keep the activities and division of the armed forces as far removed from politics and as rational and businesslike as possible. It has been commonly agreed by various participants as well as commentators that prior to independence, the arrangements and planning for the division of the armed forces were carried on in an atmosphere of mutual concern and agreement. Because so few training centers of the Indian Army were located in what was to become Pakistan, it was agreed prior to partition that, in so far as possible, these institutions would be used jointly until suitable training institutions could be established in Pakistan. The growth of ethnoreligious tension in the society at large, however, had its effect on the attitudes of cadets in these training schools to such an extent that the cadets became divided into warring camps. Therefore, the schools had to be divided shortly after independence, even though some cadets had only a few months to go before graduation and commissioning.

Numerous aspects of the work of partition helped to shape attitudes on the part of the military toward the new state and encouraged the development of its self-perception as a distinct and national military force. The first partition activity was the Punjab Boundary Force, which was sanctioned by the Partition Council, largely at the insistence of its Pakistani members, to help maintain law and order and to assist in the transfer of populations in that province.⁶¹ The PBF, which included the major portion of a division of the Indian Army, commenced its work on August 1, 1947, and was given responsibility for maintaining law and order in twelve districts of the Punjab. The troops placed at its disposal, however, were inadequate to fulfill its job in the face of organized communal bands and private armies; and since martial law had not been declared in these areas, the military were subordinate to civilian authority, which during that period was on the verge of collapse. Instead of being able to bring the area under control, the military, including the officer corps, itself started to become divided on ethnoreligious lines.⁶²

With the creation of Pakistan on August 15, 1947, there were several additional factors which tended to encourage an identification of the military forces with the new state. First, a large share of the Pakistani forces, particularly the army, came from the Punjab, which was the scene of the greatest ethnoreligious turmoil during and after partition. Many of the families of both officers and troops were directly involved in the partition troubles, and many men were granted compassionate leave during the first few months of independence.⁶³ Second, since civilian authority nearly collapsed in Pakistan during partition, the military became exceedingly active in administration and refugee work and in the maintenance of law and order.⁶⁴ The felt necessity to alleviate and correct the administrative and economic disruption in both East and West Pakistan created by partition served to counteract major political cleavage. These problems made each area considerably dependent upon the central government for economic resources and administrative services. East Bengal, the Punjab, and Sind had all undergone considerable economic distress when the traditional business and monied classes, almost entirely Hindu and Sikh, emigrated to India, and this dislocation was

aggravated by a large influx of refugees.⁶⁵ Moreover, the administrative classes prior to partition had also been largely Hindu and Sikh, almost all of whom went to India, thus leaving the administrative system highly chaotic at the very moment when a well-organized and efficient administrative apparatus was most urgently required.⁶⁶ Participation in this common enterprise tended to instill a sense of unity, particularly within the administrative and defense services.

Cohesiveness in the military was protected and encouraged in several ways. For example, they were not divided by those major regional factors which had divided the society and polity, since the military were recruited almost entirely from the Punjab and the North-West Frontier. (This, however, kept the army from being in fact a national one, since East Bengal, the largest province in terms of population, was almost without representation.) Further, the fact that the military had been removed from political activity helped to avoid the rise of differing political orientations within the military.

MILITARY ALOOFNESS FROM POLITICS: 1947-54

The Autonomy of the Political and Military Spheres

During this period the military became involved in nonmilitary functions only in response to requests of political authority to aid civilian agencies in the execution of tasks which could not be or were not performed adequately by the agencies responsible. In every case in which the military did become involved, it returned to its primary function of defense immediately after the completion of its tasks and at the request of civilian authority.

The military played an important role in the decision to enter the Kashmir war, but subsequent policy and negotiations were totally a political affair.⁶⁷ The attempted coup on the part of a few officers in 1951—the Rawalpindi conspiracy—lacked general support from the military. The army made no attempt to expand its role in the government or to change those legitimating assumptions upon which the political order rested when, as has been reported, the army was requested to take over the affairs of government at the time of the dismissal of the Nazimuddin ministry in 1953. Moreover, Commander-in-Chief Ayub refused to accept the governor-general's request for the army to assume political power after the dismissal of the Constituent Assembly in 1954.

Although the early postindependence period witnessed the beginnings of serious political instability in Pakistan, the military never became an active part of the political equation. The primary concern of the military leadership was to create a military establishment that could adequately perform its professional function of defense against external aggression. In the presence of an antagonistic neighbor this was an intense concern, because the resources which the military inherited at the time of independence were perceived as inadequate, and the military apparatus inherited at partition consisted of many disparate units which had never before been organized into one integrated whole.

During the preindependence period the British-Indian armed forces had kept aloof from political activity. With the exception of a few incidents, such as the formation of the Indian National Army under Subhas Chandra Bose, military officers as well as troops were involved only in military activity. The British-Indian army had been a professional military force from its inception, and Indian officers had been educated and trained in the apolitical tradition of the British. During World War II almost all major units of the armed forces were employed in overseas operations and thus were largely out of contact with the nationalist movement after it became irreconcilably split on the basis of religious communities. After independence, the Pakistan military's concern for the primary defense function rather than other matters such as politics was reinforced by the apolitical attitudes which the ranking Pakistani officer corps had developed after their education and rearing in the British military tradition.

The political leadership gave the military extensive freedom in the internal organization, planning, and management of the defense services and were responsive to the felt needs of the military regarding financial support required for its development. At the time of independence there was no political leader who had been schooled in the affairs of military administration and organization. Governor-General Jinnah, shortly after independence, informed the ranking military officers that all military problems would be left to the respective services themselves for solution and that only the most general policy control would be reserved for political decision.⁶⁵

The dependence of the political leadership on the British officer corps offered considerable political access to the military establishment with respect to defense requirements. The first Secretary of Defense was Iskander Mirza, who started his career as an officer in the British-Indian army and was one of the first Indian nationals to graduate from Sandhurst. Military leaders, both British and Pakistani, placed great faith in his ability, as did the upper echelons of the Pakistan administrative services. He was singularly instrumental in establishing the initial working relationships between the military and administrative and political elites. Members of the Pakistan officer corps were limited, though not particularly frustrated, by the new institutional framework in which they were placed after independence. This framework served as a governor on political ambitions, if they existed, and tended to propagate those attitudes which the military brought with them after partition. One of the most important institutional checks was the existence of British officers in command positions and the dependence of the military on British expertise for the development of the technical services. These officers were selected and approved by a board of Pakistani national officers and appointed by the state. The Pakistan military therefore became a national force under the tutelage of their former commanders in the armed forces of British India. The absence of opposition to the early leadership of a British military elite and the commitment to the institutionalization of the military establishment on the British model were indicative of the professional commitment of the Pakistani officer corps.

The national military leadership, both before and after the complete nationalization of the armed forces, publicly advocated a nonpolitical role for the military and the necessity of the military to be responsive to the decisions of civil political authority. In his speech to the nation upon his appointment as the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan counseled the troops to "keep out of politics. By saying this I don't mean to imply that you should not take an intelligent interest in the affairs of your country. In fact, as citizens of Pakistan, you must do that. But what you must avoid is taking an active part in party politics and propagation of any such views. As I said before, we are servants of Pakistan and as such servants of any party that the people put in power."⁶⁶

The Kashmir War: 1947-48

The first major example of military participation in political decision-making was the Kashmir war. With the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir to India and the immediate movement of Indian troops into the state in October 1947, Governor-General Jinnah of Pakistan issued orders to Sir Douglas Gracey, Chief of Staff acting in place of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Frank Messervy, to move troops into Kashmir to ward off any threat to Pakistan and to give assistance to the Azad (Free) Kashmir forces in the state.⁷⁰ This placed Gracey in a difficult position, since the commitment of Pakistani troops would have demanded the immediate withdrawal of all British officers as a result of the "stand down" order* promulgated prior to partition with the agreement of both Pakistan and India.⁷¹ Instead of promptly complying with the order, Gracey, in a telegram to Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army Auchinleck, requested him to come to Lahore, where he and Gracey talked with Jinnah, the former reminding the governor-general of the situation regarding British troops, and the danger of violating Indian territory, while Gracey emphasized the comparative weakness of the Pakistan military organization and the difficulties which would arise in any major military contest.⁷² Jinnah subsequently withdrew the orders. About six months later, however, after Gracey had become the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, he recommended the entry of Pakistan troops into Kashmir, reportedly as a protective measure,⁷³ although it involved the removal of all British officers from command positions.⁷⁴ The decision not to enter the Kashmir fracas and the later decision in May 1948 to do so did not reflect a desire on the part of the military to appropriate for themselves a larger role in the apparatus of government. Moreover, it was not an action taken by a nationalized army leadership but by two major British officers. The fact that there was no public resentment or internal action on the part of the Pakistani officer corps was indicative not only of its obedience to political authority, but also of its obedience to the British officers who at that time held many of the major command positions.⁷⁵ The decision to commit Pakistan troops was taken on the formal recommendation of military authority, but the extent to which troops were committed as well as the negotiations of January 1948-December 1948 concerning the signing of the cease-fire on January 1, 1949, were decided by political authorities.

During the Kashmir war and afterward, during initial stages of reorganization, the military started to conceive of themselves as being innovative and adaptive in the mobilization and employment of resources to cope with an unpredictable environment. This increased their sense of self-confidence.

The Rawalpindi Conspiracy: 1951

The most significant and crucial test of the military's subordination to political authority was the Rawalpindi conspiracy case of 1951. There was considerable frustration in the army after the cease-fire, largely because the military authorities felt that the war was turning in their favor precisely at the time that the cease-fire was negotiated.⁷⁶ In an announcement on March 9, 1951, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan stated that "a conspiracy hatched by the enemies of Pakistan, has just been unearthed. The aim of the conspiracy was to create commotion in the country by violent means and, in furtherance of that purpose to subvert the loyalty of Pakistan's defense forces."⁷⁷ The major leaders of this alleged coup were arrested on the same day and included Maj.-Gen. Akbar Khan, Chief of the General Staff and a major commanding

*This required all British officers to leave the service should war break out between India and Pakistan.

*Kashmir was not legally Indian territory.

officer in the Kashmir war: Brig. M. A. Latif, a brigade commander at Quetta; Faiz Ahmad, editor of the Pakistan Times; and Mrs. Akbar Khan. There was widespread support for Liaquat's move from professional associations, political parties, newspapers, and the military itself. In all, there were only fifteen persons arrested and tried in connection with the case, but they eventually included another major general, Nazir Ahmed, and the highest ranking Pakistani officer in the air force, Air Com. Mohammed Janjua. A special tribunal was established by act of the Constituent Assembly to try the case and the decisions of the tribunal were not appealable to any other court.⁷⁷

The events surrounding the case demonstrated the lack of political aspirations on the part of the military as well as the outright rejection of political objectives by the dominant army leadership. They also indicated the intention and ability of the government to deal effectively with an alleged threat to civilian supremacy in the political system. The proceedings of the special tribunal have never been made public and there have been conflicting reports as to how real and serious the threat actually was.⁷⁸ In any event, if it was serious and real, the ability of the government to take the action it did made evident the restraint of the military establishment, for there was no attempt to push military involvement nor was there any effort to come to the defense of the accused. Even if the threat were not real, the same would hold true, since the military did not question the action of the government but instead gave it its undivided support. It is true that since the accused included several top-ranking officers, the remaining officers may have hesitated to come to the defense of the accused because of a desire to keep the way open for their own advancement. On the other hand, the lack of discernible unrest among military officers at the time would seem to indicate that the accused had little support within the military forces.

Operation Jute: 1952-53

The military did become involved in a number of public service functions and peace-keeping activities, but in each case it was the political authority that decided on the best means for achieving a particular goal, while the military—on the request of political authority—assisted in the implementation of that decision. These public-service and peace-keeping functions included army participation in antilocus campaigns and monsoon flood relief operations. During the disastrous floods of 1950 a pattern of military assistance was developed for future occasions. This assistance included: (1) the provision of signal detachments to watch the rivers and protective bands in the rainy season; (2) relief and rescue work; and (3) reconstruction of damage. In these cases only a limited number of troops were employed and they worked with and served under civilian agencies.

"Operation Jute" was launched in East Bengal in September 1952 and continued until the end of January 1953. Prior to independence the province of Bengal constituted an integrated jute economy—raw jute produced in the regions of East Bengal was processed in Calcutta. The partitioning of India divided the economy, leaving Pakistan's East Bengal with minimal processing facilities and India's West Bengal (with Calcutta) without any raw material for its factories. The exchange of goods was complicated when the Government of India decided to devalue the Indian rupee and Pakistan failed to follow suit. There was also a sizable export duty on jute which yielded considerable revenue for the Pakistan Government. With these barriers to trade, smuggling became widespread; as a result, the government lost considerable revenue. Although attempts had been made to halt this activity by use of the border police, it continued to increase. On September 12, 1952, after consultations with the Commander-in-Chief of the army Gen. Ayub Khan, Gen. Mohammed Musa, the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the 14th Army Division, was placed in charge of the antismuggling operations, and the East

Pakistan Rifles, the border patrol in East Pakistan, were placed under his command.⁷⁹ The general control of the antismuggling operations, however, remained formally in the hands of the district magistrates. Civil liaison officers were appointed to all military and East Pakistan Rifles detachments, and it was directed that all searches and arrests of suspects be made in their presence. The military, however, was empowered by a special ordinance to arrest, detain, or take into custody any person engaged in smuggling, and to seize any controlled commodities which were being smuggled out of the country.⁸⁰ The operation, at least in the early months, was successful. The cooperation and working relationships which were struck with civilian authorities during this joint endeavor became important in subsequent activity, not only in the prosecution of other operations of this sort, but in the organization of power after the military coup in 1958.

Martial Law in Lahore: 1953

Another major internal policing function was the declaration of martial law in Lahore in March 1953, after the disturbances caused by the anti-Ahmadiyya movement. This movement was begun in 1949 by the Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam, a revivalist Muslim organization, which aimed to have the Ahmadiyyas, a reformist Muslim sect, declared outside the pale of Islam and to have the eminent Ahmadiyya Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, removed from his post.⁸¹ By the end of 1952 the movement began to get out of hand; several riots occurred, involving a number of different groups with grievances to vent against the government. Although the direct-action campaign in Karachi was quickly controlled, the urban centers of the Punjab, where a large majority of Ahmadiyya lived, became hotbeds of civil violence and disorder. The Punjab government actively aided the movement, reportedly for the purpose of channeling any potential resentment against it to the central government.⁸² In all Punjab towns except Lahore order was maintained by the police or, in several places, by the police with the support of the army. In all, troops from six regiments were deployed to help in rural areas.⁸³ The situation in Lahore, however, eventually got completely out of control, and on March 6, 1953, the central government declared the area under martial law, with Gen. Azam Khan, the GOC of the 10th Division, as chief administrator of martial law and with Huzif Abdul Majid, chief secretary of the Punjab government, as his deputy. The area was divided into six sectors, each under the command of a brigade commander. After five days calm was restored. The martial law organization relied upon the police and civil authorities to a great extent in the administration of martial law, with military officers and troops playing a minimal role. The army reportedly was prepared to return control to the civil administration after one week, but the central government directed it to remain.⁸⁴ Martial law lasted, then, from the end of March until May 15, during which time the martial law authorities embarked upon a number of projects directed at improving public facilities in the area, such as widening roads, enforcing the keeping of clean shops, organizing campaigns to encourage a sense of civic consciousness among the public, and fostering steps to remove "social evils" such as excessive expenditures on marriages, parties, and feasts.

POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY: 1954-58

The primary condition which prompted the military's assumption of political power in Pakistan in 1958 was the chronic instability which characterized governments at both the national and provincial levels. Political instability involved frequent changes of governments, prolonged and intense conflict between various political elites, and the inability of governments to set and pursue "progressive" political goals for the society. It also involved competing conceptions of what a legitimate constitutional order would be, together with regional

antagonisms which threatened the existence of the political community itself. Internal political conflict and the organization of political elites and political parties increasingly became oriented around these fundamental cleavages within the society.

Dismissal of the First Constituent Assembly: 1954

It has been reported that the army was requested to take over the affairs of government at the time of the dismissal of the Nazimuddin ministry in 1953 and again in 1954 immediately after the dismissal of the First Constituent Assembly. Only the latter event will be discussed here.

The first major opposition to the hegemony of the Muslim League started in East Bengal with the formation of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik. Key members of these groups had been leaders of the Muslim League in East Bengal, but had been excluded from positions of power in League organization since independence. Both of these new parties existed outside the Legislative Assembly and developed autonomous bases of support. In 1954, the two parties banded together with several smaller ones to form the United Front coalition in opposition to the Muslim League in the East Bengal elections of that year. These elections resulted in the near annihilation of the League as an important political organization in East Bengal and marked the breaking up of the one national organization which to a large extent had softened the major conflicts which divided the nation.⁸⁵ From this juncture there were competing political parties in power which were organized along the lines of the basic political cleavages in the state and society; from that time, the possibility of establishing a coherent national political leadership and national political symbols increasingly diminished.

The United Front victory in the East Bengal elections placed the central government in a dilemma. The vote against the Muslim League in East Bengal was a tacit vote of no confidence in those members of the Constituent Assembly who had been elected by the East Bengal legislative assembly. The central government did not want new elections of members of the Constituent Assembly, since the work of finalizing the constitution, after years of prolonged debate, was underway, and the introduction of new personnel might have prolonged the debate even more. This was particularly true in view of the fact that the United Front had run on a political program which was opposed to many League policies and constitutional positions. Also, the central League leadership would have limited, if any, control over the Front government, whether it be in East Bengal or in the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, shortly after the United Front ministry assumed power in East Bengal, it was dismissed by the governor-general.⁸⁶

After the action dismissing the United Front ministry and legislative assembly in East Bengal in 1954, several attempts were made in the Constituent Assembly to establish legal restraints on the governor-general. Several minor restrictions were placed upon the office, but the several major ones appeared to be directed against the governor-general himself.⁸⁷ The major changes included the repeal of the Public Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act (PRODA); an amendment to the Government of India Act of 1935 binding the governor-general to accept the advice of the council of ministers in appointing a prime minister; directed that the prime minister be chosen from the assembly, and that he enjoy the confidence of a majority of the members of the assembly. Finally, under the provisions passed concerning the transitional period before the new constitution would come into effect, the provisional president would be elected by the Constituent Assembly, thus establishing that the governor-general would not automatically serve as the first president of Pakistan.

Shortly after these provisions were made law, the governor-general retaliated by dismissing the Constituent Assembly (1954). As had been the case after similar executive actions,

the act met with almost silent acquiescence on the part of members of the assembly, political parties, and public alike. The governor-general then asked the military to assume the responsibility of government, but the military, under Gen. Ayub Khan, refused. A "ministry of talent" was then formed which included most of the members of the previous ministry, together with representatives of the two major parties in the United Front coalition in Bengal, as well as a position for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Ayub, as the Minister of Defense.

General Ayub reportedly played an important part in getting Iskander Mirza elected as the first president of Pakistan under the 1956 Constitution, but his attention was primarily focused upon the negotiation and administration of U.S. military aid and the continued reorganization of the armed forces. In general, however, between 1954 and 1958 the active involvement of the military in civilian tasks was limited to two major operations: Operation Service First (1956) and Operation Close Door (1957-58). But the conditions under which the military had to work and their response to these conditions were considerably different from what they had been before 1954. These two experiences were instrumental in shaping military attitudes towards politics and the role of the military in the state.

Operation Service First: 1956

Operation Service First commenced in East Bengal on June 30, 1956, to handle the food crisis which had been plaguing the province from late 1955. The crisis had to some extent been brought about by the food policy of the Awami League ministry, a policy which military authorities perceived as an attempt to enhance the League's own popularity. In his broadcast over Dacca radio on June 30, the Governor of East Bengal indicated that all food distribution would be handled by the army, although the army had not been consulted about this proposed action.⁸⁸ On July 7, a headquarters of army food control was established in Dacca and sector headquarters in the three subdivisions of East Bengal.⁸⁹ On July 10 the GOC of the 14th Division announced that the army was taking over all matters concerning food distribution in the province. Subsequently, headquarters were set up at the district and subdivisional levels as well. Each of these headquarters had jurisdiction which corresponded with that of the civil administration. At each of these levels civilian administrative personnel were given administrative duties or assigned as coordinators with the civil administration. All army officers involved in the work of food distribution were appointed as acting additional district magistrates at the district level, and as subdivisional officers at the subdivisional level.⁹⁰ As had been the case in Operation Jute in 1952, the military worked in close collaboration with civilian administrative agencies and developed working relationships which were important in the administration of martial law after 1958. Unlike the previous occasions of military action in civilian affairs, this 1956 situation aroused considerable political pressures; first, directly on the army to exonerate some persons and prosecute others, and eventually on the government in the form of demands that the army withdraw from food distribution activity. The operation was called to a halt on August 13, one month from its inception.

Operation Close Door: 1957-58

The second case of military involvement, and the one which started to prompt widespread demands in the officer corps of the army for the direct employment of the military in political affairs, was Operation Close Door. Although smuggling was a common practice across the Indo-Pakistan border in East Bengal, in 1957 it became more widespread and one ranking army officer declared that it was "actuated not simply by commercial motives, but was

becoming a political conspiracy of economic strangulation."⁹¹ At the request of the chief minister of East Pakistan and at the direction of the prime minister, the army, under the command of Maj. Gen. Umrao Khan, the GOC of the East Pakistan Area Command, with detachments from the air force and navy, launched an antismuggling operation in December 1957.⁹² The organization of the operation, while similar to the two described above, was more highly organized. The major change was the creation of an all-services headquarters in Dacca, which not only included officers from the three military services but senior civilian administrators from the Department of Railways and Customs, the Commander of the East Pakistan Rifles, the Deputy Inspector General of the Police, and several other officials who acted as liaison officers between the headquarters and the East Pakistan government.⁹³ Major decisions were taken and major questions of coordination were handled by this central command.

The entire operation was divided into two major phases: (1) the immediate cessation of all smuggling; and (2) the weeding out of those centers of economic power in the urban areas which were financing most of the smuggling operations. The first phase was executed swiftly and was quite effective. With the beginning of the second phase, however, pressure was brought to bear on the government to have the operation stopped, and on the organization of the operation itself. One officer has noted that the vested interests were still influential after the Army was given the situation, and interference by the Government in extensive military operations seriously threatened the idea of a coordinated military command. The Army was forced to compromise, to hold back in some areas, to arrest or release certain individuals, and in general to do only a halfway job against the smugglers.⁹⁴

Political pressure to have the operation abolished came to a head when the National Assembly held its Dacca session in January 1958. The Prime Minister, Firoz Khan Noon, whose Republican party had just come to power with Awami League support, publicly supported and complimented the army on its job after a tour of the border areas, but eventually came under considerable pressure, largely from the Awami League, to have the army withdrawn.⁹⁵ The GOC informed the Commander-in-Chief and President Mirza of what was happening, and although Mirza sent a strong message to the prime minister urging him not to succumb to pressure, the antismuggling ordinance was withdrawn on January 9, 1958.

The Growth of Political Instability

The first source of political instability arose from the fact that the cohesion of Pakistan was in some sense based on perception of external threat. The partition of the Indian sub-continent changed the conditions and rules governing the conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim, but it did not lessen the sense of tension or the conflict itself. The conflict was now embodied in two competing sovereign states. Muslims perceived that the Indian political leadership, not having accepted the idea of partition, would attempt by all means to reinstate the old area of conflict and impose its majority will on the Muslim minority. This sense of threat from India was pointed to by Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, in a charge sheet against the Indian Government.

I charge the Government of India: first, it has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, but her leaders paid lip service to it merely to get British troops out of the country. Secondly, India is

out to destroy the state of Pakistan which Indian leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself. Thirdly, systematic sabotage of coal and rail transport; deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds, arms and equipment; and the wholesale massacre of Muslim populations; which are all designed towards one aim, namely, the destruction of Pakistan.⁹⁶

Attempts on the part of the Pakistan political leadership to mobilize support for the new state were not phrased in terms of common interests which the political community shared, but rather emphasized external threats. With the reduction of the Indian threat, however, that sense of cohesion began to diminish.

A second source of instability was the temporary nature of the only internal symbols of unity in Pakistan. The first of these symbols was the charismatic quality of the first Governor-General, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who symbolized the demand for and the creation of Pakistan. At the first session of the Constituent Assembly he was officially given the honorific title of Qaid-i-Azam, or great leader, which was to be used in all public references to him. Jinnah, and to a lesser extent his protégé, Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister, were able to serve as the ultimate adjudicators of political disputes, not only because they were the two "tall leaders" of the Muslim League and the Pakistan movement, but also because neither had to base his political support in any of the provinces which constituted Pakistan and which increasingly became the centers for political organization and political power. These symbols of national unity, however, died with their possessors, Jinnah in 1948 and Liaqat in 1951.

A third important source of instability in Pakistani politics has been the limited sense of community and obligation to the new state, particularly in those princely states and centrally administered areas which eventually became part of Pakistan. The Muslim League, unlike the Indian National Congress, had not made intensive efforts prior to independence at organizing popular movements in the princely states of India (largely autonomous under the British raj).⁹⁷ The majority of those states which eventually acceded to Pakistan had been almost entirely removed from the nationalist movement, and there had been no organized movements of protest against the traditional authority. The goal of the central government, therefore, was limited to extracting assurances from the traditional political elites of these states that they recognize the ultimate sovereignty of the new Pakistan Government, in return for which the authority structure and government in those areas would remain largely autonomous.⁹⁸ These states became involved in conflicts over questions of the locus of political decision-making both with respect to questions of public policy and to the formal organization of political power in the state.

Societal Tension and the Political Community

A fourth source of instability was the lack of integration within the Muslim community. Competing political organizations had existed in the independence movement itself. And although the Muslim League had been able to gain recognition by the British as the authoritative voice of Indian Muslims, this claim was never realized in fact. Up to the time of independence there were many differing attitudes within the Muslim community towards the creation of a separate state for Indian Muslims as well as toward different political parties competing for the support of the Muslim community. The same conditions that were conducive to the rise of the Muslim nationalist movement, with the Muslim League as its vanguard, gave cohesion to Pakistan during the first few years after independence. But those latent divisions which existed in the Muslim political community prior to independence contributed to political instability after the first few years.

Prior to 1937 numerous political groups had claimed to represent the Muslim community; but all were largely limited in both leadership and membership to the educated classes and the landed gentry. Prior to the late 1930's, Muslim political groups had neither attempted to develop a mass base of political support, as the Congress had done from 1920, nor had they engaged in an agitational style of political action. The political objectives of Muslim groups during this period were limited almost exclusively to insuring the inclusion of safeguards in the constitutional order for the Muslim community; fulfillment of such ends required negotiation rather than mass based political action. There was considerable overlapping of membership in those organizations with other non-Muslim political groups, particularly the Indian National Congress and the Liberal Party.⁹⁹

The conception that the Muslims of India constituted a distinct nation and the subsequent demand for a separate state of Pakistan as a homeland for that nation resulted from a fear on the part of one sector of Muslim political leadership, primarily those from the Muslim minority provinces of British India, that the interests of the Muslim community could not be adequately protected in a political order which placed the Hindu religious community in a political majority. It was feared that the basic questions of political conflict would be fought on the basis of the fundamental religious cleavage in the society and that Muslims, being in a minority, would be placed in perpetual dependence upon the sufferance of the majority for the protection and fulfillment of their particular interests.

Propagation of the theory that Muslims constituted a nation separate from the Hindu nation was not the result of a mass upsurge, nor did it result from or build upon a common perception of national distinctness on the part of the Indian Muslims. Rather, it was a symbol attached to the growing self-conception of religious distinctness which was encouraged by the pronouncements and manipulation of symbols of a creative Muslim political elite.¹⁰⁰ The Indian Muslim did not have to be told that he was a part of a special community—his religion and rearing did that for him—but he could understand he was a part of a particular nation only in terms of his religious distinctiveness which was threatened. The conception of a Pakistani nation was thus an artificial concept drafted as a political symbol which could give a collective political identity to an increasingly intense minority consciousness among Indian Muslims. These sentiments and the Muslim League arose and thrived almost exclusively in those provinces where Muslims were in a minority and not in those provinces of undivided India which eventually became Pakistan.¹⁰¹

The Muslim nationalist movement in India thus was a very fragile one. First, it was based upon a commonly perceived threat—the danger to Muslim interests in the face of a Hindu Congress and raj. It did not develop from nor did it evolve a set of integrative symbols or an organization which represented the collective aspirations of the Indian Muslim community. Second, the Muslim League, though it led and symbolized the movement, did not obtain control over those parts of the subcontinent which were eventually to form the new state and thus, ironically, with the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim League lost a large part of its constituency. Third, and most important, there were severe limits on the perception of nationality and ultimate identification with the new political community. The extent of empathy for the new state in those areas which finally came to constitute it was limited to sharing the aspirations of their religious fellows within the Muslim minority provinces of the subcontinent. Thus, those areas which had the highest intensity of conflict and negative response to the perceived threat of a Hindu raj eventually set the conditions of political conflict for the whole area as well as the limits on the alternatives for its resolution. The firmest advocates of a separate Muslim state were not, in large part, inheritors of it, while the inheritors were largely those who had never particularly advocated it.

The Provincialization of Political Elites

A fifth major source of instability—indeed, the dominant motif of Pakistani politics—has been the division between East Bengal and the western provinces, particularly the Punjab. There was an increasing sense of tension and competition between these provinces. The East Bengal political leadership demonstrated constant concern over the underrepresentation of that province in the government services and armed forces.¹⁰² This was important not only with respect to participation in administrative decision-making but was also of crucial importance economically, since the large part of the national budget was allocated for defense purposes and a vast part of this was channeled back into the western wing, where the major defense installations were located and most of the personnel recruited. This feeling of inadequate participation and "second-man" status was augmented by the continual imbalance in the allocation of funds from the central government for purposes of welfare and development.¹⁰³ These feelings of provincialism and the feeling of inadequate participation in the affairs of government on the part of Bengalis led to the prolonged debate over the basis of representation and the degree of provincial autonomy to be established under the new constitution (finally proclaimed in 1956).¹⁰⁴ The major conflicts which divided East and West—representation, the organization of federal power, and the place of minorities in the new state—were the major issues which made the quest for a constitution such an abortive and long process.

In order to solve the problem of representation under the constitution, it was first decided to integrate the provinces of the western wing into one administrative and political unit which would establish a basis for parity between East and West. The integration of West Pakistan had received some attention during the first Constituent Assembly, but no serious action had been taken on it. The interim government, in December 1954, had decided to implement this one-unit scheme, but this was invalidated along with other legislation by the judgments of the Federal Court. Prior to the court's ruling, however, the three provincial legislatures had given their consent to the move; but, with the exception of the Punjab, it was not unanimous, and in the case of Sind it required considerable maneuvering at both the center and in the province to assure approval.¹⁰⁵

The debate on the "Establishment of West Pakistan Act" again revealed the differences between East and West over the basis of representation under the proposed constitution as well as a fear of Punjabi domination in the new province on the part of non-Punjabi groups in the West. To the East Bengali, this proposal was merely a sinister move to reduce the power of his province within the political system. The West Pakistani, on the other hand, particularly the Punjabi who would wield a majority in the new province, argued that it was only an attempt to reduce provincialism in the West. The bill, which still left a considerable number of conflicts unresolved, was made law on September 30, 1955, and the province of West Pakistan came into being in October.

The issue of participation in the constitutional order, as in Europe, involved conflicting attitudes about political legitimacy, but in the case of Pakistan, the basis of the conflict was different.¹⁰⁶ In Great Britain and on the continent, conflict was initiated by those who conceived of themselves as part of a single political community and who were merely attempting to acquire the rights inherent in that membership. In the case of Pakistan, conflict over representation in the political regime was fought on the basis of units which perceived themselves as being quite different from one another and which demanded participation not only as a right by virtue of having been included in the national community, but as a condition by which the myth that the community did in fact exist might be maintained. This conflict existed not only over representation in the two constituent assemblies but also over participation in the civil and defense services of Pakistan. The conflict over representation, although ameliorated by

the 1956 Constitution, has never been accepted as permanent by all. A fully satisfactory formula for regulating participation in the civil and defense services has not been found even today. Representation of East Pakistanis in the defense services was discussed on pages 96-9.

Segmentation in the Structure of Political Support

A sixth cause of political instability was segmentation in the structure of political support. With the creation of Pakistan, the one symbol which had served to give unity to the Muslim League movement had been realized, and with its realization it tended to lose its usefulness as a common focus for the collective identity of the new state. There were no symbols or institutional linkages within the state to give it unity. The inability of the Pakistan political elite to create and employ new unity symbols was symptomatic of the fundamental cleavages and limited perceptions of community on the part of Pakistanis. There were two dominant types of political fragmentation. First, at the provincial level there was a development of relatively autonomous and shifting political groups which competed for positions of power and prestige.¹⁰⁷ Second, between provinces there was an increasing sense of competition concerning questions of national policy and the organization of power in the new constitutional order. After the passing of Jinnah (1948) and Liaqat (1951), competition included the positions of power in the center itself.¹⁰⁸ Political parties and political groups came increasingly to have their base of support restricted to a particular province and attempts at the development of national opposition parties always collapsed on provincial lines.

There were several conditions which were conducive to fragmentation. With the coming of independence, new centers of effective political power were created; these tended to intensify the sense of competition and conflict between groups within the League which had been able to minimize such conflict prior to independence. The central League leadership attempted in several ways to place in positions of power those provincial elites which would be responsive to their policy directives. This was attempted both by the use of governmental apparatus at the center as well as by the use of the organizational apparatus of the Muslim League. In 1949, PRODA was promulgated, which empowered both the governor-general and the provincial governors to refer to the courts or to a special judicial tribunal charges against elected representatives concerning misconduct in public office.¹⁰⁹ The governor-general and the provincial governors could act on their own discretion and without the prior advice of ministries. This order was used in seven cases before it was repealed in 1951 and was instrumental in the unseating of three major ministries, the chief minister each time taking his political supporters into opposition to the Muslim League.¹¹⁰

Another attempt on the part of the central leadership to make provincial political elites more responsive was taken in 1950 when the Muslim League, at the urging of the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, passed an amendment to the League constitution which permitted the Prime Minister to be the League president.¹¹¹ This was also applied at the provincial level where the chief minister was given control of the party organization. This amendment also gave the central League leadership control over the allocation of party tickets for provincial elections, an action aimed at making successful candidates somewhat dependent upon the central leadership. Finally, avenues of political mobility within the League were closed to persons, factions, or factional coalitions which were not in accord with the dominant faction in the province.

The attempts of the central League leadership to control the provincial political elites led to fragmentation and lateral mobility in the party organization in several ways. First, by placing the allocation of party tickets for provincial elections in the hands of the central

League leadership, the role of the legislature as the agent of restraint upon ministerial action was reduced. Smaller factions tended to move from one major group to another, with shifts usually being to those elites which came into positions of political power. Although it was not necessarily a majority which had caused the change of ministry, in no case did a new ministry have difficulty in finding majority support. Second, the use of central power in limiting political access to the League inhibited the possibility of reaching accommodations between the League and major competing political factions and placed those opposing the League or its policies outside the League organization and hence in political opposition.¹¹²

The structure of political support was fragmented into subunits whose cohesiveness was maintained by the competition between parties at the provincial level. Without a commonly accepted political leadership which could command the continuing support of these parties and groups and with major differences between the parties over political goals, any prime minister encountered considerable difficulty in mobilizing political support for the collective and sustained pursuit of a common political program. The maintenance of a position of power required responsiveness not only to the demands of one's own political party but also to the varying and often contradictory demands of the minority party in a coalition. The prime minister, while he usually had a large voice in the selection of ministers from his own party, was never in a position to select those from the partners in a coalition. Furthermore, since there were invariably important differences about major questions of policy between the parties to a coalition, the minority party was able to exact concessions by virtue of the necessity of its continued support. The price of continued support not only involved adequate sharing in positions of political power and the making or vetoing of policy decisions at the center, but also involved support for the minority party in its respective province as well. The necessity of the support of minority parties thus rendered the coalition ministry of 1953-55, as well as the ministries of 1956-58 fragile structures, although the former did accomplish the major political tasks of integrating the western provinces and drafting a constitution.

The draft constitution was accepted reluctantly by many because it did not, and probably could not, meet the demands of all, since these very demands had tended to become rigidified during the years of abortive attempts to reach accommodation. Throughout the constitutional debates the opposition was critical not only on questions of content but over the way that the drafting of the constitution had been handled and the procedure that was used in pushing it through the Constituent Assembly. The formulation and debate on the constitution itself inevitably reflected the political divisions and groups which existed in making state policy. Several walkouts on the part of the opposition permitted the government forces to pass many provisions with a minimum of debate. Toward the end of the constitutional debates, H. S. Suhrawardy recommended that a round-table conference be convened which would permit the free airing of conflicts and would allow more participation of the opposition in the formulation of the final basic law. When this recommendation was summarily ignored, he and a major portion of the nongovernment forces left the assembly and did not associate themselves with the constitution as finally drafted.¹¹³

After the work of drafting the constitution was completed, the structure of political segments started to divide and shift even more than previously. The period under the 1956 constitution thus was characterized by the absence of a political elite which could base its support in various sections of the state and upon which those various political groups could agree as a supraprovincial, if not national, political leadership. Provincial parties, with no support outside the province of their origin, became predominant at the national level.¹¹⁴ Now parties as well as political leaders became responsive directly to provincial interests. Together with the provincial bias of political organization and political support there was a continuing lack of agreement over political goals. The two major parties which dominated West Pakistan, the

Muslim League and the Republicans, had more in common with respect to policy than with either of the two major parties in East Pakistan, the Awami League and the Krishak Sramak, and vice versa. The intensity of conflict between these parties within their respective provinces, however, prevented any kind of collaboration at the national level. Such collaboration, on the other hand, no doubt would have been untenable, since the government would then have been representative of only one province, thus increasing the sense of provincial rivalry and tension. It was this absence of a cohesive national leadership and an absence of consensus toward existing constitutional norms that made the political system susceptible to increased participation by administrative cadres and the military in the making of political decisions.

The Crisis of Political Authority

The trend toward regional fragmentation of political parties and political interests which started shortly after independence became the dominant characteristic of Pakistan politics from 1954 to 1958. The purported efforts of the governor-general to establish a more stable polity by dissolving the first Constituent Assembly and establishing a "ministry of talent" in 1954 resulted in the unanticipated consequence of placing the state on the brink of legal if not political chaos.¹¹⁵

The governor-general's action was publicly praised by provincial assemblies and political parties alike, indicating, as had previously been the case and as was to be true in the future, an almost total absence of popular support for parliamentary rule and ministerial supremacy on the part of those who were its staunchest advocates when it was not in crisis.¹¹⁶

The interim government which had been constituted to give a "vigorous and stable administration to the state" was prevented from taking any major action, largely because of the questionable position of the regime and its authority in law.¹¹⁷ The tentative and ambiguous definition of positions of authority both in practice and in law revealed the handicaps inherent in any attempt to change the nature of the system within the confines of the constitutional assumptions upon which it was based. This lesson was not lost upon those engineering the coup of 1958, who changed the system by first changing those very assumptions.

Thus the seventh major factor in the political instability of Pakistan was the lack of definition of formal political roles and the scope of authority to be assigned to them. This was particularly important with respect to the power and authority of the positions of governor-general and provincial governors on the one hand and of the prime minister and provincial chief ministers on the other. Although general outlines of the authority structure had been established, they were never explicitly defined either by law or by custom.¹¹⁸ The position of governor-general in parliamentary government on the British model has been largely limited to a suprapolitical role, entering the political arena only on the advice of the cabinet. The authority which the first governor-general, Jinnah, gave this position, however, did not flow from the position itself, but from the authority of his person as the Qaid-i-Azam. The actions instituted by Jinnah under PRODA and the informal power which he exerted within the League itself were somewhat outside the tradition of his position within the political format which the country had adopted. In a similar fashion, the role of prime minister under Liaqat Ali Khan, the first prime minister, resulted not so much from an autonomous definition of that role as it did from the authority which he could claim and the power which he could exert as the Qaid-i-Millat and chief lieutenant of Jinnah. In neither case was the charisma of these leaders transferred to the office.

After the death of Jinnah (1948) and particularly after the death of Liaqat (1951), the power of these positions depended on the political resources of the incumbents. No commonly

accepted and institutionalized restraints upon and limits to the extent of executive action in the political process, nor the set of rules or traditions to insure a more or less defined scope of authority for the prime minister, the ministry, and the legislature developed.¹¹⁹

Military Policy and the Problems of Pakistan

Although military leaders did not play an important role in the decision to dismiss the Constituent Assembly in 1954 nor in other political decisions prior to the coup of October 1958, the events of this period prompted a reappraisal by the military of their role in the state. One of the first to express the new concern of the military with political affairs was Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub, who has been credited with drafting a report entitled "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan," outlining an alternative political format for creating an institutional framework conducive to political stability.¹²⁰ Several of the observations and suggestions in this paper eventually materialized, a few under the 1956 Constitution but many more under the martial law regime and the 1962 Constitution. The first suggestion concerned the constitutional order of the state. In attempting to solve the participation riddle, he suggested that East Bengal be considered as one unit in the state and be given "as much partnership as possible," while the provinces of West Pakistan should be reorganized into one unit and given equal status with East Bengal. To facilitate this process, all provincial ministries and legislatures would be abolished and then reinstituted after the reorganization had taken place. Each of these two major units, he proposed, should be subdivided in such a way that each of these subdivisions would encompass "a racial group or groups with a common economy, communications and prospective development" and that the administrative apparatus be "decentralized in these subunits as much as possible." Finally, "in order to remove any fear of domination, Punjab would be asked to accept 40 percent representation in the West Pakistan unit legislature."¹²¹

In this scheme there would be a considerable amount of control on the part of the center over the provincial governments. In each province there would be a governor, appointed by the president, who would have "power of control over the Cabinet and the services."¹²² Ultimate power in the system was to rest in the hands of the President. Although the central cabinet was to have executive powers, these would be "subject to some effective control by the President. . . . The President should be made the final custodian of power on the country's behalf and should be able to put things right in both the provinces and the center should they go wrong. Laws should be operative only if certified by the President except in cases where they are passed by three-fourths majority. No change in the Constitution should be made unless agreed to by the President. In case of serious disagreement between the President and the legislature, provision should be made for fresh elections of either one or both."¹²³ The services were also to be directly responsible to the president, and a joint staff would be formed to coordinate defense planning under a supreme commander who would be appointed by the president and be made the defense minister and an ex-officio member of the cabinet. A major change, which eventually appeared in the garb of the "Basic Democracies Order of 1959," was to change the electoral system. Under the Ayub plan, it would have consisted of an electoral college elected in each province on the basis of adult franchise; these colleges would then "elect members for the provincial legislature, the central legislature and also . . . the President. . . ."¹²⁴

The whole report indicated a feeling of frustration over attempts to establish a constitution and the tendency of ideology to get in the way of finding "practical" solutions to the constitutional riddle; but Ayub never made clear precisely how his own proposal would be implemented. It is no doubt possible that it was felt that a constitution embodying these prescriptions

could be drafted and promulgated under the cover of the interim government after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Both Ayub and President Mirza viewed that dissolution as a new beginning, while the prime minister and the law minister were the major advocates of those who saw it as a temporary disjunction in a continuing process.¹²⁵

Politicization of the Military

The period between 1954 and 1958 marked significant changes in military attitudes toward politics and political authority and in the military's self-conception of its role in society. With the introduction of U.S. military aid, the military had largely completed its program of re-equipment and organization. Attention having been diverted from developing the military establishment it was now directed to the relationship of the military to society and politics. The military started to feel that questions of political stability and national integration directly affected the performance of its defense function. Finally, the military's involvement in civilian tasks was disrupted for political reasons; military men felt that not only were they being used for political purposes but also that political leadership was both unable or unwilling to maintain even a minimum of political decorum in the country.

There was considerable resentment among military officers, particularly in the army, about being employed in nonmilitary tasks which diverted the time and resources of the military from its own primary objectives and concerns. The establishment of a border police effective enough to patrol the borders and handle border problems both in East and West Pakistan was greeted with satisfaction in the army, since border assignments had interfered with training. There was similar resentment within the army against being employed in riot control and other internal functions, and this tended to weaken the morale of those civilian agencies, primarily the police, which were charged with those functions. There was also concern over the public image of the military as a result of being employed in situations in which violence or the threat of it was often required against the public. This concern was expressed by the Chief of the Army Staff in a statement at the Joint Services Commanders' Committee as early as 1950.

There was a growing tendency to look to the Army for assistance, particularly in the Karachi area, whether the situation warranted it or not. After the country had gained some measure of stability, the Army was opposed to the use of troops for purely police duties. These duties, apart from keeping the soldiers away from their training, adversely affected the morale of the civil police. In a homogeneous country such as Pakistan, the use of troops, which it maintains for its defense against external aggression to enforce law and order on the people is always resented and leads to antagonism between them. The Army, therefore, rightly expects that the civil administration will take every means in its power, by wise government and maintenance of adequate and efficient police forces, to prevent this contingency from arising.¹²⁶

The involvement in the affairs of the Punjab at the time of the anti-Ahmadiyya movement (1953) had two significant effects upon the military leadership. First, it encouraged the self-conception of the army as selfless public servants who were accepted docilely but respectfully as such by the public, and that public improvement could be made under the guidance of martial law. Second, politicians were coming to be perceived by the military as persons who would let the public good suffer and their basic responsibility for maintaining law and order go

unattended in order to exact personal political gain. It was felt that "only the army had acted its part with dignity, waiting patiently for the day when sanity would return. Soldiers, being soldiers, were painfully conscious of the worsening political and economic conditions. Accustomed themselves to good government within the Army, they understood these conditions, perhaps better than others."¹²⁷

Military men were critical of the treatment they had received in Operation Service First (1956) and Operation Close Door (1957-58). The military had entered these civilian functions on the request of civilian authority, and on the request of that authority, they had left. But they had left, not upon the completion of the task but rather as a result of pressure from politicians whose support was suffering from these activities. The army thus felt that it was becoming a pawn in the political struggle, called in when it was to the political advantage of the party in power, and released when that advantage had ceased. Finally, when political conflicts encouraged and fostered violence, the army came to see itself as the ultimate custodian of law and order, and the defender of the integrity of the state. The ultimate obligation of the military was conceived to be to a corporate identity of the nation, and not to those temporal powers which claimed to rule it.

The military establishment has one indivisible function assigned to it in a society and that is external defense. It emphasizes service to the nation as an entity, the military being the ultimate protector and preserver of the nation, and not of particular segments of it. Organization and planning in the military are directed ultimately toward this end. The national, rather than parochial, orientation of the military is particularly evident when the nation is faced with a real or imagined threat. Given this orientation, military men are inclined to view and to judge institutions and the actions of individuals according to the contribution which they make to the welfare of the whole community. Thus politics and political parties are conceived of as representing something less than commitment to the common good. Particularly in the case of Pakistan, where parties all had narrow and restricted bases of support, they were seen as somewhat traitorous in using "provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani."¹²⁸ The policies and activities of political parties seemed to be not only irrelevant to the society but also disruptive of its internal order and a betrayal of its heritage. The *raison d'être* for Pakistan had been ignored, and political maneuvering or inaction tended toward the disintegration of the community. The military ultimately perceived itself as the real embodiment of nationalist sentiment and as the only organization which constantly made sacrifices for the country. While the politicians would barter the country away, the military would defend it; when the politicians would allow or encourage internal chaos, the military would come to restore order.

Politicians were measured by the military according to the standards of their own achievements. The work invested by military men in developing the military, together with their success in doing so, tended to underscore the basic cohesion and efficiency of the military establishment and prompted military men to compare their success in building an army to the politician's failure in building a nation. Politicians were seen not only as inadequate but as uncreative. Whereas the military took pride in reorganizing in order fully to mobilize available resources, political leadership was alleged to be content to employ political forms unsuited to the "genius" of the Pakistani people.

The pattern of politics was also seen as being largely irrelevant to Pakistan and the actual working of the political system as being permanently removed from the general population. The decadence of the political milieu was also attributed in part to the type of person who went into politics—not the best and most able person, since traditionally the most capable young men had gone into the services.¹²⁹ Too, the structure of society was such that it tended to

produce politicians who, by the nature of their position in traditional society, pursued their own narrow interests without fail. As a result of this, "many politicians had been ignorant, vainglorious good-for-nothings, only able to influence the polling of votes—often by far from honest means. Devoid of any higher understanding of politics, their vision remained confined to their own limited spheres, and instead of striving for the greatness of the nation, they looked only for self-aggrandizement and personal gain."¹³⁰

The military thus came to view themselves as the exemplification and ultimate preservers of private values and public morality, and these values emphasized such things as the sacrifice of private gain to the public good, frugality, the necessity for common identifications and common enterprise, and honesty in private and public life, attributes characteristic of the military, but absent in the polity.

By 1957 and especially by 1958 the alternatives in any quest for political stability or for the establishment of a new political formula in Pakistan had been significantly reduced. The fragmentation of political parties on the basis of cleavages within the political community had become more pronounced. At the national level, the making and unmaking of ministries as well as the major issues of conflict tended to contribute to the continuation of this fragmentation of the party political structure. Furthermore, most combinations of political elites had been tried at the center without any significant improvement in stability. Within the provinces, the intensity of conflict between parties was being resolved by violence, as in East Pakistan, or by threats of violence, as in the West. These conditions not only hindered any effort to set collective goals for the society but also hampered attempts to prevent or reduce activities inimical to the general welfare, such as smuggling, black-marketing, and widespread corruption, which military and administrative elites felt had been encouraged by politicians in their efforts to maintain political support.

The alternative course of action to military involvement would have been abrogation of the existing constitution, convening of a new Constituent Assembly, and promulgation of a new constitution. But a similar action taken in 1954 had not served as an attractive alternative, since the new Constituent Assembly ordered by the ruling of the Federal Court had produced a political regime which fostered the state of chronic political instability which it was to have replaced. President Mirza as well as Commander-in-Chief Ayub had already come to the conclusion that a presidential system was needed which, while permitting popular participation, would have a strong executive, not subject to the anarchy of a highly fragmented and frequently changing support structure, and which could take direct and decisive action. Such a regime could only be established by imposition, it was argued, not by the participation of a genus of men dedicated to the establishment of institutions which could not work. Thus, for the achievement of the president's primary objective—the creation of a new political format—it was necessary to work outside the framework of the existing regime as well as outside the framework of democratic constitution-making.

The military was the only organized center of power in the government or society which had been largely untouched by political activity. This not only had permitted the development of cohesion within the military but also had created a potentiality for decisive and controlled political action. Furthermore, the military was the only organization which could maintain order, since police forces in the past had proved inadequate when faced with major problems of law and order, which were often due to political pressure.

The capacity of a military establishment for political involvement is not entirely dependent upon its own power base but upon the relative quanta of this base in comparison with those of other institutions in the society. This is further dependent upon the extent to which social

institutions would "permit" political involvement on the part of the military before it would employ the resources at its disposal to counteract or prevent any overt transgression on the part of the military. Moreover, given the capacity of the military for overt political intervention, there remains the question of motivation for political involvement within the military, and if this exists, the extent to which there is agreement on the scope and particular goals of involvement. The military probably had the capacity for political intervention long before the 1958 coup. The major pressure of the Kashmir war and the tense relations over the border had largely passed by the early 1950's. The military had been requested to take over as early as the time of the dismissal of the Nazimuddin ministry in 1953 and was again approached in 1954 at the time of the dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly. On both of these occasions the military refused to become politically involved. Although Ayub became the Defense Minister in the "ministry of talent," appointed after the dismissal of the first Constituent Assembly, he resigned his post after eleven months. Restraints on political involvement, therefore, were largely internal to the military itself.

However, as the cohesion, performance level, and capacity for unified action increased within the army, there was no corresponding increase in stability and cohesion within the political system; in the view of the military, it had decreased. This decrease was not seen as the result of immutable forces, but rather of calculated designs of corrupt and incompetent leaders.

THE ARMY AS GUARDIANS AND GOVERNORS: 1958-62

The Planning and Strategy of a Military Coup

It is not certain when there was a widespread consensus in the senior officer corps of the army concerning the necessity of the overt involvement of the army in political affairs. Nor is it possible to indicate precisely how widespread the demand for involvement eventually became. The first indication of actual unrest in the officer corps, however, came in 1957. Early in that year, when Commander-in-Chief of the Army Ayub was on a tour of the East Pakistan Command Area, Major-General Umrao Khan, the GOC, urged that some kind of drastic action be taken by the army and arranged meetings for Ayub with some civilian officials to impress the gravity of the situation on him.¹³¹ Later, in April, at the annual divisional commanders' conference, which was attended by all general officers of the army, several senior generals approached Ayub and emphasized the need for military action to stay the drift to chronic political instability.¹³² When Ayub sounded out other generals they reportedly expressed the same opinion.

Although there had been discussions between the commander-in-chief and the president concerning the general planning of a coup about a year prior to its occurrence, final plans were drafted only after a near riot and the subsequent death of the deputy speaker of the East Pakistan legislative assembly.¹³³ At that time, the chief of the army general staff was instructed to prepare plans for the takeover; and on the last day of September those plans were approved by Ayub. The coup was initially planned for the middle of October, but as a result of Muslim League demonstrations on October 6 in Karachi, which required a considerable detachment of police to control, a decision was made to stage the coup the following day.

On October 7, 1958, President Mirza declared that "the Constitution which was brought into being on March 23, 1956, after so many tribulations, is unworkable. It is so full of dangerous compromises that Pakistan will soon degenerate internally if the inherent malaise

is not removed. To rectify them, the country must first be taken to sanity by a peaceful revolution."¹³⁴ The president then declared the constitution abrogated, the central and provincial governments dismissed, the National Parliament and provincial assemblies dissolved, all political parties abolished, and the promulgation of martial law. Ultimately a new constitution would be devised "more suitable to the genius of the Muslim people" and at the appropriate time would be submitted to popular referendum.¹³⁵

The planning and organization of the coup were executed according to the army's standard operating procedures. The plans were formulated by competent military authority and the normal channels of communication were used in the issuance of orders for the deployment of troops. The execution of the coup was undertaken by those in command of the troops at that time. The officers who played the major roles in the coup did not do so because of their political attitudes but became involved by virtue of the positions which they held. The coup was not staged or supported by a clique of politically oriented officers nor by those who desired rapid mobility within the military apparatus. Since most units of the army had been involved with various types of civilian functions previously, there was no division among army officers as to those who had been primarily involved in civilian activities and those who had attended exclusively, or even primarily, to the army's professional functions.

The reasons for the coup and the ultimate aim of establishing representative institutions were also shared by the military leadership. In his initial broadcast to the nation as the Chief Administrator of Martial Law, Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan declared that the coup was to preserve the nation from disintegration and the people from the uncontrolled machinations of dishonest politicians. The revolution was not directed against the people nor toward the radical transformation of Pakistan society, but was directed against the "disruptionists, political opportunists, smugglers, black-marketeers and other such social vermin, sharks and leeches."¹³⁶ The major aims of the regime were to be three: First, there would be a correction of immediate social and economic ills such as "malingering or inefficiency among officials, any form of bribery or corruption, hoarding, smuggling or black-marketeering, or any form of antisocial and anti-State activity." Second, certain long-range changes and reforms would have to be undertaken which would create the conditions for political stability. Finally, democracy would be restored, "but of the type that people can understand and work."¹³⁷

In the accomplishment of these tasks, Ayub appealed directly to the public for their support, without which, he maintained, the ultimate goals of building and maintaining a corporate society and a permanent and stable political order could not be achieved.

... in all this, I must demand your wholehearted understanding, cooperation and patience. I must also ask you to work hard and put in your best effort. This is the period when our state has to be built and this can only happen if people work. Slogan-mongering can never take the place of hard sweat. Remember that there are certain things which should be in our power to put right. We shall see that that is done. But there are others, solutions to which are beyond our control. Here all we can promise is our best endeavors, leaving the rest to God. So, when judging our performance do keep these hard realities in mind.¹³⁸

In the pursuit of the ends which he outlined, Ayub noted that there would be no major break in the division of labor between civilian and military agencies. The civilian agencies would be used to the maximum and would ultimately be given the opportunity to show their "mettle" and revive their "tremendous traditions," ever having the "Armed Forces' faithful support." The armed forces would be employed as little as possible and would "continue to attend to their

prime role of external defence." He argued that "at this critical juncture it is more than ever necessary for the Armed Forces to be prepared at all times to face external aggression. But they are fully aware that internal stability is absolutely essential if they are to successfully repel aggression from outside."¹³⁹

The coup was executed with a minimum use of troops, either for display of military power and intent or for coercive purposes. There were no mass arrests of political leaders, although some key figures were put under preventive detention, while legal action was instituted against others for various types of questionable activities. There was no effective or organized opposition to the coup from within society. Politics had largely been removed from society previously, since political parties and political groups had not attempted to mobilize opinion for sustained political ends nor even for inculcating an acceptance of a belief in the legitimacy of the existing political order. There had not developed within the society any autonomous movements or organizational mechanisms which had explicit political programs which might have been able to act as a restraint on political action in the old regime or in the new. Political activity at the center and even at the provincial level was somewhat distant and unintelligible to those at the local level, which was where most conflict had formerly been handled by the administrative apparatus, which continued largely unchanged under the new regime.

The only potential threat to the martial law regime and the political supremacy of the army could have come from the formal organizations of the state itself, namely from the courts, the civil service, or from divisions within the military establishment which could have acted independently by challenging the predominance of the senior army leadership, by withholding support from the regime, or by acting in coalition with the civil service against the top leadership. The courts, instead of challenging the martial law regime's claim to rule, granted it legal sanction by declaring that a revolution, irrespective of how it is executed, is itself a new "law-creating fact." In his judgment concerning the "Laws (Continuance in Force) Order," Chief Justice Munir reasoned that "a change is, in law, a revolution if it annuls the Constitution and the annulment is effective."¹⁴⁰ If it is not effective then, in law, the organizers are guilty of treason; but "if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power under the change can successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution itself becomes a law-creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to the annulled Constitution but by reference to its own success."¹⁴¹

The military during the coup and throughout the period of martial law acted as a more or less cohesive unit, wanting to insure the continuance and stability of the regime in preparation for a return to a democratic constitutional framework, and not demanding a permanent role in the actual administration of the state.¹⁴² The coup was undertaken by the army without any consultation or collaboration with the other two services. With the institution of martial law, however, Ayub was made the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in order to maintain cohesion and support for the regime not only in the army but in the military establishment as a whole. Furthermore, the commanders-in-chief of both the air force and navy assured the regime of their support and were made deputy chief administrators of martial law.

The formal organization of the coup was based on a coalition between President Mirza and several top army officers.¹⁴³ But from the outset there was considerable ambiguity as to how the interim regime was to be organized, and what the particular objectives of the regime were to be.

The general organization of power and authority in the new regime was established by the "Laws (Continuance in Force) Order," 1958, which was promulgated by President Mirza

shortly after the coup. This declaration directed that the new state "shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the late Constitution" and that all laws made under it would be valid until amended or repealed by competent authority under the new regime.¹⁴¹ The independence of the courts was to be maintained as before, and they were given the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, but these could not be issued against the chief administrator of martial law, his deputy, or anyone acting under the authority of either.¹⁴² A further restriction was placed on the courts in that they could not call into question the "Laws (Continuance in Force) Order," any order issued in pursuance of it, any martial law order or regulation, nor any finding, judgment, or order of any special or summary military court.¹⁴³ It was stipulated that the powers of governors would continue to be the same as if they had assumed all functions of government of their province on behalf of the president as prescribed in Article 193 of the 1956 Constitution. In the exercise of these powers, however, the governors were to be bound by directions given them by the president, the chief martial law administrator, or by anyone drawing his authority from the latter. As outlined in the new organizational directive of state, there was no clear-cut division of function or role in policy-making drawn between civilian authorities on the one hand and the martial law authorities on the other.

Under Mirza, the relationships between civilian agencies and the military at the center were undefined and tentative. Immediately after the coup, an advisory council was established at the center to serve primarily as a coordinating agency between major civilian departments of the government, but it included the chief administrator of martial law as its chairman. Also included on the council were the secretary-general of the government, who served as a deputy chief administrator of martial law, and the secretaries of the Departments of Defense, Interior, Finance, Industries, Commerce, Economic Affairs, and the Department of Works, Irrigation, and Power. Whenever a question concerning a department or agency not represented on the council came up for consideration, the secretary and joint-secretary of the relevant department or agency were invited to participate.¹⁴⁴

Mirza appointed a twelve-man interim cabinet which superseded the council and which granted major representation to the army. It included Ayub as Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Kashmir Affairs; Lt.-Gen. Mohammad Azam Khan, formerly the Administrator of Martial Law for the West Pakistan Zone, as Rehabilitation Minister; Lt.-Gen. W. A. Burki as Minister of Health and Welfare; and Lt.-Gen. K. M. Sheikh, former Sub-Administrator of Martial Law for the Quetta-Baluchistan sector of West Pakistan, as Minister of the Interior.¹⁴⁵ The other eight ministers were all civilians, equally distributed between East and West Pakistan. The civilian ministers included four former civil servants, an ambassador, an industrialist, and a leading advocate of the Federal Court.*

The notion of dual authority was alien to the military concept of organization and it was also feared that this might hinder the public image of the new regime as one capable of decisive and undivided action. This concern over divided authority was complemented by the army's distrust of Mirza himself. It was felt in army circles that Mirza was in large part responsible for the conditions of political instability which had prompted the coup, since he had been directly involved in the political equation by creating the Republican Party and by being instrumental in the making and unmaking of ministries both at the center and in the provinces. This was accompanied by a perception that the public services which tended to

* After the ousting of Mirza, the interim cabinet was kept intact, but the post of prime minister was abolished. Upon becoming President, Ayub promulgated an order providing for a presidential cabinet which would be the ultimate decision-making body in the state, but which would "advise" the president on the discharge of his functions and which would hold office at his pleasure.¹⁴⁶

close around Mirza after the coup were not "pure" enough to act as partners in the new regime but that they had to be subjected to a series of "purification rites." It was also felt that if the services tended to support Mirza in the regime, the possibility of only limited military control over the new regime would be encouraged as well as the possibility of a state of immobilism.

The major conflict between Mirza and the military, however, concerned differing conceptions as to what the purposes of the regime were to be and the prerequisite conditions and speed with which representative institutions would be restored. Soon after the coup, Mirza announced that the martial law regime would exist for the shortest time possible and that shortly he would set up a national council of ten or fifteen persons to allow wider representation in the making of major policy decisions. After this he indicated that he planned to set up a committee of 20 or 30 "bright young chaps" to draw up a constitution which would replace the martial law regime. It was immediately made clear by Ayub that although martial law was not to be permanent, it would first complete its job before relinquishing its powers and that that job was the "clearance of the political, social, economic and administrative mess that has been created in the past. The country has to be brought back to the state of convalescence if not complete health. In addition certain major reforms have to be introduced. All these things will need the cover of Martial Law."¹⁵⁰

It was felt in army circles that Mirza had cooperated with the military only to abolish the existing political order and that with this task accomplished he was attempting to exclude the military from any effective participation in charting the course of the new regime.¹⁵¹ The army thus felt that Mirza had called them in to take sides in the political struggle—that they were to participate in a continuation of the political conflict which they had come in to stop and correct. This was not congruent with the military's desire to be above the conflicts of politics and particularly the type of politics which characterized the old order. Their primary objective was to insure a basic stability of the political regime in which political forces and conflicts could not appreciably disturb the settled equilibrium which would eventually be established.

For the army, the martial law regime was to be above politics, a suprapolitical organization whose major functions were to do those things which the compromises and corruptions in the old order had left undone and to establish the groundwork for the ultimate purification of political life and the establishment of a new and stable political order.¹⁵² The martial law regime was not to mark a break in the corporate tradition of the nation nor in the identity of the state; it was in large part for their preservation that the coup had been staged. Rather it was to mark a break in its political traditions, and this was a question which could not be compromised. Nor could it be realized. Those who had been active in that tradition were to become instrumental in planning the purification. Finally, it was felt that because of the president's close association with those political traditions which the coup professed to eradicate, he would do violence to the image of the regime itself. Were he to continue as an equal and insist on making policy and setting the pace for the introduction of the new political regime, it would appear that the army itself was engaged in making compromises with the very tradition from which it claimed to have come to save the people.¹⁵³

President Mirza on October 27 was served with an order of dismissal from the chief administrator of martial law. The orders were served by the three army members of the cabinet backed by an armed infantry battalion. This action was met with the same compliance which had marked all similar actions in Pakistan's short political history, e.g., the dismissal of Nazimuddin in 1953, the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, and the staging of the October 7 coup itself. Also like those actions, this was met by widespread public approval.¹⁵⁴

Extent and Limit of Military Participation
in the Martial Law Regime

The organization of the administrative apparatus of martial law followed closely the army hierarchy. The state was divided into three zones—Karachi and Malir, West Pakistan, and East Pakistan—each of which was headed by a martial law administrator who, in each case, was the ranking command officer in his respective area.¹⁵⁵ Each zone was then divided into sectors based on the divisions of civil administration. Each of these areas was headed by a sub-martial law administrator. These sectors were further divided into subsectors which closely corresponded to civil administrative districts, with each subsector including no more than two districts or one district and an adjoining tribal territory.¹⁵⁶

At every level the civil administration was associated with the martial law organization, usually in staff or advisory positions. Major civil administrators were also involved in the meetings called by administrators of martial law, thus giving them informal representation in the martial law apparatus.¹⁵⁷ At the center, the secretary-general of the government, who was the official head of the Pakistan Civil Service, was made a deputy chief administrator of martial law. In each province, the secretary of the provincial government was made the deputy martial law administrator, with the exception of the Karachi-Malir Zone where the chief commissioner of Karachi was named to this position.¹⁵⁸ In each sector, the ranking divisional commissioners were made deputy sub-martial law administrators and at the subsector level, district magistrates or additional district magistrates were made deputy assistant subadministrators.¹⁵⁹ In all cases, those civilian authorities appointed to positions within the administrative apparatus of the martial law regime were members of the Civil Service of Pakistan. This also encouraged a sense of cooperation between civil and military authorities in the regime since both were recruited almost entirely from West Pakistan, and from within that province, mostly from the Punjab.

To handle the martial law orders and regulations, special and summary military courts were established. Special military courts were given the same powers and followed the same procedures as a field general court martial with the exception that all death sentences would have to be confirmed and sanctioned by an administrator of martial law. These courts were constituted on a division basis, thus corresponding to the sectors of the martial law regime, and included two military officers, one as president, and one civil administrator with not less than a first class magistrate's powers.

Summary military courts were constituted at the district (subsector) and subdivisional levels on an "as required" basis. Any magistrate of the first class or any officer of the armed forces with the rank of major or higher could constitute a court. In making its judgments, the court was required only to prepare a memorandum of the evidence or to frame the formal charges for the perusal of superior authority, and could try any offense without reference to superior authority provided that the sentence did not involve death, transportation, or imprisonment exceeding one year or whipping exceeding fifteen lashes.¹⁶⁰

The appointment of military courts was not the same in all areas. Summary military courts in the West Pakistan and Karachi zones consisted almost entirely of army officers with the rank of major or higher. There were hardly any officers employed from the navy or air force. In East Pakistan, however, almost all summary military courts were constituted by members of the East Pakistan Civil Service who, being almost entirely from East Pakistan, helped to give the new regime legitimacy and prevent it from appearing as an imposition of West Pakistani rule.

The martial law administration issued a plethora of martial law orders and regulations immediately after the establishment of martial law which covered almost all facets of public life. These orders and regulations were initially issued by the chief administrator of martial law and were binding on all subordinate authorities, although martial law administrators at the zonal level could issue orders and regulations to meet problems peculiar to their areas provided that they did not contravene any of those issued by central authority. The initial battery of regulations were directed at immediate problems, primarily at the "purification" of social life, the protection of the regime and the maintenance of public order. One type of regulation concerned "anti-social" activities such as hoarding, smuggling, black-marketing and the adulteration of foods and medicines.¹⁶¹ These crimes carried maximum punishments ranging from fourteen years' imprisonment for adulteration of foodstuffs to death for the hoarding of food grains. A second type was directed at protecting the new regime and at maintaining law and order.¹⁶² No person was to commit any act or make any speech that would "prejudice good order and public safety" or which was calculated to mislead or adversely affect the loyalty of the armed forces. Strikes and agitation in all schools and public utility installations were prohibited, and anyone who incited a strike would be as punishable as if he had actually participated in one. No one was to spread reports by any means which were "calculated to create alarm or despondency amongst the public or calculated to create dissatisfaction towards the Armed Forces and Police, or any member thereof."¹⁶³

A third type was directed at controlling "antistate" activities, contravention of which in all cases carried a penalty of death. These regulations involved all activities concerning the aiding of "recalcitrants," sabotage, attacks on or the resisting of martial law authorities, the giving of false evidence in investigations or trials under martial law, and failing to volunteer information concerning anyone engaged in activities prohibited under any martial law order or regulation.¹⁶⁴

The regulations issued by zonal administrators were almost all concerned with questions of public propriety. For example, the martial law administrator of the Karachi-Malir Zone issued regulations prohibiting the teasing and molesting of women, the throwing of garbage or rubbish in front of buildings, and the practice of beggary. The administrator also bluntly observed that "I have reasons to believe that instead of using public urinals and latrines, some members of the public relieve themselves and urinate on roads, streets, lanes, by-lanes and other public places which is strictly forbidden."

The martial law regulations were wide in scope and threatened harsh punishments. In no case, however, was a death sentence imposed; almost all judgments were passed on misdemeanors, but with severe penalties.

There seems to have been common agreement in the top officer corps of the army over the ends and extent of political involvement. The restraint on military involvement, as it had been in the past, was largely a function of the military establishment itself, and this restraint was again largely a result of the cohesion of the military apparatus and a widespread consensus on the role of the military in the state and a consensus as to what the ends of the regime were to be.

The employment of troops and the officer corps for the maintenance of order, and participation of the military establishment in civil administrative matters never became extensive. With the absence of any popular opposition to the coup and with the consolidation of the army leadership in the major positions of power, the feeling of pressure and uncertainty in the regime was reduced. One week after the promulgation of martial law, most troops had been returned to their barracks, and within three weeks almost all had been withdrawn. On November 10, all remaining troops were withdrawn. After a meeting of the martial law administrator

of the West Pakistan Zone, the governor and high civilian administrative officials, it was announced that:

The military Law Administration is satisfied that the immediate objectives of Martial Law have been achieved satisfactorily and the civil administrative machinery has been freed from extraneous influences. Smuggling has been stopped and the whole environment in the country has been electrified to an extent that the task of running the administration can to a great extent be entrusted to the civil authorities. It has therefore been decided that all troops employed on Martial Law duties will be withdrawn and all military courts set up under Martial Law will be wound up with immediate effect. 165

It was further warned, however, that this "should not be construed to mean the lifting of Martial Law. The Martial Law authorities will continue to provide cover to the civil administration to enable them to discharge their duties efficiently and expeditiously. Military courts may be revived from time to time to deal with smuggling and antistate activities if and when necessary." 166 Similar declarations were also issued in the Karachi-Malir and East Pakistan Zones, except that in the latter selected courts were maintained to handle cases of smuggling.

Note on Public Policy Under the New Regime

Although the language surrounding the coup spoke of the "revolution," the martial law regime did not institute programs directed at dissolving and building anew social institutions nor at completely liquidating potential political opposition. Severe restrictions and restraints, however, were imposed upon the political activity of major politicians under the old regime and numerous civil servants who had become involved in activities deemed inimical to the public interest were retired from the administrative services. The armed forces as such did not play a direct role in the making or administration of public policy. They were involved in public life, however, through the summoning of courts-martial to deal with alleged infractions of martial law orders and regulations. Furthermore, the dominant members of the cabinet were Army generals, until they were removed by Ayub at the beginning of the return to a more representative political format. 167

The major goals of the new regime were largely a function of its diagnosis of the body politic. Its energies were initially directed at attacking immediate public problems in an attempt to fulfill the promise of the coup and to publicize itself. These included major efforts at refugee rehabilitation, which had been neglected since independence: the collection of delinquent taxes; the problem of illegally acquired evacuee property; and a clampdown on illicit marketing and trading of goods. These activities and the air of decisiveness surrounding them were given prominent coverage in mass media during the first months following the coup.

One of the major problems facing the new elite was the institutionalization of political support and the development of a more participative political culture. Although the new regime had received the sanction of the Federal Court, the question of popular legitimacy was quite different. Furthermore, the only powerful base of support upon which the regime could rest was the military establishment, but this was support of a negative kind since it emphasized the possibility of coercion from a nonpolitical instrument rather than the consent and participation of the governed. There was concern for establishing channels of political access which would induce a sense of national consciousness and identity by closing the gap between society and

the state. This, it was felt, would also be a step in the direction of democratizing the regime in preparation for its eventual replacement.

After considerable comparative study of local self-government institutions, on October 18, 1958, Ayub promulgated the "Basic Democracies Order" which established a four-tier institutional structure linking the village to the provincial governments and associating elected representatives at each tier with the administration.¹⁶⁸ The specific aims of the basic democracies format were several. First, Ayub was under an obligation to fulfill his promise that popular participation in government would be reintroduced, but in a form that the people could understand and one which was fitted to their genius. Second, through these institutions it was hoped that a new style of politics would develop—a style which would make public policy a concern of a larger sector of the society, which would evolve a new political leadership unattached to the patterns of instability before 1958, and which would serve as a political school by granting participation in government on a restricted level and under proper tutelage. Finally, it would serve as a channel for gauging public opinion and assessing public grievances and for conveying and explaining governmental policy.

The importance of the basic democracies scheme lay not so much in the accomplishment of the aims for which it was formally established, but in providing an electoral college for electing the president, a national assembly, and provincial legislatures.¹⁶⁹

The regime pursued three major programs of "reconstruction." The first was the development of what were felt to be the social and economic prerequisites to a workable democratic polity: a program of land reforms which placed ceilings on holdings and offered a new security to tenants; educational reforms aimed at creating a new system more in tune with the modernist aims of the new government; and planned economic development.¹⁷⁰

The second was the "purification" of public and political life by placing curbs on administrators and politicians judged as having contributed to the inefficacy of the old order or as having acquired illicit gains under it. The "purification" of public and political life was a long-range continuation of edicts set forth under martial law regulations. The first efforts were directed against the administrative elites, who were subject to dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or compulsory retirement if found guilty of subversive activity, corruption, conduct contrary to rules governing government servants, or inefficiency.¹⁷¹ Politicians were subject to being disqualified from running for public office under the "Public Offices (Disqualification) Order," 1959, and the "Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order," 1959 (EBDO).¹⁷² The first authorized the establishment of tribunals by the president or governors to inquire into cases of misconduct in public office to include "bribery, corruption, jobbery, favouritism, nepotism, willful maladministration, willful misapplication or diversion of public moneys or moneys collected, whether by public subscription or otherwise, by or at the instance of a person holding public office, and any other abuse whatsoever kind of official power or position, and any abetment of misconduct. . . ." ¹⁷³ The EBDO also authorized the appointment of tribunals which could hear cases of misconduct as well as of crimes concerning the "preaching of any doctrine or the doing of any act which contributes to political instability. . . ." ¹⁷⁴ Those charged under this order were directed to appear personally before the tribunal and without friends, advisers, or legal practitioners. The accused were offered two alternatives: (1) to retire voluntarily from public life until December 31, 1966, in which case hearings would not be held; or (2) to be tried and, if found guilty, to be subject to imprisonment. Most chose the former way.

The third program of "reconstruction" included reorganization of governmental departments, law reforms, and the drafting of a new constitution, which was promulgated in 1962.

On February 7, 1960, immediately after his "vote of confidence," Ayub appointed a constitution commission to study the collapse of constitutional government prior to 1958 and to submit recommendations which would assure "a democracy adapted to changing circumstances and based on the Islamic principles of justice, equality and tolerance; the consolidation of national unity; and a firm and stable system of government."¹⁷⁵ The commission was headed by Justice Shahabuddin, a judge of the Federal Court, and included an equal number of members from both East and West Pakistan. The commission was given complete freedom to undertake its investigations and was given assurance that irrespective of whether its recommendations would be employed in the constitution, its report would be made public in full. On April 29, 1961, the commission submitted its report and a little over a year later, after careful study and preparation by cabinet and legal committees, a new constitution was promulgated, elections held, and martial law abolished.¹⁷⁶

Political organization and conflict in Pakistan since 1962 has differed markedly from the pre-1958 period in one very important way—the dominant role of President Ayub and the continuity of ministries under a far more highly centralized political format. Yet in many ways the new and the old are similar. The conflicts between East and West have become prominent on issues ranging from the allocation of economic resources to participation in the administrative and military services. The party system remains quite fragmented, the majority party finding its *raison d'être* and continuity in the person of Ayub. The organization of the constitutional order is still the subject of extended debate. Neither the martial law regime nor the government under the 1962 Constitution has resolved those fundamental conflicts which gave rise to political instability during the first period after independence. What it has afforded is a general format under which, if it proves flexible and last: , these problems might begin to be resolved.¹⁷⁷

FOOTNOTES

THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAKISTAN MILITARY

¹John Connell, Auchinleck: A Critical Biography (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1959), pp. 890-91. Connell's biography includes a number of letters, memoranda, and statements from Auchinleck's private papers. The chairman of the Army Subcommittee was Maj. Gen. S. F. Irwin and the subcommittee had an equal number of Muslim, Hindu, and British members. The Muslim members were Brig. N. I. M. Raza Col. Mohammed Sher Ali Khan, Lt. Col. M. A. Latif Khan, and Lt. Col. Mohammed Akbar Khan. All of these officers later rose to the rank of major general in the Pakistan Army. M. A. Latif Khan and Mohammed Akbar Khan, however, were convicted as leaders of the abortive Rawalpindi conspiracy in 1951.

²Ibid., p. 892.

³Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 28-29.

⁴Ibid., p. 30. After partition, Pakistan was left largely without any spokesmen on any of the major committees which were sitting in Delhi, since shortly after independence the Muslim staff officers in the Supreme Headquarters sought asylum in the refugee camp in the Red Fort. Pakistani representation on both the Joint Defense Council and the Partition Council, therefore, was limited to those officials who happened to be in Delhi at the time of the meetings and who were able to attend.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 49.

⁷Ibid., p. 51.

⁸Col. Mohammad Ahmed, My Chief (Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), pp. 58-60.

⁹Khan, op. cit., p. 52.

¹⁰Loc. cit. Another move to expand the military was the creation of the Civil Armed Forces which enabled the withdrawal of regular military units from the frontier areas. These forces, which include the Scouts, Militia, Khassadars and Frontier Constabulary, are maintained on the frontier "to meet any possible threat of invasion from outside, and also to maintain law and order in that part of the country." Until the integration of the provinces in the western wing, these forces were under the control of the central government, but since that time they have been placed under provincial administration, although they are financed through the federal budget. National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, No. 24 (1963), pp. 1477-79. The army is also supported by a Regular Reserve, which includes Junior Commissioned Officers and others who have completed active service, a Supplementary Reserve drawn from civilian volunteers with technical and administrative experience, and a National Guard with voluntary enlistment for seven years. Each of these forces requires yearly training.

¹¹Khan, op. cit., p. 39.

¹²Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves: The Last Two Years of British Rule in India, Appendix XII (London: Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1950).

¹³Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1957-58 (n.d.), p. 183.

¹⁴Pakistan Publications, Five Years of Pakistan (n.d.), p. 209.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 210.

¹⁶Government of Pakistan, Budget of the Central Government of Pakistan for the Year 1953-54 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1954), p. 12.

¹⁷Cf. James W. Spain, "Military Assistance for Pakistan," American Political Science Review, XLVIII, (September 1954), pp. 738-51. Perplexity as to reasons for restrictions on the extension of aid has also come from Pakistan. Cf. Khan, op. cit., p. 156.

¹⁸Information as to amounts and types of aid extended to Pakistan is considered as classified. Assistance to army units was restricted to those not located in East Pakistan and Azad Kashmir. General information, however, is available from unclassified sources. With respect to the navy, four destroyers and one cruiser joined the fleet in 1956 with funds for refitting being supplied under the Mutual Defense Pact. In 1957 coastal minesweepers were supplied under the aid program. (Pakistan Publications, Ten Years of Pakistan, 1947-54, p. 226, and Pakistan: 1957-58, p. 179.) In 1958 two more coastal minesweepers were added under the assistance program as well as funds for refitting two warships. (Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1958-59, p. 132.) In 1959 and 1960 two more coastal minesweepers, an oiler, and a salvage vessel were acquired under the Military Aid Program. (Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1959-60, pp. 113-14.) With respect to the air force, most modernization took place with U.S. assistance. In 1957 Pakistan received her first consignment of F86 Sabre Jets and by 1959 had received B57 bombers, SA16 seaplanes, and H19 helicopters. (Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1958-59, p. 135, and Pakistan: 1957-58, p. 183.)

¹⁹Government of Pakistan, Budget of the Central Government of Pakistan for the Year 1953-54 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1954), p. 10.

²⁰Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Budget of the Central Government for 1964-65 (Explanatory Memorandum), pp. 214-19.

²¹For the basis and logic of this computation, cf. Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 208-11.

²²Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan (London: John Murray, 1954), p. 200, and Connell, op. cit., p. 915.

²³Dawn, January 1, 1948.

²⁴Khan, op. cit., p. 49. Of the officer quota of 250 for the Corps of Engineers, there were only 146, of which 80 were British officers and 18 of the 66 Pakistani officers were non-engineers. In the Medical Corps there were 219 officers as against an authorized strength of 500, and only 11 nurses as against an authorized strength of 250. The Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers started with 60 British and 20 Pakistani officers against an authorized strength of 280, but a large portion of the Pakistani officers were not academically qualified engineers. The Signal Corps had 98 officers, 35 of whom were British, 165 junior commissioned officers, and 6,766 enlisted personnel, many of whom had to be released or transferred to positions for which they were not trained.

²⁵Dawn, January 1, 1948.

²⁶Ibid. By 1953, all principal staff positions in General Headquarters, all brigade, battalion and regimental commands, with the exception of some regimental centers, had been assumed by Pakistani officers. (Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1953-54, p. 168.)

²⁷Khan, op. cit., p. 24.

²⁸Government of India, The Army in India and Its Evolution (Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing, 1924), p. 160. For another, although somewhat biased, discussion of the development of the officer corps, see Lanka Sundaram, India's Armies and Their Costs: A Century of Unequal Imposts for an Army of Occupation and a Mercenary Army (Bombay: Avanti Prakashan, 1946), pp. 105-16.

²⁹Pakistan: 1953-54, p. 165. The air force and navy established their service academies at Risalpur and Manavar Island, respectively. In the Pakistan Military Academy, cadets choose one of three general courses in military science. After this each officer is trained in the particulars of the branch of the service in which he is commissioned. Some newly commissioned army officers, particularly in technical branches, are sent abroad for advanced training: until 1956 all newly commissioned air force officers received training abroad in addition to this education and training in Pakistan. (Pakistan: 1953-54, p. 252.)

³⁰Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1954-55, p. 171. The need for officers in the early years was so pressing that two interim arrangements had to be made. First, an Officers' Training School existed from 1949-52 at which five short courses of nine months each were offered. (Pakistan Publications, Pakistan: 1954-55, p. 171.) Second, "Short Service, Regular and Special Purposes Commissions were granted to deserving JCO's and Warrant Officers. At the same time, a long-term plan for training regular officers was set in motion. Selected volunteer graduates in engineering and students who had passed their Faculty of Science Examination, after a short course at the Pakistan Military Academy, were sent to Loughborough College in the United Kingdom. They were there for two to four years getting their diploma in automobile engineering and workshop practice. After completing these courses, selected officers also received training in specialized subjects, like tele-communication engineering, at various institutions in the United Kingdom." Khan, op. cit., p. 56.

³¹Pakistan: 1953-54, p. 165. The air force has two major preparatory schools, one at Sargodha and the other at Lower Topa. In 1963, the enrollment at the former was 214, and 148 at the latter. In each school 25 percent of the students claimed Bengali as their mother tongue. National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. II, No. 8 (1963), p. 390.

³²Pakistan: 1955-56, p. 239.

³³National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, No. 6 (1963), p. 428.

³⁴Pakistan: 1958-59, p. 131.

³⁵Pakistan: 1955-56, pp. 238-39.

³⁶In 1959 the Pakistan Air Force Staff College was established. In the courses offered here "emphasis is placed on the study of the nature of airpower, its ramifications, its application and above all, its place in the defence of the State. The curriculum covers a wide range of subjects designed to broaden their [students'] understanding of national and international problems." Pakistan: 1958-59, p. 136.

³⁷Pakistan Publications, Ten Years of Pakistan, p. 220. A number of technical schools and programs of general education for noncommissioned officers and recruits had existed long before independence. Cf. Geoffrey Wheeler, Swords and Plowshares: The Indian Army as a Social Force (Washington: The Government of India Information Services, 1944).

³⁸Pakistan: 1953-54, p. 170. After the acquisition of new types of aircraft under the military-aid program, a number of conversion schools were established in Pakistan for pilots, navigators, and maintenance personnel.

³⁹Five Years of Pakistan, p. 209.

⁴⁰Ten Years of Pakistan, p. 221.

⁴¹Khan, op. cit., p. 138. This was of particular concern to the military leadership. Khan has remarked that the training during that time had been largely haphazard and independent of central control. "The directives or programmes issued by the G. H. Q. could not, in most cases, be implemented owing to the continuous demands of internal defense. In addition, the general state of training in the units, many of which had been formed by officers and men drawn from different regiments and units, was far from uniform. More and more emphasis had to be placed on collective training to mould these heterogeneous elements into a team that could face the perpetual threat of war. Training had therefore to be left to the divisional commanders who managed as best they could." (Ibid., p. 137.)

⁴²Ibid., p. 144.

⁴³Ibid., p. 146.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 148.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 141.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 52. The top-ranking officers in all three services at the time of independence were either Punjabi or Pathan. The administrative services were likewise biased toward the western regions. Cf. Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan" in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 360-440.

⁴⁸National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, No. 12, 1962, p. 632.

⁴⁹Government of Pakistan, Department of the Army, The Army Regulations, Vol. II (Instructions), para. I (Rawalpindi: Civil and Military Press, 1960).

⁵⁰National Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, No. 1, 1963, p. 29.

⁵¹Ibid., Vol. I, No. 19, 1963, pp. 1223-28.

⁵²Ibid., Vol. I, No. 1, 1963, p. 30.

⁵³Ibid. It has been reported that if merit were always rigorously applied in air force cadet schools, few East Bengali boys would be admitted. Ibid., Vol. I, No. 19, 1963, p. 1388.

⁵⁴Ibid., Vol. I, No. 1, 1963, p. 30.

⁵⁵G. F. MacMunn, The Armies of India (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1911), pp. 141-42. He noted that "the greatest care is taken to see that men do not represent themselves to be what they are not. Regiments enlist tribes, so that in companies that exist, tribal pride and emulation and even tribal discipline and public opinion may be stimulated."

⁵⁶Sundaram, op. cit., p. 57.

⁵⁷The Army in India and Its Evolution, p. 159. During the first few years, especially capable and deserving junior commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers were given commissions. Honorary King's Commissions were bestowed on those who had rendered distinguished service but whose age and lack of education precluded full King's Commissions.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 160-61. The first groups of boys reportedly did rather badly and had a large number of failures. Later groups did considerably better. Also, the age limit for Indian boys was raised from nineteen to twenty in order to allow for some additional preparations.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 161-63.

MILITARY ALOOFNESS FROM POLITICS: 1947-54

⁶⁰Reference deleted in revision.

⁶¹Connell, op. cit., p. 906.

⁶²Ibid., p. 908. Ten days after independence, the Commander of the Force was summoned to Delhi to report on the situation and the effectiveness of the Force in keeping some semblance of order and peace between communities. He reported that "although there had not yet been actual conflict between Muslim and non-Muslim troops, the atmosphere within his Force had become very explosive, and any small incident might provoke fighting." On the night of August 31 the Boundary Force was disbanded.

⁶³Khan, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶⁴Dawn, December 18, 1947. On August 20, the West Punjab Government requested the army to take over the responsibility of evacuating Muslim refugees from the East Punjab. Shortly thereafter, a military evacuation organization was established which was largely responsible for the evacuation of 4 million refugees in the course of three and a half months.

⁶⁵Cf. Richard Symonds, The Making of Pakistan (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 83.

⁶⁶Khalid Ben Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1960), pp. 280-304.

⁶⁷Pakistani national officers did not have a major say in entry into the Kashmir war since the major army posts were at that time still held by British officers. The fact that the military did not have a voice in the negotiations about a cease-fire and the ultimate decision to cease hostilities caused considerable unrest within the military. Cf. Khan, op. cit., pp. 116-17.

⁶⁸I am indebted to Stephen P. Cohen for this observation which is based on an interview with a former commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army.

⁶⁹Dawn, January 23, 1951.

⁷⁰Khan, op. cit., p. 190.

⁷¹Col. Mohammad Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 58-61.

⁷²Connell, op. cit., p. 931.

⁷³Khan, op. cit., pp. 98-100.

⁷⁴The engagement of the military in Kashmir and in nonmilitary tasks had an important influence on the development of the military's self-conception as a national force and upon its attitudes towards the political leadership. Although the military held certain members of the political leadership in high regard, namely, Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, and had accepted them as the creators of Pakistan, during this time the military started to perceive itself as Pakistan's preserver. Both Jinnah and Liaqat soon passed from the scene, and those who followed were perceived not as creators or preservers, but as disrupters and destroyers. Even during the Kashmir war, there was some resentment against the cavalier treatment given the military by the dominant policy makers and the negotiation of a cease-fire agreement at a time

that the Pakistan Army thought the tide was changing in its favor. "Its dogged resistance in Kashmir was responsible for frustrating a more important Indian ambition which was to capture East Pakistan. This ambition had taken firm root in the minds of wishful thinkers in India who thought that Pakistani resistance might be similar to that put up in Hyderabad. It has seldom been realized in Pakistan how near to disintegration this country was in 1948. Only the Army saved Pakistan from being wiped off the map of the world." *Ibid.*, pp. 116-117.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p. 103. Whether or not Pakistan would have "won" the war in Kashmir would depend on precisely how the antagonists would have defined victory. The action of Liaquat Ali Khan in seeking a cease-fire is perhaps understandable. It has been suggested by the British commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army at that time that Liaquat feared that if the war became too expanded and/or if it turned against India in any way, then the political position of Nehru might be threatened by Sardar Patel who might possibly have rallied rightist forces around him which, in turn, would have endangered the lives of Indian Muslims. It, too, might have raised the specter of a mass migration of Indian Muslims to Pakistan, with which the government could not have coped.

⁷⁶*Dawn*, March 10, 1951.

⁷⁷*Dawn*, April 14, 1951. The central Law Minister, Abdur Sattar Pirzada, introduced a bill, immediately passed, which established a special tribunal to try the cases and which would consist of three judges of the Federal or High Courts. It also required the trial to be held in camera and directed that no decisions made by the tribunal would be appealable to any other court.

⁷⁸It has been reported that civil authorities were tipped off by a young police officer who happened to overhear a conversation between some of the would-be conspirators. For a thoughtful discussion of the Rawalpindi conspiracy case, cf. Charles Burton Marshall, "The Military in Pakistan," (n.d.) (mimeographed).

⁷⁹Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 168.

⁸¹Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of Inquiry To Inquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953. (Lahore: Government Press, 1954), p. 16. (Referred to hereafter as the Munir Report.) This movement attracted support from a number of dissidents, including the ulema.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 116.

⁸³Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-82.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, p. 185.

POLITICIZATION OF THE MILITARY: 1954-58

⁸⁵The United Front took 223 of the 237 Muslim seats and 10 of the 72 non-Muslim seats. For details of the election, see Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1957), p. 57.

⁸⁶Several events allegedly prompted the dismissal. First, the chief minister Fazlul Huq, made some unfortunate statements while in Calcutta concerning the inviolability of Bengali unity which were accepted by the central leadership as something only short of secessionist advocacy. Second, there were major riots at the Adanijee Jute Mills at Narayanganj in which nearly 500 persons were reported killed and which took on an East vs. West tone, since

Bengali workers were pitted against non-Bengali management. The seriousness of each of these events was declared to be cause for the dismissal of the ministry and the dissolution of the assembly. Governor's rule was declared and Iskander Mirza was made the new governor. He was accompanied to East Bengal by a deputation of 10,000 troops to assure the maintenance of public order. The New York Times, May 31, 1954. Also see Stanley Maron, "The Problem of East Pakistan," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVIII, (June 1955), p. 134; Richard L. Park, "East Bengal: Pakistan's Troubled Province," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIII, (May 1954), pp. 70-74; and Richard L. Park and Richard S. Wheeler, "East Bengal Under Governor's Rule," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIII, (September 1954), pp. 129-34.

⁸⁷Callard, op. cit., p. 140.

⁸⁸Dawn, July 1, 1956.

⁸⁹Dawn, July 8, 1956.

⁹⁰Khan, op. cit., p. 172.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 173.

⁹²Dawn, December 10, 1957.

⁹³Khan, op. cit., p. 174.

⁹⁴Ahmed, op. cit., p. 101.

⁹⁵Dawn, January 10, 1958.

⁹⁶Dawn, January 4, 1948.

⁹⁷For a discussion of the place of princely states in Pakistan, cf. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

⁹⁸In the case of Kalat, a major Baluchi state on the Iranian border, there were continual movements for the establishment of an independent Baluchistan. These activities were not entirely quelled and the area was not brought under control until 1959, after several months of intensive fighting between rebel forces and the Pakistan Army and Air Force. (Wilcox, op. cit., pp. 75-81, 145-46.) In the province of Baluchistan, which had been a centrally administered Commissioner's Province under the British and which was made an agency under the direct administration of the governor-general rather than a province, under the Government of India Act, 1935, there arose increasing demands, primarily from the League organization of that area, for increased autonomy for the province and for the institution of popular democratic institutions. In early 1951, the Baluchistan Muslim League established a subcommittee to recommend reforms in the constitutional order. The committee report recommended provincial autonomy as envisaged in the Government of India Act, 1935, a unicameral legislature for the province, and general elections on the basis of universal adult franchise. Dawn, January 30, 1951. Later the provincial League demanded provincial autonomy in accordance with the Lahore Resolution and urged all Muslim League members of the Baluchistan Advisory Council to resign. Ibid., May 16, 1951.

⁹⁹The activity of the League in the 1930's and particularly its resurgence after the 1937 elections is crucial in understanding the transformation which took place in the Indian political community. For a treatment of this period, see Sir Reginald Coupland, The Indian Problem (London: Oxford University Press, 1942); Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1959); Choudhri Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1961); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1946); and Khalid Ben Sayeed, op. cit.

¹⁰⁰The precise extent of Pakistan was not spelled out until the Gandhi-Jinnah talks of 1944, when Jinnah laid claim to the provinces of Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier,

Bengal, and Assam. Sir Reginald Coupland, The Future of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 237. Ignoring the extreme regional differences which existed, and which still exist between these areas, Jinnah later argued in a seminal statement that "we maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of values and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life." Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol. II. (Lahore: Muhammad Ashraf, 1947), pp. 180-81.

¹⁰¹After the elections of 1937, Muslim political leaders from the Muslim majority provinces started to participate in the deliberations of the Muslim League at the All-India level. But in each of these provinces, the major Muslim politicians had established a separate basis of political support which often included all religious communities and at the provincial level were in opposition to League attempts to undercut their bases of political support. In the Punjab, the Muslim League was unable to form the ministry until shortly before independence and in the North-West Frontier Province there was a pro-Congress ministry at the time of independence.

The idea of Pakistan was also actively opposed by a large part of the Indian ulema up to partition and after, although the League made constant efforts from 1937 to attract the support of these religious leaders. Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), pp. 28-30. For a comprehensive account of the political activity of the most influential school of ulema in the Indian nationalist movement, see Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963). Also cf. Smith, op. cit., pp. 333-39.

¹⁰²Constituent Assembly (Legislature), Debates, Vol. I, March 2, 1948, p. 122.

¹⁰³The allocation of central loans to provinces for purposes of development through 1956 was as follows:

	East Bengal	Punjab	Sind	North-West Frontier Province
1948-49	400 (35.5%)	500 (44.4%)	175 (15.5%)	52 (4.6%)
1949-50	421 (40.6%)	525 (50.7%)	none	90 (8.7%)
1950-51	100 (13.3%)	400 (53.3%)	175 (23.3%)	75 (10.0%)
1951-52	250 (25.0%)	450 (45.0%)	150 (15.0%)	150 (15.0%)
1952-53	290 (34.5%)	390 (46.4%)	25 (3.0%)	135 (16.1%)
1953-54	1285 (40.7%)	1313 (41.8%)	495 (12.2%)	163 (5.2%)
1954-55	1210 (44.0%)	1523 (55.4%)*	-	-
1955-56	1249 (38.6%)	1987 (61.4%)	-	-

* From 1954-55 the provinces of the western wing were integrated into one province, West Pakistan. Compiled from Budgets of the Central Government of Pakistan, 1948-49 to 1957-58

¹⁰⁴For discussions of regional conflict in constitution-making, see Callard op. cit., pp. 77-113, 155-93; and Binder, op. cit., pp. 116-34, 200-208, 241-58, and 307-14. These issues even started to split the Muslim League on a regional basis. For demands of the East Bengal Muslim League, see the recommendations of the Working Committee in Dawn, November 1, 1950, and January 17, 1951.

¹⁰⁵The widest support for the measure came from the Punjab Legislature where support was almost unanimous. In the North-West Frontier Province, the opposition did not attend the

session when sanction was given the move. In Sind the Chief Minister, Pirzada Abdul Sattar, was supported by 74 percent of 110 members of the assembly in his opposition to the move, but after his dismissal, the new Chief Minister, Mohammed Ayub Khuhro, who had been dismissed twice previously as Chief Minister, mustered 100 votes in favor of the one-unit scheme. Cf. Dawn, October 24, 1954, and December 12, 1954.

¹⁰⁶The conception of difference among regional areas, particularly in East Pakistan, did not diminish. In the course of a debate in the Constituent Assembly in 1956, Abdul Mansur Ahmad stated that "Pakistan is a unique country having two wings which are separated by a distance of more than a thousand miles. . . . These two wings differ in all matters, excepting two things, namely, that they have a common religion, barring a section of the people in East Pakistan, and that we achieved our independence by a common struggle. These are the only two points which are common to both the wings of Pakistan. With the exception of these two things, all other factors, viz. the language, the tradition, the culture, the costume, the custom, the dietary, the calendar, the standard time, practically everything is different. There is, in fact, nothing common in the two wings, particularly in respect to those which are the sine qua non to form a nation." Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, January 16, 1956, p. 1816.

¹⁰⁷Cf. Callard, op. cit., pp. 34-76.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., pp. 77-154.

¹⁰⁹Gazette of Pakistan, July 9, 1949.

¹¹⁰Callard, op. cit., pp. 77-154.

¹¹¹Dawn, February 20, 1949.

¹¹²For a list of these parties and groups, see Dawn, December 28, 1949.

¹¹³Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. I, February 29, 1956.

¹¹⁴The party composition of the provincial legislative assemblies as of October 1957 is indicative.

Parties	West Pakistan	East Pakistan
Republican Party	178	2
Awami League	3	115
Muslim League	107	13
National Awami Party	12	34
Krishak Sramik Party	—	34
Pakistan National Congress	—	24
Scheduled Castes Federation	—	16
Nizam-i-Islam	—	19
United Progressive Party	—	13
Total	300	300

¹¹⁵The formation of a new government provided some hectic activity. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan, was requested to head a new government but refused, although he consented to be the Defense Minister in the new interim cabinet. Ahmed, op. cit., p. 1. The former Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Bogra, was asked and consented to head the new government, although his ministry was formed not by him but by the governor-general. The new cabinet included representatives from all political parties as well as the

administration, and represented almost all spectra of political opinion. Although the prime minister was from East Bengal, the major positions in the ministry were held by West Pakistanis, mostly from the Punjab.

¹¹⁶Dawn, October 1954.

¹¹⁷The action of the government with respect to the judgments of the court was meticulously within the bounds of constitutional procedure and accorded with the interpretations and judgments of the court. In an attempt to find a way out of the legal chaos, the governor-general requested from the Federal Court an advisory opinion concerning the powers of the governor-general prior to the convening of a new Constituent Assembly; the validation of constitutional legislation passed since 1948, until it could be finally validated by the new Constituent Assembly; whether or not the governor-general acted legally in dissolving the Constituent Assembly; and the scope of legal competence of the Constituent Assembly to be called. The urgency and importance of the request was apparent to the court. In his Special Reference, Chief Justice Munir noted that "we have come to the brink of a chasm with only three alternatives before us: (i) to turn back the way we came by; (ii) to cross the gap by a legal bridge; (iii) to hurtle into the chasm beyond any hope of rescue." Ibid., p. 259. The chief justice and the court clearly took the middle path. In the Special Reference the court advised that the governor-general under the "common law of civil or state necessity" could retroactively validate relevant laws since these would be subject to the approval or rejection of a new Constituent Assembly; that the governor-general, in view of what the court declared as illegal actions of the first Constituent Assembly, had legal authority to dissolve the Constituent Assembly; and that the governor-general could not nominate a new assembly but could only name its electorate. Ibid., pp. 307-309.

¹¹⁸The Indian Independence Act and the Pakistan Provisional Constitution Order, 1947, provided that the governor-general and governors could not act against the advice of ministers but did not explicitly establish that they had to act upon or accept their advice.

¹¹⁹There were several cases between independence and 1954 in which the governor-general or governors, acting on the former's directions, dismissed ministries which had been constitutionally formed and which appeared to enjoy majority support in their respective legislatures at the time of their dismissal. In no case, however, was there any major legislative or public protest against these actions and the new ministries in no case had difficulty in mobilizing a new majority. This was the case in the dismissal of the Mamdot and Daultana cabinets in the Punjab, the Khuhro, Bakhsh, Fazlullah, the second Khuhro, and Pirzada ministries in Sind, and the Abdul Rashid cabinet in the North-West Frontier Province.

¹²⁰Reprinted in Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 88-92.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 88.

¹²²Ibid., p. 90.

¹²³Ibid., p. 91.

¹²⁴Ibid., p. 90.

¹²⁵Marshall, op. cit., p. 11.

¹²⁶Quoted in Khan, op. cit., p. 179.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 189.

¹²⁸Speech of Gen. Mohammed Ayub Khan, Dawn, October 9, 1958.

¹²⁹Fazal Muqueem Khan, op. cit., p. 192.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 193.

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¹³¹Khan, op. cit., p. 189.

¹³²Ibid., p. 190.

¹³³Ibid., p. 194.

¹³⁴Dawn, October 7, 1958.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Dawn, October 8, 1958.

¹³⁷Ibid.

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Ibid.

¹⁴⁰The Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, Section 2 (1), in Government of Pakistan, Orders of the President: 1956-60 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), p. 99. (Hereafter cited as Presidential Orders.)

¹⁴¹Ibid., Section 2 (4), p. 99.

¹⁴²In his speech at the farewell ceremony for Ayub as Commander-in-Chief, his successor, Gen. Mohammad Musa, noted that "martial law is purely providing cover for . . . more effective and efficient administration. On our part, our normal duties and training have hardly been disturbed. You may be interested to know that as a Deputy Commander-in-Chief, I issued instructions to the whole army for winter collective training only 2 days after Martial law was declared." Dawn, November 13, 1958.

¹⁴³There were also conflicting claims between Mirza and Ayub as to who really engineered the coup. Dawn, October 10, 1958.

¹⁴⁴Presidential Orders, Section 3, p. 100.

¹⁴⁵Dawn, October 9, 1958.

¹⁴⁶Dawn, October 25, 1958.

¹⁴⁷The Government (Presidential Cabinet) Order, 1958, in Presidential Orders, pp. 104-105.

¹⁴⁸Dawn, October 16, 1958.

¹⁴⁹Dawn, October 18, 1958.

¹⁵⁰All major leaders of the coup made public statements to this effect within a few days after the coup.

¹⁵¹It was also felt that President Mirza, after becoming aware of the intentions of the army leadership, attempted to divide the army and institute a counter coup. Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan cites the case of the mysterious phone call to the commander of the Karachi area on the eve of the coup, directing him to divert his troops elsewhere. After the coup, Khan argues that Mirza "... thought fit to try to undermine the loyalties of the senior officers of the three fighting services. He tried unsuccessfully to sound out a few of the most senior with a view of creating a rift within the armed forces. Before long, he became desperate and, taking advantage of General Ayub's absence in East Pakistan, he redoubled his efforts. At 2:30 p.m. on 21 October... President Mirza had a long telephone conversation with a well-placed senior officer. Playing on the sentiments and loyalties of this officer, he ordered him to arrest all

the general officers on the staff of the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The officer was completely flabbergasted and finally requested written orders. He promptly reported the conversation to the Chief of the General Staff. When questioned as to how he knew the man talking to him on the telephone was the President, the officer said that he could not have mistaken the voice of a man with whom he had played bridge regularly for the last ten years." Khan, op. cit., p. 202.

¹⁵²Dawn, October 29, 1958. There were some indications that Ayub was somewhat hesitant about ousting Mirza but that he was pressed to do so by the ranking army officers. Cf. Khan, op. cit., p. 203.

¹⁵³Ayub offered three major reasons for Mirza's ouster: (1) he had been in league with the politicians and had done much to bring about the current state of affairs; (2) there was public concern about two men being at the helm of affairs; and (3) a similar feeling prevailed in the services. Mirza, in his speech of withdrawal gave the following reasons for his action: "(1) dual control might hamper effective governmental performance; and (2) public image that he and Ayub might not act in unison. . . would be most damaging to our cause." Dawn, October 28, 1958.

¹⁵⁴Fatima Jinnah, whose voice had become something of a "conscience" to the "nation," noted the exit of Mirza as a moment of relief since he had presided over the growth of disunity and dissension with the result that "the people were reduced to the status of helpless spectators and subjected to great hardships and all kinds of social evils. A new era has begun under General Ayub Khan and the Armed Forces have undertaken to root out the administrative malaise and the anti-social practices, to create a sense of confidence, security and stability and to eventually bring the country back to a state of normalcy." Dawn, October 29, 1958.

¹⁵⁵Martial Law Order No. 1. The martial law administrators were as follows: (1) Zone A—Maj. Gen. Malik Sher Bahadur; Zone B—Lt. Gen. Azam Khan; Zone C—Maj. Gen. Umrao Khan.

¹⁵⁶For Zone A, cf. Dawn, October 12, 1958; Zone B, cf. Dawn, October 12, 1958; and Zone C, cf. Dawn, October 11, 1958.

¹⁵⁷With the exception of military courts, there was little military intervention in the administration of law. In one case, a deputy subadministrator in West Pakistan issued the following instructions: "Various business firms, banks, shopkeepers and individuals are writing to Martial Law authorities regarding classification of Martial Law Orders, declaration of food-stuffs, issue of permits, etc., by the Martial Law Authorities. It is notified for the information of all concerned and the public that for such matters they should approach the appropriate departments of the Government which has full knowledge of martial law orders and instruction." Dawn, October 29, 1958.

¹⁵⁸Dawn, November 1, 1958.

¹⁵⁹Dawn, October 10, 1958.

¹⁶⁰Martial Law Regulations, Nos. 1A and 2.

¹⁶¹Ibid., Nos. 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, and 27.

¹⁶²Ibid., Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 29.

¹⁶³Ibid., No. 24.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, and 29. "Recalcitrant" was defined as "any external enemy of Pakistan and mutineers or rebels or rioters and any enemy agent. . . ." Ibid., No. 3(d).

¹⁶⁵Dawn, November 16, 1958.

¹⁶⁶Dawn, November 17, 1958.

¹⁶⁷There have been speculations that these removals were made because of threats to Ayub's position and also that there was no concurrence as to how fast democratic institutions should be introduced nor in what form or measure. Gen. Azam Khan in 1960 was made governor of East Pakistan and after identifying himself somewhat with their demands, he was removed. He was looked upon by the opposition parties as a possible candidate to oppose Ayub in the 1965 presidential elections. Gen. K. M. Sheikh, another strong man in the cabinet, eventually became the Pakistani ambassador to Japan.

¹⁶⁸Cf. President's Order No. 18 of 1959 in Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Law, Orders of the President, 1956-60 (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), pp. 126-174. Also see S. M. Z. Rizvi (ed.), A Reader in Basic Democracies (Peshawar: West Pakistan Academy for Basic Democracies, 1961).

¹⁶⁹Prior to the first elections to these bodies, the cabinet "advised" the president that "as soon as conveniently may be, upon the completion of the first elections under the Basic Democracies Order, 1959, the persons who are declared to have been elected as members of the Union Councils, Union Committees and Town Committees, be asked, by secret ballot to be conducted by the Election Commission of Pakistan to vote in respect of their confidence in the President of Pakistan. If the majority of votes are affirmative, it should be treated as a mandate for the President to take the necessary steps forthwith to make provisions for establishing a constitutional machinery in Pakistan, and he should also be deemed to have been elected as the President of Pakistan for the first terms of office under the Constitution to be made." Pakistan Times, January 8, 1960.

¹⁷⁰Cf. Government of Pakistan, Report of the Land Reforms Commission for West Pakistan (Lahore: Superintendent, Government Printing West Pakistan, 1961); and Government of Pakistan, Report of the Commission on National Education (Karachi: Ministry of Education, 1959).

¹⁷¹Government Servants (Discipline and Efficiency) Rules, 1959. Printed in Pakistan Times, January 8, 1959.

¹⁷²Printed in Orders of the President, 1956-60, pp. 107-109 and pp. 112-18, respectively. The accused were to be tried by special tribunals appointed by the president or governors with a judge of the Supreme Court, Federal Court, or a high court or a district and sessions judge qualified for such appointment as chairman. The tribunals were given sweeping investigatory powers and were entitled to draw an adverse presumption if the accused could not or refused to explain facts appearing against him.

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁷⁵Report of the Constitution Commission, Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1962), p. 1. In a major statement of his conception of the Pakistani political malaise, Ayub proposed that the form of government to be adopted was of crucial importance and that perhaps that formal political institutions were more conducive to political instability prior to 1958 than the inadequacies of politicians. "It is now the fashion to blame the politicians outright for this mess. Yes, they were guilty of many misdeeds of omission and commission; but there is one fundamental point in which, I have a feeling, they were rather sinned against than sinning. That is, they were given a system of government totally unsuited to the temper and climate of the country." Mohammed Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, (July 1960), p. 550.

¹⁷⁶Cf. Richard Wheeler, "Pakistan: New Constitution, Old Issues," Asian Survey, III (February 1963), pp. 107-15; Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Constitutional Autocracy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI (Winter 1963-64), pp. 365-77; Sharif al-Mujahid, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections," Asian Survey, V (June 1965), pp. 280-94; and Sharif al-Mujahid, "The Assembly Elections in Pakistan," Asian Survey, V (November 1965), pp. 538-51.

¹⁷⁷Editor's note: In March 1969, approximately three years after the Sisson study had been completed, President Ayub Khan resigned, amidst widespread turbulence and violence, especially in East Pakistan. Thus once again Pakistan became subjected to martial law, with the Presidency assumed by the Army Chief of Staff, General Yahya Khan.

CHAPTER 5
POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN SOUTH KOREA*

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AN EXPLANATORY NOTE

The report which follows is based upon data collected by the author in the United States through available primary and secondary sources, including some interviews with Koreans now residing in the United States. In the summer of 1965, the author was enabled, through support of Indiana University Ford Foundation grant funds, to travel to Korea for further research. The results of that field inquiry are not included here nor are they derived from the sponsorship which made this paper possible. Data from the field research and additional data collected subsequent to completion of the study reported here are included in a separate publication by the author, forthcoming in 1970 in a volume on Korean politics edited by Edward Wright.

It should be emphasized that this study would not have been possible without the advice, assistance, and encouragement of a great many persons. I am particularly indebted to Morris Janowitz for advice and encouragement throughout this project; and to former U.S. Cultural Attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Korea Gregory Henderson, for extensive and immensely helpful criticisms of the study in draft form. In addition, Prof. William Henthorn and Prof. C.I. Eugene Kim are among the specialists on Korean affairs with whom I have consulted about various aspects of this investigation. I hasten to add that only I am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation found in the pages which follow. Key P. Yang and Young H. Yoo of the U.S. Library of Congress were immensely helpful in locating relevant source materials and in providing some translations, as was my colleague, Prof. Il Pyong Kim, and my assistant at Indiana University, Young Bae Kim. Mrs. Sonja Gay and Miss Susan Robertson performed typing and other necessary secretarial chores with dispatch and a sense of humor which made the task lighter for all concerned. A number of other Koreans residing in the United States during the period of this research, some of them having intimate personal knowledge of various important political events in Korea, made extremely useful comments and observations to the author in the course of his research; however, because of their continuing association with persons or events in Korea, they must remain anonymous.

With a few prominent exceptions (Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee), Korean names are transliterated according to the McCune-Reischauer system.

OVERVIEW

In May 1961, a relatively small group of military officers of the Republic of Korea executed a coup d'état which toppled the civilian government of Chang Myön and brought to power a military revolutionary council. In 1963, in fulfillment of a pledge made at the time of the coup,¹

*The views expressed are exclusively those of the author; they do not represent the views of CRESS or the U.S. Government.

the military regime consented to hold nationwide elections. The elections resulted in the continuation of the presidency of Park Chung Hee, who had been the senior member of the coup group. But the base of the regime was broadened somewhat to include civilians as well as military figures.

Subsequent to the 1963 elections, political power in the Republic of Korea has remained anchored largely within a cluster of military men. That military men should have attained such an ascendant position in a country such as South Korea is not surprising in the light of the heavy involvement of military groups in politics elsewhere in the world, particularly in the so-called "emerging nations," and in the light of the tumultuous conditions which have characterized South Korea for much of the period since Japanese rule was ended in 1945. Indeed, in the light of such factors, the rise of the military to political dominance in the Republic of Korea seems to have been so inevitable that perhaps a more interesting question than why the military seized power in 1961 is why they did not seize power prior to that time. The latter question in turn raises the question of what degree and scope of political influence the military has had since 1945, and how to explain the transition from one degree to another.

Although political life can never be contained neatly within compartments constructed in the mind of the observer, in the present essay the period under discussion is divided into chronological phases to highlight changes which occurred in the role of the military in South Korean politics from one phase to the next, and to highlight the interplay of three key factors which produced these changes. These factors, described in the introductory essay to the present volume, are political demands and support, the political resources of the military, and the political perspectives of the military.

The first of the phases to be discussed in the analysis which follows is the period from the end of the war in the Pacific in August 1945 to the formal proclamation of the Republic of Korea in August 1948, a period in which the U.S. military government took steps toward organizing an indigenous military force along constabulary lines. Second is the period of the formal founding and organization of the ROK (Republic of Korea) army, navy, and air force, from August 1948 to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, a period in which Syngman Rhee was president and the military remained politically impotent. Third is the Korean War period, from June 1950 to July 1953, a period in which, after initial disastrous losses, the ROK military grew tremendously in size, in skill, in organizational capacity, and in stature, and thus began to be politically significant. Fourth is the period from the end of the Korean War to the fall of Syngman Rhee from power in April 1960, during which the growing disenchantment of the military was accompanied by an increase in its political resources. Thus the military now posed a serious potential threat to the rule of Syngman Rhee, although Rhee continued to retain control of the military. Following the student demonstrations which led Rhee to step down is a fifth period, which included an interim government, and then an elected government headed by Chang Myön. This was a period of continuous unrest culminating in the seizure of power by the military in May 1961. Sixth is the period of outright rule by the military, from May 1961 to December 1963. And seventh is the period of quasi-civilianization, in which the military rulers replaced their uniforms with civilian attire and broadened the base of rule somewhat by adding members of civilian elites to the government. This period continues to the present, although the investigation is terminated with the end of 1965.

AMERICAN OCCUPATION: 1945-48

The nascent role of the military establishment in South Korean politics in the early years after World War II can be understood only in the perspective of the political situation at the

time, of which the crucial elements were the lingering effects of 40 years of rule by the Japanese followed by the occupation of Korea by forces of the United States (south of the 38th parallel) and of the Soviet Union (north of the 38th parallel).

Three consequences of Japanese rule merit particular mention. The first was the deep hostility and distrust toward the Japanese which the occupation of Korea engendered, and which continued to manifest itself in South Korea even twenty years after Japanese rule had been terminated, in the form of intense opposition to the treaty between the Republic of Korea and Japan designed to "normalize" economic relations.

A second consequence of Japanese rule was the exacerbation of hostility and distrust among Koreans themselves. Although internecine conflict in postwar Korea has some historical antecedents predating Japanese rule, in general, animosity was generated between those Koreans who suffered greatly from Japanese rule and those Koreans who directly or indirectly mitigated their own condition of subservience to the Japanese by collaboration of some sort. At the end of the war, strong demands were made by many Koreans in the former category that those in the latter category be punished. For a number of reasons—including the problem of clearly defining "collaboration" as well as the dependence of the U.S. military government upon persons whose education and skills were *prima facie* evidence of having benefited from Japanese rule, if not of having collaborated—measures taken to punish collaborators were few. Thus an atmosphere of suspicion and animosity continued to prevail among Koreans, aggravated by frequent and not always carefully documented accusations of "collaboration" by politicians against their opponents. Further, during the struggle for independence there were frictions between Korean-based nationalist groups and exile groups; between Communists and non-Communists: between exiles in China and those in the United States; and between various personality-based factions.¹ During the era of Japanese rule, the differences between the various nationalist groups could be submerged occasionally on behalf of a common cause and in the face of a common enemy; but when Japanese rule was ended, the differences became paramount and a struggle for power ensued.

Ironically, but understandably, in the light of similar historical instances of the adoption by subjugated peoples of a pattern of behavior modeled after that of those who rule them, another consequence of Japanese rule was the tendency for Koreans who rose to positions of authority in the postwar period to emulate, perhaps subconsciously, manners and habits of the former Japanese rulers. Examples of such emulation which are of particular relevance to the present study have been provided by the police, especially under Syngman Rhee, and by various military leaders—in spite of intensive indoctrination designed to purge Korean police and military, respectively, of Japanese ways and attitudes. It is of interest to note that the leadership of the military revolution of 1961 and of the military government which followed was composed predominantly of men who had received their first military training under the Japanese. It is doubtful that the dominant role of the Japanese military in prewar politics, especially in Manchuria where the military were instrumental in bringing about a dramatic increase in economic production, went unnoticed by Koreans trained in Japanese military institutions.²

The Impact of American Policies and Actions

The American occupation of South Korea which followed Japanese rule affected Korean politics in general and the role of the embryonic Korean military establishment in particular in important ways. But more often than not, American influence was haphazard rather than calculated. The succession of miscalculations and blunders committed by Americans who governed Korea south of the 38th parallel beginning in the autumn of 1945 is striking testimony

to the inadequacy of the preparation by the U.S. Government for its postwar responsibilities in Korea.

By the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, troops of the Soviet Union were already surging south across the Yalu and Tumen Rivers into Korea. Vague plans had been formulated for a joint United States-Soviet trusteeship of Korea for an indefinite period. With the surrender of Japan, a cable from Washington directed General MacArthur to have U.S. troops accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea south of the 38th parallel. The nearest U.S. troops at the time, however, were in Okinawa, and did not arrive in Korea until September 8.

Elements of the XXIV Corps, under the command of Lt. Gen. John Hodge, made up the initial U.S. governing body in Korea. With the exception of 50 officers who had been given some civil affairs training, the force consisted entirely of tactical troops, with no preparation for military government, and virtually no information about the land and people which they would govern. Of the 50 officers, none spoke Korean and only two had previously been in Korea.³

Only five weeks later did a sizable contingent of specially trained civil affairs-military government personnel arrive. But these were men who had been scheduled for the occupation of Japan and had been transferred at the last moment. Few had more than a sketchy idea of Korean history, culture, economics, and politics. An officer assigned to this contingent of U.S. civil affairs forces in Korea writes that in a year of preparation for military government, which included nine months of instruction at two army schools, his total instruction on Korea consisted of a single one-hour lecture.⁴

When the Japanese governor-general of Korea had learned of the imminence of his government's surrender to the Americans, he had approached several prominent Korean nationalists concerning the formation of a provisional government which would maintain order (and thus provide some protection for the Japanese from vindictive assaults by Koreans) until more permanent governmental arrangements could be made with the approval of the victors. A well-known Korean, Yō Un-hyōng (often transliterated Lyuh Woon Hyung), agreed to head the government, which initially was known as the Committee of Preparation for Korean Independence and later became known as the People's Republic. The committee quickly established control not only at the national level but at the provincial and local levels as well. Although Communists were among the most active members of the committee at national and provincial levels, by no means was it exclusively a Communist operation at this stage. As a matter of fact, the range of political ideologies encompassed by committee membership was a source of political friction among competing factions from the very beginning of committee operation. In the period prior to the arrival of the Americans, however, the Communists—for reasons similar to those explaining their strength in Eastern Europe at the end of the War—were in a strong position relative to other political groups: they were better organized than most groups, and they benefited from the presence of Soviet armed forces.⁵

General Hodge and his U.S. forces were unprepared for a *de facto* government. Instructed to deal only with the Japanese governor-general in effecting the transfer of authority south of the 38th parallel, General Hodge found himself greeted upon his arrival in Inchon by a delegation from Yō Un-hyōng. Not only did General Hodge refuse to confer with the delegation or to recognize any authority on the part of the committee which it represented, but the following day he announced that the Japanese governor-general and other Japanese officials would be retained in office temporarily in order to facilitate the orderly transfer of authority.⁶

Whether, as one author who was close to the scene at the time suggests, the decision to retain the Japanese in office in Korea was based upon practical considerations regarding the

economic and administrative paralysis that might ensue following a sudden removal of experienced Japanese officials and industrial managers from office; or whether, as another suggests, the decision was based upon an extension to Korea of General MacArthur's directives regarding the retention of Japanese officials in office in Japan following the surrender;⁸ or whether, as another observer asserts, the decision was actually based upon the belief that "the Japanese governor and his entourage were liked by the people and would provide the best bulwark against the leftist element."⁹ the conclusion on which all observers were in agreement was that the reaction of Koreans to the retention by U.S. "liberators" of Japanese in office was almost universally one of shock, dismay, and hostility.

The fact is that no clear U.S. policy for dealing with Koreans had been formulated and transmitted to those responsible for setting up a government south of the 38th parallel. No separation of command between the Korean and Japanese occupations had been made; both were under the authority of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). General MacArthur, who issued the first policy statements regarding military government in Korea prior to the arrival of U.S. troops. Meade points out that as a result Korean problems received less attention, since MacArthur's headquarters were concerned first with problems in Japan. Furthermore, the fact that the military government in Korea was separated from Washington by MacArthur's headquarters was to prove a continuing hindrance to the formulation of American policy to meet the special needs of Korea.¹⁰

Thus, to the dismay of Koreans, little or no distinction was made between "liberated" Korea and "conquered" Japan in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy. For example, arms, ordnance, electrical and other equipment found in Korea, which might have been used to arm a new Korean militia or have been put to other uses, were destroyed by U.S. military units. The U.S. commander, General Hodge, is reported to have referred to Koreans as "the same breed of cats" as Japanese.¹¹

Within three days, the order retaining Japanese officials in office had been rescinded. But an adverse impression of U.S. military government had been made upon Koreans.

Having removed the Japanese from office, and being unwilling to entrust governmental authority to the People's Republic (as Yo Un-hyong's group became known after September), American military authorities were forced to rely heavily at first upon their own personnel and upon other Koreans whose background and qualifications were largely matters of speculation. The political affiliations of indigenous personnel presented a kaleidoscopic pattern to the Americans. By the time of the arrival of the first specially trained U.S. civil affairs personnel, 54 political parties had registered with military government headquarters in Seoul.¹² Lacking adequate information about Korean political parties and personalities, and having almost no Americans who could speak Korean, USAFK (U.S. Armed Forces in Korea) became heavily dependent upon the advice and assistance of their translators and interpreters. (Koreans were heard to quip that U.S. military government was "a government of, for, and by interpreters.") Although initially Yo Un-hyong's committee succeeded in planting some of its agents as interpreters, in time the beneficiaries of the lack of competence in the Korean language among Americans were, by and large, the more conservative Korean political groups. Koreans who spoke English and therefore had influence upon Americans as interpreters or translators, or after an initially rigid policy of nonfraternization was eased, as hosts to Americans in their homes, often were wealthy Koreans (but not always, because some relatively impoverished Koreans had learned English from missionaries). Wealth in Korea (if not a symptom of collaboration with the Japanese or acquiescence in Japanese rule) was in almost every instance a basis for political conservatism.¹³

The Arrival Of Syngman Rhee

In this troublesome context it is little wonder that Syngman Rhee was given a warm welcome by U.S. military authorities upon his arrival in Seoul in October 1945. He was, in the first place, relatively well known in a milieu filled with personalities largely unknown to Americans. He had spent more of his adult years in the United States than in his homeland, and had been known to American presidents from Theodore Roosevelt (to whom Rhee had appealed on behalf of Korean independence at the Portsmouth Conference in 1905) to Harry Truman. He was regarded as a learned man, having received degrees from George Washington (B.A.), Harvard (M.A.), and Princeton (Ph.D); his scholarly credentials were a source of prestige among his fellow Koreans and gave him access to influential Americans. Rhee had attained international prominence through his election as president of the provisional government which Koreans in exile had established following the uprising in Korea against the Japanese of March 1, 1919, a date still commemorated in Korea as the date of the declaration of Korean independence. During World War II, Rhee (succeeded as president of the provisional government by Kim Ku) had kept in close contact with the U.S. government as Chairman of the Korean Commission, representing the Korean Provisional Government in Washington. Finally, a point which operated on the plus side of the ledger in the American assessment of Rhee, especially so in the light of the difficulties American officials in Seoul were having with representatives of the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel in discussions over the future of Korea, and with representatives of the People's Republic south of the 38th parallel, was Rhee's known anti-Communism—an attitude which many other Korean independence fighters did not share.¹⁵

Rhee's presence on the scene, and even his staunch anti-Communist outlook, proved to be a mixed blessing for the American military authorities in Korea. At a time when representatives of the U.S. Government were discussing with their Soviet counterparts plans for a joint trusteeship which would endure a number of years, Rhee organized a Central Committee for the Rapid Realization of Independence, insisting that this was not a political party, and asking Koreans of every political persuasion to join it. Then, in December, when news from Moscow revealed that the U.S. and Soviet governments had come to an agreement upon a five-year trusteeship for Korea, Rhee denounced the agreement. He organized demonstrations to protest the agreement, and launched a series of weekly radio addresses to the Korean people setting forth his views. Ironically, Rhee's popular support at the time was enhanced by a curious reversal of position (prompted by directives from Moscow), by indigenous Communists and many other leftist groups, from their initial opposition to trusteeship to support for it.¹⁶

In January 1946, Rhee, Kim Ku, and other leaders held a series of strategy meetings; these resulted in the issuance of invitations to political representatives of the left as well as the right to attend an Emergency National Assembly in February. Many leaders of the left declined the invitation, however, refusing to acknowledge the leadership of Rhee and Kim Ku. The assembly was able to agree upon a recommendation for the establishment of a Representative Democratic Council of South Korea to advise the U.S. military officials in the governing of South Korea. General Hodge, eager to strengthen the U.S. position in Joint Commission (of the U.S. and Soviet commands in Korea) discussions by presenting a governmental structure broadly representative of the views and aspirations of Koreans, agreed to the establishment of the council, asking not only Rhee (as chairman) and Kim Ku to serve on it, but also prominent leaders of more liberal or radical views, such as Yō Un-hyōng, Kim Kyu Sik, and Pak Hyun Yōng. Of the latter group of leaders, only Yō agreed to serve; and he withdrew from the council immediately when he found, he said, that the "others formed a solid bloc and my views were completely ignored."¹⁷

Rhee's political strength continued to increase in the remainder of 1946 aided by U.S. termination of Joint Commission negotiations with the Soviets in May, and by Rhee's own energetic political activities, which included a speaking tour which, according to one source, Rhee "felt to be in the 'true Wilsonian tradition.'"¹⁸

It appears that there was some ambivalence in the relationship of U.S. officials to Rhee during these months. The charge that he had been "hand-picked by the State Department to be its anointed agent in South Korea" is, as Robert Oliver points out, unsubstantiated.¹⁹ On the other hand, for reasons already discussed, Rhee was welcomed upon his arrival in Korea by USAFIK officials, and in spite of his recalcitrance concerning the trusteeship question Rhee was given assistance by USAFIK in his efforts to enlist popular support. For instance, whereas each of the four major political parties in Korea (two identified as "left," two as "right") were given fifteen minutes monthly by the public information section of the military government to make radio broadcasts to the Korean people, Rhee, who was labeled as "nonpartisan," was given fifteen minutes weekly by the same authorities. At times broadcasts were relayed from his home, a privilege accorded to no other leader.²⁰

Yet officially, General Hodge and USAFIK endeavored to avoid being identified with any particular indigenous political leader or movement; and they were embarrassed and incensed by charges that USAFIK was promoting the political fortunes of Rhee. Thus, in November 1946, when nearly every member elected to the first South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly represented a political position identified with Rhee or with Kim Ku (whose views were generally close to those of Rhee), General Hodge was persuaded to make most of his 45 appointments to the assembly (the ordinance providing for the assembly called for 45 elective and 45 appointive seats) from individuals not identified with Rhee or Kim Ku.²¹

Kim Ku had been arguing for a provisional government independent of U.S. authority. But, while equally indignant at the appointments which General Hodge had made to the interim assembly, Syngman Rhee favored a strategy less radical in its immediate form though similar to that of Kim Ku in its long-range objectives. Since it appeared to him that United States-Soviet negotiations regarding transition to a unified independent government for Korea were hopelessly deadlocked, Rhee maintained that South Koreans now must enlist American support for the creation of an independent government within the territory presently controlled by the Americans. However, General Hodge, consistent with policy guidelines from Washington directed toward creation of a moderate group in the South which could reach a reasonable agreement with Communists in the North, was unsympathetic to the Rhee-Ku factions. Thus Rhee decided that his strategy required a personal trip to the United States.²²

Rhee therefore flew to the United States in December 1946, in spite of protests by General Hodge that Rhee was going "over his head" to Washington. In the United States, Rhee organized a "strategy council" to aid him in his cause.²³ The council developed and presented to the State Department a program which called for the election of an "interim government . . . for southern Korea, to serve until the two halves of Korea can be reunited and a general election held immediately thereafter."²⁴

Rhee's strategy for creating, with American support, an independent government for South Korea was not immediately successful. For one thing, the Soviet Union unexpectedly agreed to a renewal of discussions on the reunification of Korea, thus the U. S. Government was unwilling to jeopardize discussions of reunification by giving encouragement to Rhee and his plans for creation of an independent South Korea. In late 1947, however, convinced that direct negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the Korean problem had failed, the United States asked the General Assembly of the United Nations to place the Korean question on its agenda.

The story of the decision of the United Nations to hold elections throughout Korea under supervision of UN representatives, the problems which UN Commission representatives encountered in their efforts to gain access to North Korea, and the final decision to go ahead with elections in South Korea, need not be recounted here. These events led to the elections which Syngman Rhee sought, although many other prominent leaders in South Korea, including Kim Kyu Sik and finally even Kim Ku, opposed separate elections on the grounds that they would formalize the division of Korea. The elections were held in May 1948, and Syngman Rhee was elected chairman of the new assembly.

An Embryonic Military Establishment

For the first several weeks after the arrival, in September 1945, of the U.S. forces in Korea, the situation was chaotic. Order was maintained by a variety of self-appointed groups throughout Korea. These included the Peace Preservation Corps (Chiandai) of the Committee of Preparation for Korean Independence, which claimed to be the legitimate provisional government of all Korea; various groups of military veterans formed into private armies, and a substantial segment of the police force which had served under the Japanese (30 to 40 percent of the police force had consisted of Koreans). To have attempted to disband various groups and assume full responsibility for the maintenance of order themselves no doubt would have taxed the resources of USAFIK beyond their capacity. The strategy of USAFIK, therefore, (after the initial fiasco of reinstating the Japanese authorities and then hurriedly ousting them again), was to assert USAFIK authority throughout South Korea, and to rely heavily upon existing groups to maintain order, assimilating them gradually into a national police force and constabulary.²⁵

In October 1945, the former Japanese police academy in Seoul was reopened, and a one-month training course given to new recruits.²⁶ The core cadre for a police force for South Korea was provided by those thousands of Koreans who had had police experience under the Japanese. Thus, three years later, on the eve of the founding of the Republic of Korea, the Director of National Police admitted that 53 percent of all police posts above the rank of lieutenant were held by officers trained by the Japanese, including 9 out of 10 commanders of the Seoul Metropolitan Police. He further acknowledged that many of the Japanese trained policemen were resistant to changes in police methods being introduced under the guidance of Americans.²⁷

Early in the occupation, USAFIK postulated the need for supplementing the police force with a formal military establishment of some sort, and in November 1945, within USAFIK, a Headquarters of National Defense was established. The headquarters was assigned the mission of organizing a Korean Army and Coast Guard, and training them in the maintenance of peace and order and in making a contribution to national development. Since the police and military roles were largely undifferentiated initially, the headquarters originally embraced both a Bureau of Military Affairs and a Bureau of Police Affairs. However, in April 1946, the latter was given a status independent of the Headquarters of National Defense.²⁸

Initial recruitment into the military establishment was relatively unsystematic; and as in the case of recruitment to the police force, USAFIK depended heavily upon those who had had prior experience under the Japanese or (in the case of the military, but not the police) the Chinese. In December 1945, the first school for training South Korean military officers was established in Seoul, on the campus of a Methodist seminary near the former West Gate. Referred to as the Military English Language Institute, the school actually was the forerunner of the Korean Military Academy. The first students at the institute consisted entirely of veterans

of the Japanese or Chinese armies, and were selected largely from candidates nominated by six of the leading private "armies" in South Korea. The 200 men who were admitted to the school were, in fact, given training in the English language; also they were given some military training (although a small amount relative to what many of them had received in prior military service). At the end of April 1946, after producing 110 graduates, the institute was closed, being replaced by the South Korean National Defense Officers' Training Academy, located on the outskirts of Seoul.²⁹

By this time, a constabulary force of 2,406 was in existence. Korean officers to command the first units of the constabulary were selected on the advice of Yi Hyong-kun, who had been one of the two Korean colonels in the Japanese Army.³⁰ Support for the constabulary was poor, both in terms of resources (arms, clothing, equipment, and funds) and in terms of advice and supervision. On the average, between 1946 and 1948, no more than six U.S. military advisors were available to the constabulary at any one time. These men had to cover such a stretch of territory that their visits to any given unit were infrequent; furthermore, the advisors were dependent upon interpreters for communicating with Korean officers. One consequence of the lack of adequate U.S. supervision during this period was a heavy reliance by Koreans upon knowledge and methods which had been acquired in previous service with the Chinese or Japanese armies, especially the latter. Training during the period was limited in scope as well as quality, consisting primarily of drill and instruction in small arms; although some training in mortars and machine guns was provided, in spite of regulations by the Department of Internal Security to the contrary.³¹

Smuggling and piracy flourished along the Korean coasts and made the creation of a coast guard (forerunner of the ROK Navy) a matter of some urgency. The coast guard faced problems of resources and training, however, which perhaps surpassed even those of the constabulary. There were, in the first place, practically no vessels available to the coast guard. By April 1946, the coast guard had commissioned only 33 officers, and had a total strength of 1,011. Until September 1946, when a contingent of fifteen U.S. Coast Guard officers and enlisted men arrived, the South Korean Coast Guard depended for advice primarily upon a handful of junior officers from the U.S. Army.³²

The Military and the Police: Competing Roles

It was the turbulent internal situation that provided the primary need for a South Korean military force during the years of the U.S. occupation, although the threat of an external attack from the North was viewed with concern also. Even after a year of U.S. military government, the president of the Korean Affairs Institute, Kim Yong Jeung, could observe of a visit through South Korea, "In South Korea there is no law and order."³³ An armed insurrection on the island of Cheju early in 1948 was ample evidence that if Mr. Kim's observation had been an exaggeration, it had nonetheless suggested the volatile nature of existing order.

The energies of the military, therefore, were largely invested in a role supplementing the police force in maintaining order. It is not surprising that conflicts arose between the two groups, partly over jurisdictional questions, partly over matters involving personal jealousies and rivalries. In these conflicts, the police during this period generally held the upper hand. They were better organized than the military. In numerous instances policemen had been in positions of authority in local government under the Japanese, and thus were skilled in the often crude techniques of wielding political control in their areas, frequently aided by access to the intelligence files which the Japanese had used to keep track of the activities and backgrounds of the local populace. Consequently, on the eve of the founding of the Republic of

Korea, the police were a key political force—in some areas the only political force; whereas the embryonic military establishment was, at this point, politically impotent.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 1948-50

Broadening temporarily the focus of the study from South Korea to the Korean peninsula as a whole, one sees in 1948 a change in the nature of political struggle north as well as south of the 38th parallel. From the end of World War II various political factions within the Communist Party as well as among conservative groups and between both ends of the political spectrum had struggled with one another for dominance locally and nationally (that is, throughout all of Korea). The political scene was one of complexity and confusion. However, the ascendancy of Syngman Rhee in the South and of Kim Il-sŏng in the North represent the culmination of a first stage of political struggle in the postwar period. The formal founding of the Republic of Korea in August 1948, with its capital in Seoul, followed by the formal founding of the People's Republic of Korea, in September 1948, with its capital in Pyongyang, symbolizes the beginning of a second stage of conflict. With the beginning of the second stage, the political struggle had become polarized ideologically around Communist and anti-Communist leadership, and had become polarized geographically north and south of the 38th parallel.

As Simmel, Coser, and others have pointed out, conflict may have functional as well as dysfunctional consequences for parties to the conflict. In the Korean case, the Communist versus anti-Communist conflict became a rationale and a rallying symbol which Kim Il-sŏng in the North and Syngman Rhee in the South utilized to consolidate their own power. This is not to say that in either case the conflict was an artifice created to satisfy personal ambitions. The point is simply that once in power, each leader tended to utilize the existence of the now-polarized conflict in ways that were beneficial to the strengthening of his personal power. Personal loyalty was encouraged as a concomitant of loyalty to the common national cause. Criticism of or opposition to the ruler was identified as disloyalty to the state.³⁵

Conflicting Demands on the Military

Somewhat ironically, the struggle with communism not only served to strengthen Rhee's position, but in time contributed to the rise of a formidable political threat to Rhee, the ROK military. However, the ROK military acquired substantial political resources—in the form of size, arms, and equipment, cohesion, skill, organizational capacity—only during and after the Korean War. Before the war the military remained relatively impotent politically. It is true that elements of military units played important political roles during this period; but they did so as instruments (of the Communists on the one hand, or of the Rhee regime on the other) rather than as initiators of political action.

During the months between the founding of the Republic of Korea and the outbreak of the Korean War, the ROK military establishment was debilitated by conflicting demands. At a time when it was imperative to lay the foundations for basic organizational structure and to augment the strength of the organization through recruitment, the military was plagued with internal strife and purges. Attempts to provide training that would meet the needs of the new nation for defense had to yield to demands for the commitment of troops, however inexperienced, to internal security and antiguerrilla tasks.

By the time Syngman Rhee assumed office as President of the Republic of Korea in August 1948 (he had been nominal leader of the country since the end of May as Chairman of the

National Assembly), the threat of Communist insurrection and subversion in South Korea was increasingly manifest. As mentioned previously, a rebellion led by Communists had broken out on the island of Cheju in April, suppression of which required the services over a period of months of large numbers of the constabulary, the coast guard, and the police. In October, elements of the 14th Regiment at Yosu, under orders to assist in the suppression of guerrilla elements remaining from the Cheju uprising, mutinied. The Yosu mutiny, in which Communist members of the 14th Regiment played a prominent role, was followed by a number of other uprisings led by Communists, and still more mutinies in the armed forces, including the defection of two army battalions and the crew of a navy minesweeper to North Korea. According to one estimate, 60 percent of the ROK national budget in 1949 was devoted to countering guerrilla and subversive activity. During the final six months of that year, the ROK Army mounted 542 separate counter guerrilla actions. On the eve of the outbreak of the Korean War, some 13,000 persons had been convicted in South Korea and some 14,000 more had been arrested and were awaiting trial, under the National Security Law which the National Assembly had passed in its first session in 1948. An estimated 1,500 men were removed from the ROK Army itself in an effort to eliminate Communist influence.³⁶

The American Influence

Demands upon the ROK military during this period were made more severe by the reduction of U.S. force levels in Korea, in spite of appeals by the ROK National Assembly and president that the withdrawal of U.S. troops be delayed until the ROK military could be established on a firm footing. However, pressure upon the United States to accelerate rather than decelerate withdrawal was exerted by an announcement by the Soviet Union of its intention to withdraw all of its forces from Korea by the end of 1948, followed by a resolution of the UN General Assembly asking for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korean soil. At the end of June 1949, all U.S. combat forces having been withdrawn from Korea, Headquarters USAFK was deactivated. Through an agreement between the United States and Republic of Korea Governments, an advisory function, which U.S. military personnel had performed from the beginnings of the ROK military establishment, was retained. A provisional Military Advisory Group was renamed, in mid-1949, the U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG); its authorized strength remained at about 470 from mid-1949 until the outbreak of the Korean War.³⁷

The influence of U.S. advisory personnel in Korea during this period was diluted by a number of factors. First, the number of advisory personnel was too few to implement the postulated goal of assigning an advisor to every ROK military unit down to battalion size. The number of Americans available to advise the ROK Navy, the ROK Air Force, and the National Police was even fewer, proportionately as well as absolutely, than those available to advise the ROK Army. During the year from the formal founding of KMAG to the outbreak of the Korean War, there were rarely more than a dozen U.S. advisors with the ROK Navy, nor more than half a dozen each with the ROK Air Force and National Police at any one time.

Second, as a member of the board that had sought officer volunteer assignment to KMAG noted, the assignment was generally considered a highly undesirable one. In order to make it somewhat more attractive, the U.S. Government authorized reduction of the tour of duty in Korea to 18 months, with dependents, as contrasted with a normal 30-month tour elsewhere in the Far East. The result of this decision was that advisory personnel in Korea, even if they had a positive outlook on their responsibilities, had a relatively short time to learn their jobs and to adjust to their environment.

Third, and related to the short duration of the assignment for advisory personnel, none of those assigned as advisors was able to speak Korean with any fluency. A school to teach the Korean language to Americans in Korea had been organized after World War II; but it was closed because of lack of sufficient interest. Consequently, Americans continued to be dependent, as they had been from the beginning of the occupation of Korea, upon interpreters.

Fourth, U.S. officers sometimes were junior both in rank and in age to their Korean counterparts. A number of advisors lacked the experience which would have been desirable in advising commanders of units of battalion size and above. However, even advisors with excellent qualifications often encountered a lack of receptivity to advice on the part of Korean officers senior to them in age or rank. The emphasis in Korean culture upon deference to persons senior in age or in position also was reflected in a reluctance on the part of ROK officers to admit mistakes when they acted contrary to the advice of advisors junior to them, or even to present information to the advisors which might conceivably reflect unfavorably upon their command.

Fifth, because of the rapid expansion of the armed forces after the founding of the Republic of Korea, merit frequently was secondary to personal "connections" as a criterion for appointment to command and staff positions. Lack of adequate professional experience and prior training on the part of some ROK officers, therefore, was a further barrier to effective utilization of the assistance available from U.S. advisors.

Finally, equipment available for training remained inadequate. The Republic of Korea received military aid under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949; but equipment needs were based on an estimated total strength of 65,000 at a time when the ROK Army had already grown to nearly 100,000. Probably because of the limitation on aid to Korea as well as of the U.S. military assessment of the feasibility of employing various types of weapons in the Korean terrain, no heavy equipment (such as tanks and 155-mm. howitzers) was included in the ROK military-aid program. Thus the ROK Army continued to operate with primary reliance upon a motley assortment of Japanese and U.S. small arms. The variety of weapons made maintenance and the supply of spare parts and ammunition particularly acute problems.³⁸

Diluted as the American influence was by the factors just described, nevertheless, during the year and a half from the founding of the Republic of Korea to the outbreak of the Korean War the direction and form of development in the organization and training of the ROK military were largely determined by American influence.

Within a year from the founding of the Republic of Korea, thirteen separate educational institutions had been established within the ROK Army. Those that were founded after KMAG began its operations were organized under the direction of KMAG personnel; those that were already in existence were reorganized under KMAG supervision. Lt. Col. Lewis D. Vieman, appointed as schools advisor with KMAG, played a key role in establishing Korean military institutions on the model of comparable institutions in the United States. Course outlines and lesson plans for the ROK Army schools were translated into Korean from those drawn up by KMAG personnel, and were generally based upon outlines and plans from U.S. service schools.

Particular effort was devoted by KMAG personnel to the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff College, both of which were founded in September 1949. Instruction at the Command and General Staff College (C&GS), which at the time was the highest level educational institution within the Korean military, at first was given entirely by U.S. advisory personnel.

Colonel Vieman's proposed program called for attendance by the end of 1951 of all company grade officers in the ROK Army at the basic course in the branch to which they were assigned, the attendance of 30 percent of officers at advanced branch courses, of 300 officers at C&GS, and of large numbers of enlisted men at schools to receive technical instruction. Furthermore, as many Korean officers were to be sent to U.S. armed service schools as the U.S. Government would permit. In fact, ten ROK field grade officers and two company grade officers received training in the United States in 1948 and 1949. Thirty-three ROK officers received training as observers with the U.S. Eighth Army in Japan; and on the eve of the Korean War, 9,126 officers and 11,112 enlisted men had graduated from schools within the ROK military educational system.³⁹

The ROK Military Academy

The institution from which the core leadership of the ROK Army of the future was to be drawn was the ROK Military Academy (known in abbreviated form as KMA). Prior to the Korean War, KMA provided training essentially like that of an officer candidate school, rather than like the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, with its combination of military training and four-year college education. Nevertheless, under urging from KMAG personnel and a number of ROK officers, plans were underway by the time of the outbreak of the war to move to a four-year program of instruction, modeled after that at West Point. These plans were implemented in 1952.⁴⁰

On the 8th of December 1948 most (but not all, as subsequent discussion will explain) of the "8th Graduating Class" entered the academy. Because expansion of the armed forces was underway in 1948, large numbers of officers were needed. Consequently, the largest class in the history of the academy was admitted that year. Actually, three different programs of instruction were given to various members of the 8th Graduating Class; the particular program which a cadet received depended upon his prior experience. First, those who had had no prior military experience entered the academy in December 1948; they were given a six-month program of instruction before receiving commissions as second lieutenants in the army. Second, three months later, those who had had prior military experience in the ROK army joined the class and were given a three-month program of instruction. Third, another group, known as the "special squad," was drawn from those who had served in either the Japanese or Chinese army. This group received only a couple of weeks of training at KMA prior to being commissioned; because of their short stay at the academy, they are sometimes excluded from descriptions of the composition of the 8th Graduating Class.⁴¹

The 8th Graduating Class subsequently became famous in Korea for the high degree of participation by its members in the military revolution of 1961; e.g., Kim Chang-p'il, a leading figure in the coup, graduated eighth in this class. The basis of the cohesion of the class from the time they were cadets in 1948, is difficult to pinpoint. The following common experiences of the class would seem particularly relevant. First, this was the initial class to enter the academy after its formal designation as the ROK Military Academy. Second, almost precisely one year from graduation, members of the class went into battle in positions of leadership at the company level. The chaotic state of affairs after the initial attack by North Korean forces, and later, after the entry of the Chinese into the war, made company-level leadership of enormous importance. Many members of the class were killed in battle; those who lived could share a feeling of pride at the contribution which they had made to the survival of the nation. Third, during and after the war, members of the class served in command and staff positions under the authority of officers who had had, in many cases, training inferior to that of the 8th Graduating Class and yet who blocked the aspirations of members of the class to rise to top

leadership positions. Perception of this situation almost certainly strengthened the sense of common identity and fate on the part of members of the 8th Graduating Class. As a final observation on the class, it is interesting to note that the superintendent of the academy at the time of the graduation of this class, Gen. Kim Hong-il, later served as an advisor to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNR), the key governing body of the military government from 1961 to 1963.⁴²

Air Force, Navy, Reserves, and Paramilitary Forces

One might say that a ROK Air Force was created in spite of, rather than because of, the advice of KMAG. The U.S. Government feared that the ROK economy could not sustain a separate air force; furthermore, KMAG was not equipped to provide professional assistance to a separate air arm. Nevertheless, after functioning for several months as a branch of the ROK Army, with fourteen liaison aircraft which had been provided by the U.S. Army on the assumption that they would be used for routine army liaison tasks only, a separate air force was established by presidential decree in October 1949. An Air Academy, forerunner of the ROK Air Force Academy, had been established at Kimpo airfield in January 1949.⁴³

The cadre of the new ROK Air Force was composed primarily of personnel who had had experience with the Japanese Air Force during World War II. For example, Col. Kim Chong-yŏl, who was appointed as the first Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force and later became Minister of Defense under Syngman Rhee and Ambassador to the United States under Park Chung Hee, was a graduate of the Japanese Military Academy and of the Japanese Army Air Force Flying School. He had served both as a squadron commander and as a group commander with the Japanese during World War II.⁴⁴

The ROK Coast Guard was redesignated the ROK Navy in August of 1948. In May 1949, the naval college which had been in existence since 1946 was named the ROK Naval Academy, and a four-year course of study was instituted. In addition, during 1948 and 1949 a number of training schools for warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and seamen were established. Simultaneous with the order instituting the ROK Naval Academy, a presidential decree was issued creating a ROK Marine Corps under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff of the Navy.⁴⁵

In the case of the navy, its leading figure had received his early training under the Chinese. Rear Adm. Son Wŏn-il, first Chief of Staff of the ROK Navy and the man usually credited with having organized the Korean Coast Guard during the U.S. occupation, and later Minister of Defense under Syngman Rhee, had served for a number of years with the Chinese Coast Guard.⁴⁶

The law of November 1948, which set forth the basic organization of the armed services of the Republic of Korea, provided for a reserve force for the army and the navy in the form of a National Protectors Corps. In August 1949, the conscription law stipulated that the reserves should be placed under direct control of the army and navy headquarters.⁴⁷

In November of that year, a nationwide paramilitary organization known as the Youth Protector Corps (Ch'ongnyŏn Pangwidae) received official status as an organization that would provide youth with military training prior to their induction into formal military service.

Advisors from the ROK Army were provided to local units of the corps; and within army headquarters a Bureau of Youth Defense was established. The Youth Protector Corps, with an estimated one and a quarter million members, was an offshoot of some of over 40 youth groups ("youth" being defined broadly, somewhat in the manner of "Young Democrats" and "Young Republicans" in the United States) which had been organized, usually with political ambitions, after 1945. The political potential of the Youth Protector Corps is suggested by the fact that its leader, Yi Pöm-sök, who had been an officer in the Chinese Nationalist Army, served concurrently as the first Premier of the Republic of Korea and as the first Minister of Defense. Initially, the power of the Youth Protector Corps worked to enhance the political strength of Syngman Rhee; but within a few years Rhee worked systematically to undermine the political strength of Yi and the Youth Protector Corps, which had become threatening to Rhee's own position.⁴⁸ The Youth Protector Corps was abolished as an official organization in April 1950; but it continued to function informally for some time thereafter.

WAR AND THE GROWTH OF THE MILITARY: 1950-53

The history of the Korean War need not be recounted here, but brief attention will be focused on those effects of the war which are relevant to our study of the role of the ROK military in politics. Ultimately, such effects included a considerable increase in the political capability of the ROK military and some increase in inclinations among the military toward political activism. But the initial impact of the first several weeks of war upon the ROK military was that of nearly total disaster.

Within a week from the time North Korean troops moved south of the 38th parallel, ROK Army Headquarters could account for approximately 20,000 troops, or roughly one-fifth of the estimated strength of the ROK Army a week earlier. The rest were dead, wounded, prisoners of the North Koreans, or deserters who, in some cases, abandoned their units to flee southward as civilians. ROK equipment at first was no match for the Soviet armor and weapons employed by the North Koreans. Morale was low, and some ROK military leaders seemed to be acting impulsively to the detriment of whatever effectiveness ROK units might have had at the time. For example, during the second day of the war, ROK Army Headquarters moved south from Seoul (without notifying the American KMAG representative), thereby severing communications with their own front-line units which were defending the city. The effectiveness of the ROK military at this point, coupled with situations such as one in which elements of ROK forces set off demolitions destroying the major bridge across the Han River, killing or injuring hundreds of their own people, and leaving major ROK units stranded north of the river, was also severely damaging to the prestige of the ROK military.⁴⁹

To compensate for their loss of manpower, the ROK Army combed the streets and countryside conscripting young men into the ranks. A ten-day training program was instituted, during which, according to a U.S. advisor on the scene, the trainees were expected to learn how to dig foxholes and how to care for their weapons; but the real training ground was the battlefield.⁵⁰ A ten-day training program could not produce officers and noncommissioned officers, however; consequently, thousands of Korean conscripts who could not be absorbed into the ROK Army, which lacked the officer and N.C.O. strength to supervise them, were assigned to the U.S. 8th Army to be integrated into American units at the squad level. American commissioned and noncommissioned officers often proved reluctant to depend upon Korean soldiers, with most of whom they could not communicate effectively; by and large, therefore, Koreans in the KATUSA program (Korean Augmentation U.S. Army) were employed by U.S. commanders as laborers rather than as soldiers.⁵¹

Rebuilding and Expanding the Military

The strength of the ROK Army had been built back up to 82,000 by August of 1950. Then, after another setback when the Chinese entered the war massively in November, the ROK Army rose by February of 1951 to its initial strength as of the outbreak of the war of 100,000. Washington had given General MacArthur authority to arm and train an additional 200,000-300,000 Koreans.⁵²

When Gen. Mark Clark replaced Gen. Matthew Ridgway as Commander of UN Forces in Korea in May of 1952 (Gen. Ridgway had replaced Gen. MacArthur in April 1951), he indicated a desire to have the ROK Army expanded "to its maximum capability," and to have the ROK Navy and Air Force expanded as much "as technical skills of the Koreans permitted and as equipment became available."⁵³ Earlier, as Chief of U.S. Army Field Forces, General Clark had arranged to permit Korean officers to attend the U.S. Army Infantry School, Artillery School, and Command and General Staff College. This program was continued, and indigenous training programs were enlarged under the guidance of KMAC during General Clark's tour in Korea, which lasted through the armistice of 1953. Two hundred and fifty ROK officers went to the United States as the first contingent under this program. Upon their graduation in March 1952, a second contingent of equal size was sent. By the middle of 1952, most of the indigenous training facilities which had been in existence prior to the war had also been reopened. Thus, with the assistance of KMAC, a full-scale training operation in the ROK military had been resumed in the last year of the war.⁵⁵

The ROK Air Force also had expanded its training facilities. By the final year of the war primary, basic, and advanced flight schools, staffed by American instructors, and utilizing American planes and equipment, had been initiated.⁵⁶

By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States in November 1952 on a platform that included the famous pledge to go to Korea to see for himself what could be done to bring the now unpopular war to a conclusion, the size of the ROK Army had risen to over 400,000. One of Eisenhower's early acts as president was to authorize the organization of two new divisions, bringing the ROK Army to a size of 14 divisions and some 525,000 troops.⁵⁷ By the end of the Korean War, the ROK Army was one of the largest in the world in absolute numbers. Its officers had acquired combat and noncombat (i.e., managerial and governmental) experience which was of political relevance; military personnel at all levels had been exposed to modern equipment and techniques; military organizations had developed increased effectiveness and cohesion from the war. The military were more important to the society than they had ever been before; as shown not only by the increased prestige which military men were accorded, but by the percent of the budget committed to military purposes—nearly 80 percent for fiscal year 1953-54.⁵⁸

Grievances and Changing Perspectives of the Military

Within the military establishment, however, there were numerous sources of discontent, including poor food, inadequate clothing and equipment, and low pay. During the Korean War, the pay scale in the ROK military ranged from about 3,000 won per month for a private to about 60,000 won per month for a general, at a rate of exchange of 4,000-6,000 won to the U.S. dollar.⁵⁹ As General Clark observed:

Pay was so low in the ROK Army that it was not only a morale factor but forced whole ROK units to take time for extracurricular activities

to make a living for families of their troops. Two divisions stationed on the fairly active east coast, for instance, operated their own fishing fleets. These divisions were renowned in the ROK Army as wealthy divisions. They sold their fish to their own division mess halls and also to the civilian population. The divisions had an edge over their civilian competitors in the fishing business, of course, for the ROK troops had American Army trucks and gasoline to help them transport their catch.⁶⁰

The low pay of the ROK soldier was striking in contrast to the relatively high pay which the American soldier enjoyed, especially for KATUSA's who were integrated directly into American units. "They learned how much our soldiers were paid, how much they were saving or sending home. They saw how many packages of cigarettes the American soldier could buy a week, saw how much money he spent in post exchanges for luxury foods, cameras, souvenirs for the home folks."⁶¹

Furthermore, the contact with the American military—its men, its organization, and its equipment and supplies—a contact greater in intensity and scope during the war than before, was important in terms of its impact on traditional attitudes of Koreans. As General Clark noted:

The ROK saw the wonderful equipment our industry produces for our American Army. He saw mechanical hole diggers for telephone poles. He saw bulldozers. He saw helicopters carry supplies to men atop mountains that ROK bearers would take many hours to climb. He saw hot food and ice cream delivered in giant tins to Americans in the frontline bunkers. He soon wanted all these things.⁶²

Authoritarian Political Rule

During the wartime period Syngman Rhee was confronted with a severe challenge to his leadership, which he met successfully, in that he was able to remain in power; but the price of success was that of increased regimentation and suppression of opposition. Probably few observers would explain Rhee's actions at this time as sympathetically as Marguerite Higgins, who saw Syngman Rhee as a man of "sincere democratic convictions," who was simply yielding to an "autocratic temperament."⁶³ But whatever Rhee's motives, the effect of his actions was to generate increasing disenchantment, both at home and abroad, among those who had hoped that Rhee would lead Korea along the path of democratic political practices.

In 1951, Rhee had been instrumental in organizing a new political party, the Liberal Party, as a means of consolidating his power. However, the National Assembly had proven itself to be far from dominated by Rhee; in fact, Rhee had run into persistent opposition within the National Assembly. This opposition was a severe potential threat to Rhee's re-election, since the Constitution of 1948 provided for election of the president by a two-thirds vote of members of the National Assembly. In January 1952, a proposal by Rhee to amend the constitution to provide for the election of the president by popular vote was defeated in the National Assembly, 143-19. When members of the Taehan Youth Corps (not the same as the Youth Protector Corps) demonstrated in front of the assembly hall in protest of the vote, the National Assembly resolved, 100-0, to demand that President Rhee submit an explanation of the demonstration in person; but he refused to appear. Early in March, Rhee stated that he was not a candidate for re-election. However, he implied that it might be necessary for him to tour the country

rallying popular support—not for his re-election, but rather to gain acceptance of his retirement—because, he complained, "what bothers me is that the people do not want me to retire."⁶⁴ Later in March, the Liberal Party nominated Rhee as their candidate for president. In April, a constitutional amendment was introduced in the National Assembly by 127 assemblymen, the effect of which would have been to reduce the president to a figurehead, transferring real power to the premier.⁶⁵ The tension between Rhee and the National Assembly came to a head in May, when martial law was declared and a number of assemblymen were arrested on charges of Communist affiliation in spite of protests from General Clark and the UN Command.⁶⁶ President Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie. The ROK National Assembly voted, 73-0, not to adjourn until the arrest of its members had been satisfactorily explained by the Rhee government; and by a 96-3 vote, the assembly demanded that martial law be lifted. Rhee replied with further arrests and a threat to dissolve the assembly. Rhee's threats, backed by police and military support, culminated in the capitulation of the assembly in July when, by a 163-0 vote, the assembly agreed to the constitutional amendment providing for popular election of the president. Over 100 assemblymen were brought out of hiding by police to the assembly hall to cast their votes, and for a 48-hour period during which the voting took place, no one was permitted to leave the assembly building.⁶⁷ The re-election of Rhee as president in August 1952 by an overwhelming margin in the country at large came as something of an anticlimax to the drama.

To summarize, the chief effects of the Korean War years insofar as the ROK military were concerned were these: after nearly disastrous initial setbacks, the military increased their political capabilities during the war in several respects—size, organizational cohesion, skills, and prestige. Contact with the relatively affluent and better paid U.S. Army raised the threshold of expectations of the ROK military—individually, and collectively on behalf of Korean society—and thus aggravated their grievances. Although the evidence suggests no large, organized efforts among the military at this time for direct political action, it is not surprising that some signs of political activism among the military were detected. The authoritarian tactics of Syngman Rhee, in particular, aroused discontent among many Korean military men. A retired ROK Army general reports that during the war several young officers came to him and asked, "Is this democracy?" He successfully dissuaded them, however, from the view that the military should "do something about it."⁶⁸ Following Rhee's battle with the National Assembly in the summer of 1952, the Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Yi Chōng-chōn was replaced because, according to a report of The New York Times, he had refused to be a party to the arrest of assemblymen.⁶⁹ Further evidence of increased political activism among the military was provided by the request of 41 officers for discharge at the end of the war in order to enter politics to compete in forthcoming National Assembly elections. Of equal interest, however, was Syngman Rhee's response to the request: a decree was issued ruling that all officers in the ROK Army must remain in service for a minimum of five years.⁷⁰

GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH SYNGMAN RHEE: 1953-60

President Syngman Rhee was in his late seventies when the Korean War ended. His many opponents, unsuccessful in their efforts to defeat him in the political arena, looked to the day when his advanced age might turn political fortunes in their favor. Yet years went by and, as one observer of the scene put it, "not Rhee but their hopes [i.e., those of his opponents] had died."⁷¹ Twice more after the Korean War he was re-elected to the presidency: in 1956, following a stormy and controversial session of the National Assembly in which the constitution was amended to make a third term for the president legal; then again in 1960. But opposition to Rhee did not vanish in the face of these successes. In 1956 Chang Myōn, a member of the newly formed Democratic Party, the leading opposition party, was elected vice president.

defeating Rhee's hand-picked running mate. In late 1958, in an effort to prevent the enactment of amendments to the National Security Law which would seriously curb civil liberties and potentially hamper political opposition to the Rhee regime, 85 members of the National Assembly staged a sit-down strike in the assembly hall. The strikers were bodily evicted from the hall, the amendments passed by Liberal Party legislators, and the law used to justify the arrest, and later the execution, of Cho Pong-am, leader of the Progressive Party, who had received nearly 25 percent of the popular vote for president in 1956. But growing disillusionment with the Rhee regime crystallized in response to blatant manipulation by the Liberal Party of the 1960 presidential election returns, and culminated in a series of popular demonstrations which led Rhee to step down in favor of an interim regime which would prepare the way for new elections.⁷²

In retrospect the political demise of Syngman Rhee seems to have been foreshadowed by events in the years before 1960, yet the political staying power of the aged Rhee appears impressive. As David Earl, writing a few months after the so-called "student revolution" of April 1960, which brought about Rhee's downfall, put it, "Twelve years of this type of experience [i.e., economic distress, official corruption, and political suppression of liberties] had created a deep-rooted discontent which was partly economic and partly political. However, discontent is not revolution." (Emphasis added.) Earl notes that life under Rhee, in spite of many hardships and annoyances, was to most people an improvement over life under the Japanese. He argues convincingly that in spite of the accumulation of grievances which Koreans had experienced by 1960 under Rhee, that his final downfall was brought about simply by "incredible bungling" during the early months of 1960.⁷³ An analysis which supports this assessment of Rhee's resilience is provided by Eugene Kim and Kim Ke-soo, who make the following observations regarding popular sentiment in Korea in 1960:

For the Korean populace, it was not Syngman Rhee himself who was wrong in the election riggings, but his underlings. The worst charges against him were: "He was too old"; "He did not know what went on below him." The demand for Rhee's resignation was thrown into all the unsorted slogans very late during the movement; and it first appeared among the demands made of the government by the college and university professors who waged a demonstration of their own in sympathy with the students' cause.⁷⁴

No doubt the continued dependence of Korea upon U.S. financial, technical, and military aid during this period strengthened the hand of Rhee in domestic politics; for although frictions between Rhee and members of the U.S. Government frequently reached heated proportions, he nevertheless had many supporters in America. Indeed, at times Rhee's defiance of the U.S. Government seemed to enhance his bargaining power with the United States and his prestige. For example, during the final weeks before the armistice in Korea, when the Eisenhower administration was most anxious to reach an agreeable settlement with the Communists, Rhee arranged for demonstrations against the armistice talks and for the release of 27,000 prisoners, greatly embarrassing the U.S. position in negotiations. Yet as the Commander of UN Forces, General Clark, observed of Rhee's obstinacy, "his stature in Asia increased a great deal through the mere fact that the envoy of the President of the United States came to him day after day from June 26 to July 12 to ask for co-operation."⁷⁵ Furthermore, the United States made a number of promises to Rhee in return for his eventual agreement to abide by the armistice. These included the promise of a United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Security Pact, long-term economic aid with a first installment of 100 million dollars, emergency relief, and support for the increase of the ROK Army to twenty divisions, with appropriate increases in the size of the navy and air force.⁷⁶ The mutual Defense Treaty between the United

States and the Republic of Korea went into effect late in 1954. It included a proviso which guarded against the commitment of the United States to an effort instigated by South Korea to reunify Korea by force, frequently threatened by Rhee.⁷⁸

Continued Organizational Development of the Military

In 1954, following a series of high-level conferences between civil and military officials of the United States and the Republic of Korea, increases in ROK military strength were implemented. The strength of the ROK Army was increased to twenty divisions, plus an additional ten reserve divisions. A special ten-weeks military training program for all male college students was put into effect. In 1955, a Command and Staff College for senior naval officers was opened, and provision was made to send a small group of officers annually to attend the U.S. Naval War College. An arsenal was established for the army; and construction of a drydock for naval vessels, begun during the Korean War, was completed. Two sea-planes were provided for the navy; jet planes were provided for the air force.⁷⁹

In 1956, an Office of Psychological Warfare, an Office of Public Information, and a National Defense College were established within the ROK Army.⁸⁰ The same year, the Naval Recruit Training Center and Service School Command were integrated into a Naval Training Center for recruits and for petty officers. At the Army Replacement Training Center near Nonsan, by 1956 some 600 men per day were being admitted for training.⁸¹ By the end of that year, more than 600,000 men were on active duty with the ROK Army, making it the fourth largest army in the world.⁸²

The organizational model for the ROK armed forces continued to be that of the U.S. Armed Forces. The extent to which American forms and practices were emulated in the Korean setting is fascinating. For example, in 1954 the ROK Army instituted a Chaplains' Corps, with the mission of providing for "the guidance and development of Christian soldiers in the ROK Army."⁸³ A chaplain was assigned to each army division, chapels were constructed, and Sunday services provided. The result, according to ROK Army figures, was a marked rise in the education of ROK soldiers in the Christian faith, from less than 10,000 in 1953 to over 150,000 by the end of 1956. By the end of 1956, nearly 15 percent of ROK soldiers were classified as Protestant, 2 percent as Roman Catholic. Less than 1 percent each were classified as Confucian, Buddhist, and Chundokyo, and the remainder, presumably, subscribed to no religion.⁸⁴

Undeveloped Military Professionalism

Although the period 1953-60 was one of growing strength in personnel, organization, and equipment for the ROK Armed Forces, it would be erroneous to conclude that a high degree of professionalism (defining "professionalism" as Huntington does, to include corporateness, responsibility, and expertise)⁸⁵ had been developed. Rather, the norms of professional conduct and ethics to which ROK officers and men paid nominal allegiance were violated in practice. The pervasiveness of disregard for formal rules of professional conduct overwhelmed the efforts of most of those who desired to reform the system.

A number of factors conspired against the development of professionalism in the ROK military. First, the pay of ROK military men was virtually at subsistence level (or below, in some cases). At an exchange rate of roughly 1,000 hwan to US \$1 monthly salary scales in hwan for various selected ranks in the ROK Army in 1959 were as follows:

General: 87,300 (after deductions; 73,252)
Colonel: 63,122 (after deductions; 54,352)
Captain: 45,762 (after deductions; 40,156)
Second lieutenant: 40,066 (after deductions; 35,456)
Master sergeant: 36,082 (after deductions; 32,170)
Corporal: 4,000 (no deductions).⁸⁷

The Bank of Korea estimated that it required 36,000 hwan per month, in Pusan, to feed the average family at the time.⁸⁸ Thus, the temptation for military men to supplement their salaries through illegal means was considerable; it is not surprising that substantial quantities of military equipment and supplies found their way into black market channels.

A second factor hindering the development of professionalism in the ROK military was the continued strength of Confucian thought and norms of behavior in Korean society. Instead of impersonal, contractual relationships in the authority structure of Korean bureaucracy (including the military), relationships tended to be highly personal, with those in positions of authority demanding personal loyalty and service from their subordinates, and subordinates tolerating a system of rewards and punishment which corresponded not to a set of bureaucratic rules common to all but rather to those imposed by the individual caprice of those in authority. Confucian emphasis on family loyalties tended to make family allegiance paramount to organizational allegiance or allegiance to rules of the impersonal "system"; and made the attraction to nepotism great. Furthermore, the traditional notion that persons in positions of status (e.g., the upper class) should not indulge in menial labor conflicted with the Western professional ideal (found especially in the military) that one responsibility of the leader is to set the example for his men, which means that he must physically take part in many of the same activities in which his men participate.

Political Pressures on the Military

During the early years after the Korean War, according to an historical account written by members of the military government which came to power in 1961, political pressures on the ROK Armed Forces began increasing. Appointments and promotions to command positions were manipulated by the ruling Liberal Party. One of the consequences was that officers at the middle level (field grade especially) now found themselves in a situation in which future promotion appeared thwarted. Top positions in the military were occupied mostly by men in their middle or later thirties, young enough, in most cases, to be many years from retirement. Since in a number of instances the top officers' general education and military training were inferior to that of the middle level officers, political loyalty rather than competence seemed to be the criterion for the top officers' continuation in positions of authority.

Funds for anti-Communist intelligence activities allegedly were diverted into personal fortunes of key party members. Further corruption among high ranking military officers was noted. In response to this situation, a group of young officers, including Park Chung Hee, Kim Chong-p'il, and certain other members of the so-called 8th Graduating Class of the Korean Military Academy are said to have begun meeting on a regular basis "to search for a way to clean up corruption in the military and to insure the independence of the military from political influence."⁹⁰

Thus, important sources of discontent existed within the Korean military establishment. Signs of political activism were becoming more apparent as the tendency for the Liberal Party to manipulate the military for political purposes increased. Furthermore, elsewhere in the world military men had taken action against the sources of their discontent by seizing control of the government. Members of the military government which was formed in South Korea in 1961 remember coups in Egypt, Argentina, Burma, and Pakistan as having had an important influence on their own thinking, as examples of action by military men "aimed at recovering national integrity by eliminating political corruption."⁹¹

Yet it is interesting that in spite of growing discontent, and in spite of significant political resources potentially at their disposal, the South Korean military did not follow the Egyptian, Burmese, or Pakistani examples during these years. It would appear that the observations made above (p. 161) about the Korean people, who continued to respect the authority of Syngman Rhee until he stepped down from power (or at least until the revelation of corruption in the 1960 elections) in spite of their accumulated grievances, apply with even more significance to the attitudes of the ROK military. Robert Scalapino, in a report submitted by Conlon Associates to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was accurate when he observed in 1959 that a military takeover of the South Korean government was a possibility, but not a likelihood in the immediate future. The continued subordination of the military to the authority of the Rhee government was attributable particularly to:

... the skill with which the Liberal administration, and particularly President Rhee, has [sic] handled the army. Potential rivals have been sidetracked; strong, independent-minded leadership has been discouraged. Under the circumstances, factional disputes and attempts to gain the President's favor have flourished.⁹²

RESIGNATION OF RHEE AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: 1960-61

When Cho Pyong-ok, rival candidate to the aged Syngman Rhee for president in 1960, died on the eve of the election, the event was enough to convince some Koreans that "Syngman Rhee's ancestors will not let him be defeated."⁹³ Surely the fate of Rhee's key opponents for the presidency over the years had been an unhappy one. Kim Ku, the rival in 1948, had been assassinated in 1949. Cho Pong-am, leading opposition candidate in 1952, was subsequently convicted of treason and hanged. P. H. Shinicky, the contender in 1956, had died of a heart attack less than two weeks prior to the balloting that year.

Yet in 1960, it was obvious to most observers that more than the spirits of his ancestors had intervened on Rhee's behalf. Both Syngman Rhee and Yi Ki-pong, his running mate, were elected by overwhelming margins. Not only Rhee's re-election, but the election of his running mate were important to the Liberal Party both because of Rhee's advanced age and because Chang Myon, Democratic vice-presidential candidate who had defeated Rhee's running mate in 1956, was running again against a nominee of Rhee's. Evidence became widespread that the

Liberal Party resorted to fraud, intimidation of prospective voters, suppression of the opposition, and other means of manipulating the election returns in order to secure victory. Among the techniques of election rigging employed, a special correspondent for The Economist on the scene at the time noted the use of coercion and bribery at voting places, invalidation of the votes or registration of Democratic Party voters, the use of pre-marked ballots, and "assistance" to voters in the marking of ballots.⁹⁴ Investigations following the resignation of Rhee disclosed the extent to which the police, especially, had intervened on behalf of a Liberal Party victory, and the extent to which leading businessmen and industrialists had contributed funds, voluntarily or involuntarily, to be used for irregular election purposes, such as the bribery of voters.⁹⁵

Immediately following the election, the Democratic Party protested that the results were invalid; its members in the National Assembly withdrew from the chamber, denouncing the illegality of the returns.⁹⁶ Popular protests of election rigging took place in cities and towns throughout South Korea; the most significant was in the southern port town of Masan where, on March 15 (the evening of election day), 7 persons were killed and over 70 wounded following a clash of hundreds of demonstrators with police.⁹⁷ When fishermen recovered the body of a boy, the victim of a police tear gas shell, in Masan harbor three weeks later, new protests began, spreading from Masan to Seoul and to other parts of Korea. In a major demonstration in Seoul on April 19, some 100 citizens in the crowd were killed by police gunfire. It was these demonstrations, especially the dramatic protest demonstrations of students through the streets of Seoul, that convinced Syngman Rhee that the time had come to resign his office, a decision followed by the suicide of his running mate, Yi Ki-pong, and the entire Yi family.⁹⁸

The success of the so-called "student revolution" of April 1960, was made possible in large part because of the sympathetic attitude which the ROK military displayed toward the demonstrations. Although martial law had been declared and the ROK Army was charged with the responsibility of suppressing the demonstrations and restoring order, ROK soldiers took little action against the students. Indeed, there is evidence that the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Song Yo-ch'an, and the Defense Minister, Kim Chong-yŏl, personally exerted pressure upon Rhee to resign, and permitted a student delegation to visit Rhee to present a similar request.⁹⁹

Furthermore, by this time, a number of military officers had formulated plans of their own for a coup d'état. As Gen. Park Chung Hee emphasized a few months after the military coup of May 1961:

...this military revolution did not take place on May 16 all of a sudden and by chance, but had been already in the making since the notorious rigged mid-March elections a year ago when youthful officers of the Korean armed forces were resolved to take the initiative to chastise the Liberal Party for its rotten practices and irregularities. . . . When they were just about to touch off the coup, the April revolution took place and the Liberal Party regime was overthrown. Accordingly, they suspended the coup and engrossed themselves in their assigned military duties, eagerly looking forward to a better future for this country.¹⁰⁰

When Syngman Rhee resigned, former premier and former mayor of Seoul, Hŏ Chŏng, accepted Rhee's request to head an interim government that would prepare the way for new elections. Following the passage of constitutional amendments that changed the ROK Government from a presidential to a parliamentary system, and changed the National Assembly from a unicameral to a bicameral body, elections were held late in July. In August, Chang Myŏn was asked to accept the role of premier and to form a government.

Problems of the Chang Myŏn Government

From the beginning, the Chang government was enfeebled by a severe split within the ranks of the Democratic Party between the so-called "old faction," which had been led by the late Cho Pyŏng-ok and the so-called "new faction," led by Chang Myŏn. A breakdown of seats in the new lower house of the National Assembly as reported by a leading Seoul daily newspaper listed 84 Democratic Party members affiliated with the "old faction," as compared with 83 "new faction" affiliates.¹⁰¹ Chang Myŏn also apparently felt constrained to appease representatives of the various key regions and provinces in his selection of a cabinet. "The final decision," according to a report at the time, "was hastily made after last-minute-swapping of several ministries. Such an internal problem, together with the failure in the negotiations with the Old Faction, inevitably resulted in a 'weak cabinet.'"¹⁰²

The Chang government was plagued also by severe economic problems inherited from the Rhee regime and the turbulent interim period, aggravated by disorder stemming largely from the disaffection of the bulk of the intellectual community from the new regime. Leadership of the April revolution was heady wine for Korean students, who continued to exert their influence on the political process through almost continuous public demonstrations. According to an official ROK Government report issued shortly after the Chang government had taken office, over 1,500 demonstrations had been staged since the end of the April revolution, participated in by over three-quarters of a million persons, of whom the largest number were students and teachers.¹⁰³ The most dramatic demonstration during the Chang period was one in October 1960, when thousands of demonstrators, led by students wounded in the April protest that brought about the downfall of Rhee, crowded in front of the National Assembly Building demanding that the Chang cabinet resign and that the assembly dissolve itself. Fifty of the wounded revolutionaries, in an action unprecedented in the twelve-year history of the Korean Republic, stormed into the assembly building to make their protests.¹⁰⁴ In early 1961, noting that "student excesses quite naturally have tended to overshadow a number of areas in which the Chang government has made progress in picking up after the aged Rhee..." Richard C. Allen observed that the "prevailing concern is no longer that of police suppression, but one of freely-voiced fears as to whether popular forces unleashed by the revolution can successfully be kept in check."¹⁰⁵

The Chang regime, generally permissive in its attitude toward demonstrations, was further hindered in its efforts to maintain order by the weakness of the police. Efforts by the Chang government to purge the police of corrupt or otherwise undesirable elements, coupled with post-Rhee antipathy to the police throughout Korean society, rendered the police virtually impotent for several months. Although college graduates were hired for the first time to fill police posts in an effort to improve the quality and image of police work, demoralization of the police force was so thorough, and persistent demonstrations such a trial, that many of the college graduates resigned from the force along with hundreds of other policemen who resigned voluntarily.¹⁰⁶ In addition, over 2,000 other policemen, including 81 police chiefs, had been relieved from duty by the Chang government by early December 1960.¹⁰⁷

Accumulation of Political Resources and Cross Pressures Within the Military

Almost by default the military emerged during this period as the most important group in South Korean politics. The purging and discrediting of the police had eliminated from competition the only other major group with substantial means for organized violence at its disposal. Of the two major political parties, the Liberal Party had been discredited and the Democratic Party was faction ridden and suffered in the minds of many Koreans from being

virtually indistinguishable ideologically and in terms of upper class base from the Liberal Party. The students, like the military, represented an important modernizing force in Korean society; and they had gained political stature in the April revolution. However, all efforts to develop an effective national student organization failed. Consequently, student activity continued to be organized around relatively small, highly personalized cliques, devoted primarily, it would seem, to the advancement of the personal careers of the group leaders.¹⁰⁸

The military, on the other hand, had acquired increased stature through their refusal to employ violence against the students in the April revolution. They were numerous, disciplined, hierarchically organized, with modern communications and weapons at their disposal. Shortly after Rhee's replacement by Hŏ Chŏng's interim government, an observer in Seoul noted not only the strong possibility of a military coup, but that the interim government would certainly "ask the army to take over should a new crisis develop."¹⁰⁹ (Emphasis added.)

The resignation of Syngman Rhee meant the departure from the scene of a man who had demonstrated great skill at retaining control of the military. Chang Myŏn not only showed little capacity for enlisting the positive allegiance of the military, but his government took a number of actions which severely threatened important elements of the military. During his election campaign, Chang Myŏn had urged the reduction of the ROK Armed Forces from nearly 700,000 men to a force of 400,000.¹¹⁰ In the final stages of the campaign, Chang's party, the Democrats, issued a statement pledging a reduction of 100,000 in the armed forces if the Democrats were made the ruling party. This pledge was reiterated by the new minister of defense shortly after the Chang Myŏn government came to power.¹¹¹

Almost immediately, however, the new government found itself caught in cross pressures. On the one hand, elements within the ROK military complained that a thorough and rapid purge of corrupt elements in the officer corps, especially at the highest levels, must be carried out. On the other hand, others within the military exerted pressures to retain their jobs. Furthermore, representatives of the U.S. Government expressed fear that a reduction of 100,000 in the ROK Armed Forces was excessive, and warned that toleration of the efforts by junior officers to have their seniors removed was the kind of insubordination which would undermine the discipline of the entire ROK military structure. As early as May 1960, UN Commander Gen. Carter B. Magruder had expressed criticism of those who favored an extensive purge of top ROK military officers. "Now is no time for junior officers to accuse seniors of irregularities committed in the past when those same junior officers maintained silence or even participated at the time when the irregularities are supposed to have taken place," he said.¹¹² In September, U.S. Military Assistance Director, Gen. Williston B. Palmer, accompanied by General Magruder, warned that the plan to remove high ranking officers from active duty would "eventually destroy the defense power and greatly harm the Republic of Korea as well as the entire free world."¹¹³ The same week, Gen. I. D. White, Commander of U.S. Ground Forces in the Pacific Area, urged the ROK Minister of Defense to guard against endangering the command structure of the ROK Armed Forces through unwarranted elimination of key officers.¹¹⁴

The reaction of the Chang government to these cross pressures was to express resentment of U.S. interference in Korean affairs and to claim a determination to continue with plans to "purify" the armed forces,¹¹⁵ while modifying the plan for reduction of the armed forces to bring it into line with U.S. proposals. The figure for reduction of forces was reduced from 100,000 to 50,000, then to 30,000 men, limited to army units in rear areas.¹¹⁶

In November 1960, at a meeting with ROK service chiefs and top-ranking officers, Premier Chang announced that the purge of high-ranking military officers had been completed; he emphasized that henceforth criticism of superior officers by subordinates should not be tolerated.¹¹⁷

Talk of a purge of high-ranking officers had stimulated a number of widely publicized incidents in which subordinates defied or openly repudiated the authority of their superiors. For example, in the navy, the fleet commander made public allegations of malfeasance on the part of his superior, the chief of naval operations.¹¹⁸ In the army, the best known incident was one in which five colonels and eleven lieutenant colonels, purporting to represent the 8th Graduating Class of KMA and two other classes, called upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Ch'oe Yŏng-hui, and recommended, among other things, that he retire "for the sake of purification of the army."¹¹⁹ No doubt an unduly permissive attitude on the part of the Chang government toward actions of subordinate officers toward their superiors would have been seriously detrimental to the maintenance of discipline and order within the armed services. Furthermore, U.S. officials made it clear that aid in the modernization of the ROK Armed Forces was dependent upon demonstration that the ROK Government was determined to maintain discipline within its military establishment.¹²⁰ Thus pressures on the Chang government to minimize the extent of a purge of top military leadership, and to take action to suppress criticism of senior officers by subordinates were great.

Nevertheless, the fact that original plans for a sweeping purge of top military leadership were aborted created considerable strife within the military establishment and was an additional precipitant to the decision of military coup planners to implement their designs.

One reason that the checking of the purge caused discontent among field grade and company grade officers, for example, was that it left in power general officers who not only served physically by their continuance in position to block the promotion of their subordinates, but by serving as the members of promotion screening committees, held a power over the careers of their subordinates which the latter distrusted and resented.¹²¹

Numerous signs of friction within the armed services were visible on the surface, including a reshuffling of key staff and command assignments to place dissident officers in less critical positions,¹²² the court martial of the sixteen officers who had requested that the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff resign,¹²³ and the retirement to reserve status of officers (Lt.-Cols. Kim Chong-p'il and Sŏk Chong-son), believed to have been influential in instigating the visit to the chairman.¹²⁴

MILITARY GOVERNMENT: 1961-63

Beneath the surface of visibility, designs for execution of a military coup d'état moved from the level of abstract speculation to detailed planning. Among the leading figures in planning the coup were the following: Army Maj. Gen. Park Chung Hee, who commanded the Army Logistical Command at Pusan until a few months before the coup, when he was transferred to Second Army Headquarters; Lt. Col. Kim Chong-p'il, nephew by marriage of General Park; Marine Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-ha, commander of the marine division at Pohang; and certain classmates of Lt. Col. Kim Chong-p'il of the eighth graduating class of KMA. Since the Chang government had instituted riot control training in the ROK Armed Forces, including plans for troop mobilization, in anticipation of a possible crisis on April 19, 1961, the first anniversary of the student revolution, planners of the military coup decided to use antiriot measures on that date as the cover for execution of a coup d'état. However, when the crisis did not materialize and troops were therefore not mobilized, a new date, May 12, was selected. Again, plans miscarried, this time because an informant leaked plans of the coup. Finally, in the early hours of May 16, with the employment of some 5,000 soldiers and marines, the virtually bloodless coup was executed. At 5 a.m. (Seoul time) the nation was told by radio that the government had changed hands.¹²⁵

Ideology of the Military Revolution

The analyst of a revolutionary movement invariably must confront the all but impossible task of disentangling the private motives of those who lead a revolution from their public efforts to justify it. Frequently, critics of a particular revolutionary movement take the position that publicly espoused ideals of the movement are nothing more than ideological whitewash, functioning solely to conceal underlying opportunistic motives of the revolutionary leaders. Admirers of a particular revolutionary movement, on the other hand, often are inclined to accept public revolutionary pronouncements, manifestoes, and "white papers" at face value, as sufficient explanation of the behavior and motives of the revolutionaries. The truth—in the case of most revolutionary movements, and specifically in the case of the one which led to the military revolution of May 1961 in South Korea—would seem to lie somewhere between the cynical verdict of critics and the idealistic conclusions of admirers. For reasons described in a previous section of this essay, those who led the overthrow of the Chang government had personal grievances against that regime, e.g., relief from active duty in the case of Kim Chong-p'il; continued retention by the regime of senior officers who blocked career advancement, in the case of others. Yet, as also indicated above, the ills which beset the Chang regime were many; thus the ideological justification of the military revolution, which pointed to economic distress, public disorder and turmoil, continued corruption, and lack of vigorous leadership, was not fabricated out of whole cloth but represented grievances widely voiced throughout Korean society. There is little reason to doubt that the military revolutionaries were sincere when they, too, voiced these popular sentiments as part of their justification of the revolution.

Keeping in mind the admixture of underlying private motives with those visible in public declarations and speeches, the formal ideology of a revolution is nevertheless of considerable interest as a reflection, partially at least, of the self-image which leaders of revolutionary movements have of themselves in their capacity as revolutionaries, and of the doctrine which they believe to be most palatable in justification of a forcible overthrow of government. Virtually every revolutionary ideology is composed of two elements: a derogatory image to be conveyed of the situation prior to the revolution (that is, a list of grievances); and an image of the favorable situation to be created as a result of the revolution (that is, a list of promises). In Table 1, the recurrent themes which are found in the various tracts issued during and following the takeover of the ROK Government by the military in May, 1961, are summarized.

A statement issued by the Military Revolutionary Committee on May 16, the day that the Chang government was overthrown, contained six pledges to the Korean people. The first of these was that the military revolutionary government would "uphold anti-communism as our foremost national policy. . . ." ¹²⁶ In subsequent justification of the revolution, military leaders contended that under the Chang regime, a political and ideological vacuum had been created, stimulating increased Communist subversion, and generating domestic unrest to the point that it might explode in a form susceptible to Communist takeover. ¹²⁷ Thus, according to the military revolutionaries, military men found themselves confronted with a dilemma. "Was it their duty to maintain their constitutional posture, aloof from politics, while the nation drifted slowly through chaos toward communism? Or was it their real duty to take swift and positive action to save the country before it was too late?" ¹²⁸ To this rhetorical question, the military revolutionaries "most reluctantly concluded that it was their duty to take action to save the country, and to lay a solid foundation for real democracy after their revolutionary task[has] been completed." ¹²⁹

Table 1
Ideological Justification of the Military Takeover

Problem area	Image of the past (Under civilian rule)	Image of the future (To be developed by military rule)
National security	Nation weakened to external threat through factional strife and inadequate leadership; susceptible to communism.	Nation strong before its enemies.
Economy	Subsistence economy, heavily dependent upon the United States, oriented to lavish consumption items.	Self-sufficient economy providing for the welfare of all, attained through planning; emphasis on primary industry, and expanded base of trade.
Social values and ideals	Continued prevalence of decadent Confucian ideas and customs. Rampant hedonism and corruption, even among the young.	Prevalence of modern ideas; achievement-oriented society. Cultivation of a new morality, based upon austerity. Rejuvenation of the ideals of the young.
Social and political structure	Factions, parties, and cliques feuding with one another and pursuing their own self-interest under the guise of democracy.	National solidarity; "administrative democracy."
Governmental leadership	Those in power committed to self-aggrandizement, profiteering at the expense of the people. Rulers incapable as well as irresponsible.	Those in power committed selflessly to building the nation and promoting the welfare of the people. Rulers wise and efficient.

A second area in which the revolutionaries expressed concern on behalf of their nation was the economic area. Indeed, this usually was the theme given greatest emphasis in revolutionary doctrine. Revolutionary leader Gen. Park Chung Hee wrote, for example:

....I want to emphasize and re-emphasize, that the key factor of the May 16 Military Revolution was to effect an industrial revolution in Korea. Since the primary objective of the

revolution was to achieve a national renaissance, the revolution envisaged political, social and cultural reforms as well. My chief concern, however, was economic revolution.¹³⁰

Elsewhere he wrote: "Poverty, hunger and low incomes are the most serious obstacles to the establishment of modern, liberal democracy in our country. . . . It is for this reason that the Revolutionary Government today places especial emphasis on its economic policies and devotes the major part of its resource economic development."¹³¹

Economic conditions under the Chang government were described not only as generally bad, but as contributing to the enjoyment of the wealthy few to the detriment of the poverty-stricken many, and leading to the construction of "tea shops, billiard halls, and bars" while construction in primary industry remained neglected.¹³² As General Park described the situation:

Prices continued to rise. Currency expansion was posing a serious threat to the Korean economy. Externally, American aid was gradually decreasing. Foreign commodities poured into the country in spate. The national economy was dragged in the mire. But the previous regime remained insensitive and slept on.¹³³

The military revolutionaries proposed to remedy these economic ills and to attain economic self-sufficiency for Korea through establishment of a planned economy,¹³⁴ emphasis on the development of primary industry, acceptance of austerity in consumer goods,¹³⁵ expansion of trade, and stimulation of foreign investment, e.g., through normalization of relations with Japan.¹³⁶

A third tenet of revolutionary ideology of the military was to promote "a spiritual regeneration of the people."¹³⁷ According to the ambassador of the military government to the United Nations, Yi Su-yong, this was the most basic objective of the revolution and "the need for it is the ultimate justification of the military revolution."¹³⁸ Among the "evil legacies of the Yi Dynasty" which, according to Gen. Park Chung Hee, continued to plague Korea in the twentieth century, were a "lack of independent spirit," manifested particularly in the form of a servile attitude toward China "blind admiration for anything Chinese," and in the form of "indolence and desire for unearned income. . . . lack of enterprising spirit. . . . malicious selfishness. . . . lack of honor (in the sense of the Western code of chivalry). . . . lack of [a] sound spirit of criticism. . . ."¹³⁹ The continued prevalence of traditional ways of thinking rooted in Confucian thought was described by General Park and other revolutionary leaders as a fundamental barrier to progress which had to be overcome through "social reconstruction," and the cultivation of a new sense of personal dignity and identity among the Korean people. The traditional perspective of the Korean, Park contended, was one in which there was no established ego.

Where there is no established ego but only father-son, master-slave and adult-child relationships, there can be no equality, and no human rights. . . . Establishment of the ego is, first of all, to know oneself. Only after understanding himself will one understand others and understand the national entity to which he belongs. And only when one trusts himself will he trust others. Trust of others and reliance upon others are essentially different things. The difference between the two is as great as the difference between the feudal age and the

modern age. Only when we trust others and understand others can there be cooperation and compromise.¹⁴⁰ (Emphasis added.)

These problems were aggravated, General Park maintained, by corruption and privilege-consciousness among the Democratic Party (the ruling party under Chang Myon), which was little more than the "twin" of the Liberal Party.

...the morality of the Korean people was completely gone; intrigues, slander, and libel were rampant. Adversely affected by such social traits [the] nation's youthful people sought only their own fortunes, tried to lead an indolent life, drifted themselves into hedonism....¹⁴¹

Given such corruption, immorality, and misery, it was only natural, the military revolutionaries asserted, for the people to turn to the military as their only hope.

The nation was proud of the courage and fighting skill of its armed forces. And parents were proud of their own sons in uniform. The army represents discipline, dedication to duty, patriotism, and the subordination of individual self-seeking to the public necessities. It is for this reason that the armed forces became the hope of the people. This is why the Military Revolution was greeted with warm acceptance and rapidly won the whole-hearted support of the people.¹⁴²

The allegation by General Park of decadence and corruption of the moral fiber of Korean society under predecessor regimes was closely related to his charge that Korean society in general, and the political system in particular, was rent by divisive factions, each dedicated to the pursuit of special privileges, often to the detriment of the society as a whole. Political parties neglected "the urgent problems of the nation as a whole," he said; instead, characteristically, they "split into new and old factions, junior and senior groups, Honam and Yongnam subdivisions and Southern and Northern cabals, each pursuing its own private interests and ambitions...."¹⁴³ The old system under the Rhee and Chang regimes was the more insidious, General Park maintained, because "it disguised itself under the cloak of democracy," whereas in fact, "...it was no more than an oligarchy bolstered by monetary influence."¹⁴⁴

It is important to note that the leaders of the military revolution did not claim that their own rule could be called democratic, nor did they believe that Western-style democracy was appropriate to Korea at that particular stage of political development. Rather, the contention was that disease of the body politic had reached such an acute stage that major surgery was required in order to create the healthy conditions under which democracy could flourish. As General Park observed:

...the military revolution is not intended to strangle democracy in this country but to suspend it temporarily while it is undergoing medical treatment. In other words, the military revolution assumes a nature of controlled or remedial democracy.¹⁴⁵ (Emphasis added.)

Elsewhere, General Park noted that

...Western democratic institutions do not harmonize with the underdeveloped conditions of Korea and have in fact caused deleterious effects. We had scarcely set ourselves free from the restrictions

of feudal society when we were suddenly tossed into a completely democratic society. This was too abrupt and unnatural. Therefore, we have to establish a new system, whatever the form it may take.¹⁴⁶

Details of the "new system" to be established under military rule were not spelled out with clarity, rather there was simply a desire to institute a new system, "whatever the form it may take." The "new system" was later termed, "administrative democracy," so-called to distinguish it from "political democracy," a system of government for which Korea was said to be unprepared.¹⁴⁷ Yet the criteria for the implementation of "administrative democracy" were vague. The term seemed to connote principally a requirement for austerity and egalitarianism among the ruling elite. As A.M. Rosenthal observed, the men of the military junta knew what they did not want; "they did not want disorderliness, graft, indiscipline." But they had only an "embryonic idea of what they did want: a welfare state, with economic opportunity, run by themselves, and founded on a variety of adjectival democracy—administrative, pure, social, guided."¹⁴⁸

Justifying the military seizure of government in South Korea was the assumption of the total failure of civilian rule. The April 1960 student uprising had been a genuine revolution, according to General Park and his colleagues. However, the April revolution failed, because, General Park wrote, "in spite of the righteousness of its ideals... it did not have any real power. It could destroy a government, but did not have enough strength to prevent the emergence of a corrupt government similar to one it had superseded."¹⁴⁹ Rather those entrusted with carrying out the April revolution turned out to be a "faithless mob, completely betraying the hopes of the people."¹⁵⁰

Thus, the revolution that had been initiated by the student protests had been perverted by "incapable and irresponsible" politicians, who were cut off from the desires and needs of the people by their own selfish pursuit of private interests and privileges.¹⁵¹ What happened, essentially, General Park claimed, was that the revolution had failed to uproot the "old generation" of power holders. "The power and money held by the established generations were too great and too well entrenched."¹⁵² Therefore, what was needed was a new force, both powerful and willing to carry on the spirit of the revolution which the student protests had initiated. The military revolution was designed to meet this need. "It was to enable a new elite... to take over the nation and the State. In this light, this revolution is a national, common people's revolution, a revolution of national consciousness, and a turnover of generations."¹⁵³

The new elite, the military revolutionary elite, would work to achieve national solidarity, hindered in the past by "economic class conflict... [by] the artificial fission of pseudo-political parties blinded with greed for power and gain, and thirdly, [by] the unreasonable and backward factionalism based on family connections, class sympathies, provincialism and school ties."¹⁵⁴

The ideological perspectives of Korean military leaders were influenced by historical revolutionary models. Park Chung Hee, key leader of the 1961 Korean military revolution, cites five revolutions or periods of revolutionary development as providing lessons which Korean military revolutionaries sought to emulate: the modernization movement in China, led by Sun Yat-sen; the Meiji restoration in Japan; the revolution of the "Young Turks," led by Mustafa Kemal; the Egyptian revolution, led by Nasser and the Free Officers Corps; and the post-World War II reconstruction in West Germany.¹⁵⁵ The first four movements had in common the fact that they were modernizing as well as nationalistic movements, and were directed against internal despotism and backwardness as well as against foreign oppression. The fifth, which Park terms the "miracle on the Rhine," was one in which a nation physically

divided, and economically in ruins, and "subjected to persecution, hatred and a cold reception by the whole world," rose to become one of the top economic powers in the world in a matter of fifteen years.¹⁵⁶ Although Park acknowledges that the currency reform of 1948, U.S. aid, a large inflow of labor from East Germany, and other such factors contributed to the West German economic recovery, he places major emphasis upon the importance which the German "national character" played in achieving "the miracle," and upon the importance of strong leadership. Of "national character," Park finds German diligence and respect for order unsurpassed and the key to their success. "One has only to look at a school to know how order is kept," he comments, "the professor is a king and students are vassals in Germany. The American way of thinking is that there was a man before a class. To the Germans, one is a student, a corporal or a subordinate, before being a man."¹⁵⁷ Of German leadership, Park contends that "it is a fact that even Bismarck and Hitler were men who could do 'something' for their people."¹⁵⁸ And in the postwar period, Park notes, the Germans were fortunate enough to have a strong leader like Adenauer to help them on their road to recovery. Following the German example, Park has advised his people, the Koreans can create their own "miracle on the Han River."¹⁵⁹

Programs and Policies

The policies which the military government pursued were in part suggested by their ideology. However, men with responsibilities for governing invariably find that ideological generalizations must be interpreted in the light of practical problems and situations only vaguely anticipated. Furthermore, revolutionary ideology postulates ideal goals and aspirations; whereas policies and programs of action inevitably reflect compromise and adaptation to political and economic realities. More than some revolutionaries, the military leaders of the Korean Government were ready to bend or abandon a particular tenet of revolutionary doctrine in cases where it appeared to fail to meet the exigencies of the situation. As Robert Scalapino described the Korean military leaders, "they are... men of action—pragmatic, experimental, and disinclined toward theory. Their administrative method has generally been to enact some bold sweeping change, then modify it as conditions dictate."¹⁶⁰

Primary attention of the military government had to be paid to maintaining order and retaining control of the government. Policies and activities designed in part for the maintenance of order also could be (and were) expanded to serve the purpose of eliminating from the political scene or neutralizing persons or groups deemed potentially "disloyal" or dangerous to the new regime. Martial law was put into effect, to continue, with some modifications, into December 1962. An evening curfew was enforced. All political parties and social organizations, including labor unions and student groups, were dissolved for several months. Many newspapers and most of the news agencies were closed down; publications permitted to continue to publish were censored. More than 20,000 persons were arrested during the first few days of military government (although most were released within a short time), including thousands of petty criminals and so-called "street toughs;" but also more than 3,000 persons were arrested for political reasons. Early in 1962, those former politicians who had not been convicted of "anti-state" or other crimes were released from house arrest. But the names of over 4,000 former politicians were included on an official blacklist, published by the governmental Political Activities Purification Board; these persons were forbidden to participate in political activity, unless successfully screened by the board; roughly 30 percent of those blacklisted were successfully screened initially.¹⁶¹ But within a year, all but a handful of politicians were able to participate in politics once more.

Critics of the military regime, including many Americans, some of them within the U.S. Government, thought that the measures which the new ROK Government had adopted were

unduly harsh relative to the need for law and order, and that arrests and trials were conducted with a flagrant disregard for the "justice" supposedly sought by the new regime.¹⁶² The military government and its supporters defended the measures not only as necessary for public safety but also as the fulfillment of revolutionary pledges to stabilize the society in order to reduce the threat of Communist subversion, and to purge corrupt, criminal, and other undesirable elements from the society.¹⁶³

Next to the pragmatic urgencies of maintaining order and control, the desperate economic situation demanded the attention of the new regime. As one observer wryly noted, "the Army junta's first instructions to the civilian populace were to continue its normal routine, but to many individuals in Seoul, and in the farm villages as well, this could have offered little encouragement, for their normal routine had been merely to sit all day staring dully ahead of them."¹⁶⁴ Nearly one-quarter of the work force were unemployed; many persons lived at a subsistence level; prices were inflated. Park Chung Hee called the nation which he took over "an empty house."¹⁶⁵ Yet considerable recovery from the destruction of the Korean War had been made. An effort had been made, prior to the military takeover, to initiate long-range economic planning. The Rhee cabinet had approved a three-year development program early in 1960. But the Rhee government fell before the program could be initiated. And a five-year plan endorsed by the Chang Myön government in May 1961, scarcely saw the light of day before the government was ousted.

The major economic program of the new military government was contained in a new five-year plan, published in January 1962. In spite of vehement denunciation of the economic practices and policies of the Rhee and Chang Myön governments, clearly the five-year plan of the military government drew heavily upon the design of the 1961 plan, which in turn had borrowed some features from the plan of 1960.¹⁶⁶ The 1962 plan (for the years 1962-66) was for the industrialization of the Korean economy through major emphasis upon private enterprise, with governmental assistance and guidance. Electric power, agriculture, and social overhead capital projects such as road and dam construction, using underemployed labor from rural areas, were to be the three principal sectors of concentration. An annual growth rate of 7.1 percent was projected. The combined contribution of manufacturing, industry, and power to the gross national product was expected to double during the five-year period. Self-sufficiency in food grain production was to be attained by 1966.¹⁶⁷

A further important economic measure of the military government was a currency reform, implemented suddenly in June 1962, in hopes of bringing back into circulation large quantities of hoarded currency.¹⁶⁸

The high hopes of the military regime for economic progress during this period were not met, however. The hopes were thwarted partly because of unavoidable misfortune, such as the drought and floods which plagued agricultural production during the first year of the five-year plan;¹⁶⁹ partly the difficulties were attributable to inadequate planning. For example, not only did the monetary reform fail to bring large quantities of hoarded currency back into circulation, but the reform appears to have had the effect of temporarily freezing needed working capital, thus partially paralyzing economic activity.¹⁷⁰

A third factor which thwarted the hopes of the military regime for making giant strides economically during the first years of their rule was their own inability, and that of their countrymen, to adhere to the stringent standards of morality and frugality demanded by the economic plans. An enthusiast of the revolution wrote wishfully a few months after the military had gained control that a total transformation had been effected in the behavior and outlook of the Korean people. The new "revolutionary man" in Korea was said to have

learned, within a few days after the revolution, to live within his means and to practice austerity.

After sweeping his yard and eating [a] wholesome breakfast, he puts on simple but clean trousers and short-sleeved shirts. He is really glad he no longer has to wear [a] necktie and [a] thick suit in this hot weather. Then he takes a bus or a street car without being ashamed—most decent people take them now. . . . At noon, he eats from his lunch box, which he carried according to the logicity of living the Revolution has taught him. He admits without shame that Korean cigarets are as good as any foreign made ones. He has realized that coffee is not indispensable like he once believed from his morbid vanity.¹⁷¹

The Chang Myŏn government, as well as the military regime that overthrew it, had attempted to mobilize the spiritual as well as the economic energies of the people through an austerity program. As one observer described participants in the austerity movement under Chang Myŏn:

They discarded formal suits and overcoats and wore cheap corduroy suits. They abandoned official cars and tramped to work on foot. They shunned geisha houses and expensive restaurants, imported coffee and cigarettes. Even the prime minister ate his lunch at his desk and ordered other officials not to receive visitors in the morning so they could do their work without interruption. He likewise directed his cabinet members to fire all officials who maintained concubines.¹⁷²

But neither the corduroy suits of the Chang Myŏn regime nor the fatigue uniforms of the Park Chung Hee government were gestures sufficient to revolutionize behavior of either leaders or followers. In September 1961, the military government arrested, on charges of accepting bribes, its own fifteen-man team investigating the illegal accumulation of wealth under the previous regime.¹⁷³ Initial plans for ruthlessly punishing entrepreneurs and businessmen who had amassed fortunes through illicit activities in previous regimes were gradually shelved as military leaders found a need for the managerial skills of the industrialists and businessmen in building the economy.¹⁷⁴ By late in 1963, a *Wall Street Journal* correspondent in Korea noted that U.S. officials there were "openly critical of the junta's high living."¹⁷⁵ Instead of concentrating upon the development of an industrial capacity for export, or for replacing urgent items currently imported, the ROK government and Korean businesses were said to have "lavished foreign exchange on equipment for plants to make lipstick, cigarettes, stockings and similar items—mainly for the local market."¹⁷⁶

As a consequence of difficulties of the types described, the military government fell considerably short of its economic goals. The GNP during the first year of the five-year plan advanced only by 2.6 percent, half of the projected figure for first-year growth. Unemployment remained at about 25 percent of the total work force. The population continued to grow at nearly 3 percent annually. Inflation continued: some staple foods, including rice, doubled in price during 1963. Bank savings rather than increasing according to plan declined.¹⁷⁷

In speculating on prospects for the five-year plan shortly after it was published, RAND economist Charles Wolf, Jr. expressed concern that the plan might prove to be "too broad and too ambitious."¹⁷⁸ Citing a number of detailed weaknesses of the plan, Wolf concluded

with an observation that has special interest to students of the role of the military in developing nations:

Finally, one is surprised by the omission from consideration in the plan of ways in which Korea's substantial military establishment and defense budget may be able to complement and advance the country's development, for example, through training programs and the use of underemployed military manpower and equipment. Notwithstanding the assumption of political power by a military regime, the plan contains very little recognition of the potentially important complementarities between defense and development in the Korean context. ¹⁷⁹

Steps To Enlist Support

Every regime that comes to power by extraconstitutional means faces the threat, often especially great immediately after coming to power, that it will lose control of the government by means similar to those which it employed to gain control. A military junta seizing power in a society with any tradition of civil control of the military faces the additional problem of being under pressure to relinquish voluntarily the position of dominance it has acquired. This problem of the military might be viewed as but a variant of the generic problem of legitimation which all revolutionary regimes must face. Physical control of the reins of government is not enough. Sooner or later, depending upon the nature of political attitudes and institutions within the society, a regime must attempt to legitimize its rule—through elections, real or rigged; through propaganda and the cultivation of myths favorable to the perpetuation of the rule of the regime; through performance and acts which win public favor or which win favor of particularly important sectors of the public. Finally, most revolutionary regimes contain within them disintegrative or dissident elements: factions dissatisfied with their representation in the power structure; individuals jealous of the prerogatives of others in the regime with greater authority; persons disillusioned by the failure of the regime to live up to revolutionary pledges or promises. Thus, physically maintaining control of the government, legitimating their rule, and coping with the threat of disintegration of the ruling group, are three often central problems for a revolutionary regime. In the case of the military junta, which seized power in South Korea in May 1961, each of these problems was present in acute form.

First, the coup might have been thwarted if the ROK First Army, the key front-line combat army whose commanding general (Lt. Gen. Yi Han-im) initially opposed the revolution, had taken decisive action to suppress the coup. Statements cited by Walter Briggs, former consultant to the ROK mission to the United Nations, reveal that both UN Commander-in-Chief, General Carter B. Magruder, and U.S. Chargé d' Affaires in Korea, Minister Marshall Green, had urged ROK forces to remain loyal to the Chang regime.¹⁸⁰ However, substantial opposition to the coup among leaders of the ROK forces failed to materialize.

The second problem which the revolutionaries faced was that of legitimizing their seizure of power. Throughout the period of military government, the ROK leaders were repeatedly faced with American distrust, criticism, or outright opposition (as in the first days after the coup). For their part, dissatisfaction with the extent of dependence upon the United States was one of the tenets of revolutionary ideology of the new regime. Furthermore, the new leaders were not, for the most part, men with whom U.S. officials and officers in Korea had

been on friendly first-name terms. As one American put it when the military junta took over: "The 'golf links Charlies' are out and the hairshirt boys are in."¹⁸² On the other hand, the need for U.S. aid was a fact of life which the ROK military leaders had to recognize; thus various steps were taken to alleviate tensions with the United States.

A number of such steps might be cited by way of illustration. First, President Yun Po-sŏn was persuaded to remain in office after the military revolution, although of course without any real power, thereby permitting the revolutionary regime to avoid the problem of seeking diplomatic recognition from the United States and other nations. Second, the Army Chief of Staff at the time of the coup, Lt. Gen. Chang To-yŏng, was made Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee, formed in May 1961, afterwards called the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), the principal decision-making authority under the military government. General Chang was a man well known to and apparently liked by Americans. Although U.S. officials on the scene recognized that General Chang had not been an actual leader of the coup, the possibility that now he was being entrusted with real authority in the new government, coupled with his statements that South Korea would seek to continue close cooperation with the United States, served to relieve some anxieties in Washington as to the nature of the new regime.¹⁸³ When General Chang was removed from his key positions of Chairman of the SCNR, Premier, Minister of Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and Martial Law Commander, another American "favorite," Gen. Song Yo-ch'an (nicknamed "Tiger" by Americans during the Korean War), was installed as premier.¹⁸⁴

A fourth step taken by the military government to enlist support at home and abroad, especially from the United States, was the promise to restore civil rule; the question was, however, when? One of the revolutionary pledges promulgated the day of the military take-over had been a vague commitment to transfer governmental authority back to civilians "as soon as revolutionary tasks have been completed."¹⁸⁵ Gen. Chang To-yŏng, as SCNR chairman, had given further assurances that military rule was to be temporary, and that civilian rule would be restored in due course.¹⁸⁶ In August 1961 Gen. Park Chung Hee, now Chairman of the SCNR, set forth more explicitly the details of how and when the transfer of government to civilian rule was to be accomplished. Prior to March 1963 a new constitution would be established. Early that year political activities would be allowed to resume in preparation for general elections to be held in May of 1963.¹⁸⁷ However, subsequent to General Park's more explicit pledge of a return to civilian rule, the "political purification law" was enacted by the SCNR; this law, as mentioned above, banned from further political activity all former politicians except those successfully screened by the military government.¹⁸⁸ Some observers interpreted the law as one designed to thwart a return to civilian government by rendering impotent able civilian politicians. During a visit to the United States late in 1962, Director of the ROK CIA, Kim Chong-p'il, considered by many astute observers of Korean politics to be the power behind the scenes during the military government, pointed out that the "civilian" government to be established in 1963 would, in fact, be a "transitional" government; the military revolutionary elite would "also participate in the civilian government to consummate the nation's revolutionary tasks."¹⁸⁹

To help ensure that the military would continue to participate in governing the country a group of military officers led by Brig. Gen. Kim Chong-p'il announced in January 1963 the formation of a new political party, the Democratic-Republican Party, which would spearhead the drive to enlist popular support at the polls for those sympathetic to the revolution.

SCNR Chairman Park Chung Hee's position from this point on for a period of weeks was a difficult one, and one which led to considerable vacillation. In February, in an oath-taking ceremony in Seoul, Park made a public pledge ("tearfully," it was said) not to take part in the civilian government to be formed on the basis of elections later in the year. Prior to Chairman Park's speech, 53 political and military leaders had sworn to uphold a nine-point "political stabilization proposal" as the fundamental basis for transition from military to civilian rule. Point number one was a pledge that "the armed forces would maintain political neutrality and support a popularly elected government."¹⁹⁰ Points two through nine outlined the guarantees which the military and particularly the elements which had led the revolution would expect in return. They included guarantees of freedom for members of the military government to return to active military duty, or to retire and run for elective office; that the new government would carry on the spirit of the revolution of 1960-61; that there would be no political reprisals or arbitrary dismissal of civil servants legitimately hired by the military government; that military veterans would be given priority in filling vacancies in governmental positions; and that "all political parties" would "stop factional strife".¹⁹¹

In March 1963, however, following bitter infighting within the ruling junta, some details of which are presented on subsequent pages, Chairman Park proposed that military rule be extended for four years. The new proposal would be submitted to the public in the form of a national referendum, he declared. Some 160 military commanders, mostly of general officer rank, submitted a resolution to Park supporting the extension of military rule. However, under considerable pressure both at home and abroad to reverse himself again, General Park agreed to compromise to the extent that a coalition of civil and military leaders would rule for two years in preparation for a transfer to full civilian control. Finally, in early April 1963, Park announced that the plan for holding the elections which would mean the formal end of military rule had been revived; elections would be held in the autumn. And in late May, General Park, who had pledged in February to take no part in the next government, was named presidential candidate of the Democratic-Republican Party.¹⁹²

The initial promises of the military government to pave the way for an early return to civilian rule, rather than serving to help legitimize the revolutionary regime, had come to serve as a symbol of illegitimacy in the minds of many whose support the regime had sought to enlist. The U.S. State Department announced, in response to the expressed intention of the ROK Government to extend military rule, that continuation of military government would cause instability in South Korea;^{193a} and U.S. President Kennedy urged the Korean military leaders to effect an early transfer of power to civilian rule.^{193b} And when political activity in Korea was permitted to resume in 1963 for the first time in nearly two years, the first prominent party formed in opposition to the military regime called itself the "Civil Rule Party," and made restoration of civilian rule its major aim.^{193c}

The Revolutionary Elite: Recruitment Patterns and Factional Strife

The issue of whether to extend military rule or to arrange for an orderly transfer of power to a civilian government generated disintegrative forces within the ruling junta. A review of the composition of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) during the period of its existence, from June 1961 (the SCNR was formed in May, but by June its membership had become relatively stable) to December 1963, when the SCNR was formally disbanded, highlights some of the factional strife which occurred within the ruling military elite, and sheds some light on the characteristics of those who executed the revolution of 1961 (Table 2).¹⁹⁴

Table 2

Membership of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction:
June 1961, January 1962, December 1962, December 1963

June 1961	January 1962	December 1962	December 1963
Park Chung Hee (A) ^a	x ^b	x	x
Kim Chong-o (A)	x	x	x
Yi Chu-il (A)	x	x	x
Yu Yang-su (A)	x	x	x
Kim Chin-wi (A)	x	x	x
Kim Yong-sŏn (A)	x	x	x
Hong Chong-chŏl (A)	x	x	x
Kil Chae-ho (A)	x	x	x
Ok Ch'ang-ho (A)	x	x	x
Kim Hyŏng-uk (A)	x	x	
Yu Pyŏng-hyŏn (A)	x	x	
Kim Chae-ch'un (A)	x	x	
Kim Yun-kŭn (M)	x	x	
Chong Se-ung (M)	x	x	
Kim Tong-ha (M)	x	x	
O Ch'i-sŏng (A)	x	x	
Pak Wŏn-pin (A)	x	x	
Yi Sŏk-che (A)	x	x	
O Chŏng-kŭn (M)	x	x	
Kim Sin (AF)	x		
Yi Sŏng-ho (N)	x		
Yi Sŏng-ŏn (M)	x		
Pak Im-hang (A)	x		
Son Ch'ang-kyu (A)	x		
Yu Wŏn-sik (A)	x		
Chang To-yŏng (A)			
Han Ung-chŏn (A)			
Ch'oe Chu-chong (A)			
Ch'ae Myŏng-sin (A)			
Song Ch'ang-ho (A)			
Mun Che-chun (A)			
Pak Ch'i-ok (A)			
Kim Che-min (A)			
	Kang Sang-uk (A)	x	x
	Pak T'e-chun (A)	x	x
	Cho Si-hyŏng (A)	x	
		Chang Song-hwan (AF)	x
		Kim Tu-ch'an (M)	x
		Yi Maeng-ki (N)	x

^aThe letters in parentheses indicate the arm of service to which the SCNR member belonged: army (A), air force (AF), navy (N), or marines (M).

^bAn "x" indicates continued membership as of the date indicated at the head of the column.

Table 2 (continued)

Membership of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction:
June 1961, January 1962, December 1962, December 1963

June 1961	January 1962	December 1962	December 1963
			Chang Hyŏng-sun (A)
			Kim Hi-tŏk (A)
			Pak Yŏng-sŏk (A)
			Pak Hyŏn-sik (A)
			Chang Chi-su (N)
			Min Ki-sik (A)
			Yi Wŏn-yŏp (A)
			Pak Wŏn-sŏk (AF)

The Basic Law which established the SCNR provided that it was to consist of not more than 32 nor less than 20 members.¹⁹⁵ The military regime saw fit to preserve the illusion of constitutionality by maintaining the formal structure of government virtually intact. The Basic Law which they proclaimed was declared to have precedence over any provision of the constitution with which it conflicted (there were many such provisions); but ostensibly the Basic Law merely amended the constitution, rather than superseding it as did the new constitution endorsed by public referendum in December 1961.¹⁹⁶ The SCNR did not replace the various ministries of government; rather, it served as the supreme decision-making authority, with supervisory and policy-making responsibilities over each of the ministries and the judiciary as well.

Given the concentration of authority in the SCNR, it is not surprising that its membership consisted largely of those who had been chiefly instrumental in planning and executing the overthrow of the Chang Myŏn regime. However, the coup had been a combined army-marine operation. Air force and navy leaders had not made a commitment for or against the coup until its success seemed apparent. Nevertheless, when the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Lt. Gen. Kim Sin, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Yi Sŏng-ho, did announce their support of the revolution, a united front of the armed services was created.¹⁹⁷ The reward for this belated gesture would seem to have been a place on the SCNR (Table 2), although it is doubtful that either General Sin or Admiral Yi ever played more than a nominal role during his relatively brief tenure on the SCNR.

The core membership of the SCNR consisted of men who had been young generals or colonels in the army or marines at the time of the coup. By early 1963, there were only nineteen left of the SCNR membership of June 1961—all of these were army or marine generals and colonels. The oldest, SCNR Chairman Park Chung Hee, had been 44 the year of the coup; the youngest, Marine Col. O Chŏng-kŭn, had been 32 that year. The relative youth of the military governmental leaders is revealed in Table 3. Members under the age of 40 constituted 70 percent or more, although 37 percent of those with continuous membership from June 1961 to December 1963 were over 40.

The relative youth of the leaders of the military government is particularly striking in contrast to the age distribution of leaders under the Rhee and Chang Myŏn governments (Table 4). The contrast between the military government and its predecessors is somewhat exaggerated by these figures, since those for the Rhee and Chang Myŏn periods are based upon cabinet ministers, vice-ministers and top bureau chiefs, governors, key ambassadors, and key members of the National Assembly, whereas those for the military government period include only SCNR members. Fragmentary data available regarding appointments of the military government to ambassadorial, top civil service, and gubernatorial posts, for example, suggest that the mean age of men in these positions was higher than that of members of the SCNR; thus the

overall contrast between the ages of military governmental leaders and leaders of previous regimes would be somewhat less.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the military revolution had effected a "changeover of generations" as they claimed.

The military government also represented a shift in regional representation. As indicated in Tables 5 and 6, men born in northern provinces of Korea, located mainly in what is now known as North Korea, were represented almost equally with those born in the southern provinces throughout the existence of the SCNR. In comparison with regional origins of leadership of the Syngman Rhee and Chang Myŏn regimes, the composition of the SCNR represented a shift away from the southern provinces, in favor of the northern provinces. More than three-fourths of both the Syngman Rhee and Chang Myŏn leaders had been born in southern provinces, as compared with roughly half of SCNR members with southern origins. The southern provinces of Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namto (North and South Cholla) were particularly under-represented in the SCNR, especially in contrast to Chang Myŏn leadership, over 25 percent of

Table 3
Percentage Distribution of SCNR Members by Age

	Age ^a			
	45 and over	40-44	35-39	30-34
Membership ^b June 1961 N:27	4	18	67	11
Membership ^c January 1962 N:26	4	19	54	23
Membership ^d December 1962 N:24	0	25	50	25
Membership ^e December 1963 N:20	0	30	50	20
Those with ^f continuous membership January 1962- December 1963 N:8	0	38	50	13

^aComputed as the difference in years between 1961 and the year of birth.

^bTotal membership was 33, including members added or dropped during the month. Date of birth for six members was unavailable.

^cTotal membership was 28. Date of birth for two members was unavailable.

^dTotal membership was 25. Date of birth was unavailable for one member.

^eTotal membership was 23. Date of birth for three members was unavailable.

^fTotal number of councilors with continuous service during this period was nine. Date of birth for one member was unavailable.

Table 4
Percentage Distribution of SCNR Members by Age Compared With
Leadership During the Rhee and Chang Myŏn Regimes

	Age					
	Over 80	70-79	60-69	50-59	40-49	30-39
Leadership, ^a Rhee regime (age as of 1959)	1.4	4.7	29.1	38.5	24.3	2.0
Leadership, ^a Chang Myŏn regime (age as of 1960)	0	0	27.9	36.1	32.5	3.5
Members, SCNR, ^b June 1961, Janu- ary 1962, Decem- ber 1962, or De- cember 1963 (age as of 1961)	0	0	0	0	22.5	77.5

^aAdapted from Bae-ho Hahn and Kyu-taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," *Asian Survey*, III (July 1963), p. 314. Composition of the leadership groups is described in the text of the present study and in the study cited.

^bPercentages computed with N:40. Date of birth was unavailable for eight SCNR members.

whom were born in these provinces. Approximately half of SCNR members were from northern provinces, as compared to roughly one-fifth of the leaders of the Syngman Rhee and Chang Myŏn governments. Regional backgrounds take on significance in terms of the factional pattern of Korean politics. A common home town, or common province, usually implying common kinship ties as well, has been an important basis of political association in Korea. As indicated above (p.166), Chang Myŏn found it necessary to allocate cabinet posts in part according to regional origins, so that no province-based faction would be unduly alienated. Revolutionary leader Park Chung Hee was critical of provincial or other forms of factionalism in Korean politics (p.172) under previous regimes, since it represented to him the backward, traditional ways of the past which had to be reformed. Nevertheless, provincial ties proved to be a source of factionalism within the military regime.

Probably a more important source of factional groupings among the military, however, certainly more important in the past few years, has been shared career experiences. Three of the key figures in the SCNR were graduates of the Manchurian Military Academy: Gen. Park Chung Hee, Chairman throughout most of the existence of the SCNR; Gen. Yi Chu-il, Vice-Chairman for most of the same period; and Gen. Kim Tong-ha, Chairman of key committees within the SCNR and leading representative of the marines on the SCNR. Nearly all of the fifteen army members on the SCNR who had served continuously from June 1961 to early 1963 had in common the fact that they had graduated from the Korean Military Academy prior to the outbreak of the Korean War (at least half a dozen were members of the KMA 8th Graduating Class), and that they had graduated from the ROK War College in the post-Korean War

Table 5
Distribution of SCNR Members by Province of Birth (Absolute Numbers)

Membership	Province of Birth								
	Northern			Sub- total	Southern				
	North and South Hamkyong	North and South Pyongan	Hwanghae		Kyonggi and Seoul	North and South Chungchong	North and South Cholla	North and South Kyongsang	
SCNR, June 1961	5	5	1	14	5	2	1	3	11
SCNR, January 1962	5	3	4	13	5	2	1	4	13
SCNR, December 1962	5	4	3	12	4	3	1	4	12
SCNR, December 1963	3	3	2	8	1	3	2	6	12
Those with continuous membership	1	2	1	4	0	1	1	2	1

Membership totals for each period are given in the notes to Table 3. Differences between total SCNR membership for a given period and the sum of subtotals here reflect absence of data for members not included in the tabulations.

Table 6

Province of Birth: Leadership of Syngman Rhee, Chang Myön, and Military Government Periods Compared

	Province of Birth							
	North and South Hankyong	North and South Pyongan	Hwanghae	Kangwon	Kyonggi and Seoul	North and South Chungchong	North and South Cholla	North and South Kyongsang
Leadership: Rhee regime	4.8	8.8	4.2	5.4	22.4	13.6	13.6	25.8
Leadership: Chang Myön regime	5.8	11.6	3.5	2.3	13.9	12.8	26.8	22.1
SCNR Members, June 1961, January 1962, December 1962 or December 1963	18.4	15.8	13.2	0	15.8	13.2	5.3	18.4
								0

* Adapted from Bae-ho Hahn and Kyu-taik Kim, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," Asian Survey, III (July 1963), p. 315.

* Percentages are computed using N:38; data on province of birth were unavailable for ten members.

years. Many of them had been among the early group of officers sent by the ROK Government to the United States for training during or just after the Korean War.

One must look beyond the composition of the SCNR, however, to view fully the important factions within the military revolutionary elite, for one of the most powerful of these centered around a man never a member of the SCNR. Kim Chong-p'il. Kim was an extremely close friend and confidant of SCNR Chairman Park Chung Hee, and his nephew by marriage. He was a member of the 8th Graduating Class of KMA, from which many of his political associates had come. Although restored to active duty as a full colonel, then brigadier-general under the military government, he had been a lieutenant colonel in the army reserves (having been retired from active duty because of his role in the so-called "purification movement") at the time of the military revolution. General Kim's experience in army intelligence served him well in his central role in planning and organizing the overthrow of the Chang Myŏn regime; subsequently these same talents were put to use in heading the ROK Central Intelligence Agency, an organization which quickly acquired a reputation as being the chief instrument of political control of the new regime. Late in 1962 and early in 1963 the focus of Kim's energies shifted from the clandestine operations of the CIA to the more overt planning and management of a political party to serve as the vehicle for the perpetuation of the revolutionary movement during and after the projected 1963 elections. As mentioned above (p. 178), it was at this point, with the creation of the new Democratic-Republican Party, led by General Kim, that a particularly severe rift within the ruling junta occurred, the battle lines drawn primarily between a group rallying to the banner of General Kim and those opposed to Kim.

The main points at issue were not only whether or not it was desirable in 1963 to make the transition to civilian rule, but whether the party should follow the leadership of General Kim, or whether the party should seek alternative or perhaps multiple leadership. Important figures within the SCNR were identified at various times as prominent opponents of General Kim--among them Yi Chu-il, Kim Tong-ha, and Kim Chae-ch'un. Other SCNR members were strongly pro-Kim, such as Kil Chae-ho. General Park gave the appearance of attempting to act as an impartial but concerned arbiter in the dispute, although the evidence suggests that he generally sided with General Kim.

Early in January 1963, Gen. Song Yo-ch'an, former premier of the military government and one-time commanding officer of Chairman Park, charged that for the military to make plans for participating in politics under the government to be elected in 1963 was a betrayal of public pledges. He charged that excessive concentration of power had come into General Park's hands. A week later, former SCNR member, Brig. Gen. Yu Won-sik, made charges similar to those of General Song. Less than a week later, Marine Lt. Gen. Kim Tong-ha resigned from the SCNR, asserting that the regime was "betraying the people's confidence," and that the Democratic-Republican Party, of which he had been a charter member, had become simply a faction of General Kim and his followers.¹⁹⁹

During the next six weeks, nine more councillors left the SCNR. Five of these resigned to devote full time to the Democratic-Republic Party; four were relieved, including Kim Tong-ha's marine associates, Chŏng Se-ung and Kim Yun-kŭn, and army colonels O Ch'i-sŏng and Pak Wŏn-pin.²⁰⁰ In March, the ROK CIA announced that it had uncovered a plot to overthrow the government; some 21 military and civilian suspects were arrested, including Kim Tong-ha, Kim Yun-kŭn, and former SCNR member, Pak Im-hang.²⁰¹ Pak Im-hang, like Kim Tong-ha, was born in South Hamyong province, and had graduated from the Manchurian Military Academy. Earlier in March, Brig. Gen. Yu Wŏn-sik and others had been arrested on charges of involvement in various financial scandals.²⁰² In August, former premier Song Yo-ch'an was arrested after publishing an open letter in which he urged Chairman Park not to run for the presidency.²⁰³

General Kim Chong-p'il and his followers ostensibly were the political beneficiaries of many of the above purges. But the political situation was complicated and turbulent, with the Kim forces experiencing "downs" as well as "ups." Under pressure from those critical of the growing concentration of power in the hands of Kim Chong-p'il, Chairman Park had persuaded Kim to resign from the Democratic-Republican Party in February, and to go into temporary exile as an "ambassador at large." Direction of the CIA was turned over to new leadership, Maj. Gen. Kim Chae Ch'un, and several CIA men identified with Kim Chong-p'il were removed. It was rumored that the Democratic-Republican Party would be disbanded. Moreover, a separate party led by anti-Kim forces in the military was organized. But by July 1963, the Kim forces had regained dominance in the junta. Kim Hyŏng-uk of the KMA 8th Graduating Class, and confederate of Kim Chong-p'il, took control of the CIA. Gen. Kim Chae Ch'un later went into exile. The Democratic-Republican Party remained in existence, with Park Chung Hee as its presidential candidate. And in the autumn, Kim Chong p'il returned to Korea to win a seat in the National Assembly and regained his central position in governmental leadership.²⁰⁴

QUASI-CIVILIANIZATION: 1962-65

The elections of 1963 in South Korea ushered in a new phase in politics, a period of "quasi-civilianization."²⁰⁵ Following the elections the military continued to play the dominant role in Korean government and politics; however, those in cabinet posts, in the National Assembly, in ambassadorships, and in gubernatorial roles, and Park Chung Hee himself had formally retired from military service in order to run for office, or upon appointment to office. The power base was expanded by including civilians as a prelude to the formal termination of military government. In fact, there had always been some civilians associated with the revolutionary movement; for example, those who provided financial support to revolutionary activity prior to the seizure of power.²⁰⁶ Some civilians had been persuaded to participate in cabinet positions or key bureaucratic or advisory positions once the military came into power, their skills were useful to the regime, and their presence added a certain aura of respectability which would otherwise have been lacking. However, with the establishment of what was intended to be a mass political party, coupled with the recognition of the legitimacy of political opposition groups, it was essential to give civilians an even greater voice in political affairs.

Able analysts of Korean politics have described the 1963 elections in detail that need not be repeated here.²⁰⁷ Highlights of the elections (presidential election in October, National Assembly elections in November) that bear repeating are these: Park Chung Hee was elected president; but he received less than half of the votes cast, and fewer than 200,000 more votes than Yun Po-sŭn, his leading opponent. Park generally ran ahead of his opponents in the southern rural areas; but in the capital city of Seoul, and in Kyonggi Province, which surrounds Seoul, Yun Po-sŭn ran ahead of Park by roughly a two-to-one margin, suggesting a defection of intellectuals and bureaucrats from Park leadership. Even more striking was the disaffection within military ranks, suggested especially by Park's failure to carry the districts along the 38th parallel where the concentration of troops is the greatest. In the assembly elections, Park's Democratic-Republican Party won 110 of 175 seats; again, however, the party received considerably less than half of the popular votes cast. Furthermore, since a large number of the DRP candidates had won their seats on their own, rather than through a coattail effect of Parks' popularity, the actual strength which Park personally would be able to wield in the assembly was questionable. All in all, the two elections seemed to bode well for the development of democratic practices in Korea, since they were generally acclaimed as having been remarkably fair and honest; but they also revealed deep currents of discontent that would cause President Park continuing difficulties.²⁰⁸

Most obvious of all to observers of the new government was the fact that the military government had not solved the problems which had served as the rationale for undertaking a military revolution. Most basic of these problems was the economic one. Following what one correspondent termed a "winter of discontent" (1963-64) in Korea, the new government found itself confronted with severe economic difficulties—a 20 percent increase in prices during the previous year, including a 50 percent increase in a number of basic consumer goods; unemployment of some 20 percent of the work force; unresolved labor disputes involving electrical workers, dock workers, railroad and land transport workers, and employees in the tobacco industry, a governmental monopoly; continued indebtedness of farmers; a shortage of foreign exchange.²⁰⁹

On the positive side of the ledger, the gross national product had risen 5.8 percent the previous year. Industrial production had increased between 13 and 16 percent; construction continued to increase; more fuel and electricity were available than ever before. Two large fertilizer plants were in operation and two more under construction. Yet such gains were partially offset by the continuing sharp increase in population (2.9 percent for the previous year), and by the maintenance of an army of some 600,000 men, so that defense spending accounted for over 60 percent of national expenditures. Furthermore, American economic aid, which had reached a peak of some \$200 million in 1957 and 1958, had dropped off dramatically, to \$90 million in 1963, and about \$65 million in 1964; American military aid had dropped from \$200 million in 1963 to \$160 million in 1964.²¹⁰

The economic problem was aggravated by continuing graft and corruption in government and business. During the early months of 1964, over 1,000 public officials were subjected to disciplinary action for misconduct; over 500 officials were dismissed on charges ranging from embezzlement to the illegal sale of state property.²¹¹

President Park and his government recognized the severity of the problems which they faced; and they recognized the intensity of public sentiment for seeking solutions to the multitude of problems. "Today, there is a wide-spread 'crisis consciousness,'" President Park acknowledged in his "state of the nation" message to the National Assembly early in 1964. But he argued that if the nation continued "patient and creative efforts according to the direction suggested by the government," then the nation was on the verge of "... a big leap forward." Reiterating themes of the revolutionary ideology proclaimed in 1961, President Park charged all Koreans with the duty to "strive to eliminate corruption, create a brighter society, practice austerity, wipe out factional feuds and frictions for the sake of nationwide cooperation and unity."²¹² Also echoing earlier revolutionary messages were actions of the government in implementation of the policies articulated by the president. Governmental officials were warned that visiting expensive restaurants was grounds for dismissal; the people were encouraged to walk or to ride bicycles rather than use motor transportation. Indulgence in expensive liquors and cigarettes was discouraged.

However, the major step that seemed to many to be necessary for South Korea to break out of the cycle of economic distress in which it found itself was to normalize relations with Japan. The decline of U.S. aid made it all the more imperative that Korea seek new sources of foreign exchange; Japan was the most likely place to which to turn, both because of her proximity, and because her economy could provide Korea with needed manufactured goods in exchange for Korean raw materials and agricultural products. The military government had made known its intention to pursue "normalization" with Japan, and had taken certain cautious steps in that direction, e.g., permitting Japanese investments and loans in Korea. Kim Chong-p'il had attempted to pursue negotiations informally on behalf of the ROK Government. Early

in 1964, new overtures were made by the ROK Government, as their desperate economic situation continued. Understandably in the light of the fact that nearly all Koreans over the age of twenty had experienced the humiliation of Japanese control of Korea, these new efforts to break out of a cycle of economic distress set in motion a new cycle of domestic unrest with governmental negotiations triggering protests, which in turn led to harsh countermeasures by the government, which led to additional criticism and protest, and so on.

Widespread protests were launched, especially by students, early in 1964, with the resumption of plans for negotiating with the Japanese. Protesters called the Park regime treasonous and corrupt. Leaders of political opposition groups charged the government with selling the country out to Japanese "economic imperialism." Kim Chong-p'il was accused of accepting bribes from the Japanese to permit them to make inroads on the Korean economy (Kim was ordered into exile again in response to these criticisms, a willing scapegoat in the service of his country, he said). Critics contended that the ROK Government was yielding to American influence to sign a "normalization" treaty with Japan since (it was alleged) the United States wanted to abandon its own economic responsibilities in Korea.

In response to student demonstrations, accusations of treason, and other forms of criticism of its policies and actions, the Park government grew more aggressive in suppressing criticism. Latent hostility of many in the government toward the intellectual community was discharged in the form of various governmental measures restricting students and professors, including the closing of a number of colleges and universities. Martial law was put into effect, and hundreds of demonstrators and others expressing criticism of the regime were arrested.²¹⁴

In 1965, however, amidst great turbulence in both countries, a Republic of Korea-Japan Treaty was signed. (Details of the treaty, and of the agonies of the long negotiations, may be found in other publications.)²¹⁵ Late in 1965, a correspondent who had been on the scene throughout much of the turbulence observed that "a new mood" had begun to pervade South Korea; a new confidence seemed to be emerging.²¹⁶

FOOTNOTES

AMERICAN OCCUPATION: 1945-48

^{1a} See footnotes 193^a and 193^b, page 200 below.

^{1b} These frictions and the history of the Korean independence movement are discussed in detail in Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1963).

² The present author is aware of the difficulties of establishing a causal relationship between environment and behavior. Thus the observation regarding the Japanese background of Korean military revolutionaries must be classified as speculation. A more detailed attempt to explain the military revolution will be presented later in the paper.

³ Alfred Crofts, "Our Falling Ramparts," Nation, CXG (June 25, 1960), pp. 544-48. Crofts was one of the two in the group of 50 who had seen Korea previously--passing through on the South Manchurian Railway.

⁴ E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press of Columbia University, 1951), pp. 40-52. See also Carl J. Friedrich & Associates (eds.), American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart, 1948), p. 355; Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 31-61; and Siegbert Kaufmann, "Korea--One Year Later," The Voice of Korea, III (October 10, 1946), pp. 137-38.

⁵ Meade, op. cit., pp. 53-58. The People's Republic became a political grouping or party.

⁶ Ibid., p. 59; Berger, op. cit. pp. 48-50.

⁷ Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government: Korea," Far Eastern Survey, XV (November 20, 1946), pp. 349-52.

⁸ Berger, op. cit., pp. 48-50.

⁹ Meade, op. cit., p. 68.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 76-89.

¹¹ This unfortunate remark by General Hodge, which became known to Koreans, is cited in Crofts, op. cit., pp. 544-48, and in Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1955), p. 202.

¹² Meade, op. cit., pp. 154-55.

¹³ USAFIK is the official abbreviation for the U.S. Armed Forces in Korea, the highest governmental authority in South Korea during the period of the American occupation.

¹⁴ Meade, op. cit., pp. 99-104.

¹⁵ The first of many factional splits within the provisional government was between those, including Rhee, who favored enlisting the support of the United States and other Western powers through propaganda and persuasion in the cause of Korean independence, and those,

such as the first minister of military affairs of the provisional government. Yi Tong-hwi, who favored a much more militant approach, relying upon support from the Bolsheviks. This split and other problems besetting Korean independence movements are discussed in Chong-sik Lee, op. cit. A brief biographical statement of Rhee's activities in the period prior to the American occupation of South Korea is provided in Current Biography (September 1947), pp. 51-53. A lengthier discussion, extremely sympathetic to Rhee, is found in Robert T. Oliver, op. cit. A more critical and more objective biography of Rhee is Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1960).

¹⁶ The Central Committee for the Rapid Realization of Independence was formed October 23, 1945, at a meeting of some 200 persons representing more than 50 political parties and groups. Cho Soon-sung, "The Failure of American Military Government in Korea," Korean Affairs, II (1963), pp. 331-47. This group was expanded the following May under the new name of the National Society for the Rapid Realization of Independence. Meade, op. cit., p. 155. Oliver, op. cit., pp. 214-18. Allen, op. cit., pp. 79-80.

¹⁷ The Yŏ quote is from a letter to Yongjeung Kim, President of the Korean Affairs Institute in Washington, written in July 1947, the day before Yŏ was assassinated. The letter is devoted almost completely to the topic of Yŏ's relationships with the U.S. governmental personnel, and appears in The Voice of Korea, IV (September 16, 1947), p. 218. Other discussion of the Emergency National Assembly may be found in Berger, op. cit., p. 66; Meade, op. cit., pp. 156-57; Oliver, op. cit., p. 218.

¹⁸ Allen, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

¹⁹ Oliver calls the charge "absurd." Oliver, op. cit., p. 212.

²⁰ Siegfert Kaufmann, op. cit., pp. 137-38. Kaufmann served with the public information section of the military government in Korea. Alfred Crofts, who also served with the military government in this period, asserts that Rhee received special privileges. But he maintains that Rhee received a half-hour of radio time weekly in contrast to fifteen minutes per month for other political leaders. Crofts, op. cit., p. 546.

²¹ The Ordinance, dated August 24, 1946, providing for the establishment of the Interim Legislative Assembly, is reprinted in The Voice of Korea, III (November 16, 1946), pp. 145-46. Kim Kyu-sik and Yŏ Un-hyŏng were among the leaders complaining to General Hodge that the elections had been unfairly influenced by rightist terrorism. Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, in turn, angrily charged that General Hodge's appointments to the assembly had been biased in favor of leftist groups. For slightly differing versions of the episode, see Oliver, op. cit., pp. 226-33; and Allen, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

²² Oliver, op. cit., pp. 228-30.

²³ The council consisted of Robert T. Oliver, John W. Staggers, Jay Jerome Williams, Col. M. Preston Goodfellow, Col. Emory Woodall, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, Col. Ben C. Limb, and Miss Louise Yim. Ibid., pp. 231-32.

Ibid., p. 232.

²⁴ Meade, op. cit., pp. 54-56. Robert Sawyer (Walter G. Hermes, ed.), Military Advisors in Korea: KMAC in Peace and War (U.S. Army Historical Series, 1962), pp. 8-9. The Voice of Korea, III (February 25, 1946), p. 86.

²⁵ Sawyer, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁶ The Voice of Korea, V (May 15, 1948), p. 284.

²⁷ Republic of Korea, Department of Army, Office of Military History, Yukkŭn Palchŏnson (The History of the Development of the Army of the Republic of Korea), Seoul, 1955, Vol. I:

cited hereafter as Yukkūn Palchōnsa. Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense, Bureau of Troop Information and Education, Kukpangbusa, che I-chip (The History of the Ministry of Defense), Seoul, 1954, Vol. I: cited hereafter as Kukpangbusa, che I-chip. Choson Yon'gan, 1947 and 1948.

²⁹ Yukkūn Palchōnsa. Korean Military Academy Catalogue, 1951-1953. Sawyer, op. cit., p. 12.

³⁰ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 26; The Voice of Korea, III (July 30, 1946), p. 120.

³¹ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 16-17, 24.

³² The Voice of Korea, III (July 30, 1946), p. 120. Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

³³ The Voice of Korea, IV (August 15, 1947), p. 209. The Korean Affairs Institute is the publisher of The Voice of Korea.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA: 1948-50

³⁴ Georg Simmel, Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955); Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956). See also essays representing the perspectives of various social scientific disciplines in Elton B. McNeil (ed.), The Nature of Human Conflict (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

³⁵ It is not intended by this discussion to equate the political strategies of Syngman Rhee and Kim Il-sŏng, but rather to observe that in spite of differences of ideology, organization, and technique, the strategies of the two leaders showed similarities which reflected, in part, the similar roles in which they were cast in relationship to their common conflict.

³⁶ U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Handbook for Korea (Washington D.C.: Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1964), pp. 562-63. Letter from Brig. Gen. Wm. L. Roberts cited in Sawyer, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁷ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 34-66.

³⁸ The problems of American advisory personnel during this period are discussed in detail in ibid., pp. 34-113. For Korean perspective, see Yukkūn Palchōnsa, and Kukpangbusa, che I-chip.

³⁹ Kukpangbusa, che I-chip, p. 22. Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 79-87.

⁴⁰ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 80-82, 89-90.

⁴¹ Kang In-sop, "Yuksa Pali Saeng" (The 8th Graduating Class of the Military Academy) Sin Tong-a, September 1964.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Kukpangbusa, che I-chip, pp. 29-31. Yukkūn Palchōnsa. Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 93-95.

⁴⁴ Asia Who's Who (1960). Nakahō Yaku, Kankoku Tokuhon (Korean Reader) (Tokyo: Jiji Tshshinsha, 1960). William Green and John Fricker, The Air Forces of the World (New York: Hanover House, 1958) pp. 191-92.

⁴⁵ Republic of Korea, Presidential Decrees Nos. 87 and 88, promulgated May 5, 1949. Republic of Korea, ROK Naval Academy, Haegun Sagwan Hakkyo (Bulletin of the ROK Naval Academy, n.d.). Kukpangbusa, che I-chip, pp. 25-27. Republic of Korea, Navy Headquarters Office of Information and Education, Ch'ungmukong kwa Haegun (Adm. Choong Moo Kong

Lee and the ROK Navy), Korea, 1959 or 1962: cited hereafter as Ci. ung mukong kwa Haegun.

⁴⁶ Asia Who's Who (1960).

⁴⁷ Republic of Korea, National Assembly, Law No. 9, "Organization of the National Armed Forces," promulgated November 30, 1948. ROK National Assembly, Law No. 41, "Military Service Law," promulgated August 6, 1949.

⁴⁸ Kukpangbusa, che I-chip, pp. 20-27. Yukkun Palchonsa. Allen, op. cit., pp. 101, 171-72. W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 29-46.

WAR AND GROWTH OF THE MILITARY: 1950-53

⁴⁹ For details of the early days of the war, and the effects of the early fighting on the ROK military, see Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 114-39; Marguerite Higgins (who covered the Korean War as a correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune), War in Korea (New York: Doubleday, 1951), esp. pp. 157-66; T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 65-76.

⁵⁰ Maj. Dan Doyle, as quoted in Higgins, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

⁵¹ Fehrenbach, op. cit., pp. 218, 242, 506.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 166, 506. See also Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. II of Truman Memoirs (New York: Signet, 1965), pp. 490-91.

⁵³ Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (New York: Harper and Row, Pubs., Inc., 1954), p. 171.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 165-86.

⁵⁵ Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 178-85.

⁵⁶ Green, op. cit., p. 192.

⁵⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change (New York: Signet, 1965), p. 229.

⁵⁸ United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA), Report of the Agent General of the United Nations Reconstruction Agency for the Period 1 October, 1953 to 1 September, 1954, General Assembly Official Rec. 9th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (A. 2750), 1954.

⁵⁹ Fehrenbach, op. cit., p. 50.

⁶⁰ Clark, op. cit., p. 179.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 181.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Higgins, op. cit., p. 165.

⁶⁴ Voice of Korea, IX (April 30, 1952), p. 577. Assembly vote figures are from Voice of Korea, IX (March 31, 1952), p. 573.

⁶⁵ Voice of Korea, IX (April 30, 1952), p. 577.

⁶⁶ Clark, op. cit., p. 152. The martial law commander was Lt. Gen. Won Yong-dok, who later became better known as the man who released, on Rhee's orders, 27,000 anti-Communist prisoners of war from UN prison camps. Ibid.

⁶⁷ Voice of Korea, IX (July 30, 1952), p. 595. Events of this period received quite thorough coverage in The New York Times (1952). See esp. May 24, p. 5; May 28, pp. 1, 3; June 1, p. 2; June 4, pp. 1, 3; June 5, pp. 1, 3, 30; June 13, p. 3; June 23, p. 2; June 29, p. 2; July 3, p. 3; July 5, p. 1.

⁶⁸ Interview by the author with retired ROK general, December 1964.

⁶⁹ The New York Times, July 24, 1952, p. 3.

⁷⁰ Voice of Korea, XI (February 19, 1954), p. 719.

GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH SYNGMAN RHEE: 1953-60

⁷¹ Allen, op. cit., p. 225.

⁷² For details of the politics of this period, see ibid., pp. 203-34; Han Tae-Soo, "A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea (1955-1960)," Korean Affairs, II (1963), pp. 318-30; Kyung Cho Chung, New Korea: New Land of the Morning Calm (New York: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 15-53.

⁷³ David M. Earl, "Korea: The Meaning of the Second Republic," Far Eastern Survey, XXIX (November 1960), pp. 169-75.

⁷⁴ C.I. Eugene Kim and Kim Ke-soo, "The April 1960 Student Movement," Western Political Quarterly, XVII (March 1964), pp. 83-92. Reprinted by permission of the University of Utah, copyright owners.

⁷⁵ Reference deleted in revision.

⁷⁶ Clark, op. cit., p. 288.

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 287-88. See also Berger, op. cit., pp. 159-72.

⁷⁸ The text of the treaty may be found in U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements (Dept. of State, TIAS 3097, Vol. 5, Part 3), pp. 2372-75.

⁷⁹ Kyung Cho Chung, op. cit., p. 110. Ch'ungmukong kwa Haegun, pp. 74-92.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 107.

⁸¹ Ch'ungmukong kwa Haegun, pp. 74-92. Eugene R. Edwards, "Cradle of the ROK Army," Pacific Stars and Stripes, reprinted in Korean Survey (November 1957), pp. 11-12.

⁸² Figures on ROK Army strength for 1956 vary somewhat. Official ROK Army figures put the total at 600,000. Republic of Korea, Army Hq., Office of Information, Republic of Korea Army 1957, (Yearbook, 1957): cited hereafter as Republic of Korea Army 1957. A former Korean advisor to the U.S. Military Governor in Korea during 1948-49 estimates that the ROK Army was composed of over three-quarters of a million men by 1956. Channing Liem, "Korea: Partner for Freedom?" Current History, XXXI (July 1956), p. 20. Reprinted by permission of Current History, Inc. A noted American authority on Korean studies puts the figure at the time at 700,000. Shannon McCune, "The United States and Korea," in The United States and the Far East (American Assembly, 1956), p. 39.

⁸³ Republic of Korea Army 1957, pp. 72-107.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 73.

Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 8-10.

⁵⁶Reference deleted in revision.

⁵⁷Figures are from Ju Taek Kim, "Evaluation of Adequate Force of Korean Army," Sasangge Monthly, LXXXVI (October 1960), p. 20*.

⁵⁸Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review 1959, p. 276.

⁵⁹Reference deleted in revision.

⁶⁰"Military Purification Movement Leads to 1961 May Revolution," Korean Report (May 1962), pp. 10-12.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Compilation of Studies, 87th Congress 1st Sess., Doc. No. 24, Study No. 5, "Asia," prepared by Condon Associates, Ltd., San Francisco, November 1959, p. 311.

RESIGNATION OF RHEE AND POLITICAL TURMOIL: 1960-61

⁶³Quote from an anonymous "old Seoul gentleman" in Edward Neilan, "Rhee Ad Infinitum," The New Republic (March 1960), pp. 8-9.

⁶⁴"Dr. Rhee's Dubious Victory," The Economist (March 26, 1960), p. 1221. The Democratic Party had made detailed and lengthy allegations in advance of the election of the kinds of irregular techniques which the Liberal Party was planning to employ in order to insure victory. See, e.g., "DP Discloses Government's Instruction on Method of Election..." Tong A Ilbo, and "DP Discloses Method of Holding Irregular Election Suggested to Policemen and Public Officials," Tong A Ilbo; these articles appear in English translation in Korean Daily Press Translation Service (March 4, 1960), pp. 7, 19. Korean Daily Press Translation Service is cited hereafter as K.D.P.T.S.

⁶⁵"Route of Irregular Election Funds of LP Disclosed," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (June 1, 1960), p. 18. "Donators of Political Funds Revealed: 167 Businessmen Supplied LP with 9.4 Billion Hwan," Chosun Ilbo as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 25, 1960), p. 12.

⁶⁶"Election of President and Vice-President Announced; Opposition Assemblymen Walk Out; Democrats Declare Invalidity of Election," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (March 19, 1960), pp. 7-8.

⁶⁷"Demonstrators Attack Police Sub-station in Masan: 7 Killed, More Than 70 Wounded," and "Authorities Discuss Masan Case in Presence of Chief of Army Staff Song: Home Minister Asserts Incident Stemmed From Investigation by DP," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (March 16, 1960), pp. 10, 13.

⁶⁸For more detailed accounts of the so-called "student revolution" of April 1960, see the following sources: C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke Soo Kim, op. cit., pp. 83-92. Earl, op. cit., pp. 169-75. William A. Douglas, "Korean Students and Politics," Asian Survey, III (December 1963), pp. 584-55. Kyung Cho Chung, op. cit., pp. 42-72 (the most detailed account of those cited).

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- 100 Park Chung Hee, "What Made The Revolution Succeed," Koreana Quarterly, as reprinted in The Korean Republic (August 15, 1961), p. D.
- 101 "Party Affiliation of Winners," and "Winners of Old and New Factions of DP," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (August 1, 1960), p. 5.
- 102 "Chang Cabinet Dominated by New Factionists Has to be 'Weak'," Minguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (August 24, 1960), p. 9.
- 103 "770,000 Participate in Post-Revolution Demonstrations," Seoul Sinmun, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (October 1, 1960), p. 28.
- 104 "Wounded Revolutionaries Occupy Assembly Hall," Hanguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (October 12, 1960), p. 39.
- 105 Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: The New Regime," Pacific Affairs, XXXIV (Spring 1961), p. 54.
- 106 "More than 500 Policemen Tendered Resignations Since April 19," Seoul Sinmun, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (October 20, 1960), p. 25.
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- 109 Edward Neilan, "South Korea Poised on Uneasy Edge," The Christian Science Monitor (June 8, 1960), p. 9.
- 110 "Chang Myŏn Says Size of Armed Forces Will Be Reduced to 400,000," Hanguk Ilbo; and "Renovation of Defense and Foreign Policies; Statement by Democratic Party," Seoul Il Il Sinmun, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (July 13, 1960), p. 10; and (July 21, 1960), p. 18, respectively.
- 111 "Defense Minister Emphasizes for Neutrality of Armed Forces," Hanguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (August 25, 1960), p. 10.
- 112 Neilan, "South Korea Poised On Uneasy Edge," op. cit., p. 9.
- 113 "General Palmer Opposes Drastic Disarmament," Hanguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 21, 1960), p. 6.
- 114 "Gen. White Urges Prudence in Cleaning of Armed Forces," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 22, 1960), p. 34.
- 115 E.g., see the following. "Army Chief of Staff Refutes Gen. Palmer's Statement," Minguk Ilbo, and "Gen. White Urges Prudence in Cleaning of Armed Forces," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 22, 1960), pp. 31, 34. "On Conflict of Opinion Concerning the Purge of Military Leaders," Chosun Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 24, 1960), p. 21.
- 116 "Gov't to Reduce 30,000 Instead of 50,000 Servicemen Next Year," Hanguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 29, 1960), p. 49. The reduction was completed by the end of December 1960. "Manpower Cut: Army Reshuffle Completed," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (December 28, 1960), p. 24.
- 117 "Key Armed Forces Commanding Generals' Conference Convened: Premier Chang Announces Completion of Purge Among Military Personnel," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (November 15, 1960), p. 42. "Chang Addresses Meeting of Service Chiefs," The Republic News Service (November 14, 1960), p. 2.

¹¹⁸ "On Internal Controversies in the Navy," Hanguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 11, 1960), p. 30.

¹¹⁹ "16 Leading Army Officers Visit Joint Chief of Staff Chairman to Make Some Important Recommendations on Purge of Generals," Seoul Ilil Sinmun; and "16 Army Officers Referred to Disciplinary Committee for Recommending Resignation of Former JCS Chairman," Seoul Ilil Sinmun, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (September 25, 1960), p. 41, and (October 9, 1960), p. 32, respectively.

¹²⁰ "U.S. Delays Modernization of ROK Armed Forces Due to Junior Officers' Defiance of Seniors," Chosun Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (November 7, 1960), p. 10.

¹²¹ "Star Generals: Army Promotion Screening Underway," Tong A Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (December 21, 1960), p. 24.

¹²² "Army Purge: Inside of the Army," Seoul Sinmun, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (November 23, 1960), p. 25.

¹²³ "Officers Who Recommended Resignation of Former Chairman of Joint Chief of Staff Referred to General Courtmartial," Minguk Ilbo, as translated by K.D.P.T.S. (November 3, 1960), p. 53.

¹²⁴ "Military Purification Movement Leads to 1961 May Revolution," Korean Report, II (May 1962), p. 11.

¹²⁵ Ibid., pp. 10-12. See also Kang In-sop, "The 8th Graduating Class of the Military Academy," Sin Tong A (September 1964).

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¹²⁶ Other pledges included (2) continuation of adherence to the UN Charter, fulfillment of international agreements, and restrengthening of ties with the United States and other free nations; (3) eradication of corruption and rejuvenation of the national spirit, (4) relief of economic misery and establishment of a self-sustaining economy, (5) development of the strength needed for ultimate realization of re-unification, (6) upon completion of the other pledges, transference of the government to civilian control and return of the military to their original duties. With some variations in wording, English translations of the six pledges may be found in the following sources. Republic of Korea, Military Revolutionary Committee, "A Statement by the Military Revolutionary Committee," (May 16, 1961), p. 1. Park Chung Hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, (publisher not indicated, 1963), pp. 55-56. Park Chung Hee, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹²⁷ "The Military Revolution in Korea," Korean Report, I (October 1961), p. 6.

¹²⁸ Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea (July 1, 1961), 15 pp., p. 11.

¹²⁹ Korean Report, I (October 1961), p. 6.

¹³⁰ Park, The Country, op. cit., p. 177.

¹³¹ Park Chung Hee, Our Nation's Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction (Seoul: Dong A Publishing Co., 1962), p. 21.

¹³² Park, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹³³ Park, The Country, op. cit., p. 46.

¹³⁴ Park Chung Hee, People's Path to the Fulfillment of Revolutionary Tasks (Seoul: ROK Ministry of Public Information, n.d.), 12 pp.

¹³⁵ Park, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹³⁶ Song Yo Chan, "Revolution's First 2 Months' Achievements," in ibid., p. E.

¹³⁷ Soo Young Lee, The Revolution in Korea: A Report to Our Friends Around the World (Published in Seoul with foreword by Chae Kyung Oh, ROK Minister of Information, January 1962), 12 pp., pp. 7-8.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Park, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., table of contents and pp. 65-82.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

¹⁴¹ Park, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹⁴² Soo Young Lee, The Revolution, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁴³ Park, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

¹⁴⁴ Park, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Park, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ A. M. Rosenthal, "New Challenge in South Korea: The Transition to Democracy," The New York Times (May 28, 1962), p. 12. Copyright 1962 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

¹⁴⁹ Park, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., p. 106.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

¹⁵¹ Park, "What Made the Revolution Succeed," op. cit., p. D.

¹⁵² Park, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 105.

¹⁵⁴ Park, People's Path, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹⁵⁵ Park, The Country, op. cit., pp. 109-53.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 145-46.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 152-53, 181.

¹⁶⁰ Robert Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea?", Asian Survey, II (September 1962), pp. 1-13.

¹⁶¹ Details on these and other activities of the new regime may be found in the following sources. Kwang-sop Kim "Chain of Transition Period Happenings Consolidates Basis for Third Republic," Korean Report, III (January 1963), Kyung Cho Chung, op. cit., pp. 128-45. Robert Casey, "The Military Coup in South Korea," Monthly Review (October 1961), pp. 271-78. C. I. Eugene Kim "South Korean Constitutional Development: The Meaning of the Third Republican Constitution," Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters, XLIX (1964), pp. 301-12. Scalapino, "Which Route," op. cit., esp. pp. 4-6.

¹⁶² For example, see the critical judgment of the regime on the basis of observations made in Seoul at the time, by Professor Glenn Paige, in a letter to The New York Times (June 25, 1961), Sec. 4, p. 8.

¹⁶³ E.g., see an article by ROK Prime Minister, Song Yo Chan, "Revolution's First 2 Months' Achievements," Korean Republic (August 15, 1961), pp. D-F.

¹⁶⁴ E. J. Kahn, Jr., "Spring in Korea," The New Yorker, XXXVII (May 27, 1961), pp. 43 ff.

¹⁶⁵ Park, The Country, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁶ Charles Wolf, Jr., "Economic Planning in Korea," Asian Survey, II (December 1962), pp. 22-28.

¹⁶⁷ The plan is summarized in *ibid.*, and in Park, The Country, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

¹⁶⁸ Kwang-sop Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-9.

¹⁶⁹ General Park called the drought and floods "a fatal blow" to the primary sector of the economy. Park, The Country, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹⁷⁰ Kaoru Nomiyama, "Life in South Korea Today," Asia Scene, VII (November 1962), pp. 12-15.

¹⁷¹ "New Life Created for Everyone Thanks to Military Revolution," Korean Republic (August 1961), p. C.

¹⁷² No-yong Park, "Should We Impose Democracy on Korea?", Current History, XLI (December 1961), pp. 341-49 ff. Reprinted by permission of Current History, Inc.

¹⁷³ A. M. Rosenthal, "Korea Junta Seizes Graft Inquiry Team," The New York Times (October 8, 1961), p. 345.

¹⁷⁴ "Economic Developments in the Republic of Korea: 1961," prepared by Jack T. Miskell, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Far Eastern Division, Office of Regional Economics, Bureau of International Programs, World Trade Information Service (1961, Part 1, No. 62-39), pp. 1-8.

¹⁷⁵ Norman Sklarewitz, "Crisis in Korea," The Wall Street Journal (December 16, 1963), p. 12.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ The Wall Street Journal (December 16, 1963), p. 12.

¹⁷⁸ Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

¹⁸⁰ The statements were disseminated by means of press and radio. The first said, "General Magruder, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, calls upon all military personnel in his command to support the duly recognized Government of the Republic of Korea headed by Prime Minister Chang Myun. General Magruder expects that the chiefs of Korean Armed Forces will use their authority and influence to see that control is immediately returned back to governmental authorities and that order is restored in the armed forces." The statement by Minister Green was as follows: "The position taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command in supporting the freely elected and constitutionally established Government of the Republic of Korea is one in which I fully concur. I wish to make emphatically clear that the United States supports the constitutional Government of the Republic of Korea as elected by the People of the Republic last July and as constituted by election last August of the Prime Minister." Quoted by Walter Briggs, "The Military Revolution in Korea: On Its Leader and Achievements," Koreana Quarterly, V (Summer 1963), 30.

¹⁸¹ Reference deleted in revision.

¹⁸² Quoted by A. M. Rosenthal, "Men of New Type Run Seoul Regime," The New York Times (July 14, 1961), pp. 1ff. Copyright 1961 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

¹⁸³ See The New York Times (May 21, 1961), sec. 2, p. 4.

¹⁸⁴ The fall of General Chang came in stages. See The New York Times (June 4, 1961), p. 9; (June 6, 1961), p. 3; (July 4, 1961), pp. 1, 18. General Chang was later arrested, tried, and convicted on charges of having attempted to thwart the military revolution. His sentence was changed from death to life imprisonment; but in May 1962, he was released on orders from Revolutionary Chairman Park Chung Hee. See The New York Times (October 24, 1961) p. 18; (November 7, 1961), p. 4 (Park Chung Hee testimony at the trial of General Chang); (January 10, 1962), p. 2; (March 10, 1962), p. 4; (May 3, 1962), p. 6.

¹⁸⁵ "The Military Revolution in Korea," Korean Report, I (October 1961), p. 7.

¹⁸⁶ The New York Times (May 21, 1961), p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ Republic of Korea, SCNR, Chairman, "Statement Concerning the Turnover of the Government to Civilian Control" (August 12, 1961), 1 p.

¹⁸⁸ See the references cited in footnote 161 above.

¹⁸⁹ Kim Chong-p'il as quoted in Kwang-sop Kim, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁹⁰ A translation of the nine-point proposal, and an account of key events relevant to the decision to go ahead with elections in 1963, especially detailed for the period of January - March 1963 are contained in "Gov't Civilian Leaders Seek Compromise for Realistic Solution of Political Dilemma," Korean Report, III (February-March 1963), pp. 3-6.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid. This confusing sequence of events also was followed quite closely by The New York Times. (Western edition for most issues.) See esp. (January 19, 1963), p. 2; (February 19, 1963), p. 2; (March 18, 1963), p. 3; (March 20, 1963), p. 3; (March 21, 1963), p. 4; (March 23, 1963), p. 1; (March 27, 1963), p. 1; (April 2, 1963), p. 13; (April 3, 1963), p. 1; (April 6, 1963), p. 1; (April 8, 1963), p. 15; (May 27, 1963), p. 8.

^{193a} "United States Expresses Views on Military Rule," Department of State Bulletin, XLVIII (April 15, 1963), p. 573; and Rosenthal, A. M., "Korean Military Offers Coalition," The New York Times (Western edition), 27 March 1963, pp. 1, 2.

^{193b} "Kennedy Urging Korea Civil Rule," The New York Times, April 3, 1963, pp. 1, 11.

^{193c} "First Major Party Set Up By Regime's Foes in Seoul," The New York Times, May 15, 1963, p. 16.

¹⁹⁴ The social origins and career experiences of various individuals and factions within ROK military leadership are of sufficient interest, both in terms of their relevance to general theory in social science and in terms of their relevance to practical politics in Korea, to merit detailed analysis beyond the scope of the present essay. Data gathering for such analysis currently being conducted jointly by the present author and C.I. Eugene Kim is in a relatively early stage, however. The discussion in the following paragraphs of the present essay is based upon preliminary analysis of currently available data from sources too numerous to list here.

¹⁹⁵ Republic of Korea, Supreme Council of National Reconstruction, "New Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction," (sometimes called the Basic Law of the military government, taking precedence over the constitution), signed and promulgated June 6, 1961, as translated in full as an appendix in Kyung Cho Chung, op. cit., pp. 224-30. Article 4

of this law fixed the number of persons to sit on the SCNR, although of course the SCNR had been organized and had drafted the law themselves.

¹⁹⁶ See the Basic Law, article 24, as cited in *ibid.* On the new constitution, see the following. Kwang-sop Kim, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7. C. I. Eugene Kim, "South Korean Constitutional Development," *op. cit.*, pp. 301-312. Robert A. Scalapino, "Korea: The Politics of Change," *Asian Survey*, III (January 1963), pp. 31-39.

¹⁹⁷ *The New York Times* (May 18, 1961), pp. 1 ff. Briggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-34.

¹⁹⁸ Fragmentary data collected by the author on 279 persons holding ambassadorships, gubernatorial posts, or top civil service positions during the period since 1961 reveal that 5 percent were over 60 years of age as of 1960, 23 percent were between 51 and 60 years, 35 percent between the ages of 41 and 50, 35 percent between 31 and 40, and 2 percent 30 or younger.

¹⁹⁹ *Korean Report*, III (February-March 1963), p. 5. The Song Yo Ch'an, Yu Won-sik, and Kim Tong-ha episodes, and their relationship to the 1963 elections, are described in Chong-sik Lee, "Korea: In Search of Stability," *Asian Survey*, IV (January 1964), pp. 656-65.

²⁰⁰ *Korean Report*, III (February-March 1963), pp. 5, 25.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

²⁰² *The New York Times* (Western edition) (March 7, 1963), p. 2.

²⁰³ *The New York Times* (August 12, 1963), p. 1.

²⁰⁴ A more detailed, although concise, description of these events is found in William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVII (Spring 1964), pp. 20-36. A biographical sketch of Kim Chong-p'il which describes some of the key happenings of this period is found in "Ambitious Korea," *The New York Times* (June 6, 1964), p. 4. Of the CIA appointments, see *Korean Report*, III (February-March 1963), p. 5; and *The New York Times* (July 13, 1963), p. 5; (September 8, 1965), p. 3.

QUASI-CIVILIANIZATION: 1963-65

²⁰⁵ As Finer notes, the transition from direct military rule to "quasi-civilianization" is a common one. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 176-90.

²⁰⁶ Kang In-sop, *op. cit.*

²⁰⁷ See C. I. Eugene Kim, "Significance of the 1963 Korean Elections," *Asian Survey*, IV (March 1964), pp. 765-73; and Chong-sik Lee, *op. cit.*, pp. 656-65.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Election returns are cited in *Korean Report*, III (October-November 1963), pp. 3-4. See also *The New York Times* (October 17, 1963), p. 1; (October 18, 1963), p. 6; (December 1, 1963), p. 25.

²⁰⁹ "Unrest Rising Among Korean Workers," "Seoul Is Facing Austere Spring," and "Debts Still Beset Korean Farmers," in *The New York Times* (March 1, 1964), sec. 1, p. 20; (March 22, 1964), sec. 1, p. 10; and (April 12, 1964), sec. 1, p. 3, respectively. Also Warren Unna, "Korea Faces Steep Pull to Prosperity Plateau," *The Washington Post* (April 7, 1964), sec. A 1, 18.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.* Also, *The New York Times* (January 12, 1964), sec. 1, p. 12.

²¹¹ "Corruption Issue Is Plaguing Seoul," "Korea Will Oust 573 as Corrupt," "Seoul Seeks Way To Curb Grafting," "576 Korean Aides To Be Dismissed," and "Desperation in Korea," in The New York Times (February 9, 1964), sec. 1, p. 8; (March 7, 1965), p. 5; (May 31, 1964), sec. 1, p. 3; (June 9, 1964), sec. 1, p. 1; and (June 16, 1964), sec. 1, p. 4, respectively. Also "Seoul Moves To Curb Corruption in an Effort To Pacify Students," The Washington Post (June 9, 1964), sec. A, p. 11.

²¹² The Park address is translated in full in Korean Report, IV (January 1964), pp. 5-9.

²¹³ Reference deleted in revision.

²¹⁴ Various protests, governmental countermeasures, and the role of Kim Chong-p'il are discussed in the following sources. "Signs of a Power Test Grow in Korea," "Top Aide Firm on Need for Tokyo Ties," "Seoul's No. 2 Man Asked To Resign," "Students Seized in Seoul Protest," "Korean Protests Against Regime Spread to 8 Cities," "Feuding Imperils Top Korean Party," and "Kim, Ex-Party Chief in Korea, Is Coming to U.S. for Seminar" in The New York Times, 1964 (March 30), sec. 1, p. 8; (April 2), sec. 1, p. 5; (June 2), sec. 1, p. 14; (April 21), sec. 1, p. 6; (June 5), sec. 1, p. 1; (June 7), sec. 1, p. 21; and (June 15), p. 7, respectively. See also The Washington Post, 1964, (June 4), sec. A, p. 1; (June 5), sec. A, p. 23; (June 14), sec. A, p. 32; (June 6), sec. A, p. 9.

²¹⁵ See, e.g., J. Mark Mobius, "The Japan-Korean Normalization Process and Korean Anti-Americanism," Asian Survey, VI (April 1966), pp. 241-48. Mobius, "The Korean Press and Public Opinion About Japan," Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Autumn 1965). Lawrence Olson, "Japan and Korea: The Bitter Legacy," AUFS Reports, IX (East Asia Series, 1961). Chong-do Hah, "Bitter Diplomacy: Postwar Japan-Korean Relations," Studies on Asia (1964), pp. 63-87. Chong-sik Lee, "Japanese Korean Relations in Perspective," Pacific Affairs, XXXV (Winter 1962-63), pp. 315-26. P. Allen Dionisopoulos, "Japanese-Korean Relations: A Dilemma in the Anti-Communist World," Midwest Journal of Political Science, I (May 1957), pp. 60-76.

²¹⁶ The New York Times (November 20, 1965), p. 12. Copyright 1965 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

CHAPTER 6
POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN BURMA*

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INTRODUCTION

The present study focuses on the period from the independence of Burma in 1948 to 1965. During the last half of that period Burma had a military regime which initiated revolutionary changes as profound as any seen in the developing world since World War II. However, there has not been only one pattern of military involvement in civil politics there but three separate patterns: the civilian governments of 1948-58 and 1960-62; the first military government of 1958-60; and the second military government since 1962.

Civilian Government: 1948-58 and 1960-62

During the first decade of Burma's independence the military tended to play an apolitical role at the national level. Influence on decision-making in forming national policies tended to be limited to matters pertaining to the military budget and internal security. At the same time, Burma was torn by civil war, and greater importance was given to military problems than would have been true if the situation had been internally stable. Revolts by ethnic groups such as the Karens, Shans, Kachins, Mons, and Arakanese, and ideologically oriented rebellions by Communists and former army units, caused the military to become a participant in local government in unsettled areas. In the economic field the Defense Services began the limited purchase of firms for military procurement purposes. Following a 1958-60 caretaker government under military leadership, the civilians again returned to power. During 1960-62 military interest in civilian activities was more apparent than during the previous period of civilian government, and the danger of a military coup was a recognized factor of public life.

First Military Government: 1958-60

During 1958 the civilian government under Prime Minister Nu displayed a deep and apparently unbridgeable division, as the political party which had ruled Burma for a decade, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, split into two almost equal sections, the "Stable AFPFL" and the "Clean AFPFL." With the insurgency problem left unsolved and civil war possible because of the split within the AFPFL, the Defense Services, under General Ne Win, were asked to take over control of the government. After this request, which has been called "an invitation to a coup," the military took power in October 1958 with the promise to stabilize the political situation and then return power to the civilians. The military interregnum was somewhat longer than anticipated, and elections were not held until February 1960. The military turned the government over to the victor in those elections, U Nu, in April of that year. During this eighteen-month period, the formal institutions of government remained, but the armed forces were the primary decision-makers and established all important policies, while the politicians performed the role of critics. The Defense Services were particularly

* The views expressed are exclusively those of the author; they do not represent the views of CRESS or the U.S. Government.

interested in educating the voting population toward competitive democracy, making national and local administration more efficient, and accomplishing the economic and social rehabilitation of city and country life. In performing the last function, the military became deeply involved in economic matters as it took part in the formation and ownership of a variety of business firms, often as joint-venture operations with foreign groups. Its final job as caretaker was the administration of national elections, which were held with fewer complaints of government interference and corruption than had ever been experienced in previous elections.

Second Military Government: 1962-65

Following increased demands from ethnic groups for regional autonomy, and fears of greater civil strife articulated by the military, the armed forces staged a coup in March 1962. The type of involvement by the military since 1962 has differed markedly from the two previous periods. Almost the entire political and institutional framework was dismantled as major politicians were arrested, the constitution abrogated, Parliament and regional assemblies eliminated, all old political parties dissolved, and the judiciary reconstituted. In their place was formed a central decision-making body, the Revolutionary Council; a single political party formed along lines of democratic centralism; and a series of functional councils, all dominated by members of the military. The capitalist system has been all but eliminated, foreign firms have been purchased, local and foreign businesses nationalized, and middlemen eliminated from the agricultural economy in the name of the ideology and plan of the Revolutionary Council, "The Burmese Way to Socialism."

Within the developing world three factors in the environmental situation have usually been responsible for the entrance of the military into civilian politics. The first of these has been the inability on the part of a civilian government to achieve the goals of independence. With regard to Burma, much of the hoped-for Utopia promised in the days of the nationalist revolution was not achieved. The economy of Burma never fully recovered from the Japanese invasion and postwar revolts. A second factor has been the inability of a civilian government to cope with religious, ethnic, or ideological disunity. In the case of Burma, the revolts kept the government in constant turmoil and made it impossible to carry out needed reforms. They also led to frustration on the part of the military, and the suspicion that the civilian arm of the government was not doing all that was possible to end the insurgency. A third factor in the environmental situation has been the inability of the government to cope with perceived outside aggression. Whereas this factor has been an important stimulus to military intervention in areas such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and South Vietnam, it does not appear to have been important in the Burmese case. Other factors having to do with the composition and values of the military will be discussed in relationship to the Burmese case.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY

Operational History

According to Burmese military tradition, the armed forces were born in the turbulent period of 1941-45. Their heritage is thus considered nationalist and not colonial or professional. In actuality, the British maintained a company of Burman sappers and miners as early as 1887 and Burmese of all ethnic groups served in World War I. However, in 1925 the bulk of the Burman force was reduced and in 1927 the remaining Burmans were discharged. For ten years, from 1927 to 1937, Burma's defense was largely left to Indians and

Burmese companies of Karens, Kachins, and Chins. In 1937, following the separation of Burma from India, Burmans were readmitted to the army. Few joined in the first years, and at the outbreak of World War II fewer than 500 Burmans had enlisted.

In the two years prior to the Japanese invasion of 1941-42, a major effort was made to recruit Burmese of all ethnic groups, and beginnings were made in the formation of a navy and air force. But the prewar armed forces never had mass appeal; nationalists especially were antagonistic. There were several drawbacks to military service from the Burman point of view:

1. The army was formed along Indian lines and had a foreign tinge to it.
2. Officers were primarily Indian, British, or from non-Burman hill tribes. The most senior Burman to hold a king's commission in the army was a captain and the most senior Burman naval officer was a sublieutenant.²
3. The armed forces themselves had long been non-Burman (see Table 1) and as Burmans entered the service in greater numbers after 1939 they found themselves with less experience and seniority than those drawn from the country's minorities.
4. This was a period of national awakening, and an army which had previously been used to thwart Burmese nationalism might again hinder a national uprising.
5. The army had little prestige or status in prewar Burma and, in the words of one observer, "captured no Burman's imagination."

As a result of these factors, the present Burmese army looks not to the British-Indian professional levies for its heritage, but to the Japanese-trained nationalist organizations of World War II. One official date given for the birth of the "National Army" is March 3, 1941. On that day the future leader of Burma, Aung San, returned to Burma from a secret mission in Japan for the purpose of laying the groundwork for an underground organization. This was followed by the formation of the famous "Thirty Comrades," a group of Burmans sent to Japanese territory for training for the coming struggle against the British. After preparation in sabotage, military administration, and guerrilla methods, they and other Burmese returned to Burma at the time of the Japanese invasion. These men, plus underground fighters, regular army deserters, and new enlistees composed the nucleus of the first truly Burman National Army. During the following years the armed forces operated under four different names: the original Burma Independence Army (BIA), Burma Defense Army (BDA), Burma Army (Bama Tasmadaw), and the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF) or Local Burmese Forces (LBF). Until March 1945 the Burmese military worked in uneasy alliance with the Japanese, but on the 27th of that month it rose in revolt against its former allies.

Table 1
Ethnic Constitution of Army at Outbreak of World War II³

Race	Percentage of Total Population	No. in Army	Percentage of Army
Burman	75.11	472	12.3
Karen	9.34	1448	37.8
Chin	2.34	868	22.6
Kachin	1.05	881	22.9
Others:			
Native	2.38	168	4.3
Foreign	9.74		

The end of the war saw a period of hard bargaining over the future of the Burmese nationalist troops, the protagonists being Bogyoke (General) Aung San and the British command.⁴ As a result, approximately 5,700 men were brought into the regular army while the remainder later established the People's Volunteer Organization (PVO), a supposedly unarmed veterans' group. Most of the nationalists incorporated into the regular service formed the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Burma Rifles, out of which came a large proportion of the leaders of the later military coups. The 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 6th battalions of the Burma Rifles were Burman. Other ethnic groups formed regiments under the names of the Karen Rifles, Kachin Rifles, and Chin Rifles. In the immediate postwar period a navy and air force were also inaugurated.

The military forces had little time to organize themselves, for within two months of Burma's day of independence (January 4, 1948), the country was rent by rebellion, a condition which has existed in varying degrees to this day. To summarize briefly the complex issues involved: rebellions were of both an ideological and an ethnoreligious variety. In 1948-49 those instigating civil war were parts of the PVO, two Communist organizations (the Red Flag and White Flag), the Karens, who brought with them all of the regular Karen battalions, and, for a time, the Kachins and other tribal groups. At their maximum strength, the rebels put at least 30,000 men into the field. The main forces of the disaffected groups were put down by 1950 but not before almost every part of Burma had witnessed civil war and the capital of Rangoon had withstood a lengthy siege. Remnants of these antigovernment forces are still in the field, along with disaffected Kachins, Mons, Shans, Mujahids, and Kuomintang troops who escaped from China during 1949 and 1950. In 1960 the government reported the strengths of the insurgents as indicated in Table 2. In 1962 the number of rebels was put at between 7,000 and 9,000. This situation has obviously necessitated heavy commitments to field operations; as late as 1959 all thirteen brigades were reported to be engaged against the insurgents. At no time in the past sixteen years have the Burmese armed forces experienced an extended period when they were not deployed in at least counter guerrilla operations.

Table 2
Insurgency in 1960⁵

Insurgents	Number
White Flag Communists	700
Red Flag Communists	209
Karens	1,695
Shans	274
Kuomintang	2,317
Mujahids	290
Total	5,485

Size, Organization, Equipment

Varying in size over the years, it is claimed that the number of men in the Burmese military establishment was as high as 50,000 in 1942 and approximately 11,800 at the time of the attack on the Japanese in March 1945. In recent years, one report put the regular armed forces at 35,000 in 1957, including the army, navy, and air force but excluding provincial forces. A later figure gives 60,000 men supplemented by 13,000 military police. Janowitz⁶ gives a number of 149,000, including military police, as of January 1963.⁷

The organization of the military has undergone a number of changes during the past twenty years. According to U Nu, the military establishment was poorly organized as of 1951. After that period, major attention was given to the need for reorganization. Until the 1962 coup the minister of defense was normally a civilian, and civilian control of the military was accepted in principle.⁸ The minister of defense is now Gen. Ne Win, head of the Revolutionary Council. Under the civilian governments, a chief of staff system was inaugurated, with Ne Win as chief of staff, and vice-chiefs for army, navy, and air force, and an integrated general staff was established. In the field, the commanders of the thirteen brigades (all infantry) were normally colonels, and the commanders of the approximately fifty battalions were colonels and lieutenant colonels.

The army has remained primarily an infantry force, with limited artillery support; the capability of the army, therefore, is primarily limited to counter guerrilla and internal security activity. The air force has been updated with jet aircraft, but remains relatively small. The navy, also small, is equipped primarily with torpedo boats and gunboats.⁹

Training Patterns and Procedures in the Army

Burma's army has undergone four major phases of training. Prior to the war it was molded along Indian lines, with governor's commissioned officers (successors to viceroy's commissioned officers), jemadars and subahdars. During the war the Japanese provided the model for the army, and uniforms and weapons. At that time an officers' training school was established at Mingaladon, on the outskirts of Rangoon, and 300 cadets were matriculated. Further military education was given to the best cadets, who were sent to the Imperial Military Academy in Japan. These men became the nucleus of postwar officers. After the war the British became influential, and although British officers were soon eliminated from the army itself, a British military mission of some 70 officers and men had a major impact on the type of army that developed in Burma. Training, weapons, uniforms, insignia, and military procedure were modeled after the British military organization. The mission was withdrawn in 1954. Recently there has been an effort to instill into the military a greater orientation toward Burmese tradition and ideology. In the discussion which follows, training procedures are described, as they vary according to rank and arm of service.

Post-cadet Training

Until recently, regular officers have obtained advanced schooling from the local staff college or overseas. Men have been sent to Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, India, Yugoslavia, and Israel, but in the past, the primary training areas were the United Kingdom and the United States. Navy officers and men were trained at Dartmouth; army officers at Sandhurst in England, in the United States at Fort Leavenworth and other training centers; flying officers and men were trained in both England and the United States. Even the first women's corps received its initial instruction in the United Kingdom. Short "refresher courses" for senior officers have been held in Commonwealth countries, particularly the United Kingdom.

By the mid-1950's, however, most of those trained overseas were to be found in the United States rather than in the United Kingdom.

Cadet and New Officers' Training¹⁰

Since 1955 the military has maintained a regular college for the training of all the services, the Defence Services Academy, now at Maymyo. According to Prime Minister Nu, it was planned for "maximum effect and minimum expenditures in resources." As the modern trend was toward integration of forces and a closer relationship among the services, it was argued that the need was for a joint institution for army, navy, and air force. The academy was originally planned for a maximum annual enrollment of 100 cadets, but has not yet reached full enrollment. Open to all young men of ages sixteen to eighteen who can qualify for the university entrance examinations, prerequisites and training have been directed toward quality rather than quantity. Military training is given up to the level of platoon commander; and four years of academic training are provided (the cadet may choose arts or sciences, although the latter are now heavily emphasized). Those choosing science have spent part of their cadet period at Rangoon University where they have maintained a separate mess. In the past, the general course of instruction was approved by the Senate of Rangoon University, and instruction was academic rather than technical. The relationship of Rangoon University to the military instruction program is now changed because of the temporary closing of colleges and universities by the Revolutionary Council. In many ways the academy did not live up to its earlier hopes and there remains a need for considerable improvement in training.

There is another source from which officers are drawn. University graduates are encouraged to apply for commissions and to go to Officers' Training School. During OTS they receive subaltern's pay and following OTS they get two years' seniority. Even more officer candidates may be admitted through this channel if the military stays in power.

N. C. O.'s and Enlisted Men

Enlisted men usually go to a "depot" for basic training, which includes general education as well as military training. N. C. O.'s may gain further education in Burma or overseas. According to Tinker, a total lack of experienced or promising N. C. O.'s is one of the chief weaknesses of the army. Any educated and promising N. C. O. is quickly commissioned.¹¹

Air Force and Navy

The first air force training program started in 1947 with the establishment of the Flying Training School at Mingaladon.¹² Candidates go through rigid mental and physical examinations prior to an initial twelve weeks' training course in academic and technical fields. This is followed by flying instruction, more technical analysis, and weapons training. Aerodynamics, airmanship, air traffic control, signals and radio, aeronautics, meteorology, weapons, aviation mechanics, and air frame and maintenance are taught. Cadets are now training in

Provosts, Beechcrafts, and Dakotas. The total training period lasts approximately eighteen months. Cadets may also continue their training overseas. The 23 present trainees include 13 civilians. As of 1963, the air force was giving its 27th pilot training course since 1947.

There have been valiant efforts to provide a broader education for officers and men alike. During the 1958-60 period this was epitomized in an army-sponsored periodical called the Open Mind. This was freely distributed to officers, upper-echelon administrators, and university students. One issue included articles by D. Wolfstone, A. Einstein, General Montgomery, Kenyl Katvama, Aldous Huxley, and Sydney Hook. The military lent offices to an American-run international relations program and have subsidized overseas nonmilitary education for officers and civilians.

A central part of the education of officers and men has been ideological discussion and indoctrination. The Defense Services have held meetings, published pamphlets and other materials, given classes, and otherwise attempted to provide and explain the ideology of the military to the services. This began in earnest at a conference of commanding officers in 1956 and was greatly expanded during periods of military rule. Indoctrination reached its height during 1963-64.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY

Patterns of Recruitment

Our next task is to analyze the background of the individuals within the military who have actively engaged in civilian politics. What can be stated must be impressionistic in many cases because of the scarcity of source materials. Much more information is needed in this area, especially with regard to enlisted men. A few tentative observations pertaining to the recruitment of enlisted men will be made prior to a somewhat more detailed treatment of officer recruitment.

The Burmese army has been a volunteer organization. Originally, it was drawn from those who had constituted the BIA and BNA. At that time the men were more politically oriented and probably more city- and small town-based than they are currently. Recruitment appeals were based on nationalist goals, although, as with other countries during similar periods, the army attracted its share of adventurers. The present army is apparently more peasant-based, with a scattering of politically minded young nationalists. In 1949 a compulsory military training bill was passed, although as of 1965 it had not been implemented. The bill calls for compulsory training for all males 18-46, women 18-36, and technical personnel 18-56. Service is to be from six months to two years.

As was pointed out, officers are now drawn from among cadets who are given professional and academic training, university graduates, and promising N.C.O.'s. There are a few men who were rebels and who have returned to the fold, but this group is extremely small. Middle grade officers tend to be of peasant or small-town background.

Of particular interest are the backgrounds of key officers in the two military governments. These are men drawn almost exclusively from an older generation; their backgrounds may help explain their attitudes and behavior.

The first group to be discussed are the officers who helped to administer the government during Ne Win's first period of rule (1956-60). To a very large extent, these were men who had served during the Japanese period and had entered the service as young nationalists. They were not of the "Thirty Comrades": by the mid-1950's Ne Win and one Major Bala were the only members of the Thirty Comrades still in the regular army. Nor is there a high-ranking army officer at present who served in the regular prewar army. One way of checking the early service of these men is to review the officers who held the 144 major posts in the civil government (cabinet members were almost all civilians, but important aides were often military men). This can be done, in the absence of other information, by ascertaining their possession of a military order called the Star of the Revolution. Possessors of the Star of the Revolution served from January 6, 1942, to July 26, 1942; July 27, 1942, to March 26, 1945; or March 27, 1945, to August 15, 1945. Those holding the first degree served in all three periods; second degree in two of the three periods; and third degree, in one period. Of the top military members in each ministry, only two did not hold the order, first or second degree, and eleven of the nineteen held the Star of the Revolution, first degree. More than one-third of the 144 posts were held by men possessing the order, and only ten of those of the rank of major or above had not served in the Burmese army prior to August 15, 1945.¹⁴ These figures show the remarkable continuity of the revolution. Men thus recruited into the military as soldier-nationalists have a heritage which cannot be described as apolitical.

Following the return of U Nu in 1960 there were a number of changes in the armed services (not necessarily made through U Nu's intervention). The major change took place in February 1961 when, due to intra-army conflicts, some 13 officers, including 9 of the 13 brigade commanders, resigned.

A clue to the background of the present military organization can be seen by surveying the seventeen-member Revolutionary Council (only two original members of which are not military men). Broadly speaking, the membership of the Revolutionary Council at its inception in 1962 was composed of 11 colonels, 5 brigadiers, and 1 general (see Table 3). Deputy chiefs of staff for all three services were named, although the navy member died soon after the coup. Six officers—Gen. Ne Win, Brig. Aung Gyi, Brig. Tin Pe, Col. Hla Han, Col. Kyaw Soe, and Col. Saw Myint—held multiple ministerial posts while Lt. Col. Ba Ni was the only military cabinet member not on the Revolutionary Council (his was considered a technical post in the transport field). At least 9 of these men had been original members of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Burma Rifles (Burifs) and held commissions dated November 15, 1945. Three members—Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, and Kyaw Soe—all holding highly responsible positions after the coup, had been subordinates of Ne Win in the 4th Burma Rifles. At least nine of the members of the Revolutionary Council had been in the Burma army prior to the period when it changed sides in March 1945 to fight the Japanese. Only about half a dozen had not held important posts in the 1958-60 government. Therefore, this was again a group that had long had mutual associations and had been recruited, as a general rule, almost twenty years before in the nationalist cause. Most had had previous governmental experience, and more than one, such as Aung Gyi, had formerly been associated with party politics.¹⁵

There have been breaks in the unity of the revolutionary leadership. Prior to the coup of 1962, several officers high in the earlier Ne Win government had retired or taken overseas posts (the most important of whom was Col. Maung Maung, who, with Gen. Ne Win and Brig. Aung Gyi, formed the ruling triumvirate.) Com. Than Pe died within weeks of the coup; Brig. Aung Gyi resigned over differences in socialist development; and in 1964, Col. Chit Myaing was relieved of his duties for "acts prejudicial to government policy." Later, Brigadier Clift resigned.

Table 3

1962 Revolutionary Council Membership¹⁶

Gen. Ne Win (Chairman), Minister of Finance and Revenue, Defense, Justice
 Brig. Aung Gyi, Minister of Trade, Industries, and Supplies
 Com. Than Pe, Minister of Education and Public Health
 Brig. T. Clift
 Brig. Tin Pe, Minister of Agriculture and Forests, Cooperatives and
 Commodity Distribution, Minister of Trade after Col. Chit Myaing
 Brig. San Yu
 Brig. Sein Win
 Col. Thaung Gyi
 Col. Kyi Maung
 Col. Maung Shwe
 Col. Than Sein
 Col. Kyaw Soe, Minister for Home Affairs, Immigration, Democratization,
 Religious Affairs, and National Registration
 Col. Saw Myint, Minister of Information and Cultural Affairs
 Col. Chit Myaing, Minister of Trade after Aung Gyi
 Col. Khin Nyo
 Col. Hla Han, now Minister of Education and Health
 Col. Tan Yu Saing

Prestige of the Military

Because hard data are scarce on such an elusive concept as prestige, the following discussion is based upon the author's impressions as well as those of other observers.

Whereas the prewar colonial military had little status among Burmans, it did have prestige among minority groups such as the Chins and Karens. With the growth of the BIA, BNA, post-war Defense Services, and postindependence rebellions, this situation has been somewhat reversed. The military became purely Burmese and was at the forefront of the nationalist movement. Its men dressed differently, received higher pay than most civil servants, and had a number of special privileges. At the same time, it was defending the population against civil disorders without visible material rewards. This last point should be explained. While pay was high for Burma, and PX and other facilities were available, officers did not appear to garner riches from their activities. Unlike their Thai neighbors, there have been very few signs of corruption among officers, and cars and homes are generally of the Volkswagen, Fiat class.

During the control of civil government by the military, there has been a concerted effort to build and maintain the prestige of the armed forces. This has been done through the normal public-relations methods as well as by those peculiarly Burmese. One of the latter efforts took place during the 1958-60 period when the army caught and paraded through Rangoon, with great fanfare, a baby white elephant. This animal is held sacred in Buddhist Burma and its capture was publicized as a most propitious sign for the government and state.

The aforementioned facts do not mean that the military is unopposed or always held in high regard. Overbearing attitudes have often nettled citizens. At one time U Nu criticized those "who swagger with revolvers dangling on their belts or rifles in their hands, dizzy with newly acquired power and arrogant in dealing with the people."¹⁷ There have been clashes with other state groups such as the Buddhist monks. In addition, groups and individuals who have

been deprived by the military tend to be highly critical and derogatory. These groups include rebels in the field, politicians and civil servants and their families who have lost their positions or been jailed, rioting students whose colleges and universities have been restricted and closed, entrepreneurs whose shops have been closed by nationalization, certain religious groups unhappy over the more secular attitudes of the Revolutionary Council, and the foreign community which has suffered from Burmanization and nationalization. Almost all of these groups have been less satisfied with the military during the post-1962 coup period than during the 1958-60 era. The Revolutionary Council has not been unaware of their problems; for example, when it took over in 1962, the council declared, "Do not claim privileges at places of entertainment, traveling or in public places from the public." The military was warned not to "take undue advantage when assigned to duties of state."

One aspect of military prestige that needs investigation and which remains a gap in our knowledge is the relationship between the natural military character of army operations and Buddhist sanctions against violence. U Nu and others have displayed obvious religious uneasiness over the necessity of taking lives in anti-insurgency operations. The extent to which attitudes such as these affect public reaction to the military is problematical, but the guess of the present author would be that there is very little impact.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE MILITARY: 1948-58 AND 1960-62

An analysis of the relation of the military to the political system must consider the period prior to independence, and the eras of civil rule, 1948 to October 1958, and April 1960 to March 1962. The military governments will be described later, because at those times the military actually takes over rather than relates to the political system.

Period Prior to Independence

Until March 1945 the armed forces of Burma had worked with the Japanese against the Allies. The head of the armed forces was the acknowledged leader of the nationalist movement, Aung San. In March 1945 the Burma National Army turned against the Japanese and, cooperating with the British, was an important element in the drive to recapture Rangoon. As Aung San was both a military leader of these troops and an official of the major nationalist party, the AFPFL, this made the British somewhat indebted to a group which might otherwise have been considered collaborators. In the initial negotiations with the British, the existence of a Burmese military plus large numbers of armed veterans gave the nationalists an important bargaining position. The alliance of military and nationalists has been considered an important part of their history by the officers of Burma's armed forces. It should be noted as well that former Col. Ba Than's history of this period is called Roots of the Revolution.

Civil Rule: 1948-58 and 1960-62

The formal structure of government until 1962 was a British parliamentary and federal system. There was a bicameral legislature with the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, composed of 250 members elected by the people, and an upper house, the Chamber of Nationalities, also popularly elected but established to represent the states and ethnic groups therein. The prime minister and his cabinet were responsible to the chief legislative body, the Chamber

of Deputies. Both houses were needed to elect the president, who was titular head of state, to approve of members of the High and Supreme Courts, to pass on amendments, and to declare war and make peace. Formerly there were both an independent judiciary and autonomous state powers. But political practice substantially altered the aforementioned structure.

In reality, political party developments and the character of the chief political personality of the era were the primary factors in the political system. Throughout Burma's period of civilian rule the country was dominated by one party. In the elections for the lower house prior to the caretaker government, opponents of the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) received fewer than one-quarter of the seats, and the largest opposition party obtained only 48 seats out of a total of 250. The AFPFL split in 1958, but in the 1960 elections the country returned to a system dominated by a single party as the voters gave U Nu's section of the party (the "Clean AFPFL" or Pyidaungsu Party) and its affiliates approximately 80 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. One-party dominance meant that, with the exception of the 1958 period, Parliament, the cabinet, and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary, were subservient to outside political party pressure. Throughout the first ten years of independence the Executive Council (E.C.) of the AFPFL was the most significant decision-making body in the country. Nor did the federal system withstand this pressure, and the Chamber of Nationalities, supposedly representing the states, was under party control and state powers were severely restricted.

Within this system, U Nu served as prime minister almost continuously and was the dominant political force. Decisions were not taken without his express approval and the normal pattern was for government leaders to seek his advice and approval prior to any major, and in many cases minor, projects. To quote Richard Butwell's very illuminating U Nu of Burma,

Nu was a party to every decision, irrespective of the number of other persons involved. One of Nu's closest staff associates has said of his conduct in chairing the E.C., "He maneuvered the party as he did the Cabinet—not quite in a rubber stamp sense but not too far from it." . . . A close . . . associate of many years' standing has added, "Nu took mild disagreement as insufficient reason for changing course—and strong disagreement as insubordination—therefore it did not occur."¹⁸

Considerably more could be said about the political process and constitutional structure during this period. In brief, although the dominance of the AFPFL and U Nu and his associates may have from time to time hindered competition, Burma was further along on the road to democracy in those years than most Afro-Asian states. Within this pattern the armed forces restricted themselves to the military sphere and only entered the political arena in the months prior to Ne Win's assumption of office in 1958. The military could not be ignored, however, as its budget accounted for approximately one-fifth to one-third of the budget and one-fifth of capital outlays, and its requirements had first priority. Since all other programs necessitated law and order, there was general support for military needs.

Political instability was chronic during this period: but it did not evidence itself in the French Third Republic way. The AFPFL remained in power without serious parliamentary challenges until the party split in 1958. Except for short periods when he voluntarily stepped aside, U Nu remained prime minister. Instability, however, displayed itself in other ways. The government was never able to eliminate the chronic insurgency which plagued the country

and made good communications, welfare programs, and normalcy almost impossible to obtain. Although the AFPFL won elections, there were signs, particularly in 1956, that large-scale fraud and governmental interference took place. Rebellion and administrative inadequacy made the rehabilitation of the economy after the devastation of World War II take a longer time than in any other Southeast Asian country. Thus, below the seemingly complete control of the AFPFL there were turmoil and economic stagnation.

Political involvement by the military during the civilian period is not readily ascertainable except during periods of severe national danger, such as during the very early years of independence, and at the time of major stresses in the political system such as the AFPFL split in 1958 and the religious state controversy in 1962.¹⁹ Otherwise, very little mention of the nonmilitary role of the armed forces appears in the press or political speeches and there is almost no identifiable action. On the national level political recruitment, socialization, communication, and, to the extent that it existed, organized interest articulation, were civilian functions. The military was a major interest group, but it functioned largely outside of the political arena and its communications with the civil government remained unobtrusive. In comparison with other new states, the Burmese military functioned very much like a civilian control model.

The division between civil and military roles was less clear in local government, particularly in regions experiencing guerrilla operations or which were suspected of disloyalty. This portion of Burmese military operations still needs considerable research, but it suffices to state that periodically the military acted as the only government in some unsettled areas, and even after civilian government was restored it exerted pressure on the local decision-making process. To the villager during those years, the army also had a political socialization function. Young men brought into service were oriented to a system far beyond the scope of their village. People in remote areas became aware of the existence of an independent Burma through the presence of military forces and, in some cases, officer's wives acted as school teachers in areas where their husbands were serving. However, unlike later periods, the army did not try to recruit the peasants and villagers into political organizations, nor did it appear to be working for specifically political rather than nationally integrative goals.

SOCIETAL TENSIONS AND THE ENTRANCE OF THE MILITARY INTO POLITICS

An analysis of the factors which led to the two coups in Burma can be considered on two levels, the long-term reasons for military dissatisfaction with conditions, and the incidents which triggered the actual coups. Five basic factors generally constitute the long-term explanation of the coups: (1) law, order, and political stability; (2) the "federal" problem; (3) civilian inefficiency and corruption; (4) "betrayal of the revolution"; and (5) a feeling of "mission."

Points (1) and (2) are closely related. As previously mentioned,²⁰ Burma has been besieged by ethnic and ideological minorities attempting either to overthrow the regime in Rangoon or to establish their own independent or autonomous regions. Military men considered the situation increasingly intolerable and believed the civilian government at best to be incompetent and at worst to be consciously aiding the growth of insurgency. After a decade of civil war, trains were still being derailed; sections of the country were closed to all but heavily protected traffic; peasants were not making full use of their land out of fear of raids, double taxation, and an inability to move crops to market; and the split in the AFPFL had made the insurgents even bolder. Thus, according to Ne Win:

The governmental machinery also deteriorated to its present weak position. The rebels were increasing their activities and the political pillar was collapsing. It was imperative that the Union should not drown in shallow water as what almost did come about to happen in 1948-49, so it fell on the armed forces to perform its bounden duty to take all security measures to forestall and prevent a recurrence.²¹

In the first decade of independence and during the 1960-62 intercoup period, relations between Burma proper and the ethnic states composed of Chins, Kachins, Karens, Shans, and others had deteriorated. It is true that there was no longer the danger of military overthrow, as there had been in 1949-50, but, on top of other troubles, the Kachins and Shans opened hostilities in 1958-59. Adding to fears of a disruption of unity were two acts by the U Nu government in 1960-62. Nu promised the Mons and Arakanese their own states, and only the 1962 coup ended their attempts to press their claims. Nu also obtained a constitutional amendment making Burma a Buddhist state, an action which brought warnings from the military that the antagonism of religious minorities might endanger unity throughout the Union. According to the leaders of the second coup, the "federal" problem was the major consideration in their re-entrance into the political arena, as Burma could not afford to be broken up into small pieces like Laos and Vietnam.²² According to Aung Gyi, the country could not return to 1948.

In its official book describing the activities of the military during the 1958-60 period the authors began with the following fable:

A certain king of Elis, named Augeas, had a herd of three thousand oxen, the stalls of which had not been washed out for thirty years; and Hercules was commanded to wash them out in one day. This was a task that required not only strength but a good deal of thinking about also; but Hercules was not long at a loss. He saw that two rivers, the Alpheus and the Peneus, were flowing close by; and by means of his great strength, and by working at a great rate, he managed to dam up these rivers in such a way that he caused them to rush in a mighty torrent through the stalls, which were thus washed out in one day. Having done this work thoroughly, Hercules then removed the dam, and the rivers flowed on in their proper beds once more.²³

The inefficiency of the civilian governments of Burma was notorious, although perhaps no worse than that of many other Asian states. Corruption and waste went on behind the scenes and often behind U Nu's back. As time passed, Nu became ever more interested in religious affairs, while his ministers became involved in internecine party struggles. To the foreigner this situation was epitomized by the once beautiful city of Rangoon, which took on the appearance of a garbage dump as refuse lay in the streets, and squatters, a key to AFPFL power, took up all available land. It would be inaccurate to assert that these conditions were strongly condemned by the general populace. To the citizen it was proper that the state's primary aim should be the care of Buddhism, and inefficiency and corruption had become a way of life. But this attitude was not supported by the military, perhaps the most modern segment of the society. The use of Western arms, training in Western military establishments and, generally, the efficiency necessary to run a modern army had made them less than sympathetic with the civilian way of doing things. The professionalism instilled into the military, when combined with the esprit de corps formed through the years of guerrilla fighting, made the armed forces impatient with the corruption and waste so evident among the civilian politicians.

All of these complaints led to a view that the civilian governments had betrayed the hopes of the revolution and that the army, as the one pure torchbearer of the past, was needed to revive those expectations. This view was not as forcefully presented as in the case of Indonesia; but there is little doubt that it had its relevance. This attitude was combined with a fifth element, a feeling of "mission" which the Defense Services have regarding their role as leaders of Burma's modernization program. This sense of "mission" appears in a number of military publications and pronouncements. For example, at the time of the 1958-60 Ne Win government, the Defense Services produced a booklet called The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services. In it they spoke of a psychological regeneration which was the result of the "decisive leadership of the government and the ideological clarity and conviction of the Defence Services."²⁴

In addition to these deep-seated preconditions of military intervention there have been more specific immediate precipitants. It should be noted that in both cases the commentator may touch raw nerves when he discusses motives. For example, one noted British scholar speculated that one reason for the second coup was that U Nu's government was endangering the army's economic interests. This observation brought quick objections by the Burmese government, and diplomatic pressure forced a number of overseas newspapers to retract the statement. At any rate, in each of the coups there were particular events or factors, related to the aforementioned underlying ones, which piqued the military. In 1956, precipitating events included the split in the AFPFL which led to offers of compromise with rebels in the field; the disposition of the military police, which may have endangered the power position of the army; the possibility of civil war between the factions of AFPFL; and upcoming elections, which might have disrupted peace and security.²⁵ There were also rumors of possible assassination attempts on top military officers. The 1962 coup got its impetus from a "seminar" called by U Nu on the "federal" problem, which appeared to be a vehicle for giving more power to the states and establishing new states in the Union.

Thus, the experience of the Burmese military fits that of a number of other new nations. As Charles Anderson and I wrote several years ago, with regard to the military in developing areas,

These military groups, inculcated with the values of order, efficiency, and discipline, seek to see the same values applied to political life. Where the army has been at the vanguard of the struggle for independence, as in some parts of Asia, it may enter the political arena in response to a belief that the ideals of the independence movement have been betrayed by self-seeking and corrupt civilian politicians, whose factional quarrels have led to confusion and turmoil.²⁶

IDEOLOGY AND VALUES OF THE MILITARY

The formulation and articulation of national ideologies has been a characteristic of newly developed countries throughout the world. These ideologies have been found to be useful tools to legitimize new regimes, to set and emotionalize national goals, and to obtain or maintain political power. Emphasis on the last element has been particularly important in Southeast Asia as exemplified by "guided democracy" in Indonesia, "personalism" in South Vietnam and, more recently, "The Burmese Way to Socialism" in Burma. In fact, all three of these elements would appear to have been present in the Burmese case.

On April 30, 1962, the Revolutionary Council of the military-led government of Burma announced a new national ideology and plan of action termed "The Burmese Way to Socialism." This proclamation was both the culmination of army efforts to formulate an ideology which would consolidate and lead the people and a factor which was to foster serious splits in the already shaken party structure. Both of these facets of the action of the Revolutionary Council are worth consideration.

No purely military leadership in Southeast Asia has made such great efforts in the ideological field. This can partially be explained by the ideological context of some of the rebellions which have faced the Burmese government over the past fifteen years, the backgrounds of a number of the more influential colonels and, finally, the tendency in Burma to present problems in ideological terms. A military-formed ideological platform was initially publicly articulated in 1958 at about the time of the first coup against the U Nu government, although it had been considered at an earlier conference of commanding officers held in 1956. The statement made at the Defense Services Conference in 1958 previewed in somewhat less Marxian tones the "Burmese Way to Socialism" of 1962.

Man's endeavor to build a society set free at last from anxieties over food, clothing and shelter, and able to enjoy life's spiritual satisfactions as well, fully convinced of the sanctity, dignity and essential goodness of life, must proceed from the premise of a faith only in a politico-economic system based on the eternal principles of justice, liberty and equality. This is our belief....²¹

According to official military doctrine this was part of an ideological development process which had proceeded as follows. During the period of the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and the Burma Defense Army (BDA), freedom was said to be a value which came first, second, and third. This was the period when the Burmese army was formed as a nationalist challenge to the British in conjunction with the Japanese invasion and occupation. The first and last goal of the military was freedom and independence. Although other goals were articulated, they were subordinated to the need for independence. However, during the transitional period between the collapse of the Japanese and the attainment of independence, freedom remained the first goal, but, under the pressure of political events and leaders, the military began to consider other goals. Independence was near and it was necessary to plan for the future. Thus, freedom was still described as the first goal; but now democracy was a second, and socialism a third goal.

With independence came the insurgency and domestic political problems which wracked Burma. In this period the military had little time for discussion or analysis, as it was torn asunder by defections and challenged by ideological and ethnic paramilitary organizations.

By 1955 the major thrust of the insurgency had been halted, although the military remained frustrated by continuing small-scale insurrections and civilian maladministration. During this period the officers began to evaluate their own ideological heritage and to analyze what their ideology should be. These beginnings lacked the precision of doctrine contained in later military statements but they were an effort to define grievances and goals.

From 1958 to 1960 the caretaker government maintained an ideological pattern not unlike that of its civilian predecessors. The military did not demand revolution, only reform of the parliamentary democracy established at the time of independence. This was a time of tinkering with the old system in the hope that it could be salvaged.²²

However, in 1962, disgusted and frustrated in its efforts at reform, the military now decided to discard the old system and produce a new ideology which, however, still had roots in the past.

This pattern of ideological development was somewhat more confused than the military (whose version of the pattern has been described above) would care to admit. During the period of the caretaker government (1958-60) particularly, and immediately after the return of U Nu in April 1960, differences of opinion were apparent concerning the role of the military in a civilian-led government and whether a civilian administration could fulfill the Defense Services' desire for unity and economic and social progress. Politically, experiments were made with the idea of the multiparty parliamentary system, with independents holding the balance, rather than with the single ideological party proposed after the second coup. In the religious field attempts were made to use Burma's various faiths as tools against communism. Efforts were also initiated to make the constitution a basis for the nation's ideology. None of these activities was very successful.

The period between the two military governments (April 1960 to March 1962) was apparently one of considerable shifting and rethinking within the officer corps. Officers with pro-Western views had been displaced from positions of influence during this period. Hope, admittedly slight, that U Nu had "learned his lesson," would be a more efficient administrator, and maintain domestic unity, was damaged by a number of incidents. Unity in particular appeared to be rather weak under the Nu government, as his own party split, ethnic groups appeared to be acquiring more autonomy, and the establishment of the Buddhist state (August 1961) intensified religious antagonisms.

Thus, when the army did return, there was evident a shifted emphasis in ideology, although previous ideological foundations remained. The difference was primarily a hardening of tone and position, a heightened nationalism, puritanism, and emphasis on socialism and unity. Superficial signs of the shift could be seen in such promised "reforms" as the elimination of various American and British educational agencies, abolition of beauty contests, horse-racing, etc. The impact of Marxist thinking became readily apparent two months after the second coup with the publication of The Burmese Way to Socialism.²⁹

The primary goal, affirmed by the statement of the Revolutionary Council, was socialism, based on a socialist economy which is described as "the planned proportional development of all the national productive forces." Specifically, the R.C. called for nationalization of "vital" means of production such as industrial and agricultural production and distribution, transportation, and commodities; work according to one's abilities and pay according to quality and quantity; a reasonable closing of income gaps; and the recognition of workers and peasants as the vanguard and custodians of the "Socialist Democratic State" (but with the acceptance of loyal middle strata). Politically, the document noted that parliamentary democracy had failed in Burma due to its "defects, weaknesses, and loopholes, its abuses and the absence of a mature public opinion." Thus, "the nation's socialist aims cannot be achieved with any assurance by means of the form of Parliamentary Democracy that we have so far experienced."

To achieve the "Burmese Way to Socialism" the R.C. called for education, an end to fraudulent politics, the prevention of "parasitism," reform of the bureaucratic machinery, modernization of agriculture, help to industries compatible with national resources, and the formation of mass and class organizations. Science in education was stressed.

Just as the old parties feared the document's implications for party government, the traditionalist religious community could take little comfort in the words of the R.C. Toleration

of all religions, demands that education be based on more secular values, and attacks on "hypocritical religiosity" were all signs of a secular approach within the military. Later efforts were made to assuage the feelings of religious groups when a member of the Revolutionary Council stated that the "Burmese Way" was in accord with the principles of Buddhism.

The pattern of this vaguely worded document differed from previous military pronouncements: it used more Marxian terminology and was more vigorous in its attacks on the failures of parliamentary democracy in Burma. Finally, it was developed within the nationalistic context of the new army group's ideology. As former prime minister and former head of state, Dr. Ba Maw, noted, "It is also Burmese. It wants socialism, which is good, but it wants it in a Burmese form and in the Burmese way, which is better still."³⁰

As matters developed, discussions over the "Burmese Way to Socialism" centered upon two issues, the social and economic ideology of the socialist system expounded by the military and the political means of implementing that system. There was almost no argument on the socialist program presented. Written vaguely enough to appeal to most politicians, it also fit into the Marxian rhetoric of postwar Burmese socialist oratory. AFPFL leaders grumbled that their party had worked for the achievement of a socialist society for at least a decade and supported army efforts in the same direction. The Pyidaungsu Party (previously called the "Clean AFPFL") officers in and out of jail also stated that what the military was proposing had long been party policy. The far left National Unity Front and its allied parties were initially the most active supporters of the military, although they wanted clarification of the particulars of the R.C. program. Other politicians in and out of party life were equally ready to applaud these socialist principles when called upon to do so. Even former Communist Party "General" Bo Aung Min publicly approved of the army position. Only Communist insurgents in the field appeared to voice open opposition.

The military has followed the initial pronouncements on the "Burmese Way to Socialism" with both a more philosophical foundation and more clearly Marxist statements. The former appeared in a booklet called The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment, which is the official philosophy of the Burma Socialist Programme Party. The influence of Marxism is apparent, but it is interlaced with spiritual values which lead the authors to attack both capitalism and the "vulgar materialism" of "some so-called leftists." The spokesmen for the military have meanwhile continued to hammer home the importance of socialism (national, not international), nationalism (not aggressive), and neutralism (closer to isolationism than an "independent" foreign policy as found in the Indian or Indonesian context).

There are, however, other important values held by the Burmese military which have been noted by foreign observers such as Butwell, Dupuy, Pye, Tinker, and the present author. The military are a modernizing elite which is anxious to bring to Burma the material benefits of the West. Before proceeding, two reservations must be made with regard to this often repeated statement. To declare that the leadership of the Burmese military is "modernizing" does not assume that all or perhaps most of the officers are not also deeply influenced by other Burmese social and cultural values. However, it is probably true that as a whole they are more Western-oriented in discipline, training, and equipment than their civilian counterparts. They also tend to be somewhat more secular in their views than civilians and, in the past, the officer class included a disproportionate number of non-Buddhists. A second, and most important, reservation, however, is that there has yet to be published a systematic survey of the values of the military. Therefore, all assessments in this field are built upon impressions, some from close links with individuals in the armed services and others from less intimate associations.

Very generally, then, the following values have been associated with the Burmese military: (1) Modernization—defined as bringing material benefits to the people through new agricultural techniques, industrialization, and a more efficient administration. (2) Efficiency—the military has decried the wastefulness and corruption of the parliamentary system and is probably influenced by the demands for efficiency within its own system. (3) National unity—there is strong emphasis on the need to establish and maintain a unified Burmese state. (4) Distrust of foreign influence—this has appeared in public statements as well as in actions which continue to shut Burma off from the outside world. For example, except for the diplomatic community and a few others, individuals desiring to enter Burma can usually obtain only a 24-hour visa. (5) Puritanism—the military, unlike its Thai counterpart, has eschewed what it considers to be the more blatant aspects of Western culture as well as a public display of wealth. Burma has not been known as a country in which conspicuous consumption finds approval, and the military has been even less prone to indulge itself than have the civilian politicians.

These values may be related to the military experience of their spokesmen. As I wrote in another paper:

Military life leads to a closer attachment to: (1) the material values of Western mechanical civilization as against more "spiritual" patterns (or at least traditional ways); (2) efficiency with regard to administration; (3) national survival and unity; and (4) authority. As Dupuy has noted in an interesting article on Burmese military, the handling of Western weapons, close proximity to the modern sector rather than the traditional village pattern and the training given in the army all lead to a greater emphasis on modernism and efficiency. It should also be noted that a number of the officers in the Defense Services were trained overseas with modern weapons. Army officers have been trained at Sandhurst, Navy men at Dartmouth and refresher and training courses have been taken by Burmese in Commonwealth forces, the Communist Bloc and in the United States. There is little evidence to show that these officers and men received much indoctrination in "democracy" but they were introduced more into the modern sector with training in weapon handling and military administration. This type of training in Burma and abroad would tend to lead toward a value structure emphasizing efficiency and modernization and training can also lead to an emphasis on importance of the nation and the place of the Defense Services as defender of the nation. This was certainly part of the indoctrination carried out by the Burmese military and was probably at least partially responsible for the place of nationalism and national unity in the ideology of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Finally, military training can (although it does not always) emphasize the importance of authority, obedience and the values which can run counter to democratic ideology. In sum, the background and resultant value pattern of the Defense Services must be considered as at least related to those facets of the military ideology which emphasized efficiency, nationalism, national unity, authority and most particularly, "modernization." This is not an unusual pattern as exemplified by Pakistan under Ayub Khan, the United Arab Republic under Nasser, Turkey under Ataturk, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic and a variety of other Latin American caudillos and younger members of the officer class.

An overriding problem for the military has been how to accomplish their program and fulfill the "Burmese Way to Socialism" with resources available to them. Our next task is to identify these resources.

POLITICAL RESOURCES COMMANDED BY THE MILITARY

A key question, if not the key question, regarding military involvement is the extent to which the officer group can extend its control over the economic and administrative apparatus of Burma without overreaching itself. In the 1958-60 period the military could count on its own officer class in addition to civil servants and the more apolitical Burmese leaders. As we earlier pointed out, military men held key posts but civilians were maintained in a variety of posts. Additionally, the government was then far less involved in the economic and social life of the country. As we have seen, it is now heavily engaged in a wide variety of activities previously left in private hands. Moreover, the administrators of this apparatus are primarily from the officer class. This section then seeks to answer the questions: What political resources in the community are the military willing and able to use, and in what capacities are the present leaders to be found?

Political Resources Lost to the Military

The military itself of course is the major recruiting area for contemporary Burmese leadership, but during the past 15 years the armed forces have lost a considerable number of their officers through a variety of circumstances. First, a large number of officers from the prewar professional and wartime nationalist groups revolted. Among the former the most obvious were the Karen forces, many of whose officers were British trained. Even those Karen officers who remained loyal were, as a rule, eased out of office and, according to Tinker, only three senior Karen officers remained on the active list. This was a serious loss insofar as the professional officer class was concerned. There were also other losses among ethnic minority groups as well as from among those who joined the Communist underground. For example, among those White Flag Communists who went underground in 1948 and did not surrender until 1963 were Bo Ye Htut, member of the Thirty Comrades and lieutenant-colonel in command of the 3rd Burma Rifles; Bo Sein Tin, major and second in command of the 1st Burma Rifles; Bo Ye Maung, former captain in the 6th Burma Rifles; and Bo Tha Doe, who was in the Medical Corps in 1940 and as a captain had been sent to the United Kingdom for postwar training before he went underground. A number of other examples could be cited, for in 1948 two of the five fully equipped Burman battalions of the Burma Rifles mutinied.

Second, Burma has lost a number of able officers during the past 16 years of rebellion, although no official statistics on this area are available. A review of the newspapers does turn up a number of reportedly promising young men killed in battle. There have also been some deaths from normal causes such as that of the chief of staff for the navy, Com. Than Pa.

Third, in 1961 there was a major purge in the armed forces which led to resignations by many of the most experienced (both in civil and military administration) officers, including nine of the thirteen brigade commanders. Most of these men were given overseas posts, but they are not available for internal posts for which experienced men appear to be vitally needed. Among those who resigned because of pressure or other reasons in the 1961-62 period were the following (in some cases, the overseas position to which a man was sent is indicated in parentheses): Col. Kyi Wlin, 7th Brigade, Myittha; Lt. Col. Kyaw Myint, 10th Brigade, Chauk; Lt. Col. Aye Maung, 2nd Brigade, Toungoo (Military Attaché, Washington); Col. Thein

Dok, 4th Brigade, Taunggyi (Military Attaché, Tel Aviv); Co'. Tun Sein, 9th Brigade, Kengtung (Military Attaché, Tokyo), Lt. Col. Ba Hpyu, 12th Brigade; Col. Sein Mya, 8th Brigade, Bassein (Military Attaché, Canberra); Col. Tin Maung, 13th Brigade, Maubin; Col. Hia Maw, 5th Brigade, Moulmein (Military Attaché, Moscow); Brig. Aung Shwe, Commander Southern Burma (Ambassador, Australia); Brig. Maung Maung (Ambassador, Israel); Lt. Col. Chit Khaing; Col. Ba Than, resigned to take up religious duties. These men held vital positions in the regular army as well as in the government from 1958 to 1960. Positions they held included head of psychological warfare (Ba Than), mayor of Rangoon (Tun Sein), one of the ruling military triumvirate (Maung Maung), administrator of the Agricultural Resources Development Corporation (Kyi Win), and administrators in labor and taxation.

Finally, since the 1962 coup, three of the seventeen original members of the Revolutionary Council have felt it necessary to leave (Aung Gyi, Clift, and Chit Myaing) and one has died (Than Pe). Aung Gyi in particular was a key man in the administration of the 1958-60 period and was the main military economic advisor from that time to his resignation.

Civilian politicians constitute another potential source of skills. One can argue about the efficiency and honesty of many of the politicians who governed Burma during the postwar period, but they did have administrative experience. With the rare exceptions of some left-wing, nonmajority party politicians, the military is not using these people. With the March 1962 coup the major leaders, including the cabinet, of U Nu's Pyidaungsu Party were thrown out of office and arrested, and there were further arrests. In 1963 members of the "Stable AFPFL" were arrested. Following unsuccessful negotiations with the underground Communists, the government proceeded to arrest the last segment of free national politicians, the far left NUF. This means that, in Burmese terms, the old right, left, and center leadership is now out of action. A few politicians have been released from custody but they have not been drawn into the government. Nor do they have a party to which they can return, for in 1964 the Revolutionary Council abolished all political parties except the BSPP, taking over all their assets, and declaring that no new organization could be formed without the consent of the government.

The Burma Socialist Programme Party is now the only party organization buttressing the military. However, as has been pointed out, all major party posts are held by military men. The party is admittedly cadre-oriented in character. Those members so far accepted do not include many well known or respected members of older parties. To a great extent membership has been recruited from far left splinter organizations.

The majority of the precoup High Court judges have been dismissed. With the formation of the People's Courts it is said that many of Burma's 3,000 lawyers are seeking other employment.

The civil service was one of the mainstays of the 1958-60 government and the present Ne Win regime is continuing to make use of these people in administrative roles. To this observer there are two differences between the two periods. First, fewer civil servants are finding themselves even formally in high posts, and there are obviously more military men at all levels now. Second, but this is only an impression, there is now far less sympathy for the means and goals of the military. During the author's stay in Burma at the time of the 1958-60 Ne Win government he found general support among those civil servants who were not "Clean AFPFL" affiliated for what the military was doing. In a short return visit in 1963 this did not appear to be the case. It should be emphasized that these observations are only impressions gathered from conversations. The military is attempting to inculcate the doctrines of the "Burmese Way to Socialism" in the civil service.

An examination of the relationships between the military regime and non-Burmans and insurgents could be extensive; but it suffices to say that R.C. efforts to assuage minority feelings have been only partially successful. The government still faces paramilitary opposition from Shans, Mons, Karens, Kachins, and Arakanese, although a few top Karen leaders have surrendered. There have also been a number of Communist insurgents who capitulated during Ne Win's second regime. These men provide a questionable political resource, except as agents to induce further surrender.

When discussing resources for political and economic development, one must note that a major loss has been from the foreign community. The R.C. would sharply deny this, holding that many foreigners have been leeches on the Burmese economy. However, there has been a large-scale emigration of Indians, Pakistanis, and Chinese from Burma. The number of those who have left or seek to leave may reach 200,000. They are leaving for a variety of reasons but primarily because of the government policies of nationalism and nationalization. The restrictions on jobs for non-Burmese and the nationalization of stores, industries, import and export businesses, etc., have hit hard the minorities who to a very great extent constitute the business community of Burma. Through these policies Burma has lost a valuable resource. Even if we accept the government's view that these people were motivated only by selfish, un-nationalistic goals, they did provide a reservoir of trained individuals who are going to be hard to replace. These nonnationals were not only shopkeepers, but many were doctors and technicians.

Political Resources Available to the Military

The patterns of recruitment and the prestige of the military were described under the section on social organization. An effort will now be made to analyze briefly the capabilities of the Defense Services for maintaining the politico-economic system which they have established. We should note first that the military profession itself gives its members both a training and a value structure which emphasize modernization and efficient administration. The enlisted man, as well, is trained to handle more modern techniques than the average villager is. To this administrative training within the military may be added practical political action by the Defense Services since independence. The continuing insurgency has meant that members of the armed forces have maintained a hand in local government affairs over the past seventeen years. In some cases, this has meant the complete administration of villages and regions. At the national level, military men have held cabinet and administrative posts, particularly during the 1958-60 period. This gave them the opportunity to serve in civil, political, and administrative functions over an extended period. Although there were complaints of overefficiency, as a whole the military men were lauded for their handling of these offices. However, the Defense Services' involvement in the government process was in no way as great as it has been in the post-1962 period.

Finally, the Defense Services have become involved in the economic activities of the state, as will be described in the next section. Ever since 1950 military men have helped to run various business operations. After 1958 these activities were of a highly complex and sophisticated nature. Again, although mistakes were made, the general assessment of the administration of these operations was that the military was more successful than the civilians, measuring success in terms of efficiency and profit.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY: 1958-60 AND 1960-65

This section attempts to analyze the pattern of military involvement in the politico-economic life of Burma in two major areas: the extent of military control in the society; and the monopolization of governmental and economic positions by the ruling military. The analysis will be on three levels: (1) political-historical—an account of the involvement of the military during the 1958-60 and post-1962 periods; (2) functional—a more mundane analysis than Easton's of the military government's actions regarding interest groups; (3) economic—pre-1960 economic activities of the military, post-1962 government policy and the role of the military in the economy.

To recapitulate the relationship of the military to the government during the aforementioned periods before going into detail: During the first Ne Win regime the output functions were formally attended to by a dual partnership of the military and civilians, with former governmental institutions remaining intact. As has been pointed out, the armed forces were the decision-making voice in the system. Finally, since 1962, all functions (formally and informally) have been completely controlled by the military. Now when we analyze any governmental function in Burma we are discussing the military role.

Political-Historical Analysis

The Caretaker Government: 1958-60

During the caretaker government period of Burma's postwar history the formal constitutional structure remained intact. Parliament still sat, civilians held most of the posts in the cabinet, and although a large number of allegedly corrupt civil servants were relieved of office, respected old-line civil servants were placed in positions of influence. Only 6 of the 30 ministries were held by military personnel. However, primary control of the decision-making apparatus was taken over by the military. Some 150 important posts in a variety of ministries were held by officers of the armed forces; and final power rested in Prime Minister Ne Win and his close military associates. Although other services had influence, the great preponderance of power lay in the army, particularly with about twenty colonels. Those men tended to share more power with older civil-administrative personnel than did the military after the 1962 coup. According to Louis J. Walinsky, chief foreign economic adviser to the Burmese government and a man knowledgeable about the decision-making process in Burma, the caretaker government worked as follows:

The Cabinet... was not to be the significant decision-making body in this Government. Of more importance was the Military Staff Council, presided over by Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung Maung, and composed for the most part of colonels and other officers assigned to key administrative and operating posts. It was by the Military Staff Council, reportedly, that the important decisions were made, subject only to the approval of General Ne Win. Had General Ne Win sat as Chairman of the Military Staff Council there would have been no need for the Cabinet at all, except as a vehicle for civilian appeals against military decisions. These decisions came before the Cabinet for confirmation, to be sure, but only to preserve the constitutional form. The Cabinet was, in effect, a constitutional "cover" and a sounding board before which General Ne Win could express his reactions to the proposals of his military aides—with whom he was

not always in agreement--and make his decisions. The ministers well understood the real power position; they knew that power resided elsewhere and were fearful of opposing it.^{30a}

According to some officers with whom this author spoke, political recruitment and socialization were considered to be the long-term influences of the caretaker government. Control of the newspapers and other mass media, to the extent that it was used, was directed toward this end as were efforts to form social and interest groups. The military program had two goals: to inculcate in the population a willingness to support a democratic political system which would rest not on the power of the old politicians but upon a competitive politics by an informed populace; and to "inoculate" the population against Communist propaganda. Two instruments were used to implement this program: the National Solidarity Association and mass indoctrination campaigns.

The National Solidarity Association (NSA or Kyant Khaing Ye Ahphwes) was a largely abortive movement to form associations of ordinary Burmese citizens.³¹ Military officers played a dominant role in the NSA but did not hold a majority of the positions in its Central Executive Council. Brig. Aung Gyi was vice president of the council, Col. Maung Maung its general-secretary, and Brig. Tin Pe, Commodore Clift, Com. Than Pe, Brig. San Yu, and Brig. Aung Shwe were members. Its announced purposes were to fight attempts of private businessmen to flout regulations and laws for profit-making, to fight armed insurgency, and, particularly, to educate "the people as to their civic rights and duties." Associations were established throughout Burma under the aegis of the military with the hope that the population could be taught competitive democracy and could thus be bolstered both against the insurgents and former AFPFL politicians. The NSA was not attached to any one party, and those holding executive posts in political parties were ineligible to join the NSA. Nor did any army officers use the NSA to launch their own careers in civilian politics. Popular participation in the democratic process was the somewhat unrealistic purpose of the military. The return to party politics in 1960 showed that the NSA was not based upon firm foundations. With the prodding of the military gone, the NSA announced its intention to become a cadre organization to educate the people for the future, a sign of a lack of mass support. Later, its operations were phased out and in 1964 were completely eliminated.

The military also instigated mass campaigns to educate the people.³² One such was the cleanup campaign to rebeautify the cities and give people a feeling of pride in their neighborhoods. Of a more distinctly political nature was a campaign to use religion as a weapon against communism.³³ In this case the army backed publication of Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian propaganda documents and helped to start mass rallies attacking communism as antireligious. Over one million pamphlets were printed, and meetings led by religious and military leaders were held in most major centers. The Psychological Warfare Department of the army was deeply involved in this campaign and hoped to inhibit future Communist propaganda.

The overall policy of the Ne Win caretaker government was put forward by the regime after its first nine months in office in policy objectives set forth for compliance by the various information agencies. In general, these objectives were to propagate the national ideology according to the Constitution, to combat ideologies and organizations contrary to the Constitution, to promote solidarity, national traditions, religious knowledge, and civic responsibility.³⁴

The Military Government: 1962-65

After 1962, in Gabriel Almond's terms, all output functions, rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication as well as almost all input functions, political socialization and recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication have been dominated by the military in Burma. All political parties except for the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) have been banned. All organized interest groups have been either co-opted or forced to disband. Except for the Buddhist monks and insurgents in the field, there is no organized civilian opposition. The Constitution has been abrogated, the Supreme and High Courts eliminated, Parliament dismissed, the cabinet abolished and its members arrested, the state councils and ministries abolished. In their place has been established a structure completely dominated by the military. At the top is the seventeen-man Revolutionary Council (R.C.) composed of representatives of the armed forces. The R.C. replaces the cabinet and, to all intents and purposes, the Parliament. Laws and decrees are promulgated by the R.C. and in its hands is ultimate control of all output functions. To replace other governing bodies the R.C. has reconstituted the federal and judicial systems. More power has been put in the hands of the central government, including the supervision of budgetary matters. Judges who were considered antagonistic were fired, and in 1964 the government instituted a system of People's Courts.

In time, political power is supposed to be returned to civilians but not in a way modeled after the former parliamentary system. In place of the old AFPFL, the primary decision-making body in the old system, the BSPP, with all major positions held by the military, molds the input functions of the political order. Since March 1964 it is the only legal party. Entrance into this cadre organization is carefully scrutinized; leaders at all levels are presently chosen by selection, not election. Although the R.C. claims that 150,000 applications have been received, as of mid-1964 the party nucleus was based on 300 cadres who had completed training at the Central School of Political Science, established in 1963, and 600 N.C.O. cadres at the N.C.O. Cadre Training School. Its constitution provides for a transitional party ultimately leading to a mass organization based on democratic centralism. It "performs such basic party functions as recruiting nucleus personnel called cadres, and training and testing them by assigned duties, etc." The cadre party provides for a very tight code of discipline, including provisions relating to factionalism, conflicts of interest, individual income, gifts, secrets, disciplinary action, demands on members for acquiring knowledge, self-criticism, and acceptance of the political ideology of the military. It has acquired a number of members from previous parties, but presently it is essentially under control of the R.C. Both the Central Organizing Committee and the Party Discipline Committee are composed of military men and Ne Win is chairman of the first and president of the latter. The R.C. now provides the BSPP with a subsidy. Through the BSPP and the military itself, the R.C. hopes to effectively control political recruitment at the national and regional level.

Functional Analysis

The second Ne Win government has attempted to dominate or control all associational interest groups. In rather crude categories, four associational interest groups legally operated in civilian Burma: the Buddhist religious organizations, labor unions, peasant associations, and trade associations. None of these could be compared to the more articulate American groups in organization, discipline, membership, or influence on policy. The Sangha (Buddhist clergy) was often divided and officially was supposed to stay out of politics. The absence of industrialization in Burma and the presence of factionalism meant that labor lacked a strong voice. Peasants were organized in name only; and the foreign domination of trade and socialist ideology of the country made trade associations less effective.

In May 1962, the R.C. abolished the national religious association of monks, the Buddha Sasana Council, but for the next two years little effort was made to control the various Sangha organizations. These had been centers of nationalist activities during colonial times, and the monks, particularly those of Mandalay, had never been wholeheartedly in sympathy with either of the Ne Win regimes. The high place held by the Sangha made their control difficult for the R.C., and one of the few cases of retreat during the post-1962 period took place in April-May 1964, when it called upon the Sangha to eschew politics and to have their organizations register with the government. Various monks' associations objected to the registration and within three weeks the R.C. backed down. During 1964, monks in Mandalay were seen smashing the presses of a newspaper printing what they considered to be objectionable material.

Various teachers, civil servants, trade unions, and other employee associations have voluntarily dissolved themselves since 1962, and the government has formed a system of workers' councils. The workers' councils are to operate "for the welfare of the workers" and are organized on a class basis "under the leadership of the BSPP."

Although during AFPFL days rural patronage and party politics tended to be dominated by the All-Burma Peasants' Organization, and a variety of government policies were carried out under its auspices, the ABPO has now dissolved itself and the R.C. has been attempting to deal directly with the peasants. One means has been the peasant seminar, where officers meet with peasant groups to explain policy and hear complaints.

The nationalization of all major businesses, industries, and the import-export trade has made the trade association obsolete.

Education in Burma is primarily a government function: but since the 1962 coup the R.C. has emphasized the need for even greater control and for fitting the educational system into the "Burmese Way to Socialism." The ideas of a free choice of subject matter by students and education for education's sake were declared a discredited legacy of the colonial and capitalist past. Vocational education and specialized training have become emphasized. A major problem for the military has been the higher education system, particularly the student organizations. In 1962 there was a student riot in which the military felt forced to fire on rioters (a number of whom were killed). The army then blew up the student union, center of student protests. In 1963 the University of Rangoon was closed twice. Commissions considering educational problems have been dominated by military men, and the Council of University Education Bodies is headed by the minister of education, a member of the R.C.

Radio was always government-controlled in Burma, and newspapers and magazines have never been free of interference (more than one newspaper was closed and newsmen arrested during U Nu's rule). The present regime controls the press through laws passed during the colonial, civilian, and military periods, (set forth in 1867, 1931, 1947, 1959, and 1962). The nationalization of businesses has also hurt newspaper enterprises because of lost advertising. In 1964 the most well-known English-language paper was closed; a government-sponsored paper now publishes in both English and Burmese. Other papers have been forced to close or limit publication. Finally, there is control of news going into and coming out of Burma. Under the aegis of the R.C., a semiofficial national news service, the Associated Press of Burma, was established which has contracts with various international news services. Their dispatches are edited in Rangoon and sent out in the form of bulletins. As of now, distortion does not appear to be as great as it is in, say, Indonesia, but the news service is not as free from interference as the Press Trust of India. Foreign newsmen have also found it very difficult to get into Burma, and thus news going out of Burma tends to be government-controlled.³⁶

In summary, with rare exceptions (keeping in mind the difficulties of control in a developing country, even without Burma's perennial civil war problem), the military in Burma now controls all major functions of government. As Ne Win declared in 1963, "We do not engage in politics secretly, but openly."

Economic Analysis

One of the most distinctive and interesting roles of the military in Burma has been long and deep involvement in economic activities. In almost all countries the military becomes an economic factor through its demands on the national budget and services such as housing, post exchanges, etc. However, ever since it took over the Ava Book House in 1951, the Burmese armed forces have gone farther, operating enterprises and taking actions directed toward civilian consumers. In analyzing this role it is necessary again to delineate the difference between action by the military as a separate organ of government (1948-62), and the military as the government. In the former case the military acted as a kind of holding company; while in the latter it made all policy, thus making it difficult to differentiate between action taken by someone as a member of the military, and action taken as a member of the government. It should also be noted that until as late as 1963 it was possible to delineate an orderly development of military economic involvement; but since then R. C. actions have been at an extremely fast pace, precluding orderly description.

Pre-1960 Economic Activities³⁷

The central organ for military involvement in the economic sphere was the Defence Services Institute (DSI). The DSI in 1950 established a department store for military personnel, more or less patterned after the American PX and British NAAFI. In 1951 it bought the Ava Book House to provide books, stationery, and supplies to armed forces members, but soon began serving the public as well. Under the Ne Win government in 1958 the DSI expanded its activities, engaging in joint-venture companies with American, Israeli, Japanese, and Singapore firms. It then entered shipping, taking over with Israeli aid the money-losing government shipping operations, fishing projects with Japanese and Singaporeans, foreign trade promotion of exporters acting for the DSI, banking with the aid of an American firm, bus transportation in Rangoon (it controlled 10 percent of city transportation by 1960), hotels and restaurants, an electronics workshop, the most famous department store in the country, and a coal supplying business. By the end of the first Ne Win government it was one of the most powerful economic forces in the country, a holding company running fourteen major enterprises with a capital of perhaps 2 million dollars (10 million kyats). This involvement brought criticism, particularly from firms which were in direct competition with the army. The DSI stated it did not intend to act as a competitor, although in one case the army opened "butterfly stores" (so-called for their rather modern shape) to offer consumer goods to the public in order to keep prices low. It should also be emphasized that the DSI's announced intention was to turn over these enterprises ultimately to private enterprise.

By the end of 1960 some 25 firms were under the DSI; and a new system was thought to be necessary to control this expanding operation. Thus in 1961 the Burma Economic Development Corporation was formed. Seventeen DSI subsidiaries were taken over by the BEDC. The BEDC also took over badly run government operations to make them into commercial enterprises. These included such ill-managed state enterprises as the pharmaceutical industry, Mandalay State Brewery and Russian "Gift" Hotel. The BEDC was government-owned, with some operations on a joint-venture arrangement. About ten percent of all profits went into a reserve fund, 20 percent to taxes, 63 percent was ploughed back into the BEDC, and about 15

percent went to the Defense Services welfare organization. The BEDC had expanded to some 34 firms by the time of the second coup. The BEDC was a civilian organization, but, particularly after March 1962, it became a special protégé of Brig. Aung Gyi (who had been an original formateur of the DSI), who hoped to attract foreign capital, and at the same time end economic corruption in Burma.

March 1962-65 Economic Activities

After the March coup, analysis of separate military/economic roles is of little value, and discussion of this period will center on government policy and the place of military personnel.

Prior to 1962 there were already moves to eliminate import-export firms which were not owned by nationals. On October 1, 1962, all importers were prohibited from doing import business. Some firms closed while others went into other activities. In January 1964 the Export Agency, Burma, was set up to take over the entire export trade of the nation under the minister of trade development, Brig. Tin Pe. This followed an October decision that all foreign airlines assign Union of Burma Airways as their agents in Burma.

At the present time there remains very little business or industry in Burma that the R.C. has not nationalized. All foreign firms have been taken over (with compensation) and new joint ventures have ended. Imperial Chemicals Inc. was nationalized in 1962. In 1963 the government purchased the remaining foreign-owned stock in the Burma Oil Company and Indo-Burma Petroleum Limited. By early 1963 no major foreign firm was doing regular business in Burma. Financial control, foreign and domestic, came under the government in February 1963 when fourteen foreign and ten private national banks were nationalized by the R.C.

Nationalization of the sale and distribution system was the major move by the government. The R.C. had previously attempted to control distribution through government "People's Shops," but these had not worked well. Finally, in March-April 1964, full-scale nationalization began. The nationalization order covered wholesale stores, brokerages, and department stores; shops dealing with food, clothing, and general commodities, and warehouses storing such goods; cooperative stores (although some are exempt); and general stores. The order did not include the following retail businesses: (1) hotels, restaurants, and teashops (some of which were already under BEDC); (2) firms retailing vegetables, fruit, tobacco leaves, meat, fish, and eggs (the army had at one time run some fisheries, vegetable, and fishing activities and these were still under its control); (3) shops selling leather goods, shoes, slippers, and hats; and tailor shops. Included in the nationalization were shops selling machinery, auto parts, hardware, watches and their parts, spectacles, fountain pens, stationery, imported pharmaceutical goods, chinaware, glassware, and mirrors. Following this, all large shops in Rangoon were nationalized and all privately owned timber depots in Rangoon and its suburbs were taken over. Only Burmese employees were maintained. The influence of the army was very apparent in this operation, which in time is expected to include 10,000 firms. Twenty-five army inspection teams inspected the big shops, and the BSPP asked all its applicants to help make the system run smoothly by volunteering labor for the first seven days.

Thus, almost all facets of Burmese economic life are now under the R.C., including imports and exports, industries, wholesale firms, finance, and many retail firms. To run this immense project, military men were put in administrative positions throughout the economy.

At first, five nationalization committees were formed to administer the People's Pearl and Fishing Board, DSI, the BEDC enterprises, the cigarette industry, and the Pylon Awbwa Rice Mill. From May 29, 1964, the Socialist Economy Construction Committee took over the functions of the nationalization committees. It is in this committee that the dominant role of the army is apparent. It is headed by Col. Than Sein and includes 2 colonels, 21 lieutenant colonels, 2 majors, and 4 civilians.

The military has paid special attention to the desires of the peasants and is continually attempting to explain its position to them. Emphasis has been put on general rural development, and in particular, on rural finance. Cooperative loan societies have been formed; the government is carefully scrutinizing the sale of rice; mills have been nationalized; and efforts have been made to eliminate "unnecessary" middlemen. The government has set minimum prices for thirteen agricultural products and no private individual or firm may buy, sell, distribute, or possess these products for business purposes. All essential agricultural commodities are included, such as paddy rice, tapioca, tobacco, jute, cotton, wheat, peanuts, and sesame. The R.C. states that in the fiscal year 1963-64 it spent more than nine times what the Nu government had spent in its last year for rural projects and equipment. To carry out this program the army has worked at the local level through military dominated security and administration committees.³⁹

This massive political and economic involvement by the Burmese military has led to the criticism that it has overextended itself. According to a London Times special correspondent, "It seems out of the question that the army could not [sic] suppress all this insurgency when battalion commanders are busy controlling the rice market and issuing licenses to betel-nut sellers. It cannot hope to pacify the country and rule effectively at the same time."⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

Most parties to the 1958 military action do not officially describe it as a coup. Briefly, during 1958 the internal political situation in Burma had become unstable as the AFPFL split and the insurgents became more active. Following the victory of the Nu section of the AFPFL in Parliament, sections of that party reportedly tried to eliminate certain opposition-oriented army officers by defaming the army as a whole. On September 3, 1958, army leaders went to U Nu and complained and the prime minister promised to stop these "wrongs." Allegedly, U Nu then proposed the formation of a six-man faction to run the government. This group was to be composed of three Nu men and three army men. The army supposedly turned down the offer and the situation grew worse as part of U Nu's faction attempted to gain support from the Union Military Police and others. The army was alerted, and on September 22, 1958, established security measures against possible civil war. That day U Nu returned from a trip to Upper Burma and began discussions with the military and his own followers. The military apparently wanted control but not martial law, while U Nu was trying to convince his followers that the situation demanded the entrance of the army if civil war was not to develop.

Reportedly, on September 26, U Nu drafted two letters, one his offer to General Ne Win to take over the government and the other Ne Win's reply. The latter set down the general conditions under which the military was to rule. At any rate, a letter of invitation was sent and General Ne Win did reply, giving promises as to conduct. Finally, on October 28, 1958, at an emergency session of Parliament, U Nu resigned as prime minister and proposed Ne Win as his successor. The Chamber of Deputies unanimously agreed.

Thus, the actions of 1958 were not those of a coup in the "normal" sense. Parliament and the other institutions remained and political leaders remained free to criticize. No major political leader was arrested for noncriminal activities, and all actions were supposedly within the frame of the Constitution.

The 1962 coup was quite different. Previous to the coup there were warnings by the military that all was not well and, as usual, Rangoon was full of rumors. However, the coup was of the "traditional" sort. Tanks and men suddenly appeared in Rangoon and elsewhere. People were not allowed to move into or out of the city (except golfers) and members of the government were arrested. As noted earlier, all governmental institutions were soon eliminated and a Revolutionary Council was named. The action was a sharp break with the past, clandestine, and carried out without previous discussion with the civilian government.

Of disinvolvement by the military, there is only one case, that of 1960. The military, as noted, was never involved in every aspect of government, as the parliamentary system was allowed to continue. As Ne Win was the "elected" prime minister, the easiest and most democratic means of disinvolvement was to have new national elections. General Ne Win's government announced its decision to hold elections on August 13, 1959. The military made sure that the abuses of former elections were not tolerated and that the electoral law was obeyed. In order to negate charges of military interference, the armed forces were kept to their cantonments on election day. The result was a "free" election in the best Western democratic sense, as the party the military disliked the most (U Nu's) won by a landslide.

Following the election in February 1960 there was a short, peaceful changeover and U Nu took power again in April 1960. At that time the military stepped aside, seemingly for good. The point seems to be not whether a military regime can step down from power—it has done so in Burma, Turkey, Sudan, and a variety of Latin American states. More precisely, the military does not seem to be able to step down from power and remain apolitical. The taste of power is sweet and not easily forgotten.

FOOTNOTES

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY

¹In this paper "Burman" refers to the majority ethnic group of the country while "Burmese" refers to all citizens of Burma.

²The navy, on the whole, did better than the army in this respect, and 9 of the original 29 officers were Burmans. It was also patterned more on the British navy than on the Indian navy. The same may be said for the air force.

³John S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice. A Comparative Study of British and Netherlands India (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1948), p. 184.

⁴At the time the PBF, as the army was then called, contained 1 major general, 3 colonels, 14 majors, 25 adjutant-majors, 59 captains, 141 lieutenants, 362 2d lieutenants, 280 warrant officers, 382 sergeant majors, 347 sergeants, 732 corporals, 4 military academy students, 12 nurses, 5,822 other ranks, and 957 guerrillas. This excluded 32 officers and 387 of other ranks still behind the lines. Ba Than, Roots of the Revolution (Rangoon: Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, 1962), p. 59. This meant that there were approximately six rank and file members to every officer and a ratio of less than 4 to 1 for rank and file members to noncommissioned officers.

⁵Union of Burma, Is Trust Vindicated? (Rangoon: Directorate of Information and Broadcasting, 1960), p. 35.

⁶Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 20.

⁷S. H. Steinberg (ed.), The Statesman's Year Book, 1966-1967 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966) gives the following figures for 1965: army--127,500; navy--6,250 including reserves; air force--6,000.

⁸A constitutional provision guaranteeing civilian control was drafted when the constitution was being written but was rejected on the basis that such provisions could really not stop military dictatorships. The constitution was abrogated after the second military coup.

⁹For details, see Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1961), p. 335; also, S. H. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 866.

¹⁰See "Defence Services Academy," The Guardian, II (March 1955), pp. 29-31, and "Defence Services Academy," Burma, Eleventh Anniversary Number, 1958, pp. 149-52.

¹¹Tinker, op. cit., p. 331.

¹²See Pe Than, "Training Pilots for Burma Air Force," The Guardian, IV (February 1957), pp. 21-24; and Maung Kyi Thit, "Young Wings of Burma," Forward, I (April 22, 1963), pp. 11-15.

¹³See Union of Burma, The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services (1959).

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY

¹⁴Union of Burma, Is Trust Vindicated?, pp. 561-57. Some of these men did not serve continuously and for short periods were not attached to the regular army, particularly during the unsettling years 1945-50.

¹⁵Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," Paper for American Political Science Association, August 1959, pp. 21-22, remarks on the 1958-60 government.

¹⁶Burma Weekly Bulletin, X (March 3, 1962), p. 326.

¹⁷Burma Weekly Bulletin, XXII (September 1955).

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE MILITARY:

1948-55 AND 1960-62

¹⁸Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), pp. 132-33.

¹⁹See p. 215, below.

SOCIETAL TENSIONS AND THE ENTRANCE OF THE MILITARY INTO POLITICS

²⁰See pp. 203-206.

²¹Union of Burma, Is Trust Vindicated?, pp. 546-47.

²²Burma Weekly Bulletin, X (March 15, 1962), p. 395.

²³Union of Burma, Is Trust Vindicated?, p. iii.

²⁴Union of Burma, The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services, p. 3.

²⁵See Sein Win, "The Split Story," Guardian (Rangoon) (1959).

²⁶Fred R. von der Mehden and Charles W. Anderson, "Political Action by the Military in Developing Areas," Social Research, XXVIII (Winter 1961), pp. 459-75.

IDEOLOGY AND VALUES OF THE MILITARY

²⁷Union of Burma, The National Ideology and the Role of the Defence Services, p. 5.

²⁸Ibid., p. 3.

²⁹Union of Burma, The Burmese Way to Socialism (1962).

³⁰Nation (Rangoon) (May 2, 1962).

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY: 1958-60 AND 1962-65

³⁰Louis J. Wallinsky, Economic Development in Burma, 1951-1960 (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1962), pp. 253-254.

³¹Most of this material is from Richard Butwell, "The New Political Outlook in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, XXIX (February 1960), pp. 21-27.

³²The military also attempted to provide more discipline at the university level, but in the final analysis rather little was done about changing curricula.

³³See Fred R. von der Mehden, "Burma's Religious Campaign Against Communism," Pacific Affairs, XXXIII (September 1960).

³⁴Union of Burma, The Nine Months After the Ten Years (Rangoon: Ministry of Information, 1959), pp. 14-15.

To propagate the national ideology—democratic beliefs and principles embedded in the Constitution—to promote the widespread dissemination and understanding amongst the people of the Union spirit, a spirit of fair economic practices, and a moral code of ethics.

To function as effective combatants against those ideologies, organizations and activities that are in conflict and opposition to the beliefs and principles enunciated in the Constitution, and also against those that are in contravention of the accepted moral code of ethics.

To raise the morale and the growth of solidarity amongst the Government servants (including school teachers), the students, and the masses of the people.

To promote national culture and traditions, religious knowledge and a full understanding of civic duties.

Much cooperation was effected between the governmental information agencies and the psychological warfare organs in the implementation of these policies. One measure of this successful implementation is indicated in the following (taken from the same source):

Posters: 5,000 copies distributed.

Leaflets (41 varieties): 9,756,980 copies.

Booklets (81 varieties): 2,611,000 copies.

Booklets (English) (38 varieties): 14,500 copies.

Books (3 varieties): 18,280 copies.

Books (English) (4 varieties): 14,500 copies.

News releases: 3,849.

Photographs (600 varieties): 42,643 copies.

Informational talks (by Public Relations Officers in districts):
5,506.

Mass rallies: 198 towns; attended by 23,170 Sanghas and
4,810,070 laymen (exclusive of mass rallies by National Solidarity
Association).

Broadcasts: increase from 7 hours to 12 hours daily (except Mondays).

Film shows: 2,762.

Stage shows: 24 townships as compared to 15 for a corresponding
earlier period.

Printing (75 varieties): 248,705 copies (as compared with 17 varieties
and 13,025 copies in a corresponding period).

³⁵Union of Burma, The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (1962), and Forward, II (May 22, 1964), pp. 2-3.

³⁶See the various reports of the International Press Institute.

³⁷Much of this information comes from "Burma's Army in Business," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXVIII (March 17, 1960), pp. 587-89.

³⁸Reference deleted in revision.

³⁹See S. C. Banerji, "Burma's Rural Revolution," Far Eastern Economic Review, XXXII (January 2, 1964), pp. 12-13; and by the same author, "Burma's Peasant Seminars," ibid., XXXII (July 30, 1964), pp. 204-05.

⁴⁰Times (London) (February 13, 1964).

Unclassified

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) The American Institutes for Research		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
		2b. GROUP --
3. REPORT TITLE The Military and Politics in Five Developing Nations		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Technical Report Winter 1963 - Autumn 1966		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) John P. Lovell, Donald N. Levine, P. J. Vatikiotis, Richard Sisson, Fred R. von der Mehden		
6. REPORT DATE March 1970	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES xi + 240	7b. NO. OF REFS Numerous
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. DAHC 19-70-C-0015	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NO (S) --	
b. PROJECT NO. c. d.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO (S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report) --	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT This document has been approved for public release and sale; its distribution is unlimited.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Prepared under subcontract by Indiana University		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Office, Chief of Research and Development Department of the Army Washington, D. C.
13. ABSTRACT <p>This report consists of five case studies of the political role of the military: Ethiopia, Jordan, Pakistan, South Korea, and Burma. It includes an introductory essay by the editor suggesting conceptualization of a research format—that an explanation of the political role of the military depends upon (1) the political resources of the military, (2) the political perspectives of the military, and (3) patterns of demands and supports within the civilian sector.</p> <p>Each study presents the history of the armed forces, their organization, training, patterns of social recruitment, and values. The political history of each country emphasizes causes of political stability or instability such as sociopolitical divisions or presence of a potential external threat. The politicization of the military resulting from these internal and political factors has led to incidents of military involvement in politics, including <u>coups d'état</u> in all the countries, and to military governments in three of them; these incidents, and the military governments, are described in detail.</p>		

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Unclassified

Security Classification

239

Unclassified

Security Classification

14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
<p>Descriptors</p> <p>armed forces (foreign)—Ethiopia armed forces (foreign)—Jordan armed forces (foreign)—Pakistan armed forces (foreign)—South Korea armed forces (foreign)—Burma Ethiopia—political science Jordan—political science Pakistan—political science South Korea—political science Burma—political science</p> <p>Open Ended Terms</p> <p>Ethiopia—politics Jordan—politics Pakistan—politics South Korea—politics Burma—politics</p>						

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